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Vladas Sirutavičius
National Bolshevism or National Communism: Features 
of  Sovietization in Lithuania in the Summer of  1945 
(The First Congress of  the Intelligentsia) 
In this article I discuss the problem of  the sovietization of  Lithuania in 1944–1945 
from the perspective of  the goals pursued by the Communist Lithuanian government 
in convening the First Congress of  Lithuanian intelligentsia and the demands made by 
some of  the congress delegates on the government. The research is based on the idea 
that the incorporation of  elements of  nationalism into the Soviet system was regarded 
as a means of  making the regime more acceptable to the titular nationality and was 
also intended to facilitate the sovietization of  societies. Some representatives of  the 
leadership of  the Lithuanian SSR thought that it would be possible to strike a deal with 
the Lithuanian cultural elite: the Soviet government would satisfy the most important 
(national) expectations of  the intelligentsia, while the intelligentsia would support the 
government’s policies. However, no such policy was ever adopted. Instead, Moscow 
simply began to force Lithuania’s sovietization.
Keywords: National Communism, Intelligentsia, Lithuanian Communist Party, 
Sovietization
Introduction
Historians who have analyzed the evolution and features of  sovietization in 
Central Europe in 1944–1947 note that during this period Moscow maintained 
a fairly moderate political course. In some cases, the local Communists were 
warned to refrain from taking more radical political steps. Thus, the conclusion 
is reached that the leadership of  the Soviet Union, at least temporarily, for tactical 
reasons did not undertake forced revolutionary sovietization of  the countries 
in the region.1 Such a cautious political course, which took into account the 
specifi c aspects of  the local societies, was based on several assumptions. First, 
1 Silvio Pons, “Stalin and the European Communists after World War Two (1943–1948),” in Post-
war Reconstruction in Europe. International Perspectives, 1945–1949, ed. M. Mazover et al. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 124–29; Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars. From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 
(New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 2008), 236–37; Eduard Mark, “Revolution by Degrees. Stalin’s 
National Front Strategy for Europe 1941–1947,”  in Cold War International History Project. Working Paper no. 
31, (Washington: Wilson Center, 2001), 6–7, 17–20.
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the purpose of  this policy was to expand Moscow’s infl uence in the region while 
also preserving the relationship of  cooperation with the Western allies. Second, 
the main political ally of  the USSR in the region, the Communist Parties, were 
few and unpopular. The greater part of  society considered the Communists 
politically dependent and not representative of  national interests. Therefore, the 
fi rst task with which the leaders of  the Communist party were confronted was 
how to increase their infl uence and build social support. This goal could be 
achieved in two ways: by implementing social and economic reforms, which the 
greater part of  the public supported, and by positioning itself  as the party that 
defended “national interests.” Thus, the “national factor” became an important 
instrument in the practical policies of  the Communist party, mobilizing society 
and legitimizing the new soviet social and political order. The question of  how 
this policy was implemented in Central Europe, specifi cally in Poland and 
Hungary, was thoroughly studied by two historians, Marcin Zaremba and Martin 
Mevius.2 According to them, nationalism became an important instrument of  
the legitimization of  new communist governments and the sovietization of  
societies.
Historian David Brandenberger has observed that even in the 1930s the 
leadership of  the Soviet Union, seeking to strengthen the legitimacy of  the 
regime, more actively pursued cultural policies that “cloaked a Marxist–Leninism 
worldview within russocentric, etatist rhetoric.”3 According to him, in the 
Soviet Union this meant “a peculiar form of  Marxist-–Leninist etatism that 
fused the pursuit of  communist ideals with more statist ambitions reminiscent 
of  czarist ‘Great Power’ (velikoderzhavnoe) traditions.”4 Historians refer to this 
political course as national bolshevism (some call it national Stalinism).5 With 
certain exceptions and specifi cities (depending on local conditions), this course 
was supported by Moscow in Central Europe as well. The incorporation of  
nationalism into the Soviet system was intended to make the regime more 
acceptable to the titular nationality and also to facilitate the sovietization of  
societies. Of  course, historians have noted that in the policies of  the Communist 
2 Marcin Zaremba, Komunizm, legitymacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymacja władzy komunistycznej w 
Polsce (Warsaw: Trio, 2001), 135–73; Martin Mevius, Agents of  Moscow. The Hungarian Communist Party and the 
Origin of  Socialist Patriotism 1941–1953 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 87–110.
3 David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism. Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of  Modern Russian 
National Identity, 1931–1956 (Cambridge–London: Harvard University Press, 2002), 6.
4 Ibid., 6.
5 For more about the National Bolshevik conception see: Erik van Ree, “The Concept of  ‘National 
Bolshevism’: An Interpretative Essay,” Journal of  Political Ideologies, 6 (2001): 289–307.
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parties in Central Europe, one must distinguish between national bolshevism 
and national communism.6 Without dwelling too much on this question, I argue 
that the major difference between these ideologies and political practices was 
that national communism meant a certain political and cultural autonomy and 
sovereignty with regard to Moscow. In his discussion of  the Polish version of  
national communism, American historian Martin Malia identifi ed home rule as 
one of  its most important features.7 It seems that the leadership of  the Soviet 
Union tolerated certain manifestations of  autonomy in Central Europe until at 
least 1947.
It is worth mentioning, as a side note, that according to some historians 
the process of  the sovietization of  the Baltic States in 1944–1947, while it 
had its own distinguishing features, nonetheless essentially was similar to the 
sovietization of  the countries of  Central Europe. According to the Russian 
historian Elena Zubkova, Moscow’s policy in regard to the Baltic republics in the 
initial period of  sovietization (up to 1947) depended on the social and political 
situation of  the republics, the situation in the Soviet Union, and the relations 
between the Western allies and Moscow.8 Therefore, the policies of  sovietization 
were moderate: Moscow did not force Vilnius to implement collectivization, and 
Russia showed respect for national symbols, the Lithuanian language, and the 
national intelligentsia. Repressive measures were focused on members of  the 
armed underground. Thus, in the process of  sovietization attention was paid to 
the national specifi cs of  Lithuania and the other Baltic societies.9 Of  course, for 
the most part, the assessments that were penned by Lithuanian historians differ 
6 However, even authors who emphasize the differences between the two “policies and ideologies” 
also note that the relationship between them was suffi ciently “dialectic,” i.e. one could easily “switch” to 
the other. See, for example, Vladimir Tismăneanu, Stalinizm na każdą okazję. Polityczna historia rumuńskiego 
komunizmu (Cracow: Universitas, 2010), 37–40.
7 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy. A History of  Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991 (New York–Oxford: The 
Free Press, 1994), 322.
8 Elena Zubkova, Pribaltika i Kreml  1940–1953 (Moscow: Rossijskaja politicheskaja enciklopedia 
ROSSPEN, 2008), 128.
9 Recent Lithuanian historiography analyzes different manifestations of  the autonomy, i.e. national 
communism, of  the soviet Lithuanian nomenclature. However, this research covers the period from the 
1960s to the end of  the 1980s, and it is focused on the “local,” “indigenous” aspects of  policy (economic 
and cultural). See Saulius Grybkauskas, Sovietinė nomenklatūra ir pramonė Lietuvoje 1965–1985 metais (Vilnius: 
LII, 2011), 111–38; Vilius Ivanauskas, Lietuviškoji nomenklatūra biurokratinėje sistemoje. Tarp stagnacijos ir 
dinamikos (1968–1988) (Vilnius: LII, 2011), 497–570. About the concepts of  national communism, see: 
Vladas Sirutavičius, “Tautinis komunizmas ir jo raiška. Istoriografi niai problemos aspektai,” Istorija, 3 
(2013): 48–58. The research was funded by a grant (No. VAT – 02/2010) from the Research Council of  
Lithuania.
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signifi cantly. According to Lithuanian historians, as early as 1944 and 1945, the 
USSR leadership in Lithuania was already implementing a process of  sovietization 
based on “general principles,” without taking into account the national specifi cs 
of  the republic.10 This was also due, at least according to this assessment, to the 
fact that among Lithuanian Communists a “nihilistic approach to their nation” 
and subservience to the Russians prevailed.11
In fact, with certain exceptions, the Soviet leadership’s political course of  
sovietization described by E. Zubkova could have been characteristic of  the 
period until the fall of  1944 (or the beginning of  1945 at the latest). On the 
other hand, the Lithuanian historians who are critical of  Zubkova overlooked 
certain nuances of  the sovietization policies. Česlovas Laurinavičius noted that 
in the policies of  the Soviet Union (from the middle of  1943 until the beginning 
of  1945) one can see clear efforts to “raise” the Soviet Republic of  Lithuania 
in international politics, while at the same time efforts were made to “push the 
Republic of  Lithuania out of  the international arena.”12 Also at roughly the same 
time, in the policies of  the Lithuanian SSR leadership, “national aspects” began 
to be expressed more actively. In the Lithuanian programs on Moscow radio, 
the interwar anthem of  Lithuania, which had been banned in 1940,13 began to 
be broadcast. Measures were taken to release from imprisonment some of  the 
politicians and public fi gures of  the Republic of  Lithuania and use them in a 
propaganda campaign against the Germans and to proclaim the establishment 
of  the Lithuanian SSR among the Lithuanian diaspora in the USA.14 Efforts were 
also made to assure the use of  the Lithuanian language in the administrative and 
bureaucratic apparatus.15
10 Arvydas Anušauskas et. al., Lietuva 1940–1990 m. Okupuotos Lietuvos istorija (Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventojų 
genocido ir rezistencijos centras, 2005), 270–82; Mindaugas Pocius, Kita mėnulio pusė. Lietuvos partizanų kova 
su kolaboravimu 1944–1953 metais (Vilnius: LII, 2009), 54.
11 Vytautas Tininis, Sniečkus. 33 metai valdžioje. Antano Sniečkaus biografi nė apybraiža (Vilnius: n.p., 2000), 
66–68.
12 Česlovas Laurinavičius, “Vvodnaya statya,”  in SSSR i Litva v gody vtoroj mirovoj voiny. Sbornik 
dokumentov, ed. А. Кasparavičius, Č. Laurinavičius, and N. Lebedeva, vol. 2 (Vilnius: LII, 2012), 42–43.
13 The hymn of  the Republic of  Lithuania – “The National Song” of  Vincas Kudirka – was the hymn 
of  the Lithuanian SSR from 1944 until 1950. 
14 Lithuanian Communist Party daily Tiesa (Truth) in April 1944, no. 14 published a proclamation signed 
by the head of  National Union of  Lithuania Domas Cesevičius, which was named “A word to Lithuanians.” 
In the proclamation, the author called for the urgent “restoration of  the free and soviet Lithuania” in which 
“all Lithuanians could live freely and beautifully.” Cesevičius was arrested in 1940 and released in 1944.
15 In April 1944, LSSR Council of  People’s Commissars decided to “obligate the persons working in 
the Lithuanian SSR Soviet industrial and other offi ces to learn the Lithuanian language [...] To obligate 
the Education commissar to organize courses, provide them with programs and instructors. [...] To let 
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In general, Moscow at the beginning of  1944 began the course of  
“strengthening” the so-called Soviet statehood of  Soviet republics. The 
reorganization of  the people’s commissariats of  defense and foreign affairs into 
a system of  Union–republic subordination was begun16 and suggestions were 
made regarding the restoration of  the republics’ diplomatic services. In the fall 
of  1944, Soviet Lithuania, along with the Ukraine and Belarus, were proposed for 
acceptance into the UN.17 Around that time, the leaders of  Soviet Lithuania began 
to think about the possibility of  expanding the republic’s “Soviet sovereignty.” 
Metaphorically speaking, in the activities of  Lithuania’s Communists one can 
notice the tendency to move towards national communism. 
I will present an example. In the spring of  1944, as the Red Army was 
approaching Lithuania, the leaders of  the LSSR began to consider the possibility 
of  returning to the country and restoring the Soviet social and political order, in 
all likelihood at the initiative of  Moscow. In March 1944, Mečislovas Gedvilas, 
Chairman of  the Council of  the People’s Commissars (CPC) of  the Lithuanian 
SSR, appealed for assistance to Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) Secretary 
Antanas Sniečkus, suggesting that the Central Committee bureau discuss “the 
principles of  the restoration of  the Soviet system in Lithuania.”18 Unfortunately, 
we know little about how the debate actually occurred. However, we do have 
the decision of  a joint project of  the Lithuanian SSR CPC and the LCP Central 
Committee, by the same name, which was addressed to the USSR government 
and the Central Committee of  Communist Party of  Soviet Union (CPSU). In 
it, the leaders of  the Lithuanian SSR “asked” the USSR leadership to determine 
the principles of  the restoration of  the Soviet system. According to the third 
point, the Lithuanian SSR would not adopt “automatically” the ordinances 
pertaining to the republics of  the Union, but rather, having taken into account 
the general situation of  the restoration of  the Soviet system, it would accept 
the ordinances “by the resolutions and decrees of  the organs of  the republic.”19 
We know nothing about the Kremlin’s reaction to the initiatives of  Lithuania’s 
employees attend the courses twice a week in the evening.” “Resolution No.49,” Moscow, 28 04 1944, 
Lietuvos Ypatingasis archyvas (LYA) [Lithuanian Special Archive], f.1771 [Central Committee of  Lithuanian 
Communist Party], ap.7, b.28, 17.
16 “V. Molotovo pranešimas TSRS Aukščiausioje taryboje,” Tarybų Lietuva, February 6, 1944, no. 6.
17 Laurinavičius, “Vvodnaya statya,” 43.
18 “Gedvilas letter to Sniečkui,” March 1, 1944, LYA, f.1771, ap.7, b.82, 5.
19 The original version of  this decision: “Общесоюзные указы, постановления, распоряжения, 
приказы в Литовской ССР невводятся автоматически. Они вводятся в соответствии с общим ходом 
советского строительства указами, постановлениями, распоряжениями и приказами центральных 
8Hungarian Historical Review 4,  no. 1  (2015): 3–28
Communists, nor do we know in general whether such a project was sent to 
the USSR leaders. The point cited here remained only on paper, and there was 
no further mention of  it anywhere, although, of  course, it testifi ed to certain 
“sovereignty” ambitions of  the leadership of  Soviet Lithuania.20
The leaders of  the Lithuanian SSR returned to Lithuania in July 1944. In 
the fall of  that year, Moscow sharply criticized the LCP leadership for a variety 
of  “errors and failures” in their work that testify to their inability to control the 
public and the political situation in the republic. “Organizational conclusions” 
were drawn: in November, the CPSU established the Lithuanian bureau. Michail 
Suslov was appointed chairman of  the bureau.21 The bureau became the most 
important political institution of  the Lithuanian SSR, almost all of  the important 
decisions of  the LCP, the Council of  People’s Commissars and the Supreme 
Council presidium were adopted only with its consent.22 The establishment 
of  such an institution not only in each of  the Baltic republics, but also in the 
Moldavian SSR clearly testifi ed to the strengthening of  the centralistic and 
unifi cation trends in the western borderlands of  Soviet Union. From Moscow‘s 
point of  view, the Communist parties in the region were weak and the Soviet 
government did not have signifi cant support among the local populations. It was 
therefore necessary to consolidate Communist Parties. The situation in Lithuania 
was more complicated: the mobilization of  Lithuanians into the Red Army 
(which began at the end of  July and the beginning of  August 1944) collapsed,23 
and armed resistance grew stronger. On the other hand, after the defeat of  the 
государственных органов республики.” “СНК Литоской ССР и ЦК КП (б) Литвы. Постановление. 
Проект”  [Lithuanian SSR Council of  People’s Commisars and Central Committee of  LCP. Resolution. 
Project], [1944] LYA, f.1771, ap.7, b.80, 80.
20 The representative of  the USSR NKVD-NKGB in Lithuania, Ivan Tkachenko, on the basis of  
intelligence reports, wrote to his boss Lavrentij Beria in Moscow in July 1945 about the views of  Justas 
Paleckis, Chairman of  the Presidium of  the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. In a private conversation 
Paleckis explained: “our Lithuanian Communist roads are different. God only knows what ugly directives 
Moscow sends, and we are obliged to fulfi ll them. We know perfectly well what our country and nation 
want, but we are helpless. The dark forces of  the Kremlin that can lead and bring the Lithuanian people 
to degeneration and extinction operate everywhere.” “Lubianka. Stalin i NKVD-NKGB-GUKR ‘Smersh.’ 
1939–mart 1946,” in Archiv Stalina. Dokumenty vysshych organovв partijnoj i gosudarstvennoj vlasti, ed. V.N. 
Chaustov, V.P. Naumov, and N.S. Plotnikova (Moscow: Мaterik, 2006), 531.
21 Zubkovaam, Pribaltika i Kreml, 139–42. 
22 Henrikas Šadžius, “VKP (b) CK Lietuvos biuro veikla organizuojant tautinio pasipriešinimo 
slopinimą,” Lietuvos istorijos metraštis 1997 (Vilnius: Žara, 1998), 241–42.
23 LCP CC secretary Vladas Niunka in a letter to Georgy Malenkov on 4 August 1944 explained that the 
mobilization was not suitably prepared: the mobilization was carried out “without publicly proclaiming” it 
and summons were not distributed to the people. For this reason, and due to the “German propaganda,” 
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Warsaw Uprising, Moscow began increasingly to abandon the idea of  “raising” 
the international “prestige” of  the Baltic republics, fi rst and foremost because 
the West perceived this policy as an attempt to obtain the recognition of  the 
incorporation of  the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.24 Thus on the basis of  
various considerations, these kinds of  proposals were usually rejected. (Finally, 
Moscow abandoned the idea of  inviting the Lithuanian SSR to the UN at the 
Yalta conference.)
The fi ght with the increasingly stronger partisan movement and various 
manifestations of  “bourgeois nationalism” became one of  the most important 
tasks of  the Lithuanian bureau. On May 24, 1945, at a meeting of  Lithuania’s 
bureau, it was decided to extend the fi ght against the armed and unarmed 
underground. In the summer, a major military operation against the guerrilla 
movement was planned and carried out.25 In the middle of  July, the mass 
deportations of  the families of  partisans began.26 The Russifi cation campaign 
of  Lithuania’s Communist Party gained ever more momentum.27 Under these 
circumstances, the bureau of  Lithuania and the Lithuanian government decided 
to organize the fi rst congress of  the intelligentsia of  the Lithuanian SSR.28 The 
congress began on July 10 and lasted for a total of  fi ve days.
In this article, I will discuss the goals that were pursued by the Lithuanian 
SSR government in convening the congress and the demands that were placed 
by some of  the congress delegates on the Soviet Lithuanian government. During 
the congress, some of  the demands raised by the delegates had a clear national 
orientation and testifi ed to the importance in the minds of  the delegates of  
rumors began to be spread that the mobilization was just an excuse to transport Lithuanians to Siberia. 
LYA, f.1771, ap.7, b.85, 40. Also see Vytautas Tininis, Prievartinė mobilizacija į raudonąją armiją (Vilnius: 
LGGRTC, 2014), 47.
24 Laurinavičius, “Vvodnaya statya,” 43.
25 Šadžius, “VKP (b) CK Lietuvos biuro veikla,” 247–49.
26 From July 17, 1945 until the beginning of  September 1945 about 4,500 persons were deported. 
Arvydas Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940–1958 metais (Vilnius: Mintis, 1996), 320–21, 
328–29. 
27 From the summer of  1944 until the spring of  1945 more than 6,000 offi cials, most of  them Russians, 
were sent to Lithuania, by CPSU. Pocius, Kita mėnulio pusė, 54. 
28 The course of  the congress was well publicized at the time in the offi cial central press in the newspaper 
Tiesa (Truth) of  the LCP CC, and Tarybų Lietuva (Soviet Lithuania) of  the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Council 
presidium. Most of  the speeches of  the delegates and translations of  the speeches into Russian are stored 
in the Vilnius County Archive (VAA). The agency reports of  security offi cials and the accounts of  the 
congress proceedings are stored in Lithuania’s Special Archive (LYA). Some of  the material of  the congress 
is stored in the Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj archiv socialno-politicheskoj istorii (RGASPI)  [Russian State Archive of  
Socio-political History]. 
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the goal of  autonomy, albeit within the framework of  the Soviet system. On 
the other hand, the policies of  the government and the Moscow emissaries 
were increasingly coercive and were increasingly focused on centralization and 
unifi cation.29
The Organization of  the Congress and the Government’s Goals
Judging from the letter of  bureau head M. Suslov to CPSU CC Secretary G. 
Malenkov, the idea of  convening the congress of  the intelligentsia arose in the 
spring of  1945. According to Suslov, the purpose of  the congress was to expand 
“our” infl uence on the intelligentsia and to acquaint the intelligentsia with the 
achievements of  the Soviet government.30 In general, formally, the congress 
of  intellectuals was not a special event, and essentially it illustrated clearly the 
specifi cs of  the Stalinist political system. The government would organize 
similar events, “congresses,” in the hopes of  acquiring the support of  various 
social groups and thus buttressing its legitimacy. In Lithuania in the fi rst half  of  
the same year, congresses of  “labor peasants” and trade unions were held.
And yet, this congress was special for two important reasons: fi rst, it 
was a congress of  Lithuanian intelligentsia in Vilnius; second, for the Soviet 
Lithuanian government, the support of  Lithuania’s intellectuals, especially the 
older generation of  the intelligentsia, which had taken formed “in bourgeois 
Lithuania,” was particularly signifi cant. Given the ever growing partisan 
movement and the complicated economic and social situation, nothing else 
could have done more to legitimize the government of  Soviet Lithuania than 
the active “involvement in the construction of  socialism” of  the intellectuals, 
especially those who were members of  the cultural elite.
The government therefore prepared seriously for the congress. The 
organization of  the congress cost about 200,000 rubles. The participants were 
well fed. They were given cards with which they were able to purchase 500 
29  The congress of  intelligentsia was not discussed in Lithuanian historiography. Only Vytautas Tininis 
mentioned the event. He also published a few archival documents related to the congress. See Vytautas 
Tininis, Komunistinio režimo nusikaltimai Lietuvoje 1944–1953/The Crimes of  the Communist Regime in Lithuania in 
1944–1953 (Vilnius: Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija,  2003), 13–14, 135–45.
30  Suslov also asked that various cultural activists be sent to Lithuania with lectures. “Suslovo’s letter 
to Malenkov,” May 22,1945, RGASPI, f.597 [Communist Party of  Soviet Union Lithuanian Bureau], op.1, 
d.16, 50.
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rubles-worth of  goods.31 (However, according to the Lithuanian SSR NKGB 
Commissar Aleksandras Gudaitis-Guzevičius, the goods were of  poor quality 
and the logistics were poorly organized.)32 After the meetings, a cultural program 
was organized: there were lectures and performances, including even a ballet from 
Moscow. A total of  about 540 delegates and 250 guests came to the congress. 
(According to the initial plans, there would have been 600 delegates and 300 
guests.) Some guests came from Moscow, including Mikhail Jovchuk, who served 
as deputy head of  the CPSU CC propaganda and agitation department, several 
employees of  the CPSU CC apparatus and several members of  the Academy of  
Sciences.
The government took care of  more than just the everyday lives of  the 
delegates. Judging from the reports of  Commissar A. Guzevičius, 64 agents 
“observed” the events of  the congress and another 25 NKGB workers were sent 
as “service agents.”33 Over the course of  the whole congress, security offi cials 
“detected” 27 “anti-Soviet elements,” two of  whom were arrested. According 
to Guzevičius, the majority of  the delegates (teachers, principals, physicians, 
agronomists, surveyors, etc.) were from rural areas, and they were “chosen” by 
the local government and party committees.34 However, the representatives of  
the cultural elite (writers, directors, actors) and the academic elite (high school 
principals, professors), who played the most important roles in the congress 
(they were the main speakers), were invited to the congress. Some of  them, 
for instance Vilnius Academy of  Arts professor Justinas Vienožinskis, declined 
to participate in it.35 There were others who wanted to participate, but for one 
reason or another could not.36
31  In the offi cial party newspaper Tiesa, even a feuilleton was printed about the routine of  the delegates. 
It was also argued that the statements of  those arriving from the provinces were boring and that they 
repeated one another. Liūnė Janušytė, “Ką kalba delegatai,” Tiesa, July 12, 1945, no. 161. 
32  “Aleksandras Guzevičius report to the USSR NKGB deputy commissar Amajak Kobulov,” July 
13,1945, LYA, f.K41 [State Security Committee of  the Lithuanian SSR (NKGB-MGB-KGB), 2 directorate], 
ap.1, b.163, 197–98. 
33  “Guzevičiaus report to Kobulov,” draft, 1945, LYA, f.K41, ap.1, b.163, 152. 
34  “Guzevičiaus report to Kobulovui,” draft, 1945, 149.
35  Security offi cials recorded on such “anti-Soviet” statement by Vienožinskis: “I do not need a ticket 
to the congress, I’m not an ass, I cannot be bought.” “Report of  the head of  the second department LSSR 
NKGB Izotov,” July 10, 1945, LYA, f.K41, ap.1, b.163, 171.
36  Writer Sofi ja Kymantaitė – Čiurlionienė in a letter to Kostas Korsakas, on 22 July 1945, wrote: “I hear 
that the Congress was particularly interesting, for myself, as a writer it is especially important to observe 
such historical moments, but you can see what kind of  a pilot I am now.” The Institute of  Lithuanian 
Literature and Folklore Manuscript Library (LLITI BR), f.1-4739 [Writers and linguists], no pages.
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The question arises whether the government in any way attempted to 
infl uence the speakers or the statements they made, i.e. to censor them in advance. 
I would dare to say that it did not. The content of  the speeches the texts of  which 
have survived, the reactions of  the participants, and the discussions that were 
held during the congress testify that the government avoided direct interference 
or pressure.37 On the other hand, it should also be noted that the information 
in the press about the congress was presented in “doses”: the full speeches 
of  Lithuanian SSR Supreme Presidium Chairman J. Paleckis and the LCP CC 
Secretary A. Sniečkus were published. The speeches (there were about 40) of  
the delegates were summarized or paraphrased, but in general those that were 
particularly critical with regards to the government were not mentioned. Basing 
his conclusions on the reports of  agents, Guzevičius informed USSR NKGB 
Deputy Commissar Amajak Kobulov that the participants had the impression 
that they enjoyed complete freedom of  speech. Some of  the participants were 
pleasantly surprised. According to the Lithuanian SSR Security Commissar, there 
were some participants who thought that they would not be allowed to speak 
freely. Indeed they feared that they would be arrested and deported to Siberia. 
Among the arrivals from the rural areas such rumors were especially prevalent. 38
I mentioned that the congress can be called a congress of  Lithuanian 
intelligentsia in Vilnius. I failed to fi nd data on the national composition of  the 
congress participants. Probably no such data were recorded. The press noted 
that the intellectuals arrived in Vilnius from “all corners” of  Lithuania, however, 
I would guess that the overwhelming majority of  them were Lithuanians, i.e. 
representatives of  the titular nation. So my guess regarding the informal nature 
of  the congress, as it was perceived by most members of  the congress, was 
based on several assumptions: fi rst, almost all the speakers were Lithuanians.39 
Prominent representatives of  the interwar Lithuanian intelligentsia took part in 
the congress and delivered speeches.40 Only a few of  them were members of  
the Communist Party. The famous Lithuanian opera singer Kipras Petrauskas 
was “elected to the presidium” of  the congress. Second, the report of  Paleckis, 
37  Suslov, head of  Lithuanian bureau, participated in the work of  the congress, but he did not speak.
38  “Guzevičiaus report to Kobulov,” draft, 1945, 151.
39  Only a few non-Lithuanians spoke up at the congress: Jewish writer Jacob Josadė and a visitor from 
Moscow, the previously mentioned Jovchuk.
40  Theatre director Borisas Dauguvietis, physician and professor Jonas Kairiūkštis, physicist professor 
Juozas Matulis, Vilnius university rector professor Kazimieras Bieliukas, physician professor Pranas 
Mažylis, director Aleksandras Kupstas, biologist professor Jonas Dagys, actress M. Mironaitė, painter V. 
Jurkūnas, Kaunas university vice-rector professor J. Kupčinskas, former diplomat and writer Karolis Vairas-
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although formally entitled “The Current Moment and the Challenges for 
the Intelligentsia of  Soviet Lithuania,” also contained a subsection with the 
revealing title “The Road of  the Lithuanian Intelligentsia” (in other words the 
title emphasized the national belonging of  the intelligentsia, an assertion which 
was at odds with the Marxist principle of  internationalism); third, several of  
the delegates in their statements at the congress compared the gathering with 
the Great Seimas of  Vilnius in 1905, at which “autonomy for ethnographic 
Lithuania with Vilnius was demanded from the czarist Russian government.”41 
Of  course, such associations were not refl ected in the offi cial press. Indeed, 
in his introductory speech Chairman of  the Council of  People’s Commissars 
Mečislovas Gedvilas even declared that the congress was the fi rst such event in 
the history of  Lithuania.
The objectives of  the government were formulated in several editorial 
articles of  Tiesa (Truth) and Tarybų Lietuva (Soviet Lithuania) and the statements 
made by Lithuanian SSR Supreme Council Presidium Chairman Paleckis at the 
congress. The articles published in the newspapers stressed the progressive role 
of  the intelligentsia in history and also noted that the “most prominent part of  
the [Lithuanian] intelligentsia remained loyal to the people.” There was also talk 
about the “mission” of  the intelligentsia, which was to educate in the “spirit of  
Soviet patriotism,” to fi ght against “bourgeois nationalist ideology,” to promote 
the achievements of  other Soviet republics, and to develop national culture 
(“national in form, socialist in content”). In order to carry out such a mission, 
the authors of  the editorial articles asserted, it was necessary for the Lithuanian 
intelligentsia to “arm themselves with the doctrine of  Marxism-Leninism,” to 
engage actively in the fi ght against bourgeois nationalism and generally to follow 
the principles of  socialism.42 Thus, the principles of  the cooperation of  Soviet 
Lithuania and the intelligentsia were formulated: the intelligentsia acknowledges 
and accepts the “principles of  socialism” and relies on the Marxist-Leninist 
worldview, while the Soviet Lithuanian government takes care of  national 
culture, the content of  which, of  course, had to be socialist.
Račkauskas, rector of  the Academy of  Agriculture Matas Mickis, writers Julius Būtėnas, Balys Sruoga, Ieva 
Simonaitytė, Aantanas Vienuolis (Žukauskas), professor Viktoras Ruokis, astronomer professor P. Slavėnas, 
composer B. Dvarionas, professor J. Vabalas-Gudaitis, professor J. Laužikas.
41  For more see Egidijus Motieka, “Didysis Vilniaus seimas,” in Lietuvių atgimimo istorijos studijos, vol. 11 
(Vilnius: Saulabrolis, 1996.)
42  “Garbingi mūsų inteligentų uždaviniai,” Tiesa, July 10, 1945, no. 159; “Žengti išvien su visa darbo 
liaudimi,” Tarybų Lietuva, July 12, 1945, 153. 
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A similar ideas was proclaimed by Justas Paleckis on the fi rst day of  the 
congress. Lithuanian historians have noted that among other leaders of  
the Lithuanian Communist Party Paleckis was distinguished not only for his 
“liberalism,” but also as someone who “quite often voiced his dissatisfaction 
with the policy of  Russifi cation,” and in general was “a Communist of  national 
consciousness.”43 Paleckis’ turn towards “national communism” is confi rmed 
by  “Lietuvos laisvos darbo respublikos kūrimo programa” (A Program for the 
Creation of  Lithuania as a Republic of  Free Labor), which he wrote as early as 
the autumn of  1939. The program encourages the fairly radical transformation 
of  the authoritarian political system, but it does not call for sovietization; on 
the other hand, it speaks not so much on the behalf  of  the Lithuanian nation, 
but rather on behalf  of  the Lithuanian people. In other words, it is about a 
community that is defi ned more by class considerations than national sentiments; 
from the geopolitical point of  view, the future Lithuania as a republic of  labor 
was projected by Paleckis as a protectorate of  the USSR.44 In fact, this political 
program matched the attitudes of  the People’s Front that were promoted and 
actively supported by Moscow and the Comintern.
In the fi rst half  of  1940s, Paleckis was balancing between attitudes 
characteristic of  Central European national communism and national bolshevism. 
He tried to emphasize the specifi cs of  the historical development of  Lithuania 
and its differences from other Soviet republics, in which the formation of  the 
Soviet regime had begun earlier. According to him, the tradition of  statehood 
made Lithuania a unique republic, and this circumstance should be taken into 
account in the transformation of  Lithuania into a soviet. Paleckis was convinced 
that in order to make soviet authority more attractive to the Lithuanians, it 
would be necessary to cooperate with the nation’s cultural elite, in other words 
43  Vytautas Tininis, Sovietinė Lietuva ir jos veikėjai (Vilnius: Enciklopedija, 1994), 214–15; Liudas Truska, 
Lietuva 1938–1953 metais (Kaunas: Šviesa, 1995), 134–35; Vanda Kašauskienė, Istorijos spąstuose. Justo Paleckio 
gyvenimo ir veiklos bruožai 1899–1980 (Vilnius: Gairės, 2014), 497–504. In 1950, leaders of  the LCP discussed 
the question of  how to organize education in Polish-populated districts of  east Lithuania. In the opinion of  
Paleckis and Gedvilas, after the repatriation of  the Poles, the Poles who remained in the Vilnius region were 
just Polonized Lithuanians and their further Polonization through the development of  education in Polish 
would not have been purposeful. The party discussions were won by Sniečkus and his supporters, and 
practical politics was based on the principle of  “proletarian internationalism.” See Vitalija Stravinskienė, 
“Lietuvių ir lenkų santykiai Rytų ir Pietryčių Lietuvoje: 1944 m. antra pusė–1953 m.,” Lietuvos istorijos 
metraštis, 2007 metai, 2 (2008): 95–96; Arūnas Streikus, “Sovietinio režimo pastangos pakeisti Lietuvos 
gyventojų tautinį identitetą,” Genocidas ir rezistencija, 1 (2007): 22–23; Jonas Rudokas, “Tarybinė Vilnijos 
polonizacija 1950–1956 metais,” Gairės, 7 (2011): 17–18;
44  Justas Paleckis, Ieškojome tikrų kelių (Vilnius: Vaga, 1987), 134–36.
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the interwar Lithuanian intelligentsia, and to promote the use of  Lithuanian 
in public life. Also, Paleckis stressed the importance of  “national revival,” and 
the most famous representatives of  this revival, Jonas Basanavičius and Vincas 
Kudirka, for Soviet Lithuanian culture.  Of  course according to him, the “real 
liberation” of  the Lithuanian nation from national oppression was crowned with 
the establishment of  the Soviet government in Lithuania. Finally, Paleckis tried 
to incorporate national elements into the system of  symbols of  Soviet Lithuania. 
He actively supported the idea of  making the hymn of  the Lithuanian Republic, 
Kudirkas’ “National song,” the hymn of  Soviet Lithuania. The Lithuanization of  
the symbols of  Soviet power, must have hoped, would strengthen the legitimacy 
of  the Communist government.45
So in his speech, Paleckis discussed the challenges that faced the Soviet 
Lithuanian intelligentsia. Essentially, he repeated what had already been written 
in the press, though he discussed the challenges that faced each group of  
intellectuals in greater detail. He mentioned the necessity, for the intelligentsia, 
of  studying Marxism (he contended that the Lithuanian intellectual would fi nd 
all the answers to his doubts in “the writings of  the great sages of  socialism from 
Marx to Stalin”). He drew particular emphasis to the importance of  the historical 
relationship with Russia, stressing the positive impact of  Russia’s civilization on 
Lithuania (communist Russia had liberated Lithuania from the yoke of  czarism, 
returned Vilnius, and so on). He also explained the necessity of  fi ghting against 
“bourgeois nationalists,” “Hitler’s laborers,” He ended the speech with the cry 
“Long live the great leader and teacher, comrade Stalin!” According to what was 
written in the press, the hall was fi lled with “thunderous applause.” So for the 
time, it was a fairly ordinary, orthodox speech.
However, in the report there was a part entitled “The Road of  the Lithuanian 
Intelligentsia,” and this section could hardly be called orthodox.46 It was an 
obvious reference to the national aspirations of  Lithuanian intellectuals. In a 
speech by a spokesman for Marxism–Leninism, this, of  course, was peculiar. In 
this part of  the speech, Paleckis tried to combine two traditions that were, in his 
view, characteristic of  the Lithuanian national movement: the struggle for social 
45  Idem, Pergalės saliutas (Vilnius: Mintis, 1985), 105. In summer 1944, the CC of  LCP decided “to turn 
the national song [the hymn of  Lithuanian Republic] into an instrument which could strengthen the soviet 
government.” Проект постановления к вопросу o гимне. Постановление ЦК КП (б) Литвы [Central 
Committee of  LCP: the question of  anthem, project and resolution], 1944 06 21, LYA, f.1771, ap.7, b.267, 
41. The National song was formally the hymn of  Soviet Lithuania till 1950. 
46  Tiesa, July 18, 1945, no. 166.
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liberation and the struggle for national liberation. He asserted that the struggle 
for Lithuanian “national liberation” “coincided” with the solution to the social 
question, i.e. the struggle of  the peasant against the landlord. In that struggle 
“from the depths of  the common people” there arose the “new Lithuanian 
intelligentsia,” who carried out “the work of  awakening Lithuanian nation.” 
According to Paleckis two most prominent activists represented the “new 
Lithuanian intelligentsia”: Vincas Kudirka (the founder of  illegal Lithuanian 
paper Aušra (The Dawn) and composer of  anthem of  Lithuanian Republic) and 
Vincas Mickevičius-Kapsukas (the founder of  Lithuanian Communist Party.) So 
they both began the fi ght “for real Lithuanian folk matters, liberation from the 
yoke of  czarism, as well as rights and land,” Paleckis explained. 
In the end, according to Paleckis, the Soviet government completed the 
“liberation of  the Lithuanian nation.” The interwar “bourgeois Lithuania” did 
not meet the “progressive ideals of  the national movement,” and in an attempt 
to emphasize the idea to the people assembled, he cited a stanza by famous 
Lithuanian poet and priest Maironis: “Lithuania land of  heroes / We have sung 
from long ago; But from that greatness only / the devils reap their benefi ts.” 
This organic interpretation of  the nation’s history, according to which national 
liberation was naturally combined with the “people’s” struggle for social rights, 
is characteristic, according to some researchers, of  national communism.47 This 
was an effort to demonstrate that the Soviet system was “compatible” with 
national ideals. 
Of  course, in Paleckis’ speech there were still a few important aspects. 
One of  the parts of  the speech was entitled “Bourgeois nationalists—Hitler’s 
laborers.” In this section, Paleckis argued that the armed underground had been 
engendered by the Nazi occupation and ultimately had the same goals, namely 
to destroy the Lithuanian nation. In his assessment, it was therefore, necessary to 
fi ght against it, and it was important for the intelligentsia to enter into this fi ght. 
And there was another important idea in the speech that is very often found in 
the offi cial discourse, namely the necessity of  strengthening ties and friendship 
with the Russian people. According to Paleckis, the Russian people and their Red 
Army had rescued the Lithuanian nation from Nazi extermination. Furthermore, 
the Lithuanian and Russian nations were bound by old “historical ties.” Both 
nations had long fought against the Germans invaders. According to Paleckis, 
47  Yannis Sygkelos, “The National Discourse of  the Bulgarian Communist Party on National 
Anniversaries and Commemorations (1944–1948),” Nationalities Papers 37, no. 4 (2009): 426.
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“Mindaugas signed a treaty with Aleksandr Nevsky against the Teutonic knights, 
and together they crushed them.” The same event occurred “at Žalgiris,” where 
the Lithuanians defeated the Teutonic knights with the help of  the Russians. 
The fi ght of  the Russian populists against czarism had a signifi cant impact on 
the Lithuanian national movement. Their infl uence had also been important in 
the “progressive Varpas movement” begun by V. Kudirka. Finally, the struggle 
of  the Russian proletariat had “awoken” Lithuania’s workers and peasants. So, 
Paleckis tried in every way to emphasize the progressive civilizing infl uence of  
the Russian nation: it was thanks to the Russian people that the Lithuanians 
freed themselves from the clutches of  czarism and Vilnius was returned to the 
Lithuanians, etc. Russian culture was characterized as “humane,” a refreshing 
source that “also refreshes the culture of  our nation,” as the presidium chairman 
explained to those assembled.
Moscow began to promote very actively the idea of  the common battle of  
the Slavic nations against German expansion to the east during the war. This 
pan-Slavic doctrine and pan-Slavic policies had some foundation. The victims 
of  German aggression were largely Slavic states and nations. On the other 
hand, the idea of  Slavic unity did not rule out the special role of  the Russian 
nation (the Soviet Union) in the Slavic world.48 Of  course, it should be noted 
that in the 1930s some political groups in Lithuania, such as the Young Peasant 
Populists, whose leader at that time was Paleckis, regarded the Soviet Union and 
the Russian people as the main ally of  the Lithuanian nation in the fi ght against 
the “aggressiveness of  the Germans.”49
48  Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 210; Geoffrey Hosking, Rulers and Victims. The Russians in the Soviet Union 
(Cambridge–London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 207–09.
49  The Young Peasant Populists maintained close ties with the LCP, and some were members of  
the Communist party. Some of  the Young Peasant Populists, such as Paleckis, Gedvilas, Vaišnoras, 
Gregorauskas, Kežinaitis, Drobnys and others, pursued careers in Soviet Lithuania. Of  course, most of  
them were gradually pushed out from active political life and a few faced measures of  active repression. 
Juozas Vaišnoras, “Memories about People’s Front” (manuscript), 1966, LYA, f. 3377 [CC LCP Institute 
of  Marxism–Leninism] ap.46, b.964, 1320. Mindaugas Tamošaitis, “Justas Paleckis ir jaunieji valstiečiai 
liaudininkai,” Vilniaus istorijos metraštis (Vilnius: VPI, 2007), 137–60.
18
Hungarian Historical Review 4,  no. 1  (2015): 3–28
Standpoints of  the Congress Delegates
Paleckis’ programmatic speech became a subject of  debate among the delegates. 
Virtually all of  the speakers responded to it directly or indirectly.50 How 
did members of  the congress, the delegates (the Lithuanian intelligentsia), 
respond to the speech, and, more generally, to what extent did they fulfi ll 
the government’s wishes? Judging from the available archival data, one can 
assert, of  course, somewhat schematically, that among the intellectuals two 
main provisions dominated. Some of  the delegates, characterizing socialism 
as a “global development trend” that guaranteed social progress and enabled 
the development of  the national aspirations of  the Lithuanians, endorsed and 
supported the “path of  the development” of  socialist Lithuania. Of  course, they 
also saw the system’s imperfections and threats to national sovereignty, and they 
spoke about this publicly. After World War II, there were likeminded intellectuals 
in other countries, apart from Lithuania. Second, some of  the intellectuals 
present at the congress were skeptical with regards to Soviet Lithuania or even 
rejected Soviet Lithuania in principle. They identifi ed the Soviet government 
with Russifi cation, and thought that Russifi cation was inevitable and the 
sovereignty of  the Lithuanian SSR was an illusion. Of  course, they could not 
express themselves publicly, but security offi cials made notes regarding such 
non-public comments in the corridors of  the congress.
 What were these comments? Some members of  the congress were 
concerned less with Paleckis’s speech and more with the question of  whether 
an independent Lithuania would be “restored.” For some, it seemed that the 
“question of  Lithuania” should fi nally be resolved at the “conference of  the 
heads of  three countries.” The director of  the Raseiniai high school Karumas, 
who was already being observed by security forces “as a nationalist,” thought 
this way. In the opinion of  agronomist Baltušnikas, “the word (of  Paleckis) 
will not help anything, the English and American tanks will decide.”51 Another 
participant doubted whether Paleckis would be able “to resist Moscow’s will.” 
Someone called the speech by Paleckis a sermon that had little to do with 
reality.52 During the congress, professor and composer Balys Dvarionas, who 
50  The security offi cials in their reports very carefully recorded the non-public negative and positive 
comments about the Paleckis’ speech and came to the conclusion that the majority of  the delegates reacted 
to the speech positively. Some even praised it. “Guzevičius report to Kobulov,” a draft, 1945, 157. 
51  “Guzevičius report to Kobulov,” a draft, 1945, 152–53.
52  “Guzevičius report to Justui Paleckiui,” July 12, 1945 LYA, f.K41, ap.1, b.163, 176–77.
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in 1949 was awarded the Stalin Prize of  the fi rst degree and in 1950 wrote 
music for the Lithuanian SSR anthem, tried to comfort himself: “I want to fl ee 
from Lithuania, now it is not Lithuania here, but Russia,” and the University 
of  Vilnius professor Gudaitis resented that those who had fought against the 
Fascists were being taken to Siberia.53 Writer A. Žukauskas mentioned the 
diffi cult plight of  the peasants, who were oppressed both by the “bandits and 
the NKVD punishments.”54 Delegates from Telšiai and Kaunas recounted the 
rumors according to which at the end of  the congress the government would 
force the participants to sign an appeal and then would deport them to Siberia. 
Overall, the delegates from the provinces feared what would happen to them 
when they returned home. Apparently, they feared reprisals from the partisans.
And how were the sentiments of  support for the Lithuanian nation 
Lithuanian national autonomy expressed at the congress? One of  the fi rst 
speakers, professor Jonas Kairiūkštis (a physician, then non-party), approved of  
Paleckis’ views and invited the congress participants to “adopt and understand” 
the socialist system: “one can move forward only when you are convinced that 
the government will be on duty guarding national interests, only then are you 
calm for the happy future of  the nation.” He continued: “We intellectuals ... 
patriots of  our country, we love the antiquity of  our land, the language, we love 
our nation’s traditions and culture.” (Incidentally, in the LCP offi cial newspaper 
Tiesa, where the speech of  Kairiūkštis was published, the passages cited here 
were omitted.) The professor concluded his speech by saying that “in socialism 
the loss of  national identity does not threaten the Lithuanians.”55 I think that 
the principle of  mutual cooperation between the intelligentsia and the Soviet 
government was formed as early as the very beginning of  the congress: a 
government that would take care of  the development of  national Lithuanian 
culture was considered worthy of  support. Similar thoughts and ideas were 
expressed by other delegates. Some drew more emphasis to the advantages of  
socialism and the prospects it would create (such as deputy rector of  Vilnius 
University, professor of  physics and chemistry Juozas Matulis, who became an 
LCP member in 1950). This motif  was repeated in the reports of  many speakers. 
Others stressed concern about the necessity of  the culture of  the Lithuanian 
nation, such as Borisas Dauguvietis (LSSR senior director of  the theater, non-
53  “Guzevičius report to Kobulov,” a draft, 1945, 152–53. “Guzevičius report to Kobulov,” July 14 
193–94.
54  “Report of  the head of  second department LSSR NKGB Izotov,”  170.
55  “Kairiūkštis speech,” VAA, f.761 [The Executive Committee of  Vilnius city], ap.9, b.35, 15. 
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party). Recently returned from a Nazi concentration camp, writer Balys Sruoga 
addressed those assembled: “with the deepest respect and love I welcome every 
creative effort, every labor, great or small, that refreshes our land.”56 The writer 
thanked the party and the government for having rescued him, which is entirely 
understandable.57
However, the speeches of  several people at the congress stood out 
specifi cally because of  their national overtones and their critical attitudes 
towards the authorities. The speech of  botanist and Vilnius University professor 
Jonas Dagys was remarkable in this regard (in Tiesa and Tarybų Lietuva there 
was only brief  mention of  his speech.) First, Dagys talked about the need to 
bring members of  the Lithuanian intelligentsia who “had been shipped from 
Lithuania to various corners of  the USSR, Siberia and Kazakhstan in 1941” 
back to Lithuania.58 Although according to the professor, that had been merely a 
precautionary measure, “it was carried out in haste and therefore many mistakes 
were made.” It was necessary to rectify these errors, he declared. Therefore, 
the speaker appealed to the leaders of  the Lithuanian SSR to “undertake 
measures and create conditions for the Lithuanian intellectuals to return to 
their homeland.” (In the archival transcript of  the speech, after this passage 
one fi nds the words “fi erce applause.”59) He also criticized NKVD Commissar 
Juozas Bartašiūnas for his article in Tiesa.60 According to Dagys, in the article 
commissar used “many kinds of  threats and harsh words.” Such words only 
dissuaded those who wanted to get out of  the forest, and after all, one found not 
only criminals in the woods, but also people who wanted to avoid mobilization. 
In conclusion, Dagys noted that one should go to socialism not only armored 
56  “Sruoga speech,” typewriting, LLITI BR, f.1-5741 [Writers and linguists], 1–2.
57  However, in 1946 the writers congress Sruoga was harshly criticized by the LCP bureau member 
Kazys Preikšas. Preikšas accused the writer of  continuing to be under the infl uence of  “bourgeois culture” 
and representing a mentality that was “alien to the Soviet way of  life.” The novel Forest of  Gods, in which 
Sruoga potrayed the lives of  inmates in the Nazi concentration camps, was banned from publication. Už 
tarybinę lietuvių literatūrą. Lietuvos TSR tarybinių rašytojų susirinkimo, įvykusio 1946 m., medžiaga (Vilnius: Grožinės 
literatūros leidykla, 1947), 22–23.
58  “Dagys speech,” VAA, f.761, ap.9, b.35, 61.
59  Ibid., 62.
60  The article by Bartašiūnas entitled “We will pull out at the roots the most wicked enemies of  the 
Lithuanian nation—the Lithuanian German nationalists.” In the article, the commissar reminded his 
readers that the government amnesty for “members of  gangs” was still valid: those who surrendered “will 
be allowed to atone for their serious crimes.” Those who did not surrender, according to the commissar, 
could expect “fi erce punishment.” Also, anyone who helped the “bandits” would be punished “with all the 
severity of  Soviet laws.” Tiesa, May 25, 1945, no. 120.
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in the science of  Marxism, but also “with love and nurture,” It is clear the 
speech raised uncomfortable questions for the government. According to the 
accounts of  the security offi cials, the speech was actively discussed behind the 
scenes of  the congress. There were some who thought that the author would be 
punished one way or another. At the same time, the security offi cials noted that 
the professor’s ideas had far more supporters, and “only a very small percentage 
disagreed.”61 At the convention, only People’s Commissar of  Education Juozas 
Žiugžda responded publicly to Dagys’ speech. (Understandably, in the pages of  
the newspapers, this criticism of  the speech also was not published, although the 
greater part of  the Commissar’s speech was printed.) Žiugžda attacked Dagys, 
accusing him of  not knowing the theory and practice of  Marxism, Leninism, 
and Stalinism and contending that it was inappropriate for the professor to talk 
from “the venerable rostrum about what he himself  does not understand.”62
The national aspirations were highlighted even more strongly in the speech 
by Agriculture Academy Rector Matas Mickis (in 1940–1941, he served as 
minister of  agriculture in the so-called People’s government, and he joined the 
party in 1949). I will offer more extensive citations from his speech because it 
was not published in the press. According to the rector, Lithuanians were a small 
nation. “Various invaders lay claim to its sovereignty”: Polish landlords, Germans, 
czarist Russia, which not only sought to enslave, but also took away the press.63 
However, the “small nation” also wanted to be free. It wanted to preserve its 
culture and language. On the other hand, Mickis pointed out, Lithuanians had a 
“great history.” And this showed that Lithuanians were a “mature nation,” with 
their own national character and customs, which they valued, and they were no 
less proud of  these customs than large nations were of  theirs.64
Like the Russians, Mickis continued, the Lithuanian nation had many heroes, 
who nurtured its statehood. They know what Vytautas the Great, a hero of  our 
nation, had given them. No one can deny the signifi cance of  his feats. He had 
been victorious at Žalgiris, and he had stopped the German onslaught from the 
West. He made a contribution to the history of  mankind. V. Kudirka also gave 
a lot to the nation. (According to Mickis, Stalin was enthralled by the national 
anthem of  Kudirka, by its dignity and beauty.)
61  “Guzevičiaus report to Kobulov,” July 14, 1945, 80.
62  Guzevičius called the statement of  Žiugžda memorable.
63  “Mickis speech,” VAA, f.761, ap.9, b.35, 72. 
64  Ibid., 73.
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He also emphasized in his speech that for a small nation the “true road” 
is the socialist path: “we Lithuanians do not want anything more than to be 
equal, not to be thrown in the shade, and only the socialist system provides such 
conditions.” The Soviet system, the professor said, also can solve the national 
question: “The essence of  socialism is that it allows all nations to live their 
cultural lives freely.”65
However, according to Mickis the practices of  socialism do not always 
conform to the ideas proclaimed. In rural areas, “there was a lot of  tactlessness and 
arbitrariness” from the Soviet administration. Arrivals from other republics, not 
knowing the Lithuanian language, insulted it. There were numerous institutions 
in which representatives and functionaries could not understand Lithuanian. All 
this was vexing to Lithuanians, Mickis explained. As a result, in his opinion, the 
fear of  Russifi cation arose. As an example, Mickis pointed out the Utena district 
policeman, who mocked the Lithuanian language. Below I will quote an extract 
from the archival copy of  the speech: “He [the policeman] is the same kind 
of  black hundred of  whom there were many in the times of  the czar. (applause) 
The government will throw such refuse out of  our republic. (applause) They are 
not only enemies of  our nation, but also enemies of  socialism. (applause) The 
militiaman visits a peasant and tells him to open his suitcases... [he is robbing – 
author’s comment] (applause)”66 If  you want socialism, Mickis ended his speech, you 
yourself  must set an example.67
The national sentiments of  the intelligentsia found expression in other forms 
in the congress. Even though at the very beginning of  the congress Gedvilas had 
stated that it was the fi rst congress of  its kind, in their speeches several delegates 
publicly recalled the Vilnius Seimas, in which Lithuanians raised the political 
demand for the fi rst time: “autonomy for ethnographic Lithuania, with the 
capital Vilnius.”68 Thus, the speakers emphasized the historic link between the 
Lithuanian SSR congress of  the intelligentsia and the Great Seimas of  Vilnius. 
65  Ibid., 73.
66  Ibid., 76–77. 
67  Neither Dagys nor Mickis was persecuted because of  the speeches they held at the congress. (At the 
time, Dagys was under observation as “a nationalist” by the intelligence forces. See Tininis, Komunistinio 
režimo nusikaltimai Lietuvoje 1944–1953/The Crimes of  the Communist Regime in Lithuania, 14.) However, 
later both of  them experienced some pressure. In 1948, Dagys was severely criticized as the author of  
the handbook and was removed from his position as head of  the Department of  Plant Anatomy and 
Physiology at Vilnius University. In 1953, he was again appointed to this position, which he held until 1977. 
A. Merkys, “On the 100th anniversary of  Professor Jonas Dagys.” Biologija, 53, no. 2 (2007): 3.
68  Motieka, “Didysis Vilniaus seimas,” 297.
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(It is understandable that neither in Tiesa nor in Tarybų Lietuva were there any 
references to the Great Seimas of  Vilnius.) Professor Pranas Mažylis (a member 
of  the interwar Social Democratic Party and member of  the Academy as of  
1946) recalled that in the same hall in 1905 there had been “a large meeting of  
Lithuania’s peasants, workers and intellectuals, usually called the Great Seimas of  
Vilnius.”69 He himself  had participated in it, and the Seimas had had a “signifi cant 
impact on the revolution.” Writer Karolis Račkauskas-Vairas also remembered 
the Seimas. According to him, it had been a congress of  “Lithuanian peasants,” 
which had “pushed our people,” shaken the nation out of  apathy, and shown it 
a new path.70 
A few more meaningful facts merit mention that testify to the national 
ambitions of  a suffi ciently large number of  the participants in the congress. 
These facts again exemplify how on some issues the approaches of  the LSSR 
government and the intelligentsia, which promoted the “socialist road” but also 
emphasized the importance of  the national factor, were different. Overall, it 
could be argued that part of  the Lithuanian intelligentsia certainly supported 
the model of  national communism. On the last day of  the convention, after a 
suffi ciently orthodox speech by A. Sniečkus, the text of  an appeal to Lithuania’s 
intelligentsia was discussed.71 The literary critic Kostas Korsakas presented it 
to the congress. In the hall discussions arose on the text of  the appeal and 
various additions were suggested.72 Academician Matulis, discussing the tasks 
of  the intelligentsia, suggested adding “the Lithuanianization of  Vilnius” 
to the appeal. According to him, the citizens of  Poland were departing and 
Vilnius remained “half-empty.”73 He stressed the important of  pursuing the 
Lithuanianization of  Vilnius. This was met with “long applause.” (According 
to Matulis, “Lithuanianization” was equally important in the case of  Klaipėda, 
the major port city of  Lithuania.) There were other proposals, including one 
regarding the return from the USSR to Lithuania of  all Lithuanian intellectuals 
so that they could carry out restoration work in the homeland (this was also 
followed by thunderous applause). It is likely that the government did not 
69  “Mažylis speech,” VAA, f.761, ap.9, b.35, 54.
70  “Račkauskas speech,” VAA, f.761, ap.9, b.35, 124.
71  “Pirmojo tarybų Lietuvos inteligentijos suvažiavimo Kreipimasis į visus tarybų Lietuvos inteligentus,” 
Tiesa, July 26, 1945, no. 172.
72  “The discussion of  the appeal,” VAA, f.761, ap.9, b.35, 176–77.
73  On 22 September 1944, the LSSR government and representatives of  Poland’s national liberation 
committee signed an agreement on the repatriation of  people. For more information, see Vitalija 
Stravinskienė, Tarp gimtinės ir tėvynės. Lietuvos SSR gyventojų repatriacija į Lenkiją (Vilnius: LII, 2011), 95–100.
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expect such a proposal to be made. Council of  People’s Commissars Chairman 
M. Gedvilas, who was chairing the meeting, agreed to include the provision 
concerning the Lithuanianization of  Vilnius in the appeal. Regarding the second 
proposal, he contended that it would be meaningless, since the government was 
already “making every effort to return them [the intellectuals].” In the end, the 
delegates scrapped this point.
The printed message in the offi cial press on the work of  the last day and the 
text of  the appeal74 differed from the text agreed on by the Congress delegates 
and approved by the Chairman of  the Council of  People’s Commissars. In the 
offi cial accounts in the press, there was no mention of  making Vilnius more 
“Lithuanian,” a goal that was dear to the Lithuanian intellectuals who were willing 
to cooperate with the Soviet government. Rather, there were only references to 
the importance of  the “reconstruction and accommodation” of  Vilnius.
Conclusions 
First, the government of  Soviet Lithuania, by organizing the congress, sought 
to draw the intellectuals into the “construction” of  the socialist system and the 
“fi ght against bourgeois nationalists.” The express approval of  the intelligentsia 
for Soviet policies would have served the legitimization of  the government. This 
was especially important, as the partisan movement was growing stronger. One 
should note that there were signs of  such approval: the appeal to the intelligentsia 
of  Soviet Lithuania was adopted, with greetings sent to Stalin. Second, the 
participants in the congress, the Lithuanian intelligentsia, the creative elite, in 
general agreed to support the “construction” of  socialism under the condition 
that Lithuanian culture would be nurtured and favored. Not coincidentally, 
the congress proclaimed the necessity of  making Vilnius, the old, traditional 
capital of  Lithuania, “Lithuanian.” This goal was shared by various groups of  
intellectuals. Third, one can assume that some of  the members of  the leadership 
of  the Lithuanian SSR thought that it would be possible to strike a deal with the 
“old” Lithuanian intelligentsia, which had taken form “in bourgeois Lithuania.” 
The government would satisfy the most important (national) expectations of  the 
intelligentsia, while the intelligentsia would offer support for the government’s 
policies. Unfortunately, while Lithuania’s Communists may have entertained such 
visions, they were never realized in practice. Moscow began to force Lithuania’s 
74  Tiesa, July 15, 1945, no. 164. 
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Sovietization. Not coincidentally, visitors from Moscow who observed the 
congress offered critical assessments of  its results.75 Finally, if  during the summer 
of  1945 the policies of  the Soviet Lithuanian government were dominated by 
the spirit of  national bolshevism, for some of  Lithuania’s intellectuals, this was 
understood as national communism. This vision of  a form of  communism that 
would be at least in part a realization of  national autonomy was to prove fl eeting.
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Nikola Baković
“No One Here is Afraid of  Blisters or Work!”
Social Integration, Mobilization and Cooperation in Yugoslav Youth 
Brigades. The Example of  Čačak Region Brigades (1946–1952)
In this article I analyze the organizational mechanism of  youth labor projects and the 
place of  ideology and agitation-propaganda in the everyday lives of  young laborers. 
I adopt a local micro-historical perspective in my analysis of  the organization, 
documented activities and everyday functioning of  youth brigades from the Čačak 
region of  Serbia that participated in the earliest labor projects in Yugoslavia (1946–
1952). The documentation on the brigades reveals omnipresent Party surveillance of  
brigadiers (with the ultimate aim of  selecting the most “appropriate” elements for 
Party membership), but it also offers a glimpse into the ambivalent attitudes of  youths 
(ranging from passive resistance to conformist participation and cooperation). The 
daily routine of  brigade life helps further refl ection on emancipatory and modernizing 
effects that transformed local society and proved notably more far-reaching and long-
lasting than the superfi cial effects of  agitprop efforts.  
Keywords: Yugoslavia, labor actions, Čačak, youth, agitprop, shock workers
Voluntary youth labor actions organized by Yugoslav socialist authorities 
stemmed from the twofold set of  infl uences, global and local. The most 
important external role model on which the Yugoslav projects were based was 
the Soviet Stakhanovite movement, together with the system of  “shock-work,” 
public works and competitions, common to all socialist countries and the 
interwar corporatist societies.1 The local roots were sought in the pre-modern 
tradition of  communal labor during harvests (moba) and the antifascist resistance 
in the Užice region (Serbia) and Sanička dolina (Bosnia), where locals helped 
the partisan army by harvesting crops within the range of  German artillery in 
1941/42.2 Upon liberation, a wave of  initiatives aimed at providing winter fuel 
and clearing the war debris was instigated by the United Alliance of  Antifascist 
1  See Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of  Productivity in the USSR 1935–1941 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
2  Predrag M. Anastasijević, Voluntary Labour Actions of  the Yugoslav Youth (New Delhi: Tanjug, 1952), 6; 
Srećko Mihailović and Grujica Spasović, Tito, radne akcije. Stvaraoci neodoljivog poleta (Belgrade: Istraživačko-
izdavački centar Saveza socijalističke omladine Srbije, 1979), 11–13. 
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Youth of  Yugoslavia3 during the winter 1944/45.4 The network of  similar local 
initiatives quickly spread among youths in liberated parts of  Yugoslavia. This 
was just a prelude to grand infrastructural projects for which the voluntary youth 
labor was used as an asset of  reconstruction and industrialization processes. 
The fi rst federally supported project was the “Youth Railway” Brčko–
Banovići, which connected the fertile wheat fi elds of  Vojvodina and Slavonia 
with coal mines in central Bosnia. From May until November 1946, over 62,000 
members of  the People’s Youth of  Yugoslavia, with very little in the way of  
proper machinery, completed the railway 22 days before the deadline. The 
following year saw an even greater endeavor, the construction of  the Šamac–
Sarajevo railway, which was built by over 210,000 Yugoslav and 5,000 foreign 
youths.5 However, the most ambitious projects on the federal level were the 
construction of  the Zagreb–Belgrade stretch of  the Brotherhood and Unity 
Highway and the building of  the city of  New Belgrade.6 Together with numerous 
labor projects on the federal and local level, over one-million Yugoslav youths 
participated in the country’s reconstruction and fulfi llment of  the First Five Year 
Plan,7 with an astounding rate of  80 percent of  eligible youngsters applying to 
work as part of  the labor brigades.8 
Already in 1950, some Yugoslav politicians and economists criticized this 
system for its alleged fi nancial ineffi ciency, as well as for its potentially anti-
industrial over-emphasis on manual labor. Consequently, there was a halt in 
federally backed projects beginning in 1952 and lasting until 1958, when the 
initiatives were reinvigorated with the construction of  a new stretch of  the 
Brotherhood and Unity Highway. The fi nancial burden and the organizational 
complexity of  federal actions were always weighed against their benefi ts for the 
Yugoslav regime. Although the maintenance of  youth camps and the organization 
of  brigadiers’ extra-labor activities cost far more than the hiring and lodging of  
qualifi ed workers, Tito never underestimated the value of  such endeavors for 
3 This mass organization was renamed the People’s Youth (Narodna omladina) in May 1946. 
4 Beograd – Grad akcijaša (Belgrade: Gradska konferencija Saveza socijalističke omladine Beograda, 1985), 
18. 
5 Mihailović and Srećković, Stvaraoci neodoljivog poleta, 23–27, 29–31, 114. 
6 Slobodan Selinić, “Omladina gradi Jugoslaviju (Savezne omladinske radne akcije u Jugoslaviji 1946–
1963),” Arhiv, Časopis Arhiva Srbije i Crne Gore 1–2 (2005): 88–89. 
7 Slobodan Selinić, “Počeci Novog Beograda – prva faza izgradnje Novog Beograda 1947–1950.” Tokovi 
istorije 4 (2007): 75. 
8 Srećko Mihailović, Omladinske radne akcije. Rezultati socioloških istraživanja (Belgrade: Istraživačko-izdavački 
centar Saveza socijalističke omladine Srbije, 1985), 9–10. 
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the ideological indoctrination of  young Yugoslavs, whose loyalty was won by 
offering them professional, social and intellectual resources otherwise unavailable 
in their native environment. He believed that these expensive and demanding 
activities had to be provided to the brigades, should a suffi cient recruitment rate 
be achieved, because “if  youngsters are given only shovels and cramps, no one 
will go.” A strikingly militarized atmosphere in the camps was not a coincidence 
for Tito, since “people forged through work can hold on through every struggle, 
be it in work or in war.” Labor projects were an intrinsic part of  the socialist 
project of  creating a new man, a place “where the new people are forged, with a 
new understanding of  work.”9 
In this article, I analyze the “fi rst wave” of  youth labor projects as one of  the 
tools of  power in the creation of  a sense of  belonging to a cohesive multinational 
community of  Yugoslavs during the immediate postwar period. Voluntary 
youth work was not only a convenient means to secure free labor for ambitious 
infrastructural projects, but also a “social adhesive,” aimed at bringing together 
youths from the most distant parts of  the country in order to disseminate the 
ideological tenet of  “brotherhood and unity” between various representatives 
of  the Yugoslav nationalities. The primary role of  members of  the younger 
generations in this process was that of  a far-sighted, “tempered” (but in the 
long run also “tempering”) political and social consolidator of  the new system, 
which ultimately was supposed to solidify the newly re-conceptualized social 
relations and power structures, simultaneously internalizing the omnipresent 
revolutionary ideological narrative. Youth projects also served to enable the 
authorities to select a reliable future party cadre, ultimately expanding the 
Communist Party’s support basis. On the other hand, brigadiers used the projects 
as opportunities to gain otherwise unavailable material, social and educational 
resources and improve their chances for upward social mobility. The very act of  
volunteering for socialist reconstruction projects (although the truly voluntary 
nature of  brigadiers’ recruitment in this period was always in question) entailed 
the youths’ implicit cooperation with the regime, the ideological “pills” of  which 
were (willingly) swallowed, along with far more signifi cant and longer-lasting 
benefi ts of  emancipation and education. 
I will examine the role of  these projects by embedding a local micro-
perspective of  brigades sent from the region of  Čačak (Serbia) during the 
reconstruction and First Five Year Plan actions (1946–1952) within the broader 
9  Mihailović and Spasović, Stvaraoci neodoljivog poleta, 21–31.  
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postwar historical context in Yugoslavia, as well as within the already existing 
body of  scholarly work. The article’s shifting analytical focus, swinging between 
the offi cial “top-down” and the local experience helps shed new light on the 
ambivalent relationship between the power-holding center and the potency of  
the agency of  individual subjects in the circumstances of  an overarching socio-
political transformation. Thus, I explore the non-dichotomous character of  the 
interaction between the “regulating” state and the “regulated” society, which was 
highly ambivalent and often a contingent process. The brigades under discussion 
came from the central Serbian municipalities (srez) of  Ljubić-Trnava, Dragačevo 
and Rudnik, as well as from the towns of  Kraljevo and Čačak. The following 
federal actions were included in the analysis: the Brčko–Banovići railway (1946), 
the Šamac–Sarajevo railway (1947), the construction of  New Belgrade (1948–
1950), the Brotherhood and Unity Highway (1948–1950), the Doboj–Banja 
Luka railway (1951) and the Konjic–Jablanica railway (1952). I analyze various 
features of  organizational mechanisms and everyday modes of  social integration, 
including recruitment process, motivational concepts of  “shock status,” the 
screening of  brigadiers for prospective Party membership, the involving of  
brigadiers in an array of  physical, educational and cultural activities with a strong 
modernizing pretext, and the creation of  trans-ethnic and trans-national social 
networks through contacts with peers from other republics and countries.
Until the fi rst decade of  this century, historical works dealing with Yugoslav 
youth labor projects were surprisingly sparse, probably because of  the general 
post-socialist disinterest in the history of  labor movements, a topic too 
closely entwined with the perceived communist utilization of  science. Special 
monographs dedicated to individual actions, albeit devoid of  much analytical 
value, remain an important source of  information on the organizational setup 
of  brigades, as well as sources of  statistical data. They were usually published to 
honor anniversaries of  certain projects, as well as to promote the ideologies on 
which these projects were based.10 Sociologists Rudi Supek and Srećko Mihailović 
did signifi cant research concerning youth’s perceptions and motivational factors. 
However, their research mostly referred to the later phase of  labor projects 
10  Anastasijević, Voluntary Labour Actions; Beograd – Grad akcijaša; Mihailović and Spasović, Stvaraoci 
neodoljivog poleta; Radne akcije Narodne omladine Hrvatske (Zagreb: Centralni komitet Narodne omladine 
Hrvatske, 1949); Udarnici prve smene graditelja omladinske pruge (Belgrade: Novo pokolenje, 1946). In this 
respect, a recently published monograph containing basic information on all labor actions in socialist 
Yugoslavia should be mentioned for its anthological comprehensiveness, despite its analytical dearth: 
Slobodan V. Ristanović, To su naših ruku dela. Herojska i slavna epopeja omladinskih radnih akcija 1941–1990 
(Belgrade: Kosmos, 2014). 
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and is of  little relevance to the period discussed here.11 Very important recent 
contributions to the historiography on labor actions, both because of  the wealth 
of  data they include and because of  their analytical value, are found in Slobodan 
Selinić’s articles and Saša Vejzagić’s MA thesis.12 The importance of  this secondary 
literature notwithstanding, however, the main sources for this article were youth 
labor brigades’ records kept at the Regional Historical Archives of  Čačak, as 
well as the personal collection of  lawyer Velimir Cvetić, a communist activist 
from Čačak and the commander of  a 1946 brigade. I also used the relevant 
press coverage from the heavily ideologized local weekly Slobodni glas, which was 
published by the local Popular Front branch. 
Organizational and Recruitment Mechanisms
Brigades from Čačak region, apart from their municipal designation (i.e. ljubićko-
trnavska), were usually named after distinguished local communists or war heroes. 
Thus, the fi rst brigades sent in 1946 were named after Ratko Mitrović and Bata 
Janković. On the other hand, high school brigades from the town of  Čačak got 
their name in honor of  Rade Azanjac, a 20-year-old political commissar shot in 
late 1941. Brigades were serially numbered, promoting the idea of  a continuous 
and seemingly constant outfl ow of  youth workforce to dispersed construction 
sites across the country. This way, the new regime tried to enforce its own 
traditions, drawn from the historical legacy of  the persecution of  communists 
in the interwar period and their subsequent fi ght against the occupiers and 
quislings, thereby passing these traditions on to generations that had been too 
young to have had personal experience of  these events.13 
The “Ratko Mitrovic” and “Bata Jankovic” brigades, which are best 
documented in the available sources, attracted predominantly (although not 
exclusively) agricultural youth from villages around Čačak, most of  whom had 
already completed their education and thus were not tied to the school year 
11  Mihailović, Omladinske radne akcije; Rudi Supek, Omladina na putu do bratstva. Psihosociologija radne akcije 
(Belgrade: Mladost, 1963). 
12  Slobodan Selinić, “Život na omladinskim radnim akcijama u Jugoslaviji 1946–1963,” Arhiv, Časopis 
Arhiva Srbije i Crne Gore 1–2 (2007): 119–37; Slobodan Selinić, “Omladina gradi Jugoslaviju”; Saša Vejzagić, 
“The Importance of  Youth Labor Actions in Socialist Yugoslavia: A Case Study of  the Motorway 
‘Brotherhood and Unity,’” (MA thesis, Central European University, 2013). 
13  “Ratko Mitrović” brigades even had a slogan: “We bear his [Ratko Mitrović’s] name, the whole 
brigade is proud of  him!” (“Ratka Mitrovića mi nosimo ime, cela brigada ponosi se njime!”), Slobodni glas, 
August 3, 1946, 2. 
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schedule. They usually left for campsites in spring and late autumn, when the 
agricultural season allowed. The “Rade Azanjac” brigades mostly consisted of  
teenagers with urban and non-agricultural backgrounds who studied and lived in 
Čačak. They would be dispatched in July and August, when schools were not in 
session.14 It was not uncommon, especially in 1946/47, for the returning brigades 
to be greeted with lush public celebrations and agitprop slogans in the town center.
 
Figure 1. Citizens of  Čačak await the return of  the local brigade from Bosnia, November 1946 
(Source: Regional Historical Archives of  Čačak ) 
Youngsters from the neighboring town of  Kraljevo were also part of  Čačak 
brigades until 1949, when they started to form their own brigades.15 As far as the 
practical meaning of  the term “youth” is concerned, the documents show that 
most brigadiers were between 16 and 25 years of  age, although there were some 
exceptional cases of  brigade members being in their late 20s and even early 40s.16
14  D.Z., “Treća ORB ‘Ratko Mitrović’ otišla na izgradnju Omladinske pruge,” Slobodni glas, September 
7, 1946, 6.  
15  Dušan V. Janićijević, Dobrovoljni rad omladine Kraljeva  (Kraljevo: JP PTT Srbija, 1999), 61. 
16  In brigades from other parts of  Yugoslavia there were documented cases of  brigadiers who 
were younger than fi fteen (even twelve years old), probably due to the desperate insistence of  the local 
organization on fulfi lling the prescribed quotas (Selinić, “Omladina gradi Jugoslaviju,” 91; Selinić, “Počeci 
Novog Beograda,” 93). 
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Mobilizing youth for labor actions was a complex task for mass organizations 
since it had to be (or at least seem to have been) performed strictly on a non-
coercive basis. Yet, the Party’s youth organization, the Union of  the Communist 
Youth of  Yugoslavia (Savez komunističke omladine Jugoslavije, hereafter: SKOJ),17 and 
other organizers set ambitious plans with territorial recruitment quotas. These 
quotas depended on various specifi cities of  the respective areas (for example, in 
regions with numerous ethnic minorities, organizers were not expected to draw 
in big numbers because the loyalties of  the local populations were sometimes 
in question).18 Due to the centralized nature of  establishing quotas, local SKOJ 
branches were often in a tricky situation. On the one hand, they needed to attract 
the required number of  brigadiers, but on the other hand, it was an imperative 
that these youths apply voluntarily. There were many (albeit not numerous) 
cases of  coercive collective recruitment, especially in regions notorious for their 
anti-Party stance.19 Moreover, certain categories of  prisoners were also taken to 
construction sites as a part of  their sentences, and some youths, such as 36 men 
from Kraljevo, fulfi lled their military service obligations by participating in the 
construction of  the Šabac–Zvornik railway.20
Although blatant force was not permitted (at least nominally), it can be 
assumed that multifaceted informal means of  persuasion were used to increase 
the number of  brigadiers. In the countryside, agitprop units developed extensive 
propaganda aimed at presenting labor actions as a catalyst for social mobility 
and a life-enriching experience, which would in no way handicap the families 
of  the youths during periods of  seasonal work (they were promised help with 
house chores while children would be away).21 Schoolchildren were recruited 
through a web of  students who were either SKOJ members or had already 
17  In 1948, SKOJ and the People’s Youth merged into one youth supra-organization, keeping the latter’s 
name. 
18  Selinić, “Omladina gradi Jugoslaviju,” 91–92, 95. 
19  Vejzagić, “Motorway ‘Brotherhood and Unity’,” 53–55. Selinić emphasizes the almost military nature 
of  the recruitment process (not the least because in the sources themselves recruitment is often referred to 
as “mobilization”) (Selinić, “Počeci Novog Beograda,” 81). 
20  Janićijević, Rad omladine Kraljeva, 95. 
21  In the villages of  Atenica, Katrga and Rošci, the local commanders’ forceful method of  agitation 
was stigmatized as “unpolitical” and “hostile,” but it was also pointed out that “we still need a suffi cient 
number of  youths” (“Budući zadaci osnoвnih organizacija ljubićko-trnavskog sreza po pitanju formiranja 
frontovskih radnih brigada,” Slobodni glas, June 10, 1949, 2). However, a quote from the local newspaper 
vividly depicts the indirect and informal methods of  pressure that were employed to entice youths: “There 
should be no youngster who would not apply for the Youth Railway construction!” (B. Kostić, “Do 16. 
aprila treba izvršiti izbor omladinaca,” Slobodni glas, April 12, 1946, 6).  
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participated in such projects, as well as teachers who organized special lectures 
on the importance of  the initiatives. Students who were doing poorly in their 
studies were attracted by prospects of  special assistance in preparing for their 
make-up exams while the projects were underway.22 
At fi rst, collective agitation was the most widespread recruitment method, 
entailing group lectures and promotion. However, the Party realized that this 
approach did not bear satisfactory results, so SKOJ members were urged to 
undertake more personalized, individual agitation, designing specifi c means 
of  persuasion and motivational factors for each potential brigadier. This was 
especially important for schoolchildren, who often failed to apply because of  their 
parents’ reluctance (to the great dismay of  local commissars).23 Still, the Čačak 
branch of  SKOJ had no major problems fulfi lling their quotas. The fi rst brigade 
sent to the Youth Railway in 1946 (initially supposed to gather 200 brigadiers) 
had 275 members selected from a pool of  350 applicants, including one who had 
been rejected but who then had to be accepted after he refused to get off  the 
train to Brčko.24 Brigades were divided into troops (čete), usually hosting around 50 
brigadiers each. The surprisingly high number of  1,331 brigadiers in 1946 increased 
SKOJ’s ambitions, and the planned 1947 quota was raised to 3,000 youths. This 
target proved easy to reach as well, since in early March the quota for Čačak was 
surpassed by 40 applicants.25 Village brigades usually had more members than the 
high school ones (counting up to 400 youths) due to their demographic prevalence. 
Although the enthusiastic reports by SKOJ offi cials have to be taken with 
a grain of  salt, it is obvious that it was a matter of  prestige for local leaders not 
merely to fulfi ll their quotas, but also to have as great a percentage as possible of  
the youths of  their settlements apply. According to these reports, in some villages, 
such as Mršinci, every eligible youngster applied for local or federal actions, and in 
22  Vejzagić, “Motorway ‘Brotherhood and Unity’,” 51. In Čačak, the possibility of  being accepted to 
labor projects was used as a motivational factor for bad students to improve their school marks (D. Grbić, 
“U našem odeljenju prijavilo se 29 učenika,” Slobodni glas, March 15, 1947, 2).  
23  S.A., “Školska omladina Čačka učestvovaće na izgradnji auto-puta Bratstvo-Jedinstvo,” Slobodni glas, 
May 9, 1948, 4. Every attempt on the part of  parents to prevent their children from participating in labor 
actions (or mass organizations in general) was strongly condemned (I. Pešić, “O pogrešnom odnosu 
roditelja prema svojoj deci i omladinskim organizacijama,” Slobodni glas, October 1, 1948, 3).
24  B. Kostić, “Do 16. aprila treba izvršiti izbor omladinaca za sastav radne brigade koja će uzeti učešća 
na u radovima na izgradnji omladinske pruge,” Slobodni glas, April 12, 1946, 6; P.Đ., “275 omladinaca našeg 
okruga gradi omladinsku prugu,” Slobodni glas, May 8, 1946, 6.
25  Milisav Đurić, “Izgradnja nove omladinske pruge Šamac–Sarajevo najveći zadatak omladine u 1947. 
godini,” Slobodni glas, January 16, 1947, 2; “Omladina okruga čačanskog sprema se za omladinsku prugu 
Šamac–Sarajevo,” Slobodni glas, March 8, 1947, 3. 
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Opaljenica the application rate was 96 percent.26 Despite the possibility of  these 
numbers being infl ated, internal brigade records show no hints of  understaffi ng 
problems. Moreover, the fact that many 15-year-old applicants had to be rejected 
from drafts clearly shows that the youth of  the Čačak region saw labor projects as 
a unique opportunity to improve their social, political and material standing under 
the new system (as well as to widen their career prospects), despite all probable 
forms of  formal and informal pressure to volunteer. Despite the Party’s nominal 
dissatisfaction with agitation results, the prescribed quotas were always surpassed, 
signifi cant differences between the republics notwithstanding.27 Yet, the success of  
the recruitment efforts should be credited not only to the enthusiasm or pragmatism 
of  the youth, but also to SKOJ branches intentionally setting low quotas for fear of  
failing to meet them. The organizers were always pleased to accept more brigadiers 
than originally sought, although this simultaneously burdened them with additional 
board and lodging costs (which could have contributed to the temporary halt in 
the organization of  federal projects from 1952 until 1958).
Becoming a Shock-Worker
Immediately after the revolution, the Yugoslav authorities introduced the system 
of  competitions and shock-worker awards (udarništvo) to develop a culture of  
adulation of  work, as well as to promote agency channels through which the 
working class could prove their devotion to the new order and be motivated to 
contribute to its solidifi cation. This system, although it took its name from the 
Russian term for strike work (udarniki), was a virtual copy of  the Stakhanovite 
movement developed in the Soviet Union in the second half  of  the 1930s.28 Just 
as the Soviet precursor was named after the most prolifi c miner, Alexei Stakhanov, 
the Yugoslav version came to be best known by the name of  the Bosnian Roma 
miner Alija Sirotanović, who allegedly broke the coal mining world record in 
1949. Since the udarništvo movement and system of  competitions was introduced 
26  “Na smotri u Čačku uzelo je učešća preko 4000 omladinaca iz sreza i grada,” Slobodni glas, April 2, 
1948, 3; M.D. Rajčević, “Omladina moravičkog sreza u ovoj godini već je dala oko 7000 radnih dana na 
raznim lokalnim radovima,” Slobodni glas, April 2, 1948, 3. 
27  For instance, the 1949 quota was surpassed by 27 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina and only by 3.7 
percent in Slovenia (Vejzagić, “Motorway ‘Brotherhood and Unity’,” 52–53).  
28  The term udarniki was widely used in the Soviet Union to designate shock brigades and workers 
prior to the institutionalization of  the Stakhanovite system in 1935. Since the culture of  productivity was 
introduced in Yugoslavia only after World War II, different systems of  shock-work were not distinguished 
in Serbo-Croatian, but were jointly grouped under the label udarništvo.
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in all production activities in the country, it was also an inseparable feature of  
youth actions. Work tasks in camps were usually set according to “decimal plans” 
(dekadni planovi, lasting 10 days), at the end of  which the most industrious brigade 
(udarna brigada), as well as individual workers (udarnici), would be proclaimed. 
In order to become a so-called shock-worker, one had to surpass the work 
norm by 20 percent continuously. If  case there were no specifi ed norm, one had 
to surpass the common work result of  the brigade by 30 percent. Brigadiers could 
also gain the status of  shock-worker by applying measures through which 10 
percent of  the raw materials, fuel or work hours could be saved, or by introducing 
innovative techniques and methods that improved overall effi ciency. The shock-
worker status lasted for three months. During that time, in addition to enjoying 
prestige and respect, the individuals who had been given the award also got 
convenient material benefi ts, including better meals, shopping coupons, discounts 
for various goods, etc.29 These benefi ts explain the often fi erce competition among 
brigadiers at a worksite, as well as the obsessions of  commanders with their brigade 
attaining the shock status. Although allegedly even Tito expressed concern that this 
insistence on surpassing norms would harm the health of  the youths,30 the brigade 
documents show that competition and the striving for more were the order of  the 
day in literally every brigade. Typical is the quote of  one brigadier at the Youth 
Railway: “Look, I have 34 blisters. I have never had them before. Tell the others 
not to be afraid of  blisters. No one here is afraid of  blisters or work!”31 Although 
the percentage of  shock-workers varied according to the respective brigade’s work 
effi ciency, available shock-workers’ lists show that seven to twelve percent of  the 
Čačak brigades were declared shock-workers at some point.32 
Still, the workers had to participate in the competition in a comradely 
spirit, lest the rivalries lead to internal hostilities or intrigues among brigadiers. 
Overemphasizing one’s own work contributions and effort was strongly looked 
down upon, if  not outright condemned by commanders. Such was the case of  а 
29  Međuopštinski istorijski arhiv u Čačku (hereafter: MIAČ), fond Omladinske radne brigade (hereafter: 
ORB), kutija 2, fascikla 3, Udarnička legitimacija Nikolić Nikole iz Donje Trepče, December 5, 1948. 
30  Mihailović and Spasović, Stvaraoci neodoljivog poleta, 34. One of  the reasons for such excessive toiling 
was also the authorities’ pragmatic insistence during the period of  reconstruction that the work effect of  
unpaid workers should be fi ve times greater than that of  paid workers, see Momčilo Mitrović, Izgubljene 
iluzije. Prilozi za društvenu istoriju Srbije 1944–1952 (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1997), 19. 
31  B.M., “Orlova Stena, radni logor čačanske brigade,” Slobodni glas, August 30, 1946, 3. 
32  MIAČ, ORB, k-3, f-4, Opšta arhiva 1. čačanske srednjoškolske ORB “Rade Azanjac,” Ruma, July–August 1948. 
This is a somewhat lower percentage compared to the overall average for the whole New Belgrade project, 
during which every seventh brigadier became a shock-worker (Selinić, “Počeci Novog Beograda,” 86). 
“No One Here is Afraid of  Blisters or Work!”
39
24-year-old brigadier who (apparently trying to make up for being put in a high-
school brigade at such a late age) “had an tendency to show off  blisters on his 
hands and dirt on his suit, overall one sick ambition for a shock-worker’s badge.”33 
On another note, 20-year-old Pantelija Glišović, despite having surpassed norms 
by 70 percent, was criticized in personal evaluations for “not being an agitator.”34 
The order of  Main Headquarters of  youth brigades on the construction of  
the Konjic–Jablanica railway in 1952 indicates that the overt enthusiasm (or the 
unconcealed ambition of  their commanders) of  some brigades to gain shock-
worker status could eventually prove detrimental to the overall work dynamic. 
The youths were forbidden to work longer than the usual seven hours without 
the Headquarters’ prior approval, due to bad effect this would have on the overall 
performance.35 This case represents an interesting offi cial condemnation of  an 
exaggerated work ethic, quite unlike the usual public shaming of  lazy brigadiers 
or those who invested less in their work than they were supposedly capable of. 
Selecting the New Cadre
Brigade commanders, by unwritten rule Party members, wrote personal 
evaluations for each brigadier in order to support or hinder his or her nomination 
for SKOJ membership. These evaluations had a template-like character, with 
an established pattern for data input: year/place of  birth, nationality, social 
background, family standing during the war, (non)participation in the Liberation 
Struggle. Furthermore, the categories for personal impressions consisted of: 
attitude towards authority, physical effort at work, treatment of  state property, 
conduct with other brigadiers, activity in classes, proneness to (self)criticism 
and notes on private life. Evaluations concluded with the commander’s opinion 
on whether the respective comrade was eligible to become a SKOJ member.36 
33  MIAČ, ORB, k-3, f-4, Karakteristike brigadira 1. čačanske srednjoškolske brigade “Rade Azanjac” (1948). 
34  MIAČ, ORB, k-2, f-3, Kratke biografi je predloženih. 
35  MIAČ, ORB, k-1, f-4, Odluka o zabrani prekovremenog rada, July 23, 1952. 
36  MIAČ, ORB, k-2, f-1, Karakteristike brigadira; f-2, Prozivnik 2. ljubićko-trnavske brigade; k-3, f-2, Knjiga 
karakteristika brigadira 2. ljubićko-trnavske brigade (1948); f-3, Karakteristike brigadira 1. srednjoškolske ORB Rade 
Azanjac (1948); MIAČ, Lični fond Velimira Cvetića (hereafter: VC), Karakteristike par članova. Particularly 
interesting is the fact that brigade commanders put a high value on the contribution of  brigadiers (or the 
lack thereof) to overall socialization within the barracks. Thus, the strongest remarks in some evaluations 
would be: “in crowds, he was closed off  and introverted,” “he is many comrades’ favorite character,” “not 
serious in conversations with other brigadiers,” “he was always moody when among others,” “she was 
popular for her jolliness and her decent, comradely life and behavior”. MIAČ, ORB, k-2, f-1, Karakteristike 
brigadira 11. srpske brigade, Železnik (1947). 
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These documents represent a particularly valuable source, helping historians 
reconstruct different demographic structures of  labor volunteers and testifying 
to the Party’s ever-watchful eye. In compiling their evaluations, commanders 
paid due attention to the conduct of  members of  the brigadiers’ families during 
the war, as well as to their current standing towards the Communist Party and 
“the state of  today.” One of  the more revealing cases was that of  a 17-year-old 
Mileta Čvrkić, nephew of  the interwar minister of  posts Vojko Čvrkić (known 
to have supported a rival četnik movement37 during the war). Although Mileta’s 
characteristics were judged in a positive light, “special wariness” had to be paid 
to his education, because he “was surrounded by people with a negative attitude, 
who could tarnish his righteous development.”38 In several other evaluations, the 
family’s attachment to četnik movement, which was equated with having “rebel 
bandits” for relatives or clinging to “reactionary attitudes,” was mentioned as a 
potentially disruptive factor in the rearing of  a youth. There was even a case of  a 
former policeman who was fi red and expelled from the Party after having beaten 
up one “reactionary” woman. This policeman went to the Brčko–Banovići 
action to atone for and recover from his past mistakes.39 However, there were 
relatively few cases of  brigadiers being explicitly considered unreliable on the 
basis of  their family’s political affi liations. A probable reason was that individuals 
coming from extremely hostile families would not volunteer for labor projects 
anyway and even if  they did, their applications most probably would not have 
been accepted. Still, members of  more “benignly hostile” families were accepted 
to brigades. This can be interpreted as an attempt on the part of  the Party to 
“inject” itself  into these families through their offspring or, conversely, as an 
attempt on the part of  the “problematic” families to “whitewash” their past by 
encouraging participation in the new regime’s legitimization. 
Available internal documentation of  brigade party cells suggest that the cases 
of  resistance and confl ict within the brigades most often had a markedly non-
political character. The usual incidents occurring at the worksites were mostly 
37  Četnici is the colloquial term for the monarchist Yugoslav Army in the Homeland (Jugoslovenska 
vojska u otadžbini) that undertook a rebellion against German occupation as early as May 1941, fi ghting 
together with partisans until their ideological split in November 1941. They were focused on sparing ethnic 
Serbs from open confrontations with Nazis, as well as preventing communists from inciting a socialist 
revolution. Consequently, many četnik units entered into tacit collaboration with the Nazi regime, and some 
commanders ordered severe reprisals against Muslim civilians in Bosnia and Sandžak.
38  MIAČ, ORB, k-3, f-4, Karakteristike članova 1. srednjoškolske brigade “Rade Azanjac” (1948). 
39  To make this case even more bizarre, his brigade commander suspected him of  having belonged to četnici 
during the war (MIAČ, VC, Pismo sreskog komiteta SKOJ Okružnom komitetu u Gornjem Milanovcu, April 29, 1946). 
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connected to bad maintenance of  tools and the scarcity of  machines, as well 
as violations of  conduct, such as walking barefoot or wearing dirty uniforms,40 
or simply sitting idly and failing to comply with the commander’s orders. At 
campsites, complaints mostly referred to bad hygiene habits, not making one’s 
bed, and being late for or avoiding morning gymnastics. Female brigadiers were 
frequently criticized for using their menstrual cycles as an excuse to stay in the 
camp for an entire day. One girl was reprimanded for taking leave on the pretext 
of  visiting her ill father at home, but actually in order to celebrate Easter.41 In the 
course of  the Brčko–Banovići project, a bizarre ideologically grounded “hygienic 
measure” caused a scandal among the brigade party leaders. A female brigadier, 
apparently from a better-off  family, was the only one in her troop to own a 
toothbrush. The troop leader “expropriated” the toothbrush from its owner 
and declared it “common property” to be used by all brigadiers, in line with the 
collectivist spirit. This order was met with the superiors’ condemnation, both 
for breaching hygienic norms and for misrepresenting the “socialist lifestyle.” 
Yet there was no recorded disciplinary proceeding against the overtly diligent 
commander, nor is there evidence that this “expropriation” was corrected.42 
However, it showed the extent to which the commanders’ lack of  education, 
coupled with a relentless obedience to authority, could often lead to comical 
interpretations of  the offi cial party doctrines. 
On the interpersonal level, confl icts usually derived from teenager pranks 
(such as smearing toothpaste on a comrade in his or her sleep at night), alcohol 
consummation (despite a strict ban, brigadiers frequently used their leaves to 
go to nearby villages and get drunk), or “inappropriate” interaction between 
male and female comrades. One of  the commanders’ frequent concerns was 
40  The insuffi cient number of  work uniforms, as well as of  basic clothing (trousers, shirts and 
underwear), caused many problems during the 1946 project, but it seems that in later projects these 
procurements were much better planned, becoming yet another asset with which to attract poor youths to 
actions. Several brigadiers were strongly criticized for walking to and from the construction site in old and 
ragged uniforms, although they had received new ones. The commanders reminded them that they would 
not be allowed to take the new uniforms home, no matter how well they preserved them, whereas walking 
through the streets of  Belgrade in ragged clothes put the brigade in a bad light and only provided malicious 
reactionaries with additional arguments. MIAČ, ORB, k-2, f-5, Knjiga dnevne zapovesti 1. čačanske srednjoškolske 
ORB “Rade Azanjac” od 9.6. do 8.7.1949. i 2. čačanske srednjoškolske ORB “Rade Azanjac” od 8.7. do 5.8.1949. In 
the Highway construction camp, there were cases of  brigadiers abandoning the brigade without returning 
their clothes. SKOJ offi cials back home were instructed to regulate this issue. MIAČ, ORB, k-3, f-1, Spiskovi 
brigadira 1. Ljubićko-trnavske brigade (po četama). 
41  MIAČ, VC, Pribeleške za sastanke (1947). 
42  MIAČ, VC, Poleđina spiska članova SKOJ (1946). 
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keeping peace between their campmates and the locals, since cases of  theft, 
drunken brawls or stealing fruit were quite commonplace.43 Cases of  workers 
who were too rowdy with commanders or engaged in (arguably, a rather 
superfi cial sort of) dissent and confrontation were very rare and were connected 
to pragmatic material problems (i.e., brigadiers who were unsatisfi ed with their 
accommodation would sarcastically invite Tito to their luxury resort).44 One of  
the rare instances of  open vandalism among Čačak brigadiers occurred in 1948, 
when some youths who had not been provided new footwear tore down the 
performance graphs as a sign of  protest.45
One can offer several hypotheses regarding the reasons for this cooperative 
attitude. Firstly, brigadiers were mostly too young and immature to be actively 
politically engaged and form their own independent stance towards the 
communist regime. Secondly, the voluntary nature of  the projects (casual, yet 
non-negligible aberrations of  forced recruitment notwithstanding) made the 
“infi ltration of  reactionary elements” rather unlikely. Hence, this potential 
source of  dissent and disobedience was apparently missing. Moreover, a great 
majority of  brigadiers came from rather poor and backward areas, ravaged by 
the war and postwar poverty. Not only did labor projects present an opportunity 
for them to gain skills, knowledge, and personal contacts that could potentially 
improve their social status, but for many they were a rare place where they could 
secure their mere sustenance. Bearing this in mind, it is understandable that the 
few instances of  resistance and confl ict with party members and commanders 
usually derived from trivial reasons pertaining to personal character or simple 
material needs, rather than from any profound ideological stance or confl ict. 
For most youths, eager participation in state’s reconstruction projects (coupled 
with occasional, rather unobtrusive resistance) offered much greater benefi ts 
and social capital than any sort of  open opposition could ever have provided 
under the circumstances. 
43  MIAČ, ORB, k-1, f-4, Zapažanja dežurnog brigadira (1952); MIAČ, ORB, k-3, f-4, Opšta arhiva 1. čačanske 
srednjoškolske ORB “Rade Azanjac” (July–August, 1948). 
44  MIAČ, ORB, k-3, f-3, Zapisnici sa sastanka štaba i partijske ćelije (1949).
45  Some youths also threatened not to prolong their stay in the camp if  there would not be more 
straw for beds and meat for lunch. The Party cell dismissed such complaints, claiming that there were 
“opportunists” who were taking two meal portions, thus leaving other comrades without any food. MIAČ, 
ORB, k-3, f-3, Zapisnici sa sastanka štaba i partijske ćelije 5. Ljubićsko-trnavske brigade (1948).
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Youth Education and Politicization
The activities that the Party planned for brigadiers did not come to an end 
after the seven-hour shifts at the construction sites. The rest of  the day was 
fi lled with different kinds of  additional tasks and programs, which can roughly 
be grouped into two categories. The fi rst included physical activities aimed at 
keeping brigadiers fi t and increasing their stamina. These activities included 
regular morning gymnastics, pre-military training, driving lessons, sport matches 
and athletic competitions. The second group of  activities nurtured intellectual 
and political growth, with a clear intention to educate the youth in various 
spheres of  life and equip them with new skills, yet always within the ideological 
and theoretical confi nes of  communist dogma. By attempting to engage every 
single brigadier in as many of  these activities as possible, the authorities hoped 
to disseminate their ideological tenets into all pores of  youth life, as well as to 
erase the old era’s accumulated social obstacles to the development of  every 
individual’s creative potential. 
Pre-military training was supposed to acquaint boys and girls with the basics 
of  combat skills and fi rearms usage in order to improve their effi ciency in case 
of  a foreign invasion. This fear became all too realistic after the 1948 break with 
Stalin, making pre-military training compulsory for all youths older than 17. Each 
brigade was supposed to have at least one specially educated military instructor, 
often a distinguished Liberation Struggle soldier, who would teach these classes 
every other day.46 Lessons covered the skills necessary for the general functioning 
of  camps (making beds, cleaning barracks, keeping guard), but also more strictly 
military topics (loading a rifl e, shooting practice from various positions, bullet 
trajectory, marching steps, etc).47 Providing youngsters with an education in military 
conduct was seen as a peacetime perpetuation of  the People’s Liberation Struggle, 
and indeed many instructors insisted that the wartime revolutionary combatant 
zeal must not falter in absence of  actual battles. Yet many brigadiers avoided 
attending these programs, as can be seen from attendance sheets. Thus, except 
for the fi rst two days of  the shift, the 246-people-strong ljubićko-trnavska brigade 
working on the construction of  New Belgrade in 1949 never had more than 190 
brigadiers present at pre-military training (the overall participation at the Highway 
46  Vejzagić, “Motorway ‘Brotherhood and Unity’,” 66. Military instructors also used their veteran status 
to transmit their personal experiences of  the Liberation Struggle to younger brigadiers (MIAČ, VC, Posetili 
su nas delegati našeg okruga). 
47  MIAČ, ORB, k-2, f-2, Dnevnik zanimanja, June 30, 1949.
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site that year was approximately 95 percent).48 Youths used various excuses, such 
as sickness or cleaning and cooking duties, but commanders also noted accusingly 
at Party cell meetings that even SKOJ members abused their political agitation 
duties as an excuse to skip gymnastics or military training. Another way to improve 
brigadiers’ fi tness was to engage them in team sports. It was especially important 
for camp commanders to organize matches (sometimes in league form) between 
brigades from different parts of  the country in order to strengthen interethnic ties 
and showcase the volunteer movement’s regional diversity. Athletic competitions 
were usually organized on state holidays (Tito’s birthday on May 25, Labor Day on 
May 1, Day of  Republic on November 29), prior to which the athletically talented 
brigadiers underwent preparations that lasted for weeks, as these events were 
often attended by important Party offi cials, and the individual competitor’s success 
would increase the overall reputation of  his or her brigade, eventually raising the 
brigade’s chances of  gaining shock status.49 
Political-ideological education was one of  the most crucial non-labor 
programs organized for brigadiers, as it represented the most explicit means of  
infl uencing youth by exposing them to and indoctrinating them in the offi cial 
ideology, as well as recruiting new members to the Party’s youth organization. The 
curriculum consisted of  essential socialist literature (works by Marx, Lenin and 
Gorki), but also of  works of  the domestic Yugoslav canon (ideological literature 
by Tito and Edvard Kardelj). Classes on theory were followed by textual analysis 
and often fi erce debates, in which individuals interested in Party membership had 
to excel should they wish to gain admission rapidly. These meetings were also 
used offi cially to denounce derogatory texts about Yugoslavia, which were being 
published in organs of  the East European press after 1948, which often spread 
rumors (not always without any basis in reality) about abuses of  child labor and 
deaths in campsites.50 This was supposed to prevent potential outbursts of  political 
48  Ibid., Vejzagić, “Motorway ‘Brotherhood and Unity’,” 68. 
49  MIAČ, ORB, k-2, f-5, Knjiga dnevne zapovesti 1. и 2. čačanske srednjoškolske ORB “Rade Azanjac” od 9.6. 
do 8.7.1949. i od 8.7. do 5.8.1949; MIAČ, ORB, k-2, f-1, Evidencija dnevne zapovesti 1. Ljubićko-trnavkse brigade, 
20.4.-16.6.1950. 
50  Mihailović and Spasović, Stvaraoci neodoljivog poleta, 29. According to Selinić, at least 185 cases of  death 
can be documentarily proven for the period 1946–1963, most of  which occurred at the New Belgrade and 
Highway projects (Selinić, “Život na radnim akcijama,” 123–124). The only documented case of  death in 
Čačak brigades in this period was that of  Radiša Stefanović, who was mortally injured by a truck at the 
New Belgrade worksite on August 1, 1950. This death was laconically mentioned in the brigade’s offi cial 
diary, without any further notice or comment (MIAČ, ORB, k-2, f-3, Dnevnik života i rada 3. Ljubićko-trnavske 
brigade na Novom Beogradu od 1.7. do 28.8.1950). 
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dissent during that critical period. It was not a coincidence that Tito himself  visited 
the Highway construction site only 15 days after the 1948 Cominform resolution.51 
Party members had additional ideological classes, which provided forums 
for discussion of  more advanced theoretical questions, but also for agitation 
planning and evaluations of  the behavior of  non-members. A new set of  
lectures for members and non-members alike was introduced in 1948. They 
consisted of  sessions dedicated to the analysis of  Yugoslavia’s fall from Stalin’s 
grace. Naturally, the purpose of  these “analyses” was to defend Tito’s position, 
proving that even Lenin himself  established that every country had its own way 
to communism, regardless of  the Soviet policies. The minutes from brigadiers’ 
discussions reveal the depth of  this diplomatic twist, since the meetings in 1948 
were often dedicated to badmouthing Bulgarian pretensions to Macedonia, 
whereas previously there had not been any negative remarks about any other 
socialist country whatsoever. Other topics discussed at these meetings included 
rumors about Yugoslavia being involved in the failed assassination of  Palmiro 
Togliatti in July 1948, justifi cation of  Yugoslav cooperation with USA concerning 
the restitution of  Kingdom of  Yugoslavia’s gold reserves, the recommendation 
that Yugoslavia take part in the Danube conference, etc.52 Party cells also made 
decisions on future work norms, the organization of  events, and disciplinary 
measures, regardless of  the wishes of  other brigadiers.53 In the meeting 
transcripts, one can discern the timidly expressed antagonism of  non-members 
towards the Party members, who wished to exercise unquestioned authority over 
the rest of  the brigade, as well as to enjoy small benefi ts, such as being spared 
more tedious or tiring duties. Thus the nominally democratic decision-making 
in brigades usually came down to party members presenting their decisions (or 
preferred choices) to the rest of  brigade (which was supposed to accept them), 
whereas the egalitarian discourse was often twisted in order to provide small 
everyday “privileges” for individuals who were more politically engaged. 
The “War” on Illiteracy 
One of  the main emancipatory and educational efforts (and arguably the greatest 
success) of  the People’s Youth was the eradication of  illiteracy among young 
people. This problem, which had already been a concern in previous decades, 
51  Vejzagić, “Motorway ‘Brotherhood and Unity’,” 79. 
52  MIAČ, ORB, k-3, f-3, Zapisnici sa sastanka štaba i partijske ćelije (1948).  
53  MIAČ, ORB, k-3, f-3, Zapisnici sa sastanka štaba i partijske ćelije 5. ljubićko-trnavske brigade (1949). 
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was especially acute in the immediate aftermath of  World War II, when schools 
in many areas were destroyed or diffi cult to reach for many school-age children. 
It was one of  the new regime’s priorities to advance the position of  the working 
class (youth included) by ensuring that everyone was taught to read and write. 
Each youth brigade was thus supposed to have at least one instructor who 
specialized in such courses, and all illiterate volunteers were obliged to attend. 
The classes were organized in improvised classrooms or, weather permitting, in 
outdoor settings.
Figure 2. Literacy course of  the 3rd Čačak brigade, 1946 (Source: Regional Historical Archives 
of  Čačak)  
Curiously enough, in addition to illiterate brigadiers (usually around a dozen 
per brigade), Čačak brigades had a much greater number (up to one third of  all 
brigadiers) of  “semi-literates,” profi cient in only one script (in their case, Cyrillic). 
Commanders were adamant that both Latin and Cyrillic script be mastered, as 
this was considered one of  the basic prerequisites for disseminating the ideology 
of  brotherhood and unity of  the Yugoslav nations.54 The brigadiers seemed to 
have diligently attended the courses. The internal diaries imply that most of  
them did master the basics of  reading and writing both scripts, with only one 
54  Žika Marjanović, “Dopis sa omladinske pruge,” Slobodni glas, May 1, 1947, 3.
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mention of  a former policeman who declined to learn the Latin script, claiming 
he did not need it.55 Such enthusiasm was understandable, as it would have been 
hard for anyone to fail to see the advantages of  literacy. Moreover, these classes 
were one of  the rare activities the practical purpose of  which was not subjected 
to blatant ideologization (although the increase in literacy rates was certainly 
cited in state propaganda as an example of  the successful emancipation of  the 
working class). And a vast success it was, as it is estimated that more than 70,000 
people learned how to read and write during the fi rst wave of  labor actions 
(1946–1952), although one could defi nitely call into question the effectiveness 
of  such quick learning while pupils were also involved in hard manual labor.56 
In addition to offering the workers a chance (or rather obliging them) to 
master the basics of  reading and writing, labor camps and individual brigades 
also had their own modest libraries, and youths were constantly motivated to use 
them through involvement in literary circles. The book list of  the library of  the 
Camp “Jože Vlahović” on the New Belgrade site indicates the openly politicized 
nature of  these libraries. Of  the 215 titles, only around 30 did not explicitly 
pertain to communist theory and revolutionary history. Yet, a glance at the 56-
item loan list from the second ljubićko-trnavska brigade shows that brigadiers 
overwhelmingly preferred the non-political literature, with the exception of  the 
novels of  Maxim Gorki. On the other hand, this same brigade had its own small 
library with 75 books that for the most part dealt with communist themes, but it 
also had works by Shakespeare, Jack London and Jules Verne.57 These details and 
other documented statistics indicate that one loaned book amounted to hardly 
two brigadiers from Čačak, which is even worse than the admittedly low ratio of  
just over one book per brigadier for the whole New Belgrade worksite.58 
Yet this low ratio for the Čačak brigades should not be interpreted as a sign 
of  the irrelevance of  these libraries for the few youths who did use them, since 
for many it was their fi rst contact with books. The collectivist nature of  all daily 
activities in isolated camp communities and external peer pressure obviously 
enticed many otherwise disinterested youths to start reading, as can be seen from 
one brigadier’s quote: “Here we have better conditions for reading and studying 
than in the countryside, because here we are all together.”59 In addition to visiting 
55  MIAČ, ORB, k-1, f-1, Izveštaji 2. čačanske ORB “Ratko Mitrović” (Bukinje – Orlova stena, August, 1946).  
56  Selinić, “Život na omladinskim radnim akcijama,” 126. 
57  MIAČ, ORB, k-2, f-3, Biblioteka logora ‘Jože Vlahović’ and Inventar knjiga 2. Ljubićko-trnavske brigade. 
58  Selinić, “Život na omladinskim radnim akcijama,” 125. 
59  MIAČ, ORB, k-2, f-3, Zapisnik kulturno-prosvetnog odbora 3. Ljubićko-trnavske brigade, July 9, 1950. 
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camp libraries, brigadiers could improve their writing skills by compiling articles 
for wall newspapers, as well as writing letters about their camp experiences, 
which were sent to newspapers and various economic and political enterprises 
back in Čačak. 
Quite contrary to some authors’ characterization of  labor projects as 
“attempts to kill the youth’s creative cultural instincts through exhausting 
physical toil,”60 the documents of  the Čačak brigades indicate that life in the 
camps was rich with lively amateur cultural and artistic activities. Choirs, theatre 
and recitation troupes were founded for individuals who prepared performances 
for their campmates. The surviving documents show that their repertoire 
consisted almost exclusively of  material devoted to themes of  communism 
and the Liberation Struggle. It included odes to Stalin (naturally, only up until 
1948), plays and excerpts by Soviet authors (especially popular was Nikolai 
Ostrovsky’s How the Steel Was Tempered, as well as Chekhov’s Diplomat) and works 
by Yugoslav writers which could be interpreted in terms of  social justice and 
class struggle (i.e. works by Branislav Nušić, but also Desanka Maksimović and 
Mira Alečković).61 Film screenings were also organized, either within the camp or 
by taking brigadiers to town cinemas, and for many it was the fi rst time they had 
watched a motion picture. The choice of  screenings was carefully premeditated, 
with a particular favorite being the fi rst Yugoslav partisan fi lm Slavica (1949), due 
to the “volatile reactions” of  the viewers whenever they saw German soldiers 
on screen.62
Cementing Brotherhood and Unity
Alongside their apparent economic importance as a source of  free workforce, 
the youth labor projects came to be seen by the Communist Party of  Yugoslavia 
as one of  the most effective ways of  cementing the ideological concept of  
“brotherhood and unity” among the Yugoslav nationalities. This aim was 
particularly important because there had been numerous interethnic massacres 
60  Janićijević, Rad omladine Kraljeva, VI–VIII. 
61  MIAČ, ORB, k-2, f-3, Zapisnik kulturno-prosvetnog odbora 3. Ljubićko-trnavske brigade, July 9–August 22, 1950. 
62  MIAČ, ORB, k-3, f-3, Dnevnik 5. Ljubićko-trnavske brigade od 7.9. do 29.11.1949. In this regard, it should 
be mentioned that the offi cial discourse frequently accented cinema visits as an advent of  modernization. 
All the more peculiar was the consternation of  the 3rd ljubićko-trnavska brigade commander (working at New 
Belgrade in 1950) at the fact that during fi lm screenings, apart from being very noisy and littering, some 
male comrades did not even realize that they were not permitted to urinate inside the cinema hall (MIAČ, 
ORB, k-2, f-3, Knjiga zapovesti 3. Ljubićko-trnavske brigade, 4.7.–29.8.1950).
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during World War II, and chauvinistic movements had sown hatred among the 
nationalities. Under these circumstances, the victorious Communist movement 
inserted itself  with its federal vision of  Yugoslavia as a reconciliatory force, 
securing equal rights for all of  the country’s ethnicities, some of  which 
(Montenegrins and Macedonians) came to be recognized for the fi rst time 
only after the communists’ accession to power. The most farsighted way of  
disseminating the “brotherhood and unity” ideology was to internalize it among 
members of  the younger generations, whose worldview had not yet hardened 
and many of  whom had been too young to remember the ethnically motivated 
atrocities that had taken place during the war. Federally organized actions proved 
an invaluable tool in this endeavor, as they attracted brigades from all of  the 
republics. Tito himself  emphasized their importance, deeming them even more 
important than local projects, the “localist tendencies of  which might eventually 
gain a chauvinistic character.”63 
Camps of  federal labor actions provided the preconditions for the 
propagation of  such ideas. They were mostly set in isolated areas, bringing 
together youngsters from the most diverse parts of  the country to live together 
in conditions that resembled those in which the army functioned in a secluded 
environment where they had to interact with one another on a daily basis. This 
way, young people from ethnically homogenous areas (such as the Čačak region) 
had the opportunity to spend time and build friendships with members of  other 
nationalities for the fi rst time. The brigadiers’ reports and articles sent to Slobodni 
glas suggest that this experience left a most positive mark on them. Situations of  
cultural shock were all but rare, such as the bewilderment of  Čačak men who for 
the fi rst time saw Muslim women in their oriental clothes at the Brčko railway 
station,64 while the typically exalted reports described scenes from bonfi re parties, 
where youths from regions as diverse as Dragačevo, Šid, Orašac and Mitrovica 
joined together in the partisan kozaračko dance.65 Some wartime mental wounds 
were healed, as indicated by a commander’s evaluation of  one young man whose 
father had been killed by Croatian fascists, but whose interaction with fellow 
Croatian campmates helped him overcome his hatred.66 In order to ensure as 
much interethnic mingling as possible, commanders placed brigades from the 
63  Mihailović and Spasović, Stvaraoci neodoljivog poleta, 78. 
64  MIAČ, VC, Dopis Gvozdena Jovanića o pristizanju u Brčko (1946). 
65  Ljubiša Lazarević, “Druga dragačevska brigada na autoputu proglašena za dvaput udarnu,” Slobodni 
glas, July 23, 1948, 3. 
66  MIAČ, VC, Karakteristike članova ORB “Ratko Mitrović” (1946). 
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most distant regions of  the country in neighboring barracks and also organized 
sports matches between them.67 
From the outset, the People’s Youth of  Yugoslavia invited foreigners to 
participate in labor projects. Thus, as early as 1946 over 1,800 foreign youths from 
both capitalist and socialist countries took part in the Brčko–Banovići project,68 
and in 1947 this number rose to 5,800 people from 42 countries. Several youths 
from Switzerland worked at the Brčko–Banovići action together with the Čačak 
brigade “Ratko Mitrović,” and despite the language barrier they developed strong 
friendships, as indicated by warmhearted farewell diary entries. Naturally, Swiss 
brigadiers had been professing a leftist political standing, as could be seen in their 
plans to “undertake an even stronger and more decisive fi ght against capitalism 
in Switzerland.” Such enthusiasm for spreading revolutionary zeal could not be 
tarnished by one incident, when a Serbian girl was accused of  stealing a pair of  
trousers from a Swiss brigadier.69 That same year, Greek brigadiers were added to 
Čačak brigades, which fell in line with the Yugoslav interventionism concerning 
the civil war in Greece.70 This transnational exchange of  voluntary youth labor 
was mutual. Already in 1946, a Yugoslav brigade went to Poland to help in the 
reconstruction of  Warsaw, and another such brigade was sent to Czechoslovakia 
in 1947. Both brigades had members from Čačak and Kraljevo.71 
The primary aim of  hosting foreign brigades was not to increase their work 
capacity, but to propagate communist ideas among youths from the West, as 
well as to strengthen ties with “friendly” countries (until 1948 socialist, after 
that Western and non-aligned ones). The authorities often noted the practical 
uselessness of  foreign brigadiers, who usually regarded their stay in Yugoslavia 
merely as a vacation. However, the propaganda value of  having foreigners among 
the volunteers compensated for their ineffi ciency as workers. Much as isolated 
camps offered a perfect setting for creating social networks between members 
of  different Yugoslav nationalities, they also served as an ideal site to establish 
personal connections between Yugoslavs and their peers from both ideological 
blocs in order to help address the political isolation of  Yugoslavia after 1948.  
67  Ljubiša Lazarević, “Druga dragačevska brigada na autoputu proglašena za dvaput udarnu,” Slobodni 
glas, July 23, 1948, 3; Radisav Pajić, “Čačanska omladinska brigada vratila se triput udarna,” Slobodni glas, 
July 16, 1949, 4. 
68  Mihailović and Spasović, Stvaraoci neodoljivog poleta, 29, 114. 
69  Marija Krnjajić, ed. “Spomenar komandanta čačanske brigade ‘Ratko Mitrović’ Miodraga Obrenovića 
sa omladinske pruge Brčko–Banovići,”  Izvornik, građa Međuopštinskog istorijskog arhiva Čačak 28 (2013): 211. 
70  MIAČ, ORB, k-1, f-1, Fotografi je sa Omladinske pruge Brčko–Banovići (1946).  
71  Janićijević, Rad omladine Kraljeva, 313; Udarnici prve smene, 23, 72. 
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Conclusions: Youth Projects – From Social Glue to Nostalgic Memento
In the immediate postwar years, the authority of  the Communist Party was 
still not completely solidifi ed, since many strata of  the population opposed 
(mostly in a silent and passive manner) the new system for various reasons. The 
younger generations, however, especially those living in regions most stricken by 
the disastrous civil war and occupation, represented a tabula rasa on which the 
regime could “inscribe” its program for the future, to a greater or lesser extent, 
according to its own needs and ideological tenets. The local perspective of  the 
Čačak brigades that were sent to participate in federal labor projects offers 
illuminating insights into political and social mechanisms of  this early socialist 
social engineering project, often not perceptible in the “grand” perspective of  
the state-level narratives. The predominantly voluntary nature of  the recruitment 
process (with sparse, yet notable exceptions of  formally and informally coerced 
mobilization) ensured that the most “hostile” segments of  the youth would 
be excluded. This prevented them from potentially disseminating politically 
inappropriate ideas among other youths. Thus, labor camps represented 
isolated “islands” where youths could be exposed to a diverse set of  politicized 
infl uences and agitation by Party members. Spatial consciousness represented a 
very important feature of  the ideological construct of  the projects. Not only was 
the geographical seclusion of  the camps essential for effective indoctrination, 
but at the very core of  these projects was the idea of  conquering and taming a 
previously uncontrollable space, be it static spatial entities (such as marshes on 
the left bank of  the Sava river) or a dynamic reconceptualization of  distance and 
movement (such as in connecting remote and inaccessible parts of  the country 
with highways and railways). 
Simultaneously, the performance of  the brigadiers (be it at work, in extra-
labor activities or interpersonal communication) was carefully scrutinized and 
evaluated in order to enable the authorities to select the most reliable and 
promising party cadre for the future. Thus, the social, regional and generational 
base of  party membership and support was expanded and further diversifi ed. 
The “bond by blood,” which had developed among partisan soldiers during the 
war, slowly evolved during the early peacetime years into the “bond by labor” 
among brigadiers who for the most part had been too young to have partaken 
in the Liberation Struggle. After leaving these “social laboratories,” former 
brigadiers were supposed to spread the newly acquired skills, knowledge and 
especially the freshly internalized political and social ideas. The youth also proved 
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a reliable communicator of  the “correct” interpretation of  Tito’s 1948 confl ict 
with Stalin to other segments of  population. Through Tito’s personal visitations 
and an elaborate ideological homogenization within the camps’ classrooms, the 
brigades’ Party cells apparently succeeded in alleviating more harmful forms of  
ideological misgivings among the youth. 
The generations involved in the fi rst phase of  youth labor actions grew up 
under wartime conditions, surrounded by destruction and devastating poverty. 
Most of  these youths, even had they been spared a direct contact with the ravages 
of  war, were nevertheless deprived of  a proper education, and their economic 
situation was bleak, with very slow signs of  improvement in the immediate 
postwar years. Labor projects, with their wide variety of  extra-labor activities and 
educational and professional programs, offered a unique opportunity for young 
people to compensate potentially for these disadvantages and obtain skills that 
would improve their prospects for social mobility. For the state, these programs 
also meant improving the educational profi le of  its citizens. These efforts, which 
ranged from decreasing rates of  illiteracy and “semi-literacy,” creating various 
literary circles and cultural troupes, and directly preparing rural youth for jobs 
in industry, were intended to improve the educational structure and diversify the 
vocational profi le of  the younger generations in order to overcome the general 
backwardness of  the Yugoslav society. However, the effect of  these short-term 
educational programs should not be overemphasized, since they often produced 
a workforce that was insuffi ciently qualifi ed, far too swollen for the needs and 
capacities of  the early period of  industrialization, and ultimately unable to fulfi ll 
the authorities’ ambitious modernizing agenda, in the long run even burdening 
economic development itself. 
Another important aspect of  Yugoslav youth labor projects that was 
always stressed by the Party was their pan-Yugoslav character. For many youths, 
especially those living in the mono-ethnic regions (such as Čačak), participation 
in the projects was the fi rst chance to meet and interact personally with peers 
from different ethnic, religious and cultural milieus. This element was especially 
valuable in light of  horrifying memories of  ethnic cleansing and mass exoduses 
from just a few years earlier. Thus, the Communist Party’s axiom of  “brotherhood 
and unity” between the Yugoslav peoples could be developed in practice. 
Moreover, involving foreign youth brigades (or simply inserting foreigners into 
the domestic ones) helped promote Yugoslav efforts to build a unique type of  
society, especially in the critical period after the split with the Soviet Union in 
1948. Mingling with foreign peers from both the eastern and western side of  the 
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Iron Curtain enhanced the desired perception that Yugoslav citizens belonged 
to a united global working class, despite the country’s diplomatic isolation at a 
time when confl ict with USSR was in full swing but the support of  the West had 
not yet been won. 
With their far-sighted emancipatory measures in mind, all reservations 
of  some Party offi cials concerning the fi nancial viability of  organizing and 
sustaining “mammoth” federally supported youth projects were eventually cast 
aside, as the projects came to represent the social glue for the up-and-coming 
generations, deemed able to build an intrinsically socialist and multicultural 
society (supposedly) from scratch. This was the reason behind the decision to 
renew grand federal volunteer-based projects in 1958, sustaining this system 
(with signifi cant modifi cations during the 1970s) almost until the end of  the 
federation itself.72 Labor actions subsequently moved into the sphere of  national 
mythology, becoming one of  the defi ning symbols of  the socialist era, as well as 
one of  the most widespread uncritically cherished nostalgic memories for many 
former brigadiers in the post-socialist times. On the other end of  the political 
spectrum, they were also used as a notorious example of  the communists’ 
supposedly totalitarian tendencies. Eventually, the projects’ primary political aim 
of  blatant and omnipresent indoctrination of  young people with communist 
ideology proved far more superfi cial and shorter-lived than their secondary effects, 
mirrored in a far-reaching (albeit in many aspects incomplete) reconfi guration of  
the postwar social habitus in Yugoslavia.  
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Sándor Horváth
Life of  an Agent: Re-Energizing Stalinism and Learning 
the Language of  Collaboration after 1956 in Hungary
In order for a secret police report to be taken seriously, it had to be lodged in the proper 
form, according to the discursive styles of  the state bureaucracy, and in particular 
the secret police. Thus, the authors of  the reports adopted numerous elements of  
style and rhetoric in order to ensure that their goals would be achieved. How was 
this bureaucratic style adopted in Hungary, and how did ordinary citizens decide 
to accommodate to or cooperate with the authorities under the communist regime 
after the 1956 Revolution? I argue that the creators and editors of  the secret police 
reports (the “unoffi cial informants” and their case offi cers) were “sculpting” the 
offi cial language as an artefact and mapping their social network in accordance with 
idealized images of  the politico-social body. The fi rst step in the implementation of  
massive, forceful coercion was to change the narratives and the social categories that 
were used to depict the social status of  a “good citizen” and the local communities. 
In the early phases of  their work, during which they learned what was expected of  
them and how to meet these expectations, the informants mastered the language of  
the secret police in order to ensure, in the meantime, that they were able to realize 
their own personal goals in their local communities by taking advantage of  their 
access to the state security network. Thus the function of  the reports on the one hand 
was rhetorical: they were made in order to feed the bureaucracy. On the other, they 
served as a means with which their authors won approval among other members of  
the network of  their personal, everyday goals. The authoring of  reports, which can be 
understood as a kind of  period of  training, thus was not simply a matter of  exercising 
social control, but quite the reverse, it also served as a means of  appropriating power 
by members of  society in the interests of  specifi c personal goals that had little or 
nothing to do directly with the agendas of  the regime.
Keywords: communist regime, Kádár regime, bureaucratic language, secret police, 
cooperation, political participation, Eastern Europe, Hungary
Introduction
Throughout the entire Kádár regime (the period between 1957 and 1989 in 
Hungary),1 a man referred to in the records as Gy. wrote reports from a mining 
1  More on the Kádár regime see János M. Rainer, Bevezetés a kádárizmusba (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet–
L’Harmattan Kiadó, 2011); György Majtényi, “What Made the Kádár Era?,” The Hungarian Historical Review 
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village in Nógrád county, which is dotted with small villages nestled in valleys.2 
Like a king in disguise, with his reports he dispensed justice in the everyday affairs 
of  the village. Gradually, he mastered the language of  the bureaucracy. As the 
president of  the division of  the local football team, which played in the second 
tier of  the national championship teams when it was at its best, he traveled 
through the mining region. He was given his fi rst task because of  the fi gures 
who prompted a massacre by the Communist police in the city of  Salgótarján 
on December 8, 19563 (a large part of  the victims were from the village in which 
he lived) and because of  his father-in-law, a Social Democrat who hailed from 
a mining family that had emigrated to Hungary from northern Italy. He was 
given his last task because of  the reburial of  Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister of  
the revolutionary government in 1956 who was executed in 1958. The reburial, 
which took place in 1989, was an event of  great symbolic signifi cance.4 Gy. 
himself  was injured at the time of  the 1956 massacre (according to his relatives, 
not in the actual violence of  the massacre, but rather in an accident that took 
place elsewhere), but presumably the police did not use this in order to pressure 
him to write reports, but rather the fact that in 1948 he had been sentenced to 
ten years in prison as a war criminal (he had been released after having served 
18 months). His refusal to cooperate with the state security forces, his alleged 
or presumed participation in the events of  1956 (Gy. had been a member of  
a workers’ council in 1956), and his conviction as a war criminal provided the 
police with ample material with which to blackmail and recruit him.
National politics repeatedly crisscrossed the life history of  the informant 
referred to in the offi cial documents simply by the letters Gy., in spite of  the fact 
that, having gotten average grades in school, he spent the better part of  his life 
working as a physical laborer or in a low-level offi ce position in the railway service 
and later the mine. Using his life history, I attempt to make a local interpretation 
(in other words the “view from the bottom”) of  the major events that shaped 
2, no. 3 (2013): 667–75; and Majtényi’s seminal book regarding the social functions of  the Kádár cult. 
György Majtényi, Vezércsel. Kádár János mindennapjai (Budapest: Libri Kiadó, 2012).
2  Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára [Historical Archives of  the Hungarian State Security 
Services, hereafter: ÁSzTL]. M-42230/1-3. 
3  More on the local history of  1956: 1956 Nógrád megyei kronológiája és személyi adattára: a forradalom eseményei 
és aktív szereplői a megyében, ed. László Á. Varga (Salgótarján: Nógrád Megyei Levéltár, 1996).
4  Karl P. Benziger, “The Funeral of  Imre Nagy: Contested History and the Power of  Memory 
Culture,” History and Memory 12, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2000): 142–64; Gábor Ittzés, “Ritual and National 
Self-Interpretation: The Nagy Imre Funeral,” Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe, 1 (November 
2005), accessed February 3, 2015, http://www.rascee.net/index.php/rascee/article/view/26/7.
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the twentieth century more understandable.5 In this article, I address, within this 
larger framework, how Gy. became part of  the secret police network and how he 
mastered the offi cial language with which he was able, on the one hand, to write 
reports that were considered acceptable by the authorities and, on the other, to 
achieve his own personal goals, using the network as a means.
According to Michael Shafi r, when an offi cial view of  history, such as the 
Marxist–Leninist one, is abolished, memory and historical scholarship become 
competitors. Shafi r makes this observation in connection with the report of  
the Tismăneanu Committee as the presentation of  a kind of  conclusive and 
absolute historical narrative.6 A similar process was underway following the 
events of  1989 which shaped the “agent-hunting” narrative mode based on the 
impassioned call to make the fi les of  the secret police and the lists of  operatives 
and agents accessible to the public. 
After all, if  society consisted exclusively of  victims and perpetrators, then not 
only could the perpetrators be found out, on moral grounds they must be found 
out, as this would contribute to the consolidation of  democracy, at least according 
to prevailing public opinion.  According to this narrative, the denunciation of  
agents and the “cleansing” of  public life of  the “perpetrators” of  the previous 
system (lustration) were both demands of  civil rights activists and political 
tools.7 The demand to make the fi les accessible to the public was a campaign the 
emotional point of  departure of  which was the belief  that the success of  the 
committees “in search of  the truth” depended on society’s fortitude. Thus, the 
many volumes that have been written on state security forces notwithstanding, 
as of  yet no empirical studies have been done addressing the question of  the 
extent to which the state securities actually constituted an element that stabilized 
the system. As by now has come to seem almost self-evident on the basis of  
source criticism on the documents of  the state security forces, for the contents 
5  This study is a part of  a larger monograph based on the life story of  Gy. with the support of  program 
number K-104408 of  the Hungarian Scientifi c Research Fund (OTKA).
6  Michael Shafi r, “Memory and History in Postcommunism: Preliminary Theoretical Remarks,” Sfera 
Politicii  120–121–122 (2006), accessed December 15, 2014, http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/120-121-122/
art21-shafi r.html.
7  On lustration in Eastern European see: Herman Schwartz, “Lustration in Eastern Europe,” Parker School 
Journal of  East European Law 1 (1994): 141–71; Lavinia Stan, “The Vanishing Truth? Politics and Memory 
in Post-Communist Europe,” East European Quarterly 40 (2006): 392–410; Maria Lo, “Lustration and Truth 
Claims: Unfi nished Revolutions in Central Europe,” Law and Social Inquiry 20 (1995): 117–61; Alexander 
Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff, eds., Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies 
(New York: Social Science Research Council, 2007); Encyclopedia of  Transitional Justice, ed. Lavinia Stan and 
Nadya Nedelsky (Cambridge–New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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of  these documents have been understood as refl ections not of  “reality,” but 
rather of  the expectations of  the state security forces and the party, and not only 
by scholars and researchers, but also by readers at the time.
For these reasons, relatively little attention has been devoted to the fact that 
the texts that were created and used by the networks were the products of  a form 
of  interaction in which the informers became part of  the bureaucracy through 
a distinctive kind of  training process. In order to be able to write reports that 
would meet the needs of  the authorities, they had to learn the clichés that they 
were expected to use. As Katherine Verdery has written in connection with the 
Securitate on the last period of  the era, “the Securitate increasingly became a 
pedagogical or didactic rather than a punitive institution.”8 As I intend to show 
in this article, however, the relationship between Gy. and his case offi cer was 
similar to the relationship between a teacher and a pupil, at least from their 
perspective, even from the outset, though in the case of  Gy. we are speaking of  a 
“pupil” who learned not only what was expected of  him, but also how to achieve 
his own goals indirectly by making use of  the reports.
I argue in this article that the function of  the secret police reports on the 
one hand was rhetorical: they were made in order to feed the bureaucracy. On 
the other hand, however, they served as a means with which their authors won 
approval among other members of  the network of  their personal, everyday 
goals. The authoring of  reports, which can be understood as a kind of  period of  
training, thus was not simply a matter of  exercising social control, but quite the 
reverse, it also served as a means of  appropriating power by members of  society 
in the interests of  specifi c personal goals that had little or nothing to do directly 
with the agendas of  the regime.
Towards the end of  the 1960s, mining in Nógrád was irrelevant on the 
national level as the working class policy had become less and less important 
for the Kádár regime.9 Gy.’s mine was closed in 1968 because it was no longer 
regarded as economically viable,10 though the sedulous sentries of  the state 
security forces continued to insist on the submission of  reports by agents who 
took a fancy to writing them and who, by then, had provided ample proof  of  their 
8  Katherine Verdery, Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of  Romania’s Secret Police (Budapest: CEU 
Press, 2014), 17.
9  For more on the state policy regarding industrial workers during the 1950s, especially at the beginning 
of  the Kádár era, see: Mark Pittaway, The Workers’ State: Industrial Labor and the Making of  Socialist Hungary, 
1944–1958 (Pittsburgh: University of  Pittsburgh Press, 2012).
10  Ferenc Szvircsek, Bányászkönyv (Salgótarján: Nógrád Megyei Múzeum, 2000), 403.
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reliability. More and more frequently, Gy. used the reports as tools with which to 
promote his own interests. He could enforce “justice” for the “little man” (for 
instance, in the tavern they were watering down the wine, or cars were being 
repaired on the black market in the neighboring street). The reports contain not 
calls for collective action, but rather numerous manners of  attempting to further 
personal interests. 
In this article, I seek the answer to the question of  how Gy., as the author 
of  texts used by the state security, reinterpreted his own identity and how he 
created a portrayal of  himself  as a useful member of  society. This was the 
period in his life when, as the head of  the division of  the local soccer team, he 
had a large network of  relationships, which he used when writing reports. His 
collaboration with the local authorities (in comparison with the transformation 
of  the inhabitants of  the village) was not striking by any means. The fi nancial 
positions of  his neighbors and relatives (which can be clearly traced in the census 
records) were closely linked to his cooperation with the regime.11 
The Preconditions: A Life Story before the Secret Police
Gy. was born in 1923, the son of  a mechanic who worked at the Salgótarján Coal 
Mine Company, which was sinking into fi nancial ruin because of  the new borders 
of  the Treaty of  Trianon, which severed the mines from many of  the communities 
they have served. His mother used her mother’s Swabian name.12 Gy.’s mother, 
like her mother before her, gave birth to her fi rst child at the age of  sixteen as an 
unwed girl. Fortunately for her, one fi ne day towards the end of  World War I she 
was introduced to a man six years her senior, a locksmith named Aladár whose 
family was part of  the petty nobility and who would later become Gy.’s father. 
Until the beginning of  the Communist era in Hungary, Gy. spelled his family name 
with the letter “y” on the end, an indication of  noble rank, but he then changed 
it to “i,” which helped spare him the wrath of  the authorities. Aladár’s father was 
a magistrate of  an administrative district in Zagyvapálfalva, a village that later was 
inundated with miners, but according to the recollections of  family members, after 
11  Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára [Hungarian National Archives, hereafter: MNL]. 
XXXII-23-a 1970. évi népszámlálás [National Census Records, 1970]. Nógrád, Kisterenye, 1970. évi. 019 
számlálókörzet anyagai.
12  MNL Nógrád Megyei Levéltár [Nógrád County Archive], hereafter: NML. XXXIII. Anyakönyvi 
kivonatok másodpéldányai. Születési anyakönyvek. [Duplicates of  Registration Cerfi ciates. Birth 
Certifi cates]. Zagyvapálfalva. 1915–1924.
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the war, having been caught embezzling money from the widows’ war relief  fund, 
he shot himself  in the head, either out of  guilt or shame.13 Aladár had only one 
fl aw: he limped, because during the war he had been shot in the heel while serving 
on the front by Isonzo. So he was slightly less popular among the women. This 
may explain why he was willing to marry a woman who had already given birth to 
an illegitimate child. She would give birth to six more children. The birth registries 
of  her many children allow one to track the wanderings of  the family in the mining 
region relatively easily. Gy. had two older sisters, but following the death of  his 
older brother in childhood he was the oldest boy in the family. (His parents went 
on to have three more children, all girls.)14
Sociolographer Zoltán Szabó characterized Kisterenye, the village in Nógrád 
county where Gy. was born, in the 1930s as a community in which, in exchange 
for their submissiveness and compliance, workers could live a bit better: “they 
had the best opportunities regarding schooling for their children, they read 
the most bourgeois newspapers, and most of  the radios were playing in their 
apartments.”15 The village had a public elementary school paid for by the mine, a 
tavern, a club for balls, a physician’s offi ce and, in the middle of  the settlement, 
a soccer fi eld, which was the center of  social life and the marriage market. Girls 
could gather to socialize near the fi eld without having to fear people gossiping 
about them. Gy. met his wife by the soccer fi eld, leaning on the fence. In the 
village, a house with two rooms, like the one in which Gy.’s family lived (with six 
children), counted as upper middle class in the local community. The careers of  
Gy.’s surviving brothers are tales of  social mobility. One of  his younger brothers 
became a factory director (towards the end of  his life he was discharged with 
a pension after facing accusations of  having abused his position as director for 
personal gain).16 His other brother became an accountant and was later found 
guilty of  embezzlement.17
13  Most of  these details could be reconstructed from the registers of  birth and recollections of  family 
members. Interviews with Mrs. Gy., Veronika G., the widow of  Gy., and Mrs. M. Ilonka G., his sister-in-law. 
Interviews were done by the author in October 2011 in Kisterenye.
14  NML. XXXIII. Duplicates of  registration certifi cates. Registers of  births. Zagyvapálfalva, Kisterenye.
15  Zoltán Szabó, Cifra nyomorúság [“Poverty in Fine Dress”] (Budapest: Cserépfalvi, 1938), 88–89.
16  As the general manager of  the Mátraaljai Coal Mines, he was awarded numerous state distinctions. 
In 1988, many complaints were lodged against him, and indeed this was even mentioned at sittings of  
the party committee. MNL. Heves Megyei Levéltár. XXXV. 22/2. Sittings of  the Heves County Party 
Committee of  the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. 14. box 187. custody section: Minutes of  the Sitting 
of  the Party Committee, March 31, 1988. 129.
17  NML. Balassagyarmati Büntető Törvényszék. XXV. 4 c. B 273/1954.
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For Gy.’s family, schooling meant an opportunity to rise in the social 
hierarchy, and they strove to take advantage of  this opportunity. In autumn 
1929, Gy. began to attend school, and in the fi rst class of  elementary school 
he was already among the best students in the class. He was given the highest 
possible marks in every subject with the exception of  reading.18 He may have 
been one of  the favorite students of  instructor Emil Sümeg. “Old man Emil,” 
as he was called, was the one-man organizer of  the school in the village, and he 
was passionate about the task. He was regarded as the “voice of  the people” in 
the village. He wrote petitions, as did Gy.’s social democratic father-in-law. For 
instance, after the occupation of  the country by Germany in March 1944, old 
man Emil denounced the German soldiers in the village to the management of  
the mine because they had insulted three women and “did not respect the fence, 
[…] in many places simply trampling them down.”19 Later his name was listed 
in the records of  the secret service recruits, but whatever reports he may have 
made did not survive.20 In the end, Gy. wrote one of  his fi rst reports for the 
communist secret police about Emil.
Because of  his excellent grades in school, Gy. was enrolled in the higher 
elementary school (a kind of  middle school, called polgári, which means citizen) 
in the neighboring agricultural town.  Because of  his acuity, he was allowed to 
begin in the second form, where he paid discounted tuition. The pupils from 
the mining towns went in separate train cars to the school, which was intended 
to fashion citizens out of  them who would be loyal to the state and could later 
fi ll positions in the local bureaucracy. In the fi rst semester, Gy. got the highest 
possible mark in only one subject, religious instruction. In the other subjects he 
usually got the lowest passing grade, though a few times he got a decent mark. 
His form-master classifi ed his handwriting as passably legible. This improved 
considerably with time. The handwritten reports that he submitted to the political 
police as an adult are written with precise, clearly legible letters, and as a young 
adult he also worked as a clerk at the mine. As the years passed, Gy. became 
better and better as a student, though he was never an outstanding talent.21
18  NML. VIII. 287. g. Documents of  the Elementary School of  the Mining Company of  Kisterenye-
Chorin. Attendance books.
19  Emil’s Sümegi’s letter quoted in András Szomszéd, Zagyva mentén “egybekelvén”. Bátonyterenye 
(Bátonyterenye: Önkormányzat, 2002), 134.
20  M-42230/1. 85 –86 and ÁSZTL. 3.1.9. V-150373. Summary report on the armed counter-revolutionary 
groups and organizations of  Nógrád County. March 23, 1959, 81.
21  NML. VIII. 202. A Pásztói Állami Polgári Fiú- és Leányiskola iratai. Anyakönyvek. (=Pásztói Polgári 
anyakönyvek). 4. d. 1934–1935 második b osztály anyakönyve.
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The representatives of  the city of  Pásztó were hesitant to vote on the 
establishment of  a school because of  the costs. The school commissioner 
convinced them to give their approval by informing them that if  they were to 
resolve to have the school built, they would be eligible to receive support from 
the state, which could be a good source of  income for local builders. If, however, 
the state were to order the construction of  a school because of  the size of  the 
population of  the city, then they would lose any possibility of  funding. The local 
farmers continued to look with skepticism on the idea of  a school.22 
The railway employees, however, saw schooling as an opportunity to rise 
in the community, as did the miners who in the meantime had immigrated to 
and colonized the city. Gy.’s class was comprised almost entirely of  the children 
of  the local employees and miners.23 All of  his siblings attended the higher 
elementary school, where they were given a patriotic education. As was noted 
in the school bulletin, the students began and ended the school day with prayer, 
as was common at the time. They commemorated the heroes of  the battle of  
Limonowa (in late 1914, the troops of  the Austro-Hungarian army defeated the 
army of  the Russian Czar near the city of  Limonowa in what today is Poland) 
and discussed the ties between the Hungarians and the Finno-Ugric peoples in 
Hungarian class (an idea that by then had gained widespread acceptance). In an 
attempt to support Hungarian industry, careful attention was paid to ensure that 
the students only used school supplies and materials for handicrafts that had 
been made in Hungary.24 
When Gy. was in the third grade, the schools found themselves obliged 
to introduce a uniform text for prayer and exclude all other prayers. Religion 
functioned as an obligatory state and ideological framework in the process 
of  fashioning the ideal citizenry. Gy., who like his father was a Calvinist, was 
almost alone in the almost entirely Catholic class. There were two Lutheran boys 
and also three Jews who, while the other students were reciting the text of  the 
uniform prayer, were allowed not to make the sign of  the cross.25
In 1937, following visits to the factory, Gy.’s class went on an excursion 
to Budapest. In Budapest, which to many of  the students must have seemed 
22  Nándor Pintér, Ferenc Vincze, and István Csépány, Pásztó története (Pásztó: a Pásztói Községi Tanács 
Végrehajtó Bizottsága, 1970), 37–39.
23  Pásztói Polgári Értesítője 1934–1935, 2–3; 34 –35.
24  Ibid., 7–8.
25  NML. VIII. 604. A Pásztói Kereskedelmi Szaktanfolyam iratai, benne a polgári iskolákra is vonatkozó 
körlevelek 1. d. Körlevél az egységes iskolai imádság bevezetése tárgyában, April 20, 1936.
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like an enormous metropolis, they watched the military parade that was held in 
honor of  the Italian king and queen on Mussolini Square (as of  1936, this was 
the name of  the square that today is Oktogon). The school yearbook contained 
the following lines about the event: “They can take everything from us, Trianon 
can banish planes from the skies, forbid tanks, but there is one thing they cannot 
take from our souls, cannot kill in our hearts: the Hungarian Soldier.”26 The 
notion of  the Hungarian soldier and the repudiation of  the Treaty of  Trianon 
(the post-war treaty according to which Hungary had lost roughly two-thirds 
of  its territory to the surrounding states in the wake of  World War I) were two 
pillars of  the cultivation of  a patriotic citizenry in the school.
The formal rank of  the institution as a grammar school did not guarantee 
the pupils positions in offi ces.27 When he left the school, as the oldest male child 
in the family Gy. pursued the study of  a trade in industry at the mine and waited 
for an opportunity to acquire a position at the railway, where salaries were much 
higher. In 1942, with his uncle’s help, he was given a position as a trainee at the 
Hungarian National Railway.28
Because of  the program promoting industrialization (the so-called 1938 
Győri program), the railway was expanding and needed more and more 
employees. In 1942, Gy. began to work as an apprentice in the stock room 
in the train station in Miskolc, a city in northeastern Hungary. However, one 
evening he was caught rummaging through boxes from the Cikta shoe factory 
(the Hungarian name for the Bata shoe factory) and also boxes of  cigarettes. 
In the wake of  the territorial changes according to which a strip of  territory in 
southern Czechoslovakia became part of  Hungary, the Czech company, Bata, 
founded a Hungarian factory. For Gy., the Cikta shoes were sort of  like an 
entrance ticket into the world of  the “middle class”. They did not actually fi nd 
any shoes on him, but they did fi nd two boxes of  so-called Dames cigarettes for 
women. Dames were the favorite cigarettes of  Katalin Karády, a popular actress 
at the time (the Hungarian Marlene Dietrich, as it were), and they were popular 
in part because of  their elegant, decorative packaging. Gy. may have wanted to 
use them as part of  a romantic conquest, because he smoked a different brand. 
He was given a reprimand and fi red.29 
26  Pásztói Polgári Értesítője, 1936–1937, 5.
27  See Tibor Péter Nagy, A növekvő állam árnyékában. Oktatás, politika 1867–1945 (Budapest: Gondolat, 
2011), 312–13.
28  Recollections of  his widow. Interview done by the author in October 2011.
29  MÁV Irattár. 7352/1942. Csontos István főraktárnok jelentése, Miskolc, March 2, 1942.
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He was nonetheless able to fi nd a position as a traffi c assistant at another 
railway post in Transdanubia, since the records were not coordinated on the 
national level. In 1944, the frontline reached his station in Fejér County. He 
served in Seregélyes, a settlement not far from Székesfehérvár, on the front, 
the so-called Margit-line, which was one of  the best fortifi ed defense lines in 
Hungary and in the winter of  1944 was becoming rigid. According to the locals, 
towards the end of  the war the village went back and forth between the Soviet 
and the German forces seven times.30 Gy. escaped conscription, but at the time 
of  the second occupation of  the village by the Germans (which witnessed the 
vengeful acts of  Arrow Cross men from the area around Székesfehérvár) he 
committed the act for which he was later convicted of  being a war criminal. 
Indirectly because of  him, a Ruthenian railway employee was executed. The man, 
who was accused of  having helped the Soviet soldiers get women in the village 
and having robbed the offi cial residence of  the station agent, was executed. 
When the German soldiers recaptured the village (in the course of  a maneuver 
called Konrad III), Gy. reported the Ruthenian man to the gendarmerie in 
Székesfehérvár, which at the time was working together closely with the Arrow 
Cross. Not once in the records of  the people’s tribunal was the man’s name 
spelled correctly, but thanks to the digitalized documents and records of  the 
Archives of  the Hungarian National Railway and the assistance of  an archivist 
(and also a bit of  good luck), I was able to identify him and fi nd his descendants. 
The history of  the Ruthenian railway employee offers a pithy encapsulation of  
the experiences of  the inhabitants of  Sub-Carpathia between 1939 and 1944, 
as well as their relationship to Hungary. Without ever having changed places of  
residence, over the course of  his life the man worked for the railway service of  
three different countries (since in the space of  a mere two decades the territory 
was part fi rst of  the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, then Czechoslovakia, and 
then Hungary). Then, like most people from Sub-Carpathia, he was labeled a 
“politically unreliable Ruthenian” and sent to the western Hungarian border and 
then the stations near the front.31 The confl ict between him and the station 
agent arose because the station master failed to pay him three months’ salary in 
30  For more on the battles near this front line see: Csaba Veress D., “A II. világháború hadműveletei 
Fejér megyében (1944. december 3 – 1945. március 23.),” in Harcok és bűnök, ed. József  Csurgai Horváth, 
Tamás Tihanyi, and Csaba Veress D.  (Székesfehérvár: Fejér Megyei Önkormányzat, 2002), 115–18.
31  MÁV Irattár. Szmolánka László szolgálati aktája; MÁV Irattár. 290/1940. Bánhegyi István. 
Áthelyezések Kárpátalja területéről.  A Magyar Királyi Államvasutak  igazgatóságának bizalmas levele 
valamennyi üzletvezetőségnek. 1940. július 24.
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advance, which all the other employees had received with the approach of  the 
front.32 
After the war, Gy. became one of  the targets of  the Communist political 
police, which was beginning to organize in Székesfehérvár.33 In 1949, the offi cer 
responsible for his case, a man named Gyögy Székely, emigrated for the West, and 
the state security forces gathered a signifi cant amount of  material on him when 
he was abroad, because he was accused of  collaborating with the English secret 
service.34 When the case involving Gy. was underway, Székely was not named 
chief  of  police in Székesfehérvár, which was a sign of  the temporary relegation 
of  the Communist police to the background.35 In 1945, Gy. was acquitted, the 
confessions that had been extracted from him by the police notwithstanding, as 
indeed was the overwhelming majority of  people facing accusations in front of  
the people’s court in Székesfehérvár. What factors determined whether someone 
was convicted of  war crimes or not?
The marginalization of  the Communists in rural areas towards the end of  
1945 made it possible for the accused who stood before the tribunal, which 
was by no means in the hands of  the Communists, to withdraw confessions 
that had been made (often violently coerced) to the police, which was in the 
hands of  the Communists.36 On the basis of  the ruling, if  someone helped the 
gendarmerie commit an act that was regarded as “necessary retribution” or that 
was in compliance with the laws at the time, this did not constitute a war crime. 
Since the police had acted in compliance with the laws that were in effect in 1944, 
according to this logic the deportations and the provision of  assistance with the 
deportations were not illegal unless someone had been excessively “diligent.” 
The tribunal regarded Gy.s report, which had resulted in a man’s execution, as 
legal, and the members of  the tribunal were able to portray the victim, whose 
32  Budapest Municipal Archives (=BFL) XXV. 2-b. People’s Prosecutor of  Budapest. Criminal Cases. 
Documents of  the Criminal Case of  Gy. 689/1948. consolidated with 88425/1949. Confession of  the 
Station Master of  Mezősi.
33  MNL. Fejér County Archive (=FML) XXIV. 18. Székesfehérvár Városi Rendőrkapitányság Általános 
Iratok,  1.d.
34  ÁSzTL. 3.2.5. “Colorado” O-8-018/1. 520. Jelentés Székely György százados ügyéről. Sütöry Lajos 
áv. ny. alhadgy. Székesfehérvár, 1950. július 10.
35  FML. IV. 402. Fejér Vármegye Törvényhatósági Bizottságának iratai. Közgyűlés. 1945. szeptember 
26.
36  FML. XXIV. 18. Székesfehérvár Városi Rendőrfőkapitányság. Általános iratok. 1.d; FML. XVII. 401. 
Fejér Vármegye Központi és Székesfehérvár Járási 3. sz. Igazoló Bizottság. 1. d. 22/1945. Törvényszéki 
alkalmazottak. Boda József, a Gy. ügyében tanácsvezető bíró életrajza az igazolási eljáráshoz.
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name they could not spell and about whom they knew next to nothing, as guilty 
without any discussion.37 
Having been acquitted, Gy. returned to his village. With the help of  his 
family, he found a position at the mine as a clerk. In 1946, he wrote a few lines 
in Népsport (“People’s Sports”) about the local miners’ soccer team, which was 
doing well at the time. Few people knew anything about his case. He married 
the daughter, a girl sixteen years of  age, of  a prominent local Social Democratic 
miner who, as a something of  an active agitator, paid visits to prisons between 
1917 and 1957, under several different political systems. His father-in-law, 
furthermore, was an important fi gure of  the Social Democratic party in Nógrád, 
which to an extent broke from “mainstream” Peyer Social Democratic ideas.38 
He was present at strikes that were held in the village of  Etes during World War 
I and in the crowd that gathered before the massacre in Salgótarján in 1956. 
His political activism made him a symbolic fi gure in the area. Gy. argued about 
politics with him more than with anyone else.
In 1948, before he emigrated, Székely, the police captain who had 
interrogated and beaten Gy. in 1945, traveled to Budapest, where he met with 
the National Soviet of  the People’s Tribunals. Gy.’s case was reopened and he 
was sentenced to ten years of  forced labor, though the sentence was changed 
to imprisonment.39 He was put in the prison on Kozma Street in Budapest, 
which at the time was one of  the strictest prisons in Hungary. I was allowed by 
the director of  the prison to examine prison fi les that have not yet been turned 
over to the archives.40 In 1950, the Hungarian State Security Authorities took 
over control of  the building, and there was greater need for space in the cells, 
which had once been crowded with the accused who had been convicted by 
the people’s tribunals.41 In early 1950, Gy. was granted amnesty in order to help 
address the lack of  space. Initially, he worked as a barrowman in the mine, but 
as he was not accustomed to diffi cult physical labor and was able to write well, 
37  BFL. XXV. 2-b. Budapesti Népügyészség. Büntetőügyek. 689/1948. On the functions of  people’s 
courts in Hungary and in Eastern Europe see: The Politics of  Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its 
Aftermath, ed. István Deák, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); 
and recently Ildikó Barna and Andrea Pető, Political Justice Budapest after World War II (Budapest: CEU Press, 
2014).
38  BFL. XXV. 1.a. Budapesti Népbíróság. 1949 – 1081. G. János ügye.
39  BFL. XXV. 2-b. Budapesti Népügyészség. Büntetőügyek. 689/1948. Nb XII. 802/1948/2. Ítélet. 
1948. október 15.
40  Budapesti Fegyház és Börtön Irattára. Fegyencnapló 3296-3599. No. 3299.
41  Ibid., Napi parancsok. 1947–1952.
68
Hungarian Historical Review 4,  no. 1  (2015): 56–81
with the help of  sympathetic souls who had gathered around him, he was given 
a position—of  no great prominence—in an offi ce.42
In 1956, Nógrád, which was regarded as a county rife with the spirit of  
rebellion, played an important role in national politics, since lack of  coal due 
to the miners’ strike crippled industrial production.43 This is one of  the reasons 
why the fi rst Kádár government strove to restart production by using workers’ 
councils.44 Gy. was elected by his coworkers to serve as a member of  the workers’ 
council at his workplace.45 Later, the workers’ councils were cast as enemies of  
the people in the offi cial discourses of  the Kádár era. By the end of  1957, the 
local Social Democrats had also come to be seen or at least cast by the regime as 
enemies of  the people. Gy.’s fi rst important task was to keep them under close 
watch, and his father-in-law, an old Social Democrat, was the fi rst person of  
interest.
The Proper Report: Pedagogy of  the Oppressed? 
Reports and the bureaucratic forms of  the reports (i.e. the written reports) were 
important elements of  the “institutionalized culture of  complaint,” as several 
historians have referred to it.46 It is not irrelevant, however, to consider who 
obtained the right to lodge complaints and how, and whose complaints were 
actually taken seriously. Anyone whose complaint was taken seriously unavoidably 
became part of  the state exercise of  power, since the complaint functioned as 
the point of  departure for the series of  measures that were taken by the state. In 
order for a complaint to taken seriously, it had to be lodged in the proper form, 
according to the discursive styles of  the state bureaucracy. Thus the authors of  
the reports adopted numerous elements of  style and rhetoric in order to ensure 
that their complaints would be heard. I analyze how these reports actually gave 
42  The source of  his precise position: NML. XXIX. 681.  I. A. 16. Nógrádi Szénbányászati Tröszt 
(NSZB). Újlaki bányaüzem. Csigai lejtősakna. Kisterenye. NSZB. Baleset-jelentőkönyv.
43  László Á. Varga, ed., 1956 Nógrád megyei kronológiája és személyi adattára: a forr. eseményei és aktív szereplői a 
megyében (Salgótarján: Nógrád Megyei Levéltár, 1996).
44  One of  the functions of  the worker council’s from the point of  view of  the government at the end 
of  1956 was to start industrial production in the wake of  several strikes; however, for the most part they 
did not fulfi ll this task. For more on this see: Pittaway, The Workers’ State, 230 –56.
45  ÁSzTL. V-141818. Vizsgálati dosszié Filep Lajos ügyében; ÁSzTL. O –15325. 1a. 487–88.
46  Cf. Joachim Staadt, Eingaben: Die institutionalisierte Meckerkultur in der DDR (Berlin: Forschungsverbund 
SED-Staat, 1996); Paul Betts, Within Walls: Private Life in the German Democratic Republic (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 173.
Learning the Language of  Collaboration after 1956 in Hungary
69
someone the opportunity “to get as close to a public sphere as one is likely to 
get” under the Kádár regime.47
In this section of  my article I argue that the participants in the secret police 
network, which included the agents (informants), the case offi cers (who oversaw 
the work of  the agents), and the people who read the reports, sought solutions to 
the problems of  their private lives by presenting them as if  they were communal 
issues. In part as a consequence of  this, they blurred the border between the 
private and public spheres by divulging the details of  their private lives, thereby 
making communal (and therefore state) control seem more acceptable. By 
revealing details of  their private lives, the authors of  the reports let the fi gures 
of  the state bureaucracy into their bedrooms, which they were not actually 
obliged to do, making their private lives part of  the state bureaucracy by seeking 
solutions, with their reports, to their personal problems. The decision to blabber 
about one’s private life was for the most part the result of  a personal decision 
on the part of  an author seeking to further his or her own personal interests. 
One of  the goals of  the network of  informants was thus not simply to ensure 
knowledge of  and control over the circles in which the agents moved, but also 
to transform the informants themselves into bureaucrats on whom the regime 
could rely. Moreover, the authors of  the reports attempted to veil their personal 
interests by (over)emphasizing their sense of  responsibility to the community. 
In other words, both sides used the secret police network to achieve their goals: 
the network was used not only by the regime for purposes of  surveillance and 
control, but also the operatives (the case offi cers and the unoffi cial informants), 
who used it in their interests. Indeed, their personal interests were far more 
important from their perspectives. This raises an important question, namely, 
who had the right to lodge a personal complaint, and what was the proper 
manner of  doing so.
Gy. was 34 years old when he was recruited as an agent. He had three small 
children. His older daughter, who had been born while he was in prison, was 9 
and was in school. His son, who was 4, had not been accepted to the kindergarten, 
and his wife took care of  their youngest daughter, who was barely more than 
one year old and who had been born in 1956, during the miners’ strike.48 Gy., 
who was not terribly accustomed to hard labor in an underground mine, fi rst 
47  Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s”, 
Slavic Review 55, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 78. Fitzpatrick raises this question regarding the Stalinist period of  
the 1930s.
48  NML. Kisterenyei születési anyakönyvi kivonatok.
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worked in an offi ce. As of  the beginning of  1957, he worked underground, and 
not just on paper, but in reality, as a barrowman, in three shifts. Workers were 
given bonus pay for working on Sundays, but in his case this bonus was withheld 
as punishment. His youngest daughter, who had been born in September 1956, 
was a year and a half  old at the beginning of  1958, when the family was told 
she could attend the nursery school, which was a modest dream come true for 
them.49 She was accepted into the nursery soon after Gy. began writing reports. 
Gy. had many reasons to submit to the regime and write reports: the hope that 
he might be reassigned to a position in the offi ce, the possibility that he might 
be able to fi nd employment for his wife, and later the hope that his children 
would be given places in the nursery and kindergarten, since his wife had fallen 
gravely ill. (He even made specifi c mention of  the question of  admittance to the 
kindergarten in one of  his reports, and the secret police helped him resolve the 
problem.)
Gy. and his case offi cer learned, largely in the course of  their collaborative 
work, how to write a good report, and this enabled them to write numerous 
reports, and at their own initiative. Gy. found it diffi cult to imitate the style of  
the reports, and he had hardly had much instruction. As a mining clerk, he had 
grown accustomed to beginning a text by addressing its projected audience, but 
obviously he couldn’t address his fi rst case offi cer, named Ecsegi, as “esteemed 
lieutenant, Sir,” or “esteemed comrade” because of  the conspiracy, because this 
might imply collusion. He didn’t know quite how to start. In the end, he began 
his fi rst report in an offi cial tone: “I respectfully report that Sándor B., a resident 
of  the Kossuth neighborhood of  Kisterenye […]” This was followed by a brief  
description of  the man in question, “brown-haired, tall,” and then a reference 
to his health as an identifying feature (he had a limp). The physical description 
was followed by an important characterization of  his political stance, which 
later became one of  Gy.’s favorite formulas: “he is an enemy of  the people’s 
democracy.” This phrase he borrowed from the contemporary propaganda.50
Gy. had to be sure to write something that would be useful and incriminating, 
for he must have feared that if  he were to submit a useless report, he himself  
might be dragged off  to prison, as he had been in 1948 and as his coworkers 
had been after 1956. He was very afraid of  prison. According to his wife, “he 
49  Recollection of  Veronika Gy., Gy.’s widow.
50  ÁSzTL. M-42230. 59–60. Gy.’s report of  December 22, 1957.
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was badly beaten, he did not engage in politics.”51 However, of  the members of  
his family, he engaged in politics more intensively than anyone else at that time.
Gy. provided—probably in response to a specifi c request—a dramatic 
description of  a dialogue just before the Salgótarján massacre that he had heard 
more than a year earlier: “the aforementioned went over to the shaft [of  the 
mine] and made the following declaration: ‘everyone out of  the engine room 
and off  to [Salgó]Tarján. Your place is there. Anyone who doesn’t come is an 
enemy of  the people.’”52 Then another cliché regarding the enemy, which this 
time he put in the mouth of  the enemy so that it would be understandable. Gy. 
submitted reports that clearly resembled denunciations. He thereby managed 
to ensure that his reports would be read and taken seriously, even if  he wasn’t 
able to imitate the styles of  the offi cial discourse perfectly, and that he would be 
praised for his diligence.
Gy. managed to exceed expectations when completing his next task as well. 
His task, which was intended as a good warm-up for the novice agent, was to 
provide descriptions of  the characters of  two Social Democrats who were well-
known in the village. The fi rst of  these two men was Gy.’s father-in-law himself, 
who was almost seventy years old, and Gy. provided a detailed characterization 
indeed. The warm-up task in other cases was also not something unusual, since 
fi rst he had to learn the bureaucratic rules of  the genre and the form of  the 
report. In 1957, every Social Democrat was regarded as an enemy of  the party, 
as they were seen as people who might insight workers to strike. Gy.s’ report on 
his father-in-law was not restrained. “He is right-wing in his biases, someone 
who is not pleased by the fact that the Communists are in power,” he wrote, in 
the precise handwriting he had learned in the higher elementary school. And in 
order to ensure that his audience appreciated his achievement, he added, “he was 
never pleased by the fact that in the elections in 1945 and then the next elections, 
MKP [Hungarian Communist Party] […] won. He was always an agitator of  
the former Social Democrat party.”53 But alongside the political concerns, Gy. 
also makes frequent mention of  personal tensions: “He is very verbose and 
quarrelsome.”54
51  Recollection of  Veronika Gy., Gy.’s widow. Interview made by the author October 25, 2011 in 
Kisterenye.
52  ÁSzTL. M-42230. 59–60. Gy.’s report of  December 22, 1957.
53  The 1945 national elections in the village were won by the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP: 
46.5%). The Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKgP) got only 28.5% of  the vote and the Social Democrats 
only 21.2%. Szomszéd, Zagyva mentén “egybekelvén”, 140–41. 
54  Ibid.
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Gy. wrote this report at home. In the modest miner’s residence he seems to 
have found a corner where he could hide his deeds from his three children. He 
complained, however, that it was diffi cult for him to write reports in the tight 
space of  his home. “Back home it was hard to write,” he complained. It was 
diffi cult to work, and he had not been given an offi ce. His case offi cer, Ecsegi, 
liked his style, but Ecsegi’s superior wanted something different: “we must fi nd 
out, by using the agents, what kinds of  connections there are among the old 
Social Democrats in Kisterenye, Nagybátony, and Salgótarján. Are there any 
such people at all? Who are these people?”55 In the end, both Ecsegi and Gy. 
learned what their task was. They did not have to fumble in the dark. Later, the 
case offi cer switched the order of  the fi rst two reports in the fi le precisely for 
this reason. It became clear for them that the Social Democrats were the topic 
of  interest, not the 1956 massacre in Salgótarján.
The third report was the fi rst to bear this word, “Report,” as its title. They 
fi nally told Gy. to write this word at the top of  the page. Ecsegi told him other 
things as well. Gy. begins the text with the “my task was to” formula. One of  the 
fi rst Social Democrats Gy. was instructed to observe was his former instructor, 
the former director of  the elementary school in the miner’s settlement, Emil 
Sümegi, who had taught Gy. to write. Gy. contacted Sümegi, allegedly in order to 
request assistance ensuring that his four-and-a-half  year old son would be given 
a place in the kindergarten. In his report, Gy. complains about the diffi culty he 
faced securing a place for his child in the school: “When the enrollments were 
going on, on September 1, 1957 my son’s application was rejected. I asked him to 
dictate a petition to the Minister of  Education or somewhere. I very much want 
him to be allowed to attend the school, since he cries about how badly he wants 
to be a kindergarten pupil. It would be easier for us too, his parents, if  the task 
of  caring for one of  the children were entrusted to the kindergarten. He replied 
to my request by saying that we Social Democrats are oppressed.” (underlined in 
the original) Ecsegi found this last half-sentence of  the text important, and he 
underlined it. The link between the agent’s task, his complaint, and his personal 
interest is clear.
Gy. wrote down Sümegi’s contention, according to which any petition 
authored by him would be rejected, no matter where he sent it. (Sümegi was 
mistaken in this, the secret police may have intervened, since in the end the 
boy was admitted to the kindergarten.) The question of  the boy’s enrollment in 
55  Ibid., 54.
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the kindergarten became an issue with implications relevant to national politics, 
since according to their dialogue ultimately the issue depended on whether or 
not it was worthwhile to submit any petition regarding admittance to the school. 
According to Gy., Sümegi said the following: “In any event let’s wait for the 
Bulganin peace proposal.56 If  they can reach an agreement, then elections will 
be held with oversight, and then we Social Democrats will win.” Following their 
discussion of  the question of  enrollment, Gy. asked Sümegi about his views of  
the peace negotiations. The last sentence of  the report caught Ecsegi’s attention: 
“for the moment we must wait.” Clearly, the implication—that the retired Social 
Democratic instructor had been waiting for the opportune moment to topple 
Soviet power in a small village in Hungary—was absurd, but also useful to 
Ecsegi, since Sümegi was also a functionary of  the system. Ecsegi found the 
report on Sümegi so important that he soon told Gy. to pay him another visit. 
Sümegi’s opinion, however, was not important because the authorities actually 
feared him, but rather because he too was an “agent of  the department of  
internal affairs,” as Ecsegi wrote in his assessment of  the report. So his political 
reliability and political inclinations were important from the perspective of  his 
reports.57 Gy. and Sümegi were used to keep tabs on each other, while the two of  
them both used the network of  connections to serve their interests (for instance 
the question of  gaining admittance for a child to the kindergarten).
As his next task, Gy. was told to monitor the actions of  four Social 
Democrats. He fi lled more than fi ve pieces of  paper with his observations. 
The possibility of  gaining admittance for his child to the kindergarten made 
him particularly diligent.58 Like his report on his father-in-law, his report on 
the four Social Democrats also began with the “my task was to” formula (he 
only later adopted the practice of  writing in the third-person singular in order 
to mislead the enemy years). Gy. began to think of  himself  as a person of  no 
small importance. He was less afraid, and sometimes he even tried to save or 
help others. The more politically passive someone was, the more the network of  
power liked this. In his reports, Gy. noted someone’s political passiveness if  he 
sought to avoid causing the person grief. According to him, in the depths of  the 
mine “the current session of  the National Assembly came up.” This observation 
regarding what transpired in the mines was seen as particularly signifi cant, in 
56  For more on this confl ict (accessed February 15, 2015), see: http://web.stanford.edu/group/
tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/200-1956-11-KS-f-LIZ.pdf.
57  ÁSzTL. M-42230. 85 –86.
58  Ibid., 64–69. Gy.’s report of  January 30, 1958.
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part because it had been made by Gy. at his own initiative. It had not been part 
of  one of  his explicit tasks. He was therefore given a different shift in the mine 
so that he would be able to observe others while they worked. He was also given 
a raise.  
The text of  his next report, which was written less than two months after 
the fi rst one, is testimony to his development as an agent.59 He had something to 
say. He wrote almost four pages of  observations. A good half  of  his remarks did 
not directly involve the instructions he had been given and were introduced with 
the formula, “and in addition I note that…” He provided an account of  the ball 
that was held in the mining community and the profi teering that was allegedly 
underway involving the sale of  wine. In a manner that was thinly veiled at best, 
Gy. began to use the reports as a forum with which to take steps to improve 
his life and the lives of  those around him. Like a king in disguise, he sought to 
dispense justice, or at least this is the portrait he paints of  himself  in the reports.
 The detailed description of  the costume ball was Gy.’s fi rst carefully 
thought-out composition in which he himself  chose the subject of  his report. 
He wrote a kind of  self-standing denunciation within the framework of  
the report. There are no surviving family pictures of  the ball, but there are 
pictures of  the ball that was held the following year. In the pictures, Gy. and 
the members of  his family can be seen wearing their costumes. Gy. is dressed 
in traditional ceremonial Hungarian attire. His oldest daughter is dressed as one 
of  the odalisque’s of  the Turkish pasha. There is a picture of  his wife and her 
younger sister. In his denunciation, Gy. stands up for the crowd at the ball with 
his contention that Dobrocsi and Ogulin, a miner and a retired miner who were 
in charge of  serving the wine and spirits, were turning a personal profi t on the 
wine. As a conscientious consumer he took a stand and used his connections, 
though this stance, of  course, was little more than a discursive posture that he 
adopted in order to achieve his personal goals. In fact, Gy. himself  could have 
served the wine, instead of  the two “profi teers,” since he and his father-in-law 
had a good relationship with a wine-grower in the city of  Verpelét (a village that 
was known in the region for its fi ne wines). The issue at hand was a question of  
business interests. According to Gy,’s report, “many people say that Dobrocsi 
and his lot charge as much as they want for wine.” Gy. sometimes also breaks 
the rule according to which he should use the third-person singular: “On one 
occasion I asked for a wine spritzer […] Gy. also asked for a wine spritzer, but 
59  Ibid., 73–76.
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they didn’t give him one because there was no soda water.” In order to attain his 
goal, he even adopted a rather underhanded strategy and referred in his report 
not only to the alleged profi teering, but also to the acts Dobrocsi and Ogulin 
had (purportedly) committed in 1956 during the Revolution. According to his 
report, in 1956 they had “transported the drinks, the wine and brandy.”
Gy. wanted to play a central role among the “sport friends” (this was the 
term that was used for the regular spectators at the soccer games and the people 
who participated in the organizational work related to the team). After 1956, 
however, his chances were not good, given his political past. However, years 
later he became the president of  the local soccer division, which was important 
because at the time as many as 1,000 people might attend a given match, i.e. 
half  of  the population of  the mining town. The soccer games were the most 
important social events, after the miners’ balls.60 It’s possible that he accused 
Dobrocsi of  wrongdoing because Dobrocsi, who lived with his family next to 
the soccer fi eld and across from the sports club, was doing a bit better than he 
was. He was accused of  embezzlement from his workplace, though his daughter 
and his widow have no recollection of  any sanctions or punishment.61 Gy.’s 
report did not bring about the result he had hoped for, though offi cer Ecsegi 
did send it on to the criminal division. 
When the threat of  a possible strike had been averted, Gy. was given another 
range of  duties. He was charged with the task of  observing his old “bird-of-a-
feather colleagues,” the former sympathizers of  the Arrow Cross. He had to 
report on people who were regarded as “Arrow Cross” or “gendarmes.” Since 
he himself  was on fi le as a “bird-of-a-feather” (in spite of  the fact that he was 
also considered a Social Democrat because of  his father-in-law), he knew who 
the authorities were thinking about. 
In his reports, Gy. frequently recounts how, in the course of  soccer matches, 
he would begin conversations with the people under observation in order to 
learn more about their political views. The Salgótarján soccer team was one 
of  the best teams outside of  Budapest at the time. As a supporter of  the local 
team, the organizer of  the various tasks regarding the its upkeep was able to 
chat with almost anyone about the games, and he could use these opportunities 
to discover details about people’s political views, even the people who were the 
60  Recollections of  János V., deputy-president of  the local soccer division. Interview done by the author. 
October 25, 2011 in Kisterenye.
61  Recollections of  Dobrocsi’s widow and daughter. Interview done by the author with Mrs. István 
Dobrocsi (1919) and her daughter, Mrs. Gábor O. (1942), October 21, 2011, Budapest. 
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most reluctant to talk on the subject. Gy. sought to cast aspersions on one of  the 
local “petty monarchs,” a man name Racskó, whom he portrayed as someone 
loyal to the old system.62 Thus, he was able to present himself  as a righter of  
wrongs, who was acting not in his own personal interests, but rather in the 
interests of  the community, even if  there was some overlap between the two.
Conclusion
As an examination of  the early reports submitted by Gy. reveals, in order to 
attain his goals he fi rst had to learn the style necessary in order to write reports 
that would be met with interest among the authorities. Later he attempted to 
portray his work, which was done primarily in the service of  his interests, as 
a kind of  process of  dispensing justice, a process that was, according to his 
depiction, closely tied to the exigencies of  the state. But loyalty alone would not 
have been enough to have enabled him to obtain admittance for his child to the 
kindergarten with the help of  the department of  internal affairs, or later, in the 
1970s, to get permission for a private enterprise of  his son. When he wanted to 
achieve a specifi c goal, he began to go into copious detail, and he transformed his 
reports into denunciations, sometimes using articles in the local newspaper for 
help. On other occasions, when he submitted reports that were curt and offered 
little detail, this could be interpreted as a form of  political passiveness, and he 
also helped others avoid the wrath of  the authorities by characterizing them as 
politically passive, which at the time was the kindest thing one could say about 
someone under observation by the state. He portrayed himself  as politically 
passive as well, though by submitting reports he continuously infl uenced the 
lives of  those around him, since he often steered their conversations in the 
direction of  politics specifi cally because he had been charged with the task of  
doing so. He was a bureaucrat without a desk or offi ce. His “friendships” were 
little more than offi cial affairs. The details of  his reports, which were intended 
to demonstrate his aptness for the role, were as much a part of  the game as the 
reports written in self-defense, the primary goal of  which was to ensure that 
he himself  would not be seen as responsible for anything. An act of  vengeance 
motivated by envy (in the case of  alleged profi teering with wine) was written in 
the style of  a petition, however, so that it would be sure to catch the attention 
of  the authorities. 
62  ÁSzTL. M-42230. 95–96. Report of  March 27, 1958.
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He was as passionate in his denunciations of  the local “petty monarchs” 
(people who played infl uential local roles because of  their access to political 
power) as he was in his purported role as the defender of  the oppressed 
and defenseless. In the state bureaucracy, which followed characteristically 
paternalistic traditions, this mode of  administration was entirely commonplace 
and long-standing. In practical affairs, archaic rhetoric that rested on references 
to supporters and principles that were little more than matters of  terminology 
harmonized perfectly well with Communist ideology because of  the inclination 
of  communist thinking in a normative system. 
One of  the recurring questions historians who deal with the communist 
era must address is whether or not the “ordinary people” whose cooperation 
was instrumental to the functioning of  the state actually identifi ed with or how 
far accepted the goals of  that state.63 According to the totalitarian paradigm, 
the state and the citizen were locked in a struggle like David and Goliath, and 
in the end the weaker but more clever and cunning of  the two would triumph. 
These are stories of  oppression and resistance, the stories of  perpetrators 
and victims, stories the in adequacies of  which, as narratives of  the past, have 
already been clearly shown time and time again by representatives of  the so-
called revisionist school of  Sovietology. Gy.’s story and the texts he crafted 
clearly illustrate that the personal decisions of  ordinary people and the methods 
they used in order to achieve their aims infl uenced the functioning of  the state. 
Furthermore, the self-portrayals and discourses of  the people who used the 
system for personal advantage also changed, since the acceptance of  the rules 
of  the game left its mark on them. The Kádár system, which maintained power 
in part by searching for compromises, nonetheless still rested on essentially 
Stalinist principles, though it gave the people who took part in the mechanics 
of  the system the impression that they could exert an infl uence on it. The sense 
of  an open (or at least somewhat open) public sphere contributed to this, as 
did the (pseudo) debates in the press or the apparent attention that was given 
to the reports submitted by the informants who helped the state security forces. 
All of  this provided new energies for the everyday workings of  the system, 
which thus enjoyed a signifi cantly greater degree of  acceptance and stability 
by the 1960s than it had before 1956. Ultimately, to the extent that the Kádár 
regime represented a rupture with the classic Stalinism of  the early 1950s, this 
63  See John Connelly’s inquiry on this matter with regards to Nazi Germany, John Connelly, “The Uses 
of  Volksgemeinschaft,” The Journal of  Modern History 68, no. 4. (December 1996): 899–930.
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break lay in its more perceptive grasp of  people’s everyday lives and inclinations 
and the discourses on experience.64 The denunciations bundled into the reports 
offered an opportunity for an agent to realize personal aims as if  he or she were 
fi ghting in the interests of  the larger community and sought to take part in the 
functioning of  the state by playing an active role in politics. Dispensing justice 
like a king in disguise, the agent, who was thus a representative of  political power, 
would obtain his goals by alternately pursuing personal aims and playing the 
necessary bureaucratic roles. This not only strengthened the appearance of  the 
legitimacy of  the state, but also made the role of  an agent acceptable to people 
who portrayed themselves as if  they were writing reports on the community 
(including relatives and neighbors) in the very interests of  that community. 
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A Curious Case of  Cooperation and Coexistence: 
Church–State Engagement and Oppositional Free Spaces 
in Communist Yugoslavia and East Germany
The communist parties of  Eastern Europe sought to organize power relations to 
preclude potential opposition. While successful in aligning society, the economy, culture, 
education and politics in party institutions, East Germany and Yugoslavia approached 
the execution of  religious policy from a contrasting perspective. Unable to marginalize 
religion completely, the party and national churches entered into a vibrant, incentives-
based back-and-forth. Over time, Church–state accommodation crystallized, producing 
Church-based free spaces located outside of  the standard communist power structure. 
However, the ways in which East Germany and Yugoslavia engaged their churches 
generated different forms of  Church-based free space, which, by the late 1980s, 
produced variegated forms of  anti-communist opposition. 
Keywords: Eastern Europe, Civil Society, Church, Communism, Religious Policy, 
Nationalism, Oppositional Movements
Introduction
Government policy affects the spaces in which social actors work, designates and 
delineates boundaries and creates distinguishable spheres in which stakeholders 
act. While laws and legislation demonstrate where the lines of  acceptable 
political behavior lie, often they are subject to negotiation, mutual agreements 
or contentious dispute. These back-and-forth exchanges produce policies that 
rarely remain static. Over time, fl uid, dynamic relationships evolve between key 
stakeholders and elites, which further modify the policy’s trajectory, opening 
doors for new interpretations and new modes of  acting. 
Even in communist East Germany (GDR) and Yugoslavia, where authority 
was concentrated in single-party authoritarianism, power relations were neither 
a one-way street, nor were they monopolistic. There was one policy arena, 
in which one fi nds an illustrative example of  fl uid two-way, agent-to-agent 
engagement and cooperation: the arena of  Church–state relations. Despite 
times of  marginalization and suppression, it was the only policy arena that 
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necessitated negotiation and active quid pro quo.1 This study claims that decision-
making processes in East German and Yugoslav Church-state relations led to 
variegated forms of  Church-based oppositional free spaces, in which people were 
able to plant the seeds of  opposition to the legitimacy of  communist rule.2 In 
this essay, I claim that if  religious policy allows Churches to infl uence social 
issues, it is more likely that free spaces will emerge in which principles of  non-
violence, peaceful resolution and human rights prevail, and these spaces may 
play active roles in mediation in times of  unrest. If, however, religious policy 
excludes the Church on issues of  social policy, this will lead to the emergence 
of  free spaces, the actors of  which will be less loyal and less invested as social 
stakeholders. Since its intermediary role is thwarted, the Church will be less 
interested in liberal-democratic reform and will make fewer demands based on 
non-violence, inclusion and peace.
Religion policy and Church–state engagement under a communist regime 
was highly unique. The GDR and Yugoslav communist regimes devoted 
tremendous human and fi nancial resources to the regulation of  religious life, 
entrusting the various tasks to state secretariats, commissions for religious affairs, 
and security agencies. Despite their monopoly on authority, these regimes were 
never monolithic and, in turn, Churches were never passive victims. Rather, 
there arose a pragmatic exchange and vibrant Church-state dialogue based on 
negotiated responses to incentives: the state needed the Church for popular 
legitimacy, the consolidation of  power and international credibility, while the 
Church was dependent on the state for material goods, social services and sheer 
survival. Neither could function properly without the other, so a symbiotic 
necessity emerged, marked by micro-level discussions, communiqués, backroom 
deals and public deliberations. This fl uid quality was the fundamental mechanism 
that linked a set of  conditions to the outcome of  free spaces.3
1  Steve Bruce, Politics and Religion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 172.
2  Free spaces are an integral pillar for oppositional groups working in authoritarian societies, without 
which the chances of  success in challenging, reforming or toppling illiberal regimes may be signifi cantly 
lessened. The ability to organize, cultivate and articulate critical expression, free of  governmental 
intervention or violent crackdown, are the very heart of  what makes oppositional movements successful. 
While they may not be necessary for every movement and while each authoritarian regime may deal with its 
undesired, unsanctioned oppositional agents in different ways, the growing number of  successful regime-
critical groups which have demonstrated or currently demonstrate the usage of  similar forms of  free space, 
from Africa to Latin America, North America to Arab states, can no longer be ignored by social scientists.
3  Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, “Taking Process Tracing Seriously – The ‘Mechanismic’ 
Understanding and Tracing Causal Mechanisms,” paper presented at the Southern Political Science 
Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 5–8, 2011.
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Categorizing Conditions of  Church–State Engagement
The fi rst set of  conditions accounts for the initial types of  religious policy 
from 1945 to the early 1950s. The end of  the Second World War constituted a 
clear historical break from the recent past and a new political existence for the 
GDR and Yugoslavia. Each state approached its Churches in unique ways, while 
trying to solidify the supremacy of  the Communist Party. In the Soviet Zone 
of  Occupation (hereafter, SBZ) that would become East Germany, German 
communists needed to have a steady hand in navigating the chaotic post-war 
waters. The Communist Party (hereafter, SED) was institutionally weak and 
lacked popular support. Hence, it sought to avoid unnecessary challenges from 
the Church in an effort to build support. As a type of  participatory religious policy, 
the SED extended an olive branch to the Church and publicly supported its 
participation in the establishment of  the new state. 
Yugoslav religious policy from 1945 to the mid-1950s can be characterized 
as extremely repressive. Since Tito’s partisans had secured Western support in 
their struggle against fascism, their power base required less consolidation in 
the post-war period. Still, Yugoslav communists viewed religious institutions 
with trepidation since some segments of  the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) 
and, more notably, the Catholic Church had aligned themselves with anti-
Yugoslav forces. Yugoslav religious policy in this initial period, by virtue of  its 
repressiveness, re-entrenched the Churches in a critical posture vis-à-vis the 
state, giving them no other options but to embrace nationalism. 
The second condition accounts for how the regimes dealt with their national 
Churches from the mid-1950s to the late-1980s. As public dissent against the 
regime and repression of  the Church became repetitive, party leaders were forced 
to employ different methods to pacify unrest and suppress challenges to their 
authority. As a means of  restoring order and preserving a good international 
reputation, the option emerged to engage the Church as the only mediator 
between the state and protestors. As multiple incidents of  protest and unrest 
occurred and as non-Church oppositional groups sought protection in Church 
spaces, communicative cooperation between Church and state became more 
robust.4 Each profi ted from this back-and-forth relationship: the state was able 
to re-establish its authority, while the Church received considerable concessions 
4  John T.S. Madeley, Church and State in Contemporary Europe: The Chimera of  Neutrality (London: Cass 
Publishers, 2003), 13.
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and established its role as chief  mediator, thereby becoming useful to the state 
and indeed almost indispensable.
Within this second typology, my cases bifurcate along two distinct lines: 
inclusive and exclusionary engagement. Regimes that inclusively engage include 
their religious groups in ending periods of  national unrest make them part of  
the confi dence-building process after periods of  violence. Going against Marxist 
ideology, the East German regimes willingly assigned the Church the role of  
primary negotiator in mediation. By the late 1980s, as the East German regime 
reverted to repressive measures against opposition, the Protestant Church carefully 
articulated liberal-democratic demands, such as respect for human rights, freedom 
of  expression and non-violence, often phrased in masterfully-expressed socialist 
language. However, since the Protestant Church had experienced signifi cant 
drops in Church membership, the SED was not constrained to seek out the 
Church’s good offi ces for challenges to regime authority. The weak position of  
the Church meant that inclusive regime engagement was possible. Moreover, 
East Germany could embrace a more receptive stance to the Church, when its 
own institutions were unsuccessful in responding to oppositional challenge. This 
institutional weakness necessitated inclusionary engagement. 
Yugoslavia’s exclusionary regime engagement stands in stark contrast. High levels 
of  Church repression from 1945 to 1953 were replaced in the mid-1950s by 
liberalization and political decentralization within the party and its federal-level 
and republic-level institutions. After two decades of  repression, church life was 
suddenly allowed to expand, and this opened the door for initial critical expression. 
Congruent with its refusal to incorporate the Churches into the governance of  
immediate post-war Yugoslavia, Tito and Yugoslav communists never looked 
upon Church leaders as mediators in times of  unrest. Unable to erase prior 
repression and having offered a maximum amount of  space for Church activity, 
the regime could neither regain the confi dence of  the Church, nor could it offer 
concessions. The regime lost the carrot and the stick. This opened up avenues 
for Church spaces to embrace critical stances against religious policy by using 
language and symbols that questioned and ultimately rejected the supra-ethnic 
Yugoslav mantra of  “brotherhood and unity.” Since both the Serbian Orthodox 
Church (SOC) and the Croatian Catholic Church had been thoroughly excluded 
from statecraft, there was neither signifi cant sympathy nor convincing incentive 
for them to intervene on behalf  of  a weakened regime, which they had never 
viewed as a social partner. 
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East German Participatory Church–State Engagement: 1945–1953
From its inception, the SED was faced with the daunting task of  convincing 
the public of  its socialist mission, while concomitantly discrediting Western 
democratic legitimacy. Working from such a weakened position in an ideological 
minefi eld, it was necessary to concede substantial points from its party platform 
by acknowledging “a special German road to socialism.”5 SED General-Secretary 
Erich Honecker refl ects:
We calculated that the situation in Germany at that time did not 
provide the necessary requirements for the immediate establishment 
of  socialism. That’s why the goal of  the German Communist Party 
(KPD) was to create an antifascist, democratic regime, a parliamentary 
republic with all the democratic rights and freedoms for the people.6
Behind the façade, hardliners altered the party’s institutional core, securing 
a maximum amount of  space in all realms of  political, public and private life.7 
Religious policy would be the only exception. In July 1946, Central Committee 
documents demonstrate the policy of  the regime of  binding the Church to the 
new state:
Churches have a stake in East Germany’s reconstruction. Their positive 
cooperation is to be welcomed… Reasonable requests by the Church 
for the return of  occupied Church buildings for religious purposes 
should receive support from our representatives in administration, in 
command structures and in the SMAD.8
Spaces for political participation corresponded to physical spaces at the 
national level. Properties belonging to convicted Nazi party members and 
estates larger than 100 hectares were summarily brought under governmental 
5 Monika Kaiser, “Change and Continuity in the Development of  the Socialist Unity Party of  Germany,” 
Journal of  Contemporary History 30 (1995): 688.
6 Erich Honecker, Aus meinem Leben (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1988), 181.
7 Monika Kaiser, “Die Zentrale der Diktatur – organisatorische Weichenstellung, Strukturen und 
Kompetenzen der SED-Führung in der SBZ/DDR,” in Historische DDR-Forschung: Aufsätze und Studien, ed. 
Jürgen Kocka (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), 78–79.
8 Gerhard Besier, Der SED-Staat und die Kirche: Der Weg in die Anpassung (Munich: Bertelsmann Verlag, 
1993), 55.
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administration.9 However, so as not to disturb the delicate Church-state balance, 
the SED exempted all Church properties from land reforms.10 As a further measure 
of  avoiding confrontation, GDR security organs protected the Church from 
intervention. In January 1947, Soviet and East German offi cials established the 
K-5 security apparatus (a precursor to the Ministry for State Security, or Stasi) 
under the command of  the Soviet–East German Central Administration of  
the Interior.11 K-5 contained special units for de-Nazifi cation, the elimination 
of  political opponents and monitoring the Evangelical Church.12 To avoid 
potentially explosive situations, all interaction between K-5 offi cials and the 
Church required high-ranking approval from the Ministry of  Interior. 
Not only were its institutional autonomy and organizational structure left 
intact, but the Church reclaimed and expanded its pre-war position. Properties 
confi scated by the Nazis were returned to the Church and theological centers, 
which had been closed during the war, reassumed full activity.13 The SED granted 
construction permits for new buildings and provided funding for damaged 
dioceses.14 With state collection agencies placed at the Church’s disposal, Church 
coffers were replenished with the reintroduction of  Church taxes. Moreover, 
unlike the other Allied sectors, the Evangelical Church was free to introduce 
pastoral care service for university students.15 Lastly, Church radio programs, 
newsletters, periodicals and newspapers further attest to the regime’s desire to 
avoid confl ict with the Church.16
The offi cial founding of  the GDR on October 7, 1949 and the period of  
Stalinization rapidly consolidated party structures and vigorously centralized all 
state institutions. The SED injected a new ideological moniker in public debate: 
pacifi st policy (Friedenspolitik), upon which it crafted its utopian commitment 
9  Arnd Bauerkämper, “Bodenreform und Kollektivierung,” in Handwörterbuch zur ländlichen Gesellschaft in 
Deutschland, ed. Stephan Beetz, Kai Brauer, and Claudia Neu (Berlin: VS Verlag, 2005), 17–18. 
10  Clemens Vollnhals, “Zwischen Kooperation und Konfrontation: Zur Kirchenpolitik von KPD/SED 
und SMAD in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone,” Deutschland Archiv 27 (1994): 486. 
11  Monika Tanztscher, “In der Ostzone wird ein neuer Apparat aufgebaut: Die Gründung des DDR-
Staatssicherheitsdienstes,” Deutschland Archiv 31, no. 1 (1998): 48–49. 
12  Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Maasenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv/SAPMO-BArch, 
nr. 002071, Establishment of  Division E in Department V, 1947. 
13  Detlef  Pollack, Kirche in der Organisationsgesellschaft: zum Wandel der gesellschaftlichen Lage der evangelischen 
Kirchen in der DDR (Berlin: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1994), 95. 
14  “Kirchen entstehen neu!” Die Kirche, October 30, 1949, 1.
15  “Tätigkeit des Evangelischen Konsistoriums Berlin-Brandenburg,” Provinzialsynode Berlin-Brandenburg 
1951 (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1951), 27. 
16  Pollack, Kirche in der Organisationsgesellschaft, 96.
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to the advancement of  peace. ‘Peace committees’ and public panel discussions 
on non-violence were established statewide to disseminate the regime’s pacifi st 
message. Though aimed at external threats, East German pacifi sm discreetly 
targeted domestic provocateurs with links to the West. 
During this Kirchenkampf  period, the repression of  the Church became more 
direct. Seeking to create a cadre of  regime-friendly priests, the regime kept them 
under active surveillance and assessed their attitudes, which were characterized 
either as progressive or “reactionary” (critical of  the regime).17 This would later 
create fi ssures among East German bishoprics: Berlin-Brandenburg Bishop Otto 
Dibelius was a defi ant critic of  East German communism, while, for example, 
Bishop of  Thüringen, Moritz Mitzenheim, followed a much more conciliatory, 
less-critical line.18
The 1949 East German constitution guaranteed the separation of  Church 
and state. This afforded the SED a legal justifi cation offi cially to include Marxist 
scientifi c materialism and atheism in all school curricula. This prompted several 
synods in 1951 to issue letters of  protest:
The constitutionally guaranteed right to the freedom of  religion is 
effectively removed, so school lesson plans recognize only historical 
and dialectical materialism. We realize that belief  is not for everyone… 
but we request that no one be pressured to accept the absence of  
faith. The freedom of  belief  in schools can only exist, if  instruction 
in all subjects is carried out in such a way so that Christians and non-
Christians can participate with the same amount of  personal freedom.19
Still, the SED demonstrated veiled caution by instructing teachers and 
school directors to “avoid under all circumstances creating the impression of  a 
state-controlled campaign against religion.”20
The SED also pressured the Church to move its headquarters from the 
British Sector to the territory within GDR borders. Even before the 1949 state 
declaration, Evangelical leaders refused to recognize inter-zonal borders, since 
17  Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv (BLA), Repository 203, nr. 144, Positive zur Nationalen Front 
eingestellte Pfarrer des Landes Brandenburg. 
18  Pollack, Kirche in der Organizationsgesellschaft, 131.
19  Ralf  Altenhof, “Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland,” Die 
Enquetekommission des deutschen Bundestages (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993): 164.
20  SAPMO-BArch, Sensitive Information – Directive from the Central Committee of  the SED and the 
Department of  People’s Education to regional SED party offi ces and Departments of  People’s Education, 
January 7, 1950.
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several parishes straddled the frontiers.21 Party leaders demanded a relocation so 
that
priests in leading positions of  the National Front and peace committees 
will no longer be hindered by restrictions, reprimands and threats from 
the Church leadership in West Berlin… The ministerial council for the 
province of  Brandenburg is of  the opinion that it is no longer tolerable 
that the West Berlin Church administration threatens its priests, citizens 
of  the GDR, simply because they fi ght for peace.22
The SED countered with threats of  allocating funding only for religious 
groups that were in SBZ.23 Pastors and theology students from the West were 
prevented from entering the East.24 While workers easily traveled to their factories 
in East Berlin, Church employees were singled out as undesirable visitors. 
Against this growing tension, high-ranking Evangelical offi cials agreed on 
June 6, 1952 to an informal exchange with state representatives in the home of  
Brandenburg General-Superintendent Braun. Despite the informal nature and 
the palpable strains, both entities conducted an unexpectedly cordial discussion. 
The Church emphatically expressed its concerns regarding the wellbeing of  its 
youth, travel restrictions for West Berlin priests and the party-run Free German 
Youth’s agitation against the Church youth movement (Junge Gemeinde).25 Bishop 
of  Berlin-Brandenburg and chairman of  the Council of  the Evangelical Church 
in Germany Dibelius unambiguously confi rmed the Church’s bond to the Holy 
Scriptures as its sole source of  guidance. He reiterated the independent nature 
of  the Church and its resistance to political manipulation.26 Provincial Vice-
Minister Jahn of  Brandenburg urged the Church to repeal its 1950 consistorial 
order blocking priests from joining political groups.27 Though it concluded with 
little more than a handshake, this micro-level encounter proved that informal 
agent-to-agent dialogue was not only possible, but would be the necessary 
mechanism for future interaction and reconciliation.
21  Ehrhart Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR, 1949–1989 (Berlin: Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung, 1998), 76. 
22  “Kirchenleitung gehört in das Land Brandenburg!” Märkische Volksstimme December 6, 1950, 2.
23  BLA, Repository 202A, nr. 531, Letter from the Brandenburg Provincial Prime Minister to Evangelical 
Superintendents, Priests and Parish Commissioners, Pg 2. January 26, 1951. 
24  BLA, Repository 202G, nr. 45, Special Report on the meeting between state representatives and those 
of  the Church on 06.06.1952 in the home of  Superintendent-General Braun, Potsdam, June 10, 1952. 
25  Ibid.
26  Ibid.
27  Ibid.
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By 1953, East German mismanagement had produced a struggling, 
dysfunctional economy that ideologically diverted resources to heavy industry 
instead of  addressing consumer needs, and this in turn created shortages of  
basic goods and food, as well as prohibitive taxes. Over 330,000 young, educated 
members of  the East German workforce left for the West. Due to overzealous 
goals, the SED brought the country to near economic collapse. According to an 
SED document, Ulbricht recognized the possible gains to be won from policy 
“liberalization”:
It is not necessarily effective to lead a campaign of  protest resolutions 
and demonstrations against Church leadership. Instead of  intervening 
in religious events and Church services, religious policy should publish 
concrete evidence of  the subversive activity of  individual priests.”28 
We are neither leading a Church confl ict, nor do we recognize any 
such Church confl ict. We are simply looking for certain bases of  the 
enemy… And when the Church positions itself  in solidarity with such 
people, well then it’s too bad for the Church.29
 
Ulbricht and other high-ranking SED offi cials were ordered to report to 
Moscow on June 2, 1953. Fearing a collapse of  the GDR, the Soviet Council 
of  Ministers demanded a reversal of  SED Church-state relations.30 As a result, 
the SED announced a high-level church-state summit scheduled for June 10, 
1953, just days before the June 17, 1953 Berlin Workers Revolt. However, the 
eleventh-hour implementation of  the Council’s orders proved to be insuffi cient 
in averting the revolt.31
Leading up to 1953, the Evangelical Church expanded its position and social 
presence to levels not seen since before the Third Reich and, as the only other 
signifi cant social stakeholder, it tacitly participated in the formation of  the new 
state. Moreover, the regime’s calculated policy of  non-confrontation allowed 
28  SAPMO-BArch, Repository IV 2/3/380, “Opinion of  the Schwerin District Administration Report 
and the Gera District Administration on the Reactionary Activity of  Priests,” Protocol of  the SEC Central 
Committee, May 4, 1953.
29 Martin Georg Goerner, Die Kirche als Problem der SED: Strukturen kommunistischer Herrschaftausübung 
gegenüber der evangelischen Kirche 1945 bis 1958 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997), 109.
30  Christian F. Ostermann, “Keeping the Pot Simmering: the United States and the East German 
Uprising of  1953,” German Studies Review 19, no. 1 (1996): 63. 
31  “Kommuniqué der Sitzung des SED-Politbüros vom 9 Juni 1953,” Dokumente der Sozialistischen 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands: Beschlüsse und Erklärungen des Zentralkommittees sowie seines Politbüros und seines 
Sekretariats 4 (Berlin: Berlin, 1953), 428.
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the Church to maintain institutional autonomy in its decision-making processes, 
social outreach and public activities. By actively seeking out the Church’s support 
in crafting a new, socialist German state, the SED’s overarching design of  
integration produced only low-levels of  anxiety among its decision-makers. At 
the time of  Stalin’s death in March 1953, Church-based free spaces were intact 
and vibrant.
East German Inclusive Engagement from 1953–1989
As part of  the SED’s inclusive engagement, two salient features emerged in this 
period. Firstly, the state sought to elevate socialism above religion by coopting 
progressive pastors from ones that were critical of  the regime. This policy 
of  differentiation gave rise to the second feature of  this period: conciliatory, 
cooperative factions in Church ranks, which led to visible fi ssures among Church 
leaders. Inclusive engagement could take place with a weakened Church not only 
because secularization became an increasingly measurable characteristic of  East 
German society after the mid-1950s, but also because the state had succeeded in 
changing people’s attitudes toward religion.
State-lead high-level talks of  June 10, 1953 signaled the adoption of  an 
approach based more on dialogue. The resulting communiqué codifi ed an 
agreement, whereby both entities negotiated a halt in all repressive action against 
Church youth. Imprisoned Church members were released without delay32 and 
students who had been expelled or blacklisted could resume their studies.33 
Teachers, sacked based on religious belief, were reinstated.34 The Central 
Committee also promised to refrain from intervening in Church institutions.35 In 
exchange, Church leaders agreed to temper their reproaches of  the regime, limit 
the use of  the pulpit and retract their criticisms of  economic and political life.36 
Leaders from Church and state together released a joint statement celebrating 
32  Kommunique der Sitzung des SED-Politbüros, Juni 9, 1953, 428.
33  Ibid.
34  Ibid.
35  “Entschließung der 15 Tagung des SED-Zentralkomitees vom 24. bis. 26. Juli 1953 – Der neue 
Kurs und die Aufgaben der Partei,” Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands: Beschlüsse und 
Erklärungen des Zentralkommittees sowie seines Politbüros und seines Sekretariats 4 (Berlin: SED, 1953), 449.
36  BLA, Repository 530, nr. 2188, SED Provincial Secretariat’s Report entitled “On the Activity of  the 
Church after the Communique from June 10, 1953 and Suggestions for Improvements in the Arena of  
Religious Policy” Potsdam, January 8, 1954.
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the fruitful discussions, in which the regime had re-instated the Church as a 
social stakeholder.37
The June talks proved to be nothing more than a stopgap measure. Stasi 
directives reveal that it maintained its prior characterization of  Church leaders 
as “reactionary, imperialist intelligence agents working in support of  criminal 
activities against the GDR.”38 Open confl ict with the Church was to be replaced 
with a covert, operative approach: publicly demonstrating willingness to engage 
in dialogue, while remaining inwardly uncompromising. 
In 1954, alongside the Ministry of  Interior, other state institutions were 
to craft religious policy. The Department for Church Relations served as the 
government mediator between the General-Secretary, the politburo, the Central 
Committee and the Church. The regime then established the Working Group 
for Church Questions of  the SED’s Central Committee (die Arbeitsgruppe für 
Kirchenfragen or AK), which was to handle Church–state relations, monitor the 
political activities of  religious groups and report their fi ndings directly to the 
highest levels of  government. While the AK set the overall policy tone,39 the 
Council of  Ministers created the State Secretariat for Church Questions (SSCQ) 
in 1957, which served as the state contact and intermediary for Church leaders.40 
By 1960, several theologians began to search for an identity in the now 
solidifi ed Communist state. Günter Jacob, Evangelical General-Superintendent 
of  Cottbus, introduced the fi rst interpretations of  the Scriptures into the 
Church–state debate. By liberating itself  from political manipulation, the 
Church could create a space for itself  in which “the true, apolitical message of  
the Evangelical scriptures” could fi nd expression.41 At an extraordinary session 
of  the EKD 1956 Synod in Berlin, the Union of  Evangelical Priests in the GDR 
(Bund evangelischer Pfarrer der DDR or BEP-DDR) claimed that “concessions 
for greater religious freedoms within the realm of  dialectical Marxist authority” 
37  BLA, Repository 530, nr. 2187, Bishop Otto Dibelius’ pastoral letter entitled “To all Parishes in 
Germany,” Berlin, June 12, 1953.
38  BLA, Repository 530, nr. 2188, SED Provincial Secretariat’s Report entitled “On the Activity of  the 
Church after the Communique from June 10, 1953 and Suggestions for Improvements in the Arena of  
Religious Policy” Potsdam, January 8, 1954.
39  SAPMO-BArch, Repository DY 30/J IV 2/2/516, Protocol nr. 62/56 of  the Meeting of  the Politburo 
of  the Central Committee, November 27, 1956. 
40  SAPMO-BArch, Repository DC 20/4/228, Decision 53/14 of  the Council of  Ministers for the 
Appointment of  a State Secretariat for Church Questions, February 21, 1957.
41  Günter Jacob, Der Christ und die Mächte (Stuttgart: Lettner Verlag, 1960), 330.
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were only possible if  the individual… respected and reciprocally recognized the 
given borders between public life and the space of  pure religion.”42 
We are separate from any hyphenated-form of  Christianity, unbound 
from a fantastical, civic-capitalist system, foreign to Evangelicals. We 
seek neither to be a center of  conspiracy, nor a state-run propaganda 
institute. Rather, we in the BEP-DDR seek to offer brotherly help, 
to ponder theologically the existential question of  the Church in our 
republic and at the same time to be active as loyal and responsible GDR 
citizens. This union works for freedom in the world and supports the 
efforts of  the German Democratic Republic towards this end, while 
being obligated to the social renewal that is taking place in the GDR.43
The Church’s contribution to the new path took form in the fi rst observable 
expressions of  a Kirche im Sozialismus, a position that was neither supportive of  
the regime, nor ostensibly against the regime, but rather existed parallel to it. 
Due to the SED’s initial skepticism, Church leaders sent a delegation led by 
bishops from Thuringia and Pomerania to participate in discussions with the 
Ministry of  Interior, SSCQ and the Council of  Ministers.44 The delegates at the 
Church–state talks agreed to a monumental joint communiqué on July 21, 1958. 
Unlike the June 10, 1953 agreement, the church successfully weakened the state. 
The Church offered its most demonstrative statement yet:
The representatives of  the Evangelical Church in the GDR declare that 
the Church, with all means at its disposal, strives for peace amongst all 
peoples and hence is principally in agreement with the peaceful efforts 
of  the GDR and its government. In accordance with their conscience, 
Christians shall fulfi ll their civic duties based on the legal foundations. 
They respect the socialist development and shall contribute to the 
peaceful construction of  civic life.45
Short of  declaring loyalty, the Church recognized the existing political 
conditions and Marxist socialism. Regime offi cials promised only to review 
42 Günter Jacob, “Der Raum für das Evangelium in Ost und West,” Kirchliches Jahrbuch 1956 (Gütersloh: 
Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1956): 13.
43 Evangelisches Zentralarchiv Berlin (EZB), Repository 4, nr. 666, Newsletter nr. 1 from BEP-DDR in 
the German Democratic Republic to all Pastors, June 19–20, 1958. 
44 Besier, Der SED-Staat und die Kirche, 71.
45 Kirchliches Jahrbuch 1958, 241.
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certain measures taken in public education and reiterated their constitutional 
responsibility to protect the rights of  religious practice.46 This stood in stark 
contrast to the 1953 point-by-point retraction of  repressive measures against 
the Church. The policy of  differentiation had accomplished its goals. Church 
membership and congregations fell rapidly throughout the 1950s and 1960s.47 
Only one-third of  the children from religious households were confi rmed in 
the Church, while the Jugendweihe exploded in popularity from 26 percent of  
school classes in 1955 to over 80 percent in 1960.48 With the beginning of  
the construction of  the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, rather than expand 
its administrative reach to near totalitarian domination, the regime chose 
begrudgingly to accommodate the Church.49 
Under state expansion, the SED began to militarize society: military service 
in the People’s National Army (NVA) was mandated for all men in January 
1962 without the option of  conscientious objection.50 Since the majority of  
objectors were from Christian households or theology students, the move gave 
the Churches a new lifeline. Church leaders approached the regime about the 
negative effects of  forcing Christians to carry arms against their will.51 Ulbricht 
and the National Defense Council, keen on avoiding confrontations, conceded 
their position to the Church on September 7, 1964 and ordered the creation 
of  unarmed NVA ‘construction units’ that exempted Christians from weapons 
exercises. The Bausoldaten were tasked with building military installments, housing 
units and transporting material. With this, the GDR became the only Communist 
state that allowed for conscientious objection.
By the late 1960s, the Evangelical Churches decided territorially and 
institutionally to re-organize themselves from the all-German Evangelical Church 
of  Germany (EKD). After much debate, East German bishops in 1969 formally 
separated themselves from the EKD, establishing the regime-friendly Union of  
Evangelical Churches in the GDR (BEK-DDR). Despite the BEK’s separation 
from the EKD, the two entities maintained close lines of  communication up to 
1989.
46 Ibid.
47 “Statistical Report on Exiting the Church – 1950 to 1956,” Amtsblatt der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland 
19. no. 6 (1958): 17.
48 Pollack, Kirche in der Organizationsgesellschaft, 150.
49 “Programm der SED,” Neues Deutschland  January  25, 1963, 1.
50 Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR, 1949–1989, 187.
51 Ibid.
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In 1971, Walter Ulbricht’s successor, Erich Honecker, sought a more 
conciliatory approach to Church–state relations. His approach included the 
establishment of  a Church media service,52 construction permits and the 
expansion of  the Church’s presence in religion-free “workers cities.” Moreover, 
in hopes of  improving the GDR’s international image, Evangelical bishops’ were 
encouraged to participate in international ecumenical conferences.53 Church–
state interaction demonstrated the GDR’s new readiness to seek a modus vivendi. 
For its part, the Church again expressed its readiness to
neither infl ate, nor downplay the existing contrasts between Marxist-
socialism and theology. Neither option is in our interest. Rather, 
we need better to understand what occurs in this country, which is 
also our home. We shall soon discover the real commonalities in our 
responsibility to man and those social areas, where we are needed. In the 
past, anti-communism distorted our vision from our real opportunities 
and true challenges.54
The purpose of  the Church was to be fi rmly located in working within East 
German society for the good of  its citizens.55
On August 18, 1976, Church–state relations were profoundly unsettled by 
an act of  self-immolation. Before pouring petrol over himself, Pastor Oskar 
Brüsewitz had unrolled a banner with the words “the Church in the GDR 
condemns communist repression of  school children!” While the regime claimed 
the priest suffered from delusion, it feared a public protest, a damaged international 
image. Honecker and Church representatives met for another round of  talks on 
March 6, 1978, which introduced conditions that set the stage for the largest 
expansion of  Church space.56 In quid pro quo¸ the Church agreed to respect 
the SED’s request to halt all political criticism and accept the existing power 
relations of  the GDR. In turn, the SED offered a lengthy list of  concessions and 
policy liberalizations, including more construction permits, 2.2 million Marks for 
52  EZB, Repository 4, nr. 304, Letters between the Berlin Church Council and Reinhard Henkys of  the 
Berlin Arbeitsgemeinschaft für kirchliche Publizistik, July 12, 1973.
53  “Hohe DDR-Kirchenvertreter besuchen Genf  – Ökumenische Verbindungen sollen ausgebaut 
werden, Werben für Anerkennung,” Frankfurter Rundschau March 22, 1972, 1.
54  SAPMO-BArch, Repository DO4/320, State Committee for Radio Services – Department of  
Monitoring, July 2, 1971.
55  “Kirche will in der Gesellschaft der DDR künftig mitreden,” Der Tagesspiegel July 6, 1971, 45.
56  SAPMO-BArch, Repository DY IV 2/2036/49, Our Approach to the Talks with Representatives of  
the Evangelical Church of  the GDR, May 10, 1977.
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restoration projects, lifelong health care for all Church employees, pastoral care 
in prisons and retirement homes, pay increases for priests57 and greater access 
to state media for holy days.58 While Honecker viewed the talks as a “crowning 
moment and new beginning,” the Church secured a long sought after document 
that better outlined its legal position in the GDR.59
Despite the March 1978 talks, the SED became increasingly suspicious of  
Church-based peace initiatives60 and “the serious security concern of  broader 
peace movements solidifying around Church.”61 Indeed, by 1982, a number 
of  students, theologians, Church congregants and veteran Bausoldaten had 
found a protected space in the Church.62 Ulrike Poppe, founder of  “Women for 
Peace” and the “Initiative for Peace and Human Rights,” recognized that the 
existence of  these groups was best guaranteed under the protective umbrella 
of  the Church.63 Equally, Church leadership was aware of  the fate that would 
await these individuals, if  the activism and pacifi st message of  these groups 
were to take on stronger contours. The Church’s protective stance assumed a 
more communicative quality, acting as the mediator and ‘translator’ between 
the two entities.64 Bishops oversaw cooperation among the groups, warned of  
risks, advised the opposition and the regime on better forms of  communication 
and diluted their messages in the interest of  maintaining public order. Despite 
this protective cover, oppositional groups had grown skeptical of  becoming too 
compromised by the Church. Poppe was aware that “oppositional groups were 
at times afraid of  the Church’s paternalist role vis-à-vis East German human 
rights groups.”65 Hence, the relationship between Church and opposition was 
not without contention. Nevertheless, if  peaceful resolutions to confl ict and 
57  SAPMO-BArch, Repository  DY 30 IV 2/2/1740, Decision of  the Politburo supporting an increase 
in basic wages of  Evangelical regional Churches, August 22, 1978.
58  Ibid., Addendum 1 on the Commitments to Concerns Brought by the Union of  Evangelical Churches 
in the German Democratic Republic.
59  Bundesbeauftrage für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik, (BStU), Protocol from a speech held by Bishop Albrecht Schönherr on the 
importance of  the March 6, 1978 talks, MfS Document 8103, October 10, 1986.
60  SAPMO-BArch, Internal Party Document – Information on the Relationship between State and the 
Evangelical Church in the GDR, DY 2/3/119, December 2, 1980.
61  Ibid.
62  Interview with Manfred Stolpe and Joachim Heise, July 14, 2008.
63  Interviews with Ulrike Poppe, December 2008 and January 2009.
64  Interview with Manfred Stolpe, July 14, 2008.
65  Interviews with Ulrike Poppe, December 2008 and January 2009.
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the avoidance of  human rights violations were topics for both Church and 
opposition, they had now become salient issues between Church and state.
The SED’s lack of  preparation in adapting to a third, new critical element 
became apparent. By 1982, Stasi documents warned of  Church-based “enemy-
negative forces attempting to establish an independent movement for peace 
under the guise of  pacifi sm.”66 Attempts were made to remove students from 
schools and universities based on membership in illegal organizations, while 
other peace activists were taken into police custody. The SED resorted to more 
extreme measures: the regime quietly offered leading members of  oppositional 
groups travel permits or stipends to study in the West; others were forcefully 
expatriated.67 But even state security organs feared that overt repressive measures 
could push the Church to become confrontational. Intelligence reports pressed 
the SED to engage in another round of  talks with the SSCQ and Church leaders 
to ease tensions. Stasi reports even suggested using the Church leadership to steer 
the peace movements away from the public sphere.68 The regime desperately 
resorted to its old Janus-faced playbook: it actively engaged with Church leaders, 
using their mediation between regime and opposition, while cracking down 
on those who drifted beyond the accepted boundaries.69 Police and Stasi units 
increasingly stormed Churches and parish halls and confi scated printing presses 
and Church libraries. At the Zionskirche in East Berlin, Stasi units arrested 
members of  a Church-based environmental initiative. The regime’s desperate 
show of  force not only made it more dependent on the Church’s communicative 
role, it also improved the Church’s image and increased the public’s solidarity 
with it.
By late 1989, Evangelical Churches were ready to channel massive public 
frustration peacefully and prevent a potential violent state intervention. In 
Leipzig, Monday prayers for peace at the Nikolaikirche by October 9, 1989 drew 
70,000 demonstrators; one week later, over 120,000 gathered before the Church. 
Trying to stave off  unrest, the politburo replaced Honecker with Egon Krenz 
on October 18. With change evident, over 320,000 called for peaceful reforms 
in Leipzig. Tensions grew to a fever pitch as rumors spread amongst the peaceful 
66  BStU, Internal document from Ministry of  State Security to all working units of  the Stasi, MfS 
Document 7604, March 17, 1982.
67  Interviews with Ulrike Poppe, December 2008 and January 2009.
68  BStU, Suggestions of  talks with the State Secretary for Church Questions, Comrade Gysi, with the 
bishops of  the provincial Evangelical Churches in the DDR, MfS Document 7605.
69  BStU, Quarterly Report – Church and Religious Communities in the GDR – Excerpts of  an interview 
with Berlin-Brandenburg Bishop Albrecht Schönherr, MfS Document 8103, April 1985. 
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protestors that units of  the NVA, riot police and undercover Stasi agents had 
been given orders to use force to control the growing protest.70 But by now, 
word had spread throughout the GDR that Church buildings and squares were 
safe areas for expressing popular frustration and desires for reform. 
The GDR reached a point of  no return on November 9, 1989, when Party 
Secretary Krenz ordered the opening of  border crossings between East and 
West Berlin. Upon hearing the news from West German media sources, East 
Germans gathered at the border crossings by the thousands. Overwhelmed East 
German border guards, at fi rst unsure how to proceed, yielded to the swelling 
masses. Once the barriers were raised, West and East Berliners were united in a 
celebration of  peace.
Post-War Yugoslav Religious Policy: More Soviet than Thou 
In this section I claim that a unique set of  processes stemming from Yugoslavia’s 
particular Church–state engagement planted the seeds for the exclusionary 
characteristics of  Church-based free spaces that later generated nationalist 
sentiment. Yugoslav religious policy was not marked by public agreements or 
joint communiqués resulting from regular high-level Church-state negotiations. 
Once the country swung from a repressive model to an open, quasi-Western 
one, freedoms in economics, labor, media and travel undermined the necessity 
to lodge human rights complaints. By liberalizing religious policy, Yugoslav 
communists gave up an important bargaining chip: they could not offer 
concessions to Churches, since the Churches already enjoyed the most open 
religious atmosphere in the communist world.
From end of  the war to the late 1950s, the Yugoslav regime maintained a 
posture of  extreme repression. The decision to take immediate measures against 
the Catholic and Orthodox Churches was a manifestation of  Tito’s distrust and 
the Yugoslav Communist Party’s (CPY) rapid consolidation of  power. Neither 
the Catholic Church nor the SOC became participants in the reconstruction of  
the new Yugoslav state. As a result, the regime’s position offered the Churches 
no other option but to look upon the authorities with suspicion, if  not enmity. 
Such distrust bolstered the Churches’ unwillingness to support the regime, which 
70  Interview with Hans Modrow, September 2008.
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created a crucial by-product for later periods: the regime could never request the 
Churches’ mediation in times of  unrest.71 
Two points are crucial to understanding the post-war phase in Yugoslav 
Church-state relations. Firstly, the CPY systematically applied the Soviet 
playbook, which erased the political landscape of  subversives and prevented 
religio-nationalist rhetoric from challenging the state, a type of  post-war tabula 
rasa devoid of  opposition.72 The second approach involved state institutions 
confronting the Churches through nuanced repression that targeted their greatest 
weakness. This individualized method removed the presence and visibility 
of  Church space from the public sphere. In 1945, the Yugoslav Council of  
Ministers established the Federal Commission for Church Questions (SKVP), 
which passed down party directives to republic-level Commissions for Religious 
Relations (KVP), the purpose of  which was to
research all questions concerning life outside the religious communities, 
their inter-confessional relations and the position of  the Churches vis-
à-vis the state and the People’s authorities, as well as the preparation 
for all legislative solutions on relations between religious communities 
and the state.73
Yugoslav authorities considered religious groups to be a security threat 
and therefore placed the SKVP under the command of  the Ministry for State 
Security (UDBA). Authorities detained, physically assaulted and murdered 
hundreds of  Orthodox and Catholic bishops, priests, nuns, and laypersons. 
Judges in politically rigged trials speedily handed down execution sentences and 
lengthy jail times.74 Grand show trials served as a means of  eradicating Church-
71  Interviews with Bishop of  Australia and New Zealand of  the Serbian Orthodox Church, Irinej 
Dobrijevic, April 2007 and the Vicar General of  the Catholic Archdiocese of  Sarajevo, Monsignor Mato 
Zovkić, September 2010.
72  Darko Bekich, “Soviet Goals in Yugoslavia and the Balkans,” Annals of  the American Academy of  Political 
and Social Science 481 (1985), 2.
73  Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Repository 144, no. 1-1, The Presidium of  the Council of  Ministers of  the 
Democratic Federal Yugoslavia brings forth the decree on the establishment of  a federal commission for 
religious questions – Article 1 (Pretsedništvo Ministarskog Saveta Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije 
donosi uredbu o osnivanja držvane komisje za verska pitanja – Član 1), September 21, 1945.
74  AJ, Inventory 144, nr. 1-4a, Executive of  the Bishops’ Conference in Zagreb (Predsjedništvo Biskupih 
Konferencija u Zagrebu), no. 64, May 8, 1945.
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linked regime-opponents.75 In a politically rigged court in 1946, anti-communist 
Royalist Četnik commander Draža Mihailović was found guilty of  collaborating 
with Nazi Germany and summarily executed by fi ring squad. Mihailović’s stature 
in the SOC was considerable. The SOC leadership perceived the court’s decision 
as a volley across its bow. 
Similarly, the 1946 trial of  Catholic Archbishop of  Zagreb Aloizije Stepinac 
for his alignment with German and Croatian fascists highlighted the regime’s 
intent to silence any opposition. On May 8, 1945, Stepinac publicly demanded an 
explanation for the maltreatment of  Catholic priests,76 which was followed by a 
pastoral letter slamming the regime’s repression.77 However, he offered no word 
of  atonement to either the regime or the SOC for wartime atrocities perpetrated 
by Croatian clergy.78 As a result, Tito personally engaged him to consider the 
possibility of  an independent, Yugoslav Church.79 Meeting with Stepinac, Tito states
the Church should be more national, more adapted to the nation: 
perhaps you are surprised that I approach the subject of  nationality 
with such emphasis. Too much blood fl owed, I have seen too much 
suffering of  the people, and I would like the Catholic clergy in Croatia 
to be more deeply linked in its national feeling with the people than 
it now is […] We want to create a great community of  South Slavs in 
which there will be both Orthodox and Catholics […] linked with all 
the other Slavs.80
75  Dunja Melčić, “Abrechnungen mit den politischen Gegnern und die kommunistischen 
Nachkriegsverbrechen,” in Der Jugoslawien-Krieg: Handbuch zu Vorgeschichte, Verlauf  und Konsequenzen, ed. idem 
(Opladen: Westdeutsche Verlag, 1999), 198.
76  AJ, Inventory 144, nr. 1–3, Improving and renewing the Church – authorization for the collection 
of  necessary resources (Predmet: Popravk i obnova crkvi – dozvola sabiranja portrebnih sretstava), Letter 
from Stepinac to the Vlada and the republic-level Commission for Religious Affairs of  Croatia, August 14, 
1945.
77  AJ, Inventory 144, nr. 1–4, Pastoral Letter of  the Catholic Bishoprics of  Yugoslavia, Publication 
of  the Bishop’s Conference in Zagreb (Pastirsko Pismo Katoličkih Biskupa Jugoslavije, Izdano s Općih 
Biskupskih Konferencija u Zagrebu), September 20, 1945. Also see, Zvonimir Despot, Vrijeme Zločina: Novi 
Prilozi za Povijest Koprivničke Podravine 1941 – 1948 (Zagreb: Hrvatski Institut za Povijest, 2007), 258.
78  Milovan Djilas, Jahre der Macht: Im Jugoslawischen Kräftespiel – Memoiren 1945–1966 (Munich: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1992), 56.
79  Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), 562–63.
80  Stella Alexander, The Triple Myth: A Life of  Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987), 117.
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This effort sought to “yugoslavize” the Church and, as was being done in 
the GDR, align it with the state’s new identity.81 After such repression, Stepinac 
refused any such agreement and was placed on trial for collaboration, the 
dissemination of  Fascist ideology in Church media and the forced conversion 
of  Orthodox citizens.82 Stepinac was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to 
16 years of  hard labor followed by house arrest.
The CPY continued its drastic reduction of  Church space. Religious 
instruction in state-run secondary schools was discontinued in 1945 without 
negotiation.83 Partisan units physically removed all religious symbols from schools 
and public buildings and marriage documents were placed under civil code. A 
1947 federal law prohibited the public celebration of  religious holy days. Instead, 
the offi cial Socialist calendar replaced holy days with workdays.84 In 1949, the 
Ministry of  Education declared all theological faculties private institutions and 
removed them from public universities.85
The nationalization of  property rounded out the palette of  policy 
instruments. In a move against the Catholic Church, the army and security forces 
placed all Church-administered hospitals, nursing schools and pension homes 
under governmental administration. Moreover, chapels, prayer rooms, religious 
artwork and crosses in hospitals were removed and nuns, though still allowed 
to work, had to remove their habits and other displays of  religious symbolism.86 
The regime undertook a similar, nuanced measure against the SOC by targeting 
its property holdings, one of  its sources of  income. From 1946 onward, security 
forces again occupied hundreds of  SOC buildings, parish halls, secretariats and 
residencies.87 In Bosnia, over 140 Churches and offi ces were placed under rent-
81  Margareta Matijević, “Religious Communities in Croatia from 1945 to 1991: Social Casualty of  the 
Dissent Between Communist Authorities and Religious Communities’ Leadership,” Časopis sa Suvremenu 
Povijest 2, no. 1 (2006): 122.
82  Alexander, The Triple Myth, 146. 
83  Katarina Spehnjak, Javnost i Propaganda Narodna Fronta u Politici i Kulturi Hrvatske 1945–1952 (Zagreb, 
2002), 187–90.
84  Thomas Bremer, Kleine Geschichte der Religionen in Jugoslawien: Königreich-Kommunismus-Krieg (Freiburg: 
Herder Verlag), 86.
85  AJ, Inventory 144, no. 2-46, Briefi ng for the head of  the Federal Commission for Religious Questions 
on the current state of  Orthodox Faculty (Kratak referat o današnjem zalošnim stanju na našem Pravoslavnom 
Bogoslovskom Fakultetu), July 7, 1949. 
86  Matijević, Religious Communities in Croatia from 1945 to 1991, 125.
87  AJ, Inventory 144, Decrees from SKVP no. 534 and no. 68 of  1946 identifi ed these measures.
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free military and police occupation.88 In cases where non-military individuals 
occupied Church land, the regime refused requests for compensation.89 As the 
party predicted, critique of  this measure remained limited only to protest letters 
by the synod90 and Patriarch Gavrilo to the federal and the Serbian KVP.91
By 1953, the LCY had neutralized the last forms of  domestic opposition 
and now had a free hand in pursuing socio-economic policies, which anticipated 
a sharp about-face from centralized resource allocation to one of  “workers’ self-
managed” production.92 They laid the groundwork for political re-adjustments 
in Church-state relations. In 1953, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted the 
Law Concerning the Legal Status of  Religious Communities, which formalized the 
separation of  Church and state, guaranteed freedom of  conscience and religious 
belief  and stipulated the rights of  atheists and the consequences of  abusing 
religion for political purposes.93 By the late 1950s, the regime had increased the 
number of  construction permits and funds for damaged buildings.94 Lastly, the 
weekly newspapers, the Catholic Glas Koncila and the Orthodox Pravoslavlje were 
allowed to circulate in larger numbers.95
The Rise of  the Churches from 1966 to the Late 1980s
In 1966, the Fourth Plenum of  the Central Committee and the six republic 
Central Committees introduced extensive political liberalizations.96 Centrist 
factions gave way to decentralist forces that favored devolution of  powers to the 
88  AJ, Inventory 144, 1-9, List of  Church Buildings Occupied or Used by State Authorities (Spisak 
Crkvenih Zgrada Zauzetih i Upotreblijvih od Strane Gradjanskih Vlasti), February 1947.
89  Ibid.
90  AJ, Inventory 144, 1-9, Synod of  the Serbian Orthodox Church, no. 346, Letter of  protest from the 
synod of  the SOC to the republican-level KPV of  Serbia with a request to reverse the decrees, February 
11, 1947.
91  AJ, Inventory 144, 1-9, Synod of  the Serbian Orthodox Church, no. 1147, Letter of  protest to the 
Executive of  the Federal Government, March 31, 1947.
92  Thomas A. Marschak, “Centralized versus Decentralized Resource Allocation: The Yugoslav 
Laboratory,” The Quarterly Journal of  Economics 82 (1968): 566.
93   Radić, Država i Verske Zajednice, 1945–1970: Prvi Deo 1945–1953 (Belgrade: Institut za Novu Istoriju 
Srbije, 2002), 385–400.
94  Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford University 
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of  Ranković and Party Reforms, October 3, 1966: 1.
A Curious Case of  Cooperation and Coexistence
103
republics.97 With this came a new stance on Church-state policy: the SKVP and 
KVPs were removed from UDBA oversight and transformed into independent 
governmental units, ending the regime’s security and intelligence gathering 
approach. State institutions were mandated to engage in dialogue, monitor media 
and manage Church life through quid pro quo, but also to prevent Churches from 
weighing in on social issues. With this change, the SOC and Croatian Church 
became less constrained in expanding Church media, holding public masses and 
criticizing the regime. One could hardly imagine a more comprehensive change.
Although calls for decentralization fi rst came from the Serbian and Slovenian 
parties, Croatian communists most demonstratively demanded for a loosening, 
beginning with appeals for a constitutionally recognized Croatian language, 
separate from its almost identical Serbian counterpart. This peaked with the 
Croatian Spring or Mass Movement (Masovni Pokret, Maspok) from 1967 to 1972, 
which took on more alarming contours. Calls were made for the establishment 
of  an independent Croatian national bank, greater autonomy in education and 
economic policy and territorial defense units.98 Maspok supporters criticized the 
Yugoslav National Bank’s distribution of  federal development funds to poorer 
regions, while extremist fractions demanded a separate seat at the United Nations 
and revisions of  offi cial Yugoslav history.99 
Maspok coincided with the rise of  the Catholic Church’s renewed organization 
of  large-scale masses and celebrations. A symbolic start took place with the Marian 
Congress and the consecration of  the holy shrine at Marija Bistrica in August 
1971 in front of  150,000 pilgrims.100 At the same time, Glas Koncila profi ted from 
limited state censorship by publishing criticisms of  Yugoslav socialism, while 
celebrating the upsurge as solidifying the Croatian nation. As violent Maspok 
demonstrations in Zagreb threatened to destabilize the regime in 1972, Tito 
quickly purged leaders en masse and imprisoned activists.101 Under the threat 
of  irredentism, Tito and Executive Bureau Secretary Stane Dolanc cleansed the 
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Croatian League of  Communists and other republican leagues.102 Faced with the 
threat of  violence, Yugoslav communists never requested mediation from the 
Church. Unlike in the GDR, in Yugoslavia there was no rapprochement between 
Tito and Catholic bishops to restore peace. Despite the regime’s later inclusion 
of  Maspok’s demands in the 1974 constitution, the crackdown shifted outlets 
for critical expression into the hands of  the Church.103
The Church wasted no time in expanding its free space. In September 1974, 
the episcopate began the Great Novena, celebrating 1,300 years of  Christianity. 
The icon of  Our Lady of  the Great Croatian Christian Covenant was paraded 
around the countryside, accompanied by liturgical celebrations, pastoral theater 
plays and a children’s educational course. Large Eucharistic festivals followed: 
the 1977 celebration of  King Zvonimir, the 1979 declaration of  the Year of  
Prince Branimir and the 1981 National Eucharistic Congresses in Split and 
Zagreb. The pinnacle was reached in September 1984 at the fi nal celebration of  
the Great Novena, where over 400,000 convened at Marija Bistrica. 
The SOC in this period became equally active with its social presence, 
organizing numerous public liturgies, jubilees and celebrations. In May 1968, 
the SOC organized a commemoration of  the ancient Serb ruler, Czar Dušan. In 
September 1969, the SOC celebrated the 750th anniversary of  autocephaly before 
a crowd of  nearly 10,000 Orthodox faithful. The jubilee was continued at the Žiča 
monastery, where the conciliatory Archbishop German stated the following:
All who live with us here in our common home, in our common 
fatherland of  Yugoslavia want to live in concord with all, in 
brotherhood, in love, in community. We have in our present homeland 
many different nationalities and religious communities… We want to 
live with all as with brothers and sisters in one single house.104
Church-organized celebrations continued throughout 1970 as the SOC 
commemorated the 50th anniversary of  the restoration of  the Serbian patriarchate 
(1920–1970) and in 1971 the 300th anniversary of  Saint Basil of  Ostrog.105
102  David Binder, “Marko Nikežic, Yugoslav Liberal Forced to Quit by Tito, Dies at 69,” New York Times, 
January 9, 1991, 20.
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This atmosphere empowered the SOC to articulate grievances vocally. 
It initiated criticism of  the regime’s inability to resolve brewing confl icts in 
regions considered important to the Church. Since Kosovo’s post-war inclusion 
in Yugoslavia, ethnic Albanians had long been dissatisfi ed with its position as 
a non-Slavic minority without its own republic.106 To ease tensions in 1966, 
Tito greatly expanded Kosovar rights and obliged the wealthier Northern 
republics to assist in the economic development of  the territory. Nevertheless, 
Kosovo’s frustration gradually became violent. Orthodox churches, shrines and 
gravestones were increasingly desecrated and priests, nuns and monks harassed. 
Tensions exploded in November 1968, when large-scale demonstrations and 
violent riots broke out.107 Under media suppression, Tito deployed the JNA to 
quell the unrest. While quick to crackdown, Tito made no attempt to seek other 
forms of  resolution. Despite being one of  the targets of  the riots, neither the 
SOC nor Kosovar party representatives were asked to cooperate to reduce the 
tensions. Again, an opportunity for inclusive Church engagement was missed.
On May 4, 1980, Josip Broz Tito passed away. Millions of  shocked 
Yugoslavs gathered, tearfully laying fl owers, holding military memorials and 
paying their last respects. However, the country would again be rocked by violent 
demonstrations in Kosovo. The March 1981 riots were fuelled by demands for 
republic status, only this time, accompanied with violence against Serb symbols 
and the SOC and rioters demanding “Unifi cation with Albania.”108 Again, the 
regime answered with force, sending in militia and tank units and arresting 
hundreds of  protestors.109 
Less hindered by the 1966 accords, several SOC clerics penned an “Appeal 
for the Protection of  the Serbian Population and their Sacred Monuments in 
Kosovo” on Orthodox Good Friday 1982 to the Presidency of  the Yugoslavia, 
claiming that Albanian plans for “genocide” were being carried out.110 Using its 
publication outlets, it published the entire text in Pravoslavlje and other media, 
as Church spaces increasingly became the only venue where grievances could 
be expressed. Once again, aside from heavy-handed repression, no efforts were 
undertaken to bring the major stakeholders together to calm Kosovo.
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The fi nal years of  the Yugoslav project were characterized by greatly 
expanded activities of  protest. The federal SKVP and the republican KVPs were 
ineffectual in reeling in the Churches, which began to mobilize their spaces to 
fi ll the social vacuum. Tito’s passing and his apparent indifference to grooming a 
successor left many asking what might become of  Yugoslavia. The party’s fear of  
a situation in which religion would align itself  with anti-Yugoslav political forces 
would come true by the mid-1980s. The SOC Holy Bishop’s assembly began 
publicly to chronicle criminal acts perpetrated by Kosovar suspects against the 
Church. Pravoslavlje echoed the Church’s concern in regular columns and articles 
on the rise of  the “Albanian terror,” as well as in seminars and discussions 
on the topic held by the Church.111 The Church submitted formal complaints 
to provincial authorities in Kosovo, the Serbian KVP and the republican 
government, but they were never thoroughly investigated. The continued failure 
by Yugoslav governmental structures to have at least a cursory review of  the 
legitimacy of  such claims and take measures against perpetrators contributed 
to the SOC’s heightened sense of  being placed at an institutional disadvantage. 
With no credible guarantor, the SOC gradually began to instrumentalize its rich 
nationalist history of  suffering.112
By 1987, Slobodan Milošević had risen through the party ranks to become 
head of  the Serbian Communist Party. His springboard to political power took 
place at the 600th anniversary of  the Battle of  Kosovo. Flanked by ranking party 
members from the republics and SOC bishops, Milošević addressed a crowd 
of  nearly one million. Though sanctioned by the Yugoslav federal government 
and couched in socialist language, the event resembled a Church celebration. As 
one of  the fi rst high-ranking Serb offi cials to call for a comprehensive change 
in policy toward Serbia, Milošević found an ally in the SOC. Religion, religious 
symbolism and politics had now become inextricably intertwined in a self-
reinforcing dance.
The Catholic Church also strengthened its social profi le. By the mid-1980s, 
the large-scale Catholic celebrations began to take on more ethno-nationalist 
symbolism. While grand Church events continued to demonstrate the Church’s 
organizational ability, Glas Koncila had become the key voice in Church media. 
With little governmental censure, Glas signifi cantly contributed to creating a 
distinct Croatian identity. By 1989, the Catholic Church in Croatia had successfully 
111  Ibid., 124–25.
112  Mitja Velikonja, “In Hoc Signo Vinces: Religious Symbolism in the Balkan Wars 1991–1995,” 
International Journal of  Politics, Culture and Society 17, no. 1 (2003): 30–32.
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carved out its own space for re-assessing the foundation of  Croatian identity 
within a larger Yugoslavia. The rise of  Croat nationalist Franjo Tudjman in the 
late 1980s corresponded with that of  the Church. In 1987, Tudjman and his 
far-right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) turned to ultranationalist diaspora 
Church centers in Western Europe, Australia and North America.113 By 1989, 
the HDZ’s platform was thoroughly laden with revisionist ideas of  historical 
injustices, Croat nationalism, conservative Catholic values and anti-Yugoslav, 
anti-Serb populism. Like Milošević, Tudjman received massive support from 
all elements of  the clergy. The marriage of  growing political nationalism and a 
potent religious element gave even more popular credibility to the HDZ.
As the fronts began to harden between Serbia, which was seeking to re-
centralize Yugoslavia, and an increasingly independence-minded Croatia, 
which sought to rid itself  of  the rest of  Yugoslavia, each camp gained political 
legitimacy from their respective Church. Set in motion by Tito’s liberalizations 
of  the Yugoslav system 1966, the departure from a repressive to a open religious 
policy channeled Serb and Croat frustrations with the direction of  Yugoslavia’s 
path into the hands of  national Churches.
Conclusions: Assessing Church–State Engagement and Free Spaces
Challenges to authoritarian rule can take on different forms, while factors 
that affect the complex institutional interaction between a regime and its 
stakeholders can be infi nite. Moreover, anti-authoritarian opposition is made 
increasingly complex by case-specifi c experiences. Attempts to explain changes 
in power structures through the scope of  elections, voter behavior, civil society, 
democratization, ethnicity and identity, revolution or violence have yielded 
endless lists of  works from across the landscape of  ancient and modern political 
science. It is a common trait of  human behavior and demonstrates one of  the 
most essential pillars of  political science: the struggle to attain, maintain and 
challenge power and accommodate competing ideas. 
To try to capture the vastness of  this central component is beyond the 
scope of  this article. However, I claim that the uniqueness of  this study lies not in 
explaining the end of  East German and Yugoslav communism, although it does 
contribute to a more nuanced understanding of  this. I offer here an alternative 
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108
Hungarian Historical Review 4,  no. 1  (2015): 82–113
explanation to a different question: which set of  conditions and types of  
processes help us to temporally locate, theoretically identify and comparatively 
explain the variegated forms of  Church–state engagement which brought forth 
Church-based free spaces. The momentous year of  1989 in Eastern Europe is 
not the point of  departure here. Rather, it is the outcome of  a near 45-year-long 
history of  debate on religious policy. 
The empirical focus of  this study seeks to paint a picture in which free spaces 
are neither the natural outcome of  private meetings between small numbers 
of  individuals working in safe havens, nor do I claim that national Churches 
retained an innate oppositional quality. Contrary to the debate surrounding the 
development and role of  civil society, which tends to overlook the precise policy 
mechanisms and agent-to-agent interactions at the micro-level, this contribution 
demonstrates that Church-based free spaces are in fact a constructed social 
phenomenon, resulting from negotiated, institutional interactions by Church 
and state elites. To conclude, the complex interaction between Church and 
state in the execution of  religious policy across temporally organized periods 
offers us an additional tool in explaining the rise of  Church-based free spaces in 
authoritarian societies and the relationships between the rise of  these free spaces 
and end of  the European communist project.
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Marie Černá
From “Occupation” to “Friendly Assistance”: 
The “Presence” of  Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia 
after August 19681 
The Warsaw pact invasion of  Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was without doubt a 
milestone in the history of  Czechoslovakia. In the beginning, it mobilized and unifi ed 
almost the whole nation against the enemy, whose status as enemy was quite apparent. But 
unifi ed resistance to the occupation did not last long. It began to crumble as steps were 
taken to present a reinterpretation of  the “occupation” as an act of  “friendly assistance.” 
A shift in the image of  the Soviet Army became a prerequisite of  the normalization 
policy of  the regime. This article identifi es and explains the most important aspects of  
the changing image of  the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s and early 
1970s and some of  the consequences of  these changes for Czechoslovak society. These 
changes occurred mainly at the level of  offi cial presentation. Nevertheless, the offi cial 
politics of  friendship had tangible consequences, refl ected both in everyday life and the 
overall social and political climate. 
Keywords: Soviet Troops, Czechoslovakia, occupation, normalization, friendship
Introduction
The Warsaw Pact military intervention in August 1968 and the subsequent 
presence of  Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia2 unquestionably played an essential 
role in Czechoslovakia’s history. It is generally known that important changes 
1  This article was supported by the grant-funded project no. DF11P01OVV030, “Stories from the 
History of  the Czechoslovak State: Research and Experimental Development of  Software Simulations 
for the Teaching of  the History of  the Bohemian Lands in the Twentieth Century,” funded by the Czech 
Ministry of  Culture and carried out at the Faculty of  Arts and the Faculty of  Mathematics and Physics, 
Charles University, Prague, and the Institute of  Contemporary History, Academy of  Sciences of  the Czech 
Republic, from 2011 to 2014.
2  Historians have estimated the number of  Soviet soldiers who remained in Czechoslovakia after the 
signing of  the agreement in October 1968, according to the initial agreements, at about 75,000. Antonín 
Benčík, Jan Paulík, and Jindřich Pecka, Vojenské otázky československé reformy 1967–1970: Srpen 1968–květen 
1971 (Brno: Doplněk, 1999), 79. The exact number was not reported by the Soviet side until the numbers 
for 1990–91 were made public, according to which there were 73,500 soldiers and 56,832 family members 
on Czechoslovak territory. Jindřich Pecka, Odsun sovětských vojsk z Československa 1989–1991 (Prague: Ústav 
pro soudobé dějiny, 1996), 288. The number of  garrison sites has been estimated at 33, to which one 
should add four airports, three military hospitals, nineteen depots, and fi ve training grounds, though 
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took place in Czechoslovakia after August 1968. The regime came down hard on 
the population and limited civil rights and freedoms. These acts of  interference 
ended the previous process of  gradual relaxation, which had been accelerated 
mainly by the Prague Spring, which began in January 1968.3 In this process, 
called, in the jargon of  the period, “consolidation” or “normalization,” the 
intervention played the key role. In this respect, various observers of  and actors 
in the events of  the past have pointed to, fi rst and foremost, the reconfi rmation 
of  the limited autonomy of  the Czechoslovak political elites in decision-making 
and their dependence on the Soviet leaders.4 In more general works about the 
normalization of  Czechoslovak society, however, Soviet political and local 
military representatives are largely absent. Whereas the military and political 
aspects of  the intervention5 and the numbers of  victims6 are on the whole well 
charted, the impact in practice of  the subsequent presence of  the Soviet troops 
on Czechoslovak society and on its normalization has been neglected. This 
is surely also linked to the fact that we recall mostly the times during which 
most of  Czechoslovak society, offi cially and unoffi cially, perceived the Soviet 
Army as an occupying force, that is, the period which began in the wake of  the 
intervention and came to an end with the withdrawal of  the Soviet troops in 
these numbers could in the course of  time also change somewhat. Jindřich Pecka et al., Sovětská armáda v 
Československu 1968–1991: Chronologický přehled (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny, 1996), 198–206; Benčík, 
Paulík, and Pecka, Vojenské otázky československé reformy, 51.
3  The Prague Spring and subsequent intervention of  Warsaw Pact armies rank among the most signifi cant 
topics of  Czech history and historiography. See Věra Břeňová, Pražské jaro ’68: Bibliografi e, Prague: Ústav 
pro soudobé dějiny, 2013. Of  the vast amount of  research on this period, I would mention at least some of  
the English-language works: H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976); Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968–1970 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Fred H. Eidlin, The Logic of  ‘Normalization’: The Soviet 
Intervention in Czechoslovakia of  21 August 1968 and the Czechoslovak Response (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1980); Miklós Kun, Prague Spring – Prague Fall: Blank Spots of  1968 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1996).
4  Jindřich Madry, Sovětská okupace Československa, jeho normalizace v letech 1969–1970 a role ozbrojených sil 
(Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 1994); Ondřej Felcman, Invaze a okupace: K úloze SSSR a sovětských 
vojsk ve vývoji Československa v letech 1968–1991 (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 1995). Zdeněk 
Doskočil, Duben 1969: Anatomie jednoho mocenského zvratu (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 2006).
5  Benčík, Paulík, and Pecka, Vojenské otázky československé reformy; Antonín Benčík, Operace Dunaj aneb 
Internacionální vražda Pražského jara (Prague: Krutina Jiří–Vacek, 2013); Daniel Povolný, Vojenské řešení 
Pražského jara 1968, vol. II: Československá lidová armáda v srpnu 1968 (Prague: Ministerstvo obrany ČR, 2010); 
Jiří Fidler, 21.8.1968 – okupace Československa (Prague: Havran, 2003); Jan Pauer, Prag 1968: Der Einmarsch des 
Warschauer Paktes. Hintergründe – Planung – Durchführung (Bremen: Temmen, 1995).
6  Milan Bárta et al., Victims of  the Occupation: Warsaw Pact Invasion of  Czechoslovakia: 21 August–31 December 
1968 (Prague: Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, 2008); Hynek Fajmon, Sovětská okupace Československa a 
její oběti (Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2005).
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1990–91.7 “Occupation” has thus become the lens through which the presence 
of  the Soviet Army has usually been seen since 1989. Nevertheless, the term 
actually had a very short life in the post-August history of  Czechoslovakia, and 
its gradual vanishing of  the term “occupation” from the political scene, the 
mass media, and public life was of  key importance for Czechoslovak society 
in this period. Just as signifi cant is the fact that the term, with all its practical 
implications, did not offi cially return until the collapse of  the Communist regime 
in late 1989.
If  we want to consider the more complex question of  the presence of  
the Soviet Army and its impact on Czechoslovak society and normalization, 
it is necessary fi rst to identify the gradual essential change in the perception 
of  the Soviet Army since the intervention. A shift in the image of  the Soviet 
Army became a prerequisite of  the normalization policy of  the regime, which 
was based on discrediting the Prague Spring by describing it as an attempted 
counterrevolution. Only if  the image of  the Soviet Army as an occupying force 
were transformed into the image of  a savior would it be possible to reinterpret the 
Prague Spring as an attempt at counterrevolution and condemn and discredit its 
leading actors. The social and political changes that took place in Czechoslovakia 
after 1968 would have been impossible or at the very least meaningless if  the 
image of  the Soviet Army as the occupier had not changed considerably. Other 
contemporaneous terms, such as “right-wing opportunism” and “anti-socialist 
elements,” acquired meaning only if  the occupation by the Soviet forces was 
perceived as friendly assistance, and terms such as “occupation,” “collaboration,” 
and “democratization process” lost their meaning. Considering that the main 
shift in the offi cial perception of  the Soviet Army occurred in the fi rst two 
years after the beginning of  the intervention, it is obvious that a lot must have 
happened in this period. A great deal of  effort at various levels must have 
been expended in order for a spontaneously shared image of  the occupier and 
enemy to change into its complete opposite in this short period. It was mainly 
change at the level of  offi cial presentation. Nevertheless, even that had tangible 
consequences, refl ected both at the level of  everyday life and the overall social 
7  This has been occurring in the mass media during the annual commemoration of  the August 
intervention and of  the withdrawal of  Soviet troops, as well as in academic writing. The most signifi cant 
work undertaken thus far, which charts the presence of  Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia from the beginning 
to the end and thus captures the changes in the attitudes of  Czechoslovak politicians and society towards 
the Soviet Army, is Jindřich Pecka et al., Sovětská armáda v Československu 1968–1991. It provides a brief  
summary of  events, negotiations, and meetings, together with articles related to the presence of  Soviet 
troops and excerpts from a variety of  archival records or periodicals. 
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and political climate. With the gradual change of  the offi cial image of  the Soviet 
Army, the declared attitude toward it necessarily had to change, too. Friendship 
became an integral part of  state policy, and as part of  policy rhetoric it was 
implemented across society. As the pressure demanding a reinterpretation of  
the August 1968 events increased, opinions about different forms of  contact 
with the Soviet Army changed as well, from despised collaboration to valued 
cooperation. The initial covert cooperation of  politically radical and socially 
ostracized individuals with Soviet offi cers gradually developed into an offi cially 
endorsed norm. In this article, I endeavor to identify and explain the most 
important aspects of  the changing image of  the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s and some of  the consequences of  this change 
for Czechoslovak society.
The sources that I use in my research are of  various provenances. A special 
source of  information, particularly for the early stage of  the presence of  Soviet 
troops in Czechoslovakia, is the collection of  documents of  the Government 
Commission of  the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic for Analysis of  the 
Events of  1967–1970, which was established in the early 1990s. The collection 
is held at the Institute of  Contemporary History in Prague. It contains records 
from various regions of  the Czech Republic, which help the historian understand 
the problem at the local level in the very places where Soviet troops were based. 
Among the other local materials I have used are town chronicles, regional 
newspapers, and archive records from two former garrison towns, Vysoké Mýto, 
a town of  several thousand people in east Bohemia, and Trutnov, a regional 
capital in northeast Bohemia.
The Occupation and the Community of  Non-violent Resistance
When troops from the Soviet Union, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, and 
Bulgaria poured into Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968,8 most of  the inhabitants 
of  the country were shocked. The trauma that this event caused ranked with 
that of  the other national tragedies, such as the annexation of  the Sudetenland 
to the Third Reich in autumn 1938 and the German occupation that began in 
mid-March 1939. Today, it is recalled in respectful commemorations and written 
about in history books. The explanation for the signifi cance of  this trauma 
8  More precisely: the East German army remained on alert in their own country and, except for a few 
specialists, ultimately did not even cross the frontier into Czechoslovakia. The total number of  soldiers 
could never even be precisely determined. Estimates range from 200,000 to 500,000.
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lies not only in the number of  dead and wounded civilians,9 but also, perhaps 
mainly, in the great wave of  non-violent national resistance that followed in its 
wake. What is essential, however, is that slogans in Czech and Russian10 and 
resolutions and declarations condemning the occupation as an illegitimate and 
violent intervention in the internal affairs of  the state were written by almost 
everyone. Open political confl ict with the Soviet Union was unthinkable for 
the Czechoslovak political leadership; nevertheless, among them, tendencies 
to condemn the military intervention triumphed. Thus, members of  the top 
party and government bodies at fi rst joined together with journalists and editors, 
employees of  all kinds of  institutions and enterprises, and students, school 
children, and other individuals in the nationwide protest. For having done this, 
they received extraordinary support. This unity experienced immediately after 
the August military intervention went beyond the political protests, which were 
ultimately doomed to failure. One fi nds signs of  solidarity that resemble what 
the political scientist James Krapfl  referred to, when examining Czechoslovak 
society in 1989, as a “sacred sense of  community.”11 Both in 1968 and in 1989, 
in addition to protesting and referring to the occupiers as the enemy, people 
expressed solidarity with one another, and they identifi ed common values 
and basic principles of  community, creatively ascribing special meaning to the 
August events by doing so. In parallel with the everyday danger, frustration, 
humiliation, and sense of  powerlessness when face to face with tanks, a wave 
of  expression welled up, which was a celebration of  national solidarity and 
declarations of  shared values. Those values were not just values of  resistance, 
but also, and indeed mainly, prudence and non-violence. The general sharing 
of  these values became a further source of  pride at the time.12 At this level, the 
actual impossibility of  effectively preventing the military intervention could be 
recast into the positive value of  non-violence, from which society could draw a 
9  By mid-December 1968, the records show 94 dead and 345 seriously wounded Czechoslovak citizens. 
For more on this, see Bárta et al., Victims of  the Occupation.
10  “Pochemu?” (Why?), “Sovetskie okupanty” (Soviet occupiers!), “Sovetskie fashisty” (Soviet fascists!), 
“Idite domoi” (Go home!), “Lenine, probuď se, Brežněv se zbláznil” (Lenin, wake up! Brezhnev’s gone 
mad!), “Mnichov 1938, Bratislava 1968” (Munich 1938, Bratislava 1968), “Eto nashe delo” (It’s our affair), 
“Ať žije Rudá armáda, ale někde jinde” (Long live the Red Army! But somewhere else), “Proletáři všech 
zemí, odejděte” (Proletarians of  all countries, go away!), and thousands of  others.
11  James Krapfl , Revolúcia s ľudskou tvárou: Politika, kultúra a spoločenstvo v československu po 17. novembri 
1989 (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2009); idem, Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in 
Czechoslovakia 1989–1992 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013.)
12  “It turned out, however, that [the occupation] did not crush the good qualities of  our nations; rather, 
it galvanized them. The whole world now admires our nations,” Zemědělské noviny, August 27, 1968, quoted 
Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia after August 1968
119
sense of  moral superiority. The basic principle upon which solidarity was being 
formed after August 21, 1968 was, apart from prudence and non-violence, 
rejection of  the military intervention. And the intervention was considered 
chiefl y a Soviet affair. 
Collaborators
Any community threatened by an external enemy seeks to defend certain values, 
prescribing appropriate conduct with regards to the enemy and, by contrast, 
condemning inappropriate conduct. This code was embodied in a number of  
ceremonial commitments incorporated into numerous statements, such as “We 
shall not be traitors,” and also in the slogans that surfaced on occasion, such 
as “Not a slice of  bread or drop of  water for the occupier!” and “Shame on 
collaborators!” It would be wrong to think that everyone was of  the same opinion 
on that point, for had there been unanimity, there would have been no “letter 
of  invitation.”13 There were defi nitely many people who were nervous about the 
developments leading towards the democratization of  Czechoslovakia, and they 
felt that things were getting out of  hand and moving in the wrong direction. 
There were also people who were afraid, insulted, and abused by developments 
in the weeks and months before the August intervention.14 One would be better 
in Sedm pražských dnů: Dokumentace (1968), ed. Milan Otáhal, Vilém Prečan et al (Prague: Academia, 1990), 
286; published in English as Robert Littell, ed., The Czech Black Book (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969); the 
Czech is now published online January 20, 2014, http://www.68.usd.cas.cz/cz/sedm-prazskych-dnu.html.
13  The so-called “letter of  invitation” was signed by fi ve high-ranking party and state functionaries, 
mostly members of  the Presidium of  the Central Committee of  the Czechoslovak Communist Party: 
Alois Indra, Drahomír Kolder, Vasil Biľak, Oldřich Švestka, and Antonín Kapek. In the letter, they point 
to the danger of  counterrevolution in the country and urge the Soviet side “to provide effective support 
and aid by all means.” Concerning the fate and importance of  this letter, see František Janáček and Marie 
Michálková, “Příběh zvacího dopisu,” Soudobé dějiny 1 (1993), 87–101; “The ‘Letter of  Invitation’ from 
the Anti-Reformist Faction of  the CPCz Leadership,” in The Prague Spring 68: A National Security Archive 
Documents Reader, ed. Jaromír Navrátil (Budapest: CEU Press, 1998), 324–25.
14  It is probably impossible to quantify in any objective way the proportion of  these people in society 
at the time. The sources mention various instances of  people who rejected the general protest against the 
occupation or soon welcomed it, to a more than usual extent, as friendly assistance, or directly established 
contact with military representatives. The behavior of  these people is often explained away as their 
having been members of  organizations such as the People’s Militia, the Czechoslovak–Soviet Friendship 
Association, and local or workplace Communist Party organizations. In this connection, the Prague meeting 
of  about 400 “old Communists,” on October 9, 1968, and the meeting held by two district chapters of  the 
Czechoslovak–Soviet Friendship Association, in the Lucerna building, Prague, to mark the anniversary of  
the October Revolution in Russia, are well known. Soviet delegations were present at both, and the military 
intervention was assessed there as having been friendly assistance.
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off  assuming that the voices of  these people were not really heard in the turmoil 
of  late August, and that when they were heard, these people faced threats of  
revenge from others.
For example, the general manager of  Dioptra, a state-owned business 
in the town of  Turnov in northern Bohemia, was with his apprentices on an 
excursion in Hungary when the Soviet-led troops arrived, and he openly praised 
the intervention. At a Communist party meeting of  the factory after he returned, 
he was called a collaborator and was subsequently dismissed from his post as 
general manager.15 Today, of  course, it is hard to ascertain the exact motives 
and facts of  such stories. We will never learn what the Dioptra general manager 
said in Hungary or who said what about him or to him. We do not know what 
resentments, interests, and passions played a role. What is important, however, is 
that the accusations of  collaboration, of  improper conduct with regards to the 
occupiers and inappropriate opinions, could have real power and lead to tough 
and often offi cially approved sanctions. That, however, could only have been 
the case under circumstances in which the generally shared norm of  rejecting 
the “occupation” was expressed by a wide range of  more or less practical or 
symbolic acts of  protest. 
Occupation?!
Unifi ed resistance to the occupation did not last long, in spite of  the fact that 
the resistance found signifi cant support in all of  the social strata of  the country. 
The pressure exerted by the Soviets in their power politics was relentless. The 
physical presence of  armed Soviet soldiers, who often crudely intervened in local 
events, was combined with systematic pressure by Soviet politicians on their 
Czechoslovak counterparts.16 This pressure began immediately after the military 
intervention with the Soviet “abduction” of  the Czechoslovak state and party 
leaders to Moscow. During the talks with the Soviets, the Czechoslovak delegation 
was forced to accept a number of  compromises, including the invalidation of  the 
Extraordinary Party Congress (Mimořádný sjezd KSČ) on August 22, 1968, and all 
15  Ústav pro soudobé dějiny [Institute of  Contemporary History, Prague – ÚSD], sbírka  Komise vlády 
ČSFR pro analýzu událostí 1967–1970 [Collection of  the Government Commission of  the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic for Analysis of  the events of  1967–1970], Okresní zmocněnec Semily [Authorized 
district archivist]. The astute reader certainly already suspects that the sanctions did not last long.
16  For a summary, see Ondřej Felcman, Invaze a okupace: K úloze SSSR a Sovětských vojsk ve vývoji Československa 
v letech 1968–1991 (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny, 1995), or Antonín Benčík, “Intervence,” in Sovětská 
vojska v Československém vývoji 1968–1991, ed. Jindřich Pecka (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny, 1998), 9–23.
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of  its resolutions. They also had to accept limitations on the freedom of  speech 
and association, the withdrawal of  Czechoslovak demands to have the crisis put 
on the agenda of  the UN Security Council, and mainly the de facto legitimation 
of  the “temporary presence” of  Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia.17 These 
compromises were confi rmed by the signing of  the “Moscow Protocol.”18 Of  
all the generally known facts, I would emphasize that among the basic demands 
of  Moscow was a reinterpretation of  the Warsaw Pact intervention and the 
establishment of  “friendly” relations. It is clear that the designation “occupier” 
profoundly upset and offended the Soviet politicians. At the end of  August, 
General Nikolai Ogarkov (1917–1994), a plenipotentiary of  the Soviet Minister 
of  Defense, in a conversation with Josef  Smrkovský (1911–1974), the Chairman 
of  the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, demanded that in their speeches the 
representatives of  the Czechoslovak state should “speak a normal language” and 
not use words like “occupier,” because it prevented “normalization.”19 
This was defi nitely not merely the reaction of  a jilted partner, who jealously 
seeks to compel a rebel to return to his or her former devotion and compliance. 
The continuous push for Soviet interests in “twinning” (družba) and cooperation 
between the Soviet troops and various institutions (including factories, schools) 
and in personal contacts between Soviet offi cers and Czechoslovak citizens, 
offi cials, and institutions was mostly strategic. Not merely a matter of  ceremony, 
it was an effective means of  gathering intelligence and gaining control over 
otherwise unpredictable events. It is therefore no surprise that the planning 
of  “friendly” relations became the subject of  offi cial reports of  leading 
Soviet ideologues. For example, as early as September 4, 1968, the Chief  of  
17  In addition to the main actors of  the Prague Spring, such as First Secretary of  the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party Alexander Dubček, Speaker of  the National Assembly Josef  Smrkovský, Premier Oldřich 
Černík, and a member of  the CPCz Presidium, František Kriegel, and the delegation of  Czechoslovak 
President Ludvík Svoboda, on the Czechoslovak side some of  the authors of  the letter of  invitation also 
participated in the dramatic negotiations, such as Vasil Biľak, Oldřich Švestka, and Alois Indra. For a 
personal recollection of  participants in the Moscow talks in August, see Zdeněk Mlynář, Mráz přichází z 
Kremlu (Cologne: Index, 1988), 267–314; published in English as Night Frost in Prague: The End of  Humane 
Socialism (London: C. Hurst, 1980). For the minutes of  the talks, see Jitka Vondrová,  Mezinárodní souvislosti 
Československé krize 1967–1970: Dokumenty ÚV KSSS 1966–1969 (Brno: Doplněk, 2011), 213–66. For an 
English translation of  excerpts of  these negotiations, see Navrátil ed., The Prague Spring 68, 465–73. 
18  For the “Protokol z jednání delegací SSSR a ČSSR 23.–26. srpna v Moskvě,” see Jitka Vondrová and 
Jaromír Navrátil, Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize 1967–1970. Červenec–srpen 1968 (Prague–Brno: 
Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR and Doplněk, 1996), 271–74 and, “The Moscow Protocol, August 26, 
1968,” in Navrátil (ed.) The Prague Spring 1968, 477.
19  Jindřich Pecka, “Rozhovor Josefa Smrkovského s generálem N. V. Ogarkovem 30.8.1968,” Soudobé 
dějiny 1 (1997): 158–66.
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the Main Political Directorate, General Alexei Yepishev, was proposing ways 
for the Soviet Army to contribute to the “normalization” of  Czechoslovakia 
to the Central Committee of  the CPSU. Part of  his proposal was a broadly 
conceived “buttressing of  twinning and comradely relations with the population 
and members of  the Czechoslovak People’s Army,” including military and 
political contacts with local party and state bodies, the Czechoslovak Armed 
Forces, social organizations, industrial and agricultural enterprises, and schools. 
These contacts entailed, among other things, “twinning evenings” (večery družby), 
participation of  members of  the local population in cultural events organized by 
Soviet soldiers, performances by music and dance troupes of  the Soviet Army in 
Czechoslovak milieus, and even assistance by Soviet soldiers in farming. Yepishev 
recommended in particular using the Soviet fi ght against fascism for propaganda 
purposes, therefore to invite soldiers who had participated in the liberation 
of  Czechoslovakia in 1945, and to emphasize the “fi ghting friendship” (bojové 
přátelství) between the Soviet and Czechoslovak armed forces.20 In a similar spirit, 
during the Moscow talks in October 1968, Brezhnev offered the Czechoslovak 
delegation a detailed description of  his vision of  comradely friendship.21
A turnaround in relations between Czechoslovaks and the Soviet army may 
have seemed unthinkable in August 1968, because any such move would have 
been condemned as treason and collaboration.22 Nevertheless, the fundamental 
consequence of  signing the “Moscow Protocol” was that the united resistance 
20  “Náčelník hlavní politické správy SA generál A. Jepišev ústřednímu výboru KSSS. Návrhy na činnost 
sovětských vojsk při zajišťování ‘normalizace’ v Československu” [Chief  of  the Main Political Directorate, 
General Alexei Yepishev, to the Central Committee of  the CPSU. Proposals for Activity by Soviet Soldiers 
to Implement “Normalization” in Czechoslovakia], ÚSD, Sbírka KV ČSFR, Z/S, 4. 9. 1968.
21  Apart from contacts between local politicians and local governmental bodies on the one hand and 
Soviet soldiers on the other, this was also meant to include exchanges between folklore troupes and the 
promotion of  Soviet culture in general, twinning at the regional, district, and town levels, and the exchange 
of  delegations of  workers and scholars. Záznam z jednání delegace KSČ s vedením KSSS v Moskvě 3.-
4. října 1968, in Jitka Vondrová, Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize: září 1968–květen 1970 (Brno: 
Doplněk, 1997), 116–35. 
22  The author of  the article “Bez kolaborantů jsou vyřízeni” [Without Collaborators, They Wouldn’t 
Stand a Chance], boasts in the Communist Party daily Rudé právo, on August 27, 1968, that even by the 
sixth day after the arrival of  the troops the occupiers had not managed to create “collaborationist bodies 
and institutions,” with which they had hoped to create the impression that the intervention had been legal. 
That is not to say that no one was willing to collaborate; there were such people, but they stood aside 
because of  the “astonishing spontaneous unity, the huge activity of  the absolute majority of  the nation, 
the unconcealed contempt and hatred.” “One can have no doubt therefore that collaboration with the 
occupiers is the worst treason […].” 
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began to crumble and the fi rst step was taken in the reinterpretation of  the 
“occupation” as an act of  “friendly assistance.”
It’s Better Not To Write Anything about Them
In the Moscow Protocol, the representatives of  the Czechoslovak party and 
government committed themselves to taking power back from the mass media “so 
that they fully serve the cause of  Socialism” and to taking measures that “would 
prevent the publishing in the press and broadcasting on radio and television of  
speeches that could cause confl ict and tension between the population and the 
allied troops on Czechoslovak territory.”23
In order for the Soviets to withdraw their troops from the streets and 
government offi ces to garrisons and then eventually from the country altogether, 
the Czechoslovaks were expected to fulfi l these terms and conditions, as well as 
a number of  others. Shortly after the Czechoslovak leadership returned from 
Moscow, measures were taken to suppress the hitherto spontaneous expressions 
of  resistance to Soviet troops. Among the most important was a government 
decree of  August 30, 1968, which created the Press and Information Offi ce (Úřad 
pro tisk, rozhlas a televizi). Upon its establishment, the offi ce immediately issued 
orders that brought freedom of  expression in line with the Moscow Protocol.24 
According to the instructions that were issued, one was forbidden to use the 
word “occupier” or “occupation,” criticize the Warsaw pact countries or their 
Communist parties, attack their troops based on Czechoslovak territory, or write 
about victims or damages caused by the military intervention.25 These orders 
were subsequently implemented in all editorial offi ces throughout the country. 
At a press conference, Oldřich Černík (1921–1994), the Czechoslovak 
premier, met with the editors-in-chief  of  Czech periodicals to explain the situation 
and called on them to heed the new restrictions. When asked what journalists 
were allowed to write with regards to the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact 
countries, he replied, “It’s better not to write anything about them.”26
During the process of  normalization, in the most basic sense of  the 
word (in other words the withdrawal of  the allied forces from public spaces 
23  “Protokol z jednání delegací SSSR a ČSSR 23.–26. srpna v Moskvě.”
24  Jiří Hoppe, Pražské jaro v médiích: Výběr z dobové publicistiky (Brno: Doplněk, 2004), 16–17.
25  Ibid.
26  ÚSD, sb. KV ČSFR, A3, “Zpráva z tiskové konference šéfredaktorů s předsedou vlády O. Černíkem 
dne 28.8.1968.”
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and government offi ces and the restoration of  the usual administration of  
the country), this legislation assigned the main responsibility to Czechoslovak 
society. How the situation developed would allegedly be up to the people of  
Czechoslovakia. The message that the Czechoslovak political leaders took back 
home from Moscow in August 1968 was essentially that they should act with 
discipline and avoid any measures or steps that Moscow might perceive as 
provocative. Only this would make a return to normality possible. It was in this 
spirit, as an expression of  the required self-discipline, that the Czechoslovak 
political leaders, upon their return, also presented the re-imposition of  censorship 
and restrictions on the freedom of  association. Normalization began to be the 
mantra to which everything was supposed to be subordinated, although the term 
gradually went from meaning the restoration of  the basic operations of  the state 
to meaning the shoring-up of  the authoritarian regime and the imposition of  
limitations on civil rights and freedoms. We can clearly see that politicians thus 
stopped unanimously saying “No, to occupation,” and a considerable number 
of  them soon began pointing out other threats to order and unity. Henceforth, 
those who were to be considered dangerous were those who rebelled too openly 
against the occupation. These voices against rebellion gradually gained strength. 
And the essential thing is that one of  the two fundamental principles of  national 
solidarity that had been so solemnly proclaimed after August 21, 1968 began to 
thrive at the expense of  the other. Resistance to the occupation began to give 
way to prudence, non-violence, and self-discipline. The national solidarity that 
had been created by everyday politics thus gradually, but increasingly, became 
a caricature of  the national solidarity that had grown out the August events. 
Nevertheless, it provided the opportunity for some continuity and, last but not 
least, for continuous support for the political leaders who in the eyes of  the 
public represented the liberalization that had begun in January 1968.
A Rift
In a resolution of  the November 1968 plenum of  the CPCz Central Committee, 
the top party leadership called the rightwing, anti-Socialist forces the foremost 
enemies of  the state and more or less offi cially abolished the term “collaborator,” 
or, rather, logically came to the conclusion that where there is no occupation, 
there is no collaboration: “The Central Committee and its offi cials will also come 
out against all attempts to discredit Czechoslovak comrades who honorably 
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promote party policy principles against any bullying they face for their openly 
internationalist relations with the USSR.”27
With these statements, the Czechoslovak politicians quickly defi ned 
themselves as being in opposition to the rebelliously minded part of  society, and 
they took their primary task to be the quelling of  expressions of  defi ance. In 
November 1968, when university students and some secondary-school students 
went on strike in support of  the November plenum of  the CPCz Central 
Committee, to encourage the Committee to stay the course of  democratization 
and maintain the gains that had been made in civil rights, the party leadership 
rejected their support. The student activities were condemned as “ill-considered” 
and the public was called upon “not to allow this dangerous situation to grow.”28
Open resistance to the occupation and to the concessions made by the 
Czechoslovak politicians began to be politically undesirable and, as such, gradually 
became the target of  police surveillance and repression. During the spontaneous 
demonstrations that were held in Prague on October 28, 1968 (the fi ftieth 
anniversary of  the establishment of  the Czechoslovak Republic) and November 
7, 1968 (the fi fty-fi rst anniversary of  the Bolshevik Revolution; both occasions 
were state holidays), the police intervened and took some demonstrators into 
custody. The events were closely observed and assessed by the secretariat of  
the Ministry of  Interior.29 The First Secretary of  the CPCz Central Committee, 
Alexander Dubček (1921–1992), the icon of  the reform process, spoke out 
clearly on this point: “The greatest pitfalls of  the consolidation process are [...] 
attitudes that directly accuse the political leaders of  capitulatory behavior and 
27  “Hlavní úkoly strany v nejbližším období: Rezoluce plenárního zasedání ÚV KSČ” [The Main Tasks 
of  the Party in the Near Future: A Resolution of  the Plenary Session of  the Central Committee of  the 
CPCz], Rok šedesátý osmý v usneseních a dokumentech ÚV KSČ (Prague: Svoboda, 1969), 383.
28  “Provolání představitelů strany a státu” [Proclamation of  the party and state representatives], ibid., 
393–94.
29  The turnaround in the public perception of  people protesting openly against Soviet troops is 
graphically illustrated by a document from the Ministry of  the Interior. Originally, it summarized serious 
cases of  Soviet soldiers who had restricted the personal freedom of  some Czechoslovaks, mainly by 
reacting with excessive force to an imagined or real protest, such as the shouting of  abuse, the posting or 
distribution of  leafl ets, and the writing of  slogans. The fact that what was originally a list of  victims of  
Soviet military aggression could also serve as a list of  potential rabble-rousers is illustrated by the names 
and acts of  protest later being carefully and thoroughly underlined. See the report about the detention of  
Czechoslovak citizens by foreign soldiers, dated August 21, 1968, accessed October 14, 2013, http://www.
ustrcr.cz/data/pdf/projekty/srpen1968/srpen-zpravy-014.pdf.
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treason, causing an anti-Soviet psychosis.”30 The political leaders thus made it 
clear who had to be excluded from the national community.
The Treaty on the “Temporary Presence” of  Soviet Troops
Dubček’s mention of  capitulatory behavior and treason was undoubtedly related 
to other political events: as set out in the Moscow Protocol, the Treaty on the 
Temporary Presence of  Troops was signed in October 1968.31 That meant an 
important change in developments. Under the terms of  the treaty, most of  the 
Warsaw Pact troops were withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, but, on the other 
hand, the “temporary presence” of  Soviet troops was made legal; the secret 
codicil to the treaty mentions 75,000 Soviet soldiers.32 The treaty was concerned 
with matters such as what the Czechoslovaks were meant to provide for the 
Soviet soldiers, who would bear the costs for their basing, how foodstuffs, 
goods, and services would be supplied to the Soviet garrisons, and who would 
pay for them. Once adopted, the treaty shifted the problem of  the basing of  
Soviet troops considerably towards practical matters. In the 33 locations where 
the garrisons were stationed throughout the country, many problems had to 
be dealt with, including housing, rent, administration, supplies, the movement 
of  soldiers and military equipment, the determining of  jurisdictions, and the 
use of  energy and water.33 For local governments, working together became an 
unavoidable technical necessity. And the better such collaboration took place, 
the easier it was to fi nd a solution acceptable to both sides, or to obtain redress 
if  the Soviets in some way fl agrantly breached agreements. At a meeting of  the 
chairmen of  the national committees, held at the Presidium of  the Government 
on October 29, 1968, to discuss the adopted treaty, the question was also raised 
by the Deputy Minister of  Defense, General Václav Dvořák: “Regular matter-of-
fact relations with the Soviet commanders are proving to be fruitful and are thus 
30  “Z projevu soudruha Alexandra Dubčeka Hlavní úkoly strany v nejbližším období,” Rudé právo, 
November 15, 1968, 1, 3.
31  The full name of  the treaty is the “Smlouva mezi vládou Československé socialistické republiky a 
vládou Svazu sovětských socialistických republik o podmínkách dočasného pobytu sovětských vojsk na 
území Československé socialistické republiky.” It was signed in Prague on October 16, 1968. For an English 
translation, see “Bilateral Treaty on the ‘Temporary Presence of  Soviet Forces on Czechoslovak Territory’, 
October 16, 1968,” in Navratil, The Prague Spring 1968, 533–36.
32  Benčík, Paulík, and Pecka, Vojenské otázky československé reformy, 79.
33  These practical matters led to the signing of  other, more detailed treaties, ratifi ed in early 1969, 
concerning specifi c aspects of  the basing of  troops.
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helping to prevent confl icts.”34 The minutes of  the meeting include the opinions 
and local experiences that contributed to good relations with Soviet soldiers. 
A representative of  the Municipal National Committee of  Mladá Boleslav, for 
example, “talked about his three-week experience of  the presence of  Soviet 
troops there, with whom a detailed regimen was agreed on in the interests of  
the citizens and the operation of  the town. He pointed out that the expansion 
of  good relations between the Czech authorities, collective farms, and factories 
on the one hand and the Soviet command on the other facilitated the work 
and improved the status of  the national-committee offi cials dealing with daily 
problems.”35
Clearly, cooperation and twinning, politically required and practically 
necessary, could be put to practical use at the garrison bases in the service of  
the interests of  locals as well. The fact that using Soviet soldiers for various 
part-time jobs gradually became quite common practice is demonstrated by 
an October 1970 entry in the Vysoké Mýto town chronicle: “Relations with 
the local Red Army garrison should no longer be unrestricted and accessible 
to all. Enterprises, including collective farms, have begun to use the services 
of  the garrisons at all workplaces where they are behind schedule. Relations 
will henceforth be possible only by means of  the local committee for garrison 
relations […].”36
We Want Friendly and Comradely Relations
In the Treaty on the Temporary Presence of  Soviet Troops, the Czechoslovak 
Republic also committed itself  “to endeavor to buttress friendship and 
collaboration” with the Soviet Union. In practice, this turned out to be no 
mere formality; it was a commitment that the Czechoslovak politicians were 
determined to keep and to demand of  others.
In November 1968, the Presidium of  the CPCz Central Committee received 
a letter for approval the contents of  which were to be passed on to district 
and regional party committees. The letter includes the following passage: “it is 
fully in our interests to normalize relations with the USSR and to establish and 
34  ÚSD, KV ČSFR CI/9, “Záznam o poradě konané 29. října 1968 na předsednictvu vlády.”
35  Ibid.
36  “Pamětní kniha Vysokého Mýta 1961–1973,” entry from October 1970, accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://vychodoceskearchivy.cz/ebadatelna/zobrazeni-publikace-usti/?adresar=CZ_225204010_0381_
x00002&nadpis=CZ_225204010_0381_x00002&strana=1.
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develop social relations with Soviet troops. These relations can also signifi cantly 
contribute to the gradual overcoming of  problems and misunderstandings 
[…] [W]e want these relations to be friendly and comradely.” The letter also 
emphasized that “Communists in particular should actively endeavor to achieve 
the normalization of  our relations with Soviet troops.”37 Such instructions gave 
considerable impetus to efforts to ensure that comradely friendship with Soviet 
soldiers where they were stationed would become one of  the important tasks for 
party units and organizations at all levels. It was therefore a task that could not 
easily be avoided. Considering that basic party organizations existed in practically 
all institutions, offi ces, and enterprises and that these organizations regularly had 
to provide evidence and accounts of  the work they had done and the tasks they 
had fulfi lled, the space for working together was thrown wide open.
Soviet offi cers and agents oversaw the fulfi llment of  obligations stemming 
from the Treaty, and they did not hesitate to protest if  they felt that Czechs were 
hampering the development of  friendly relations.38 Clearly, the Czechoslovak 
side could not turn a deaf  ear to such complaints and demands for the simple 
reason that it had to deal with them at the highest party and government levels. 
The measures were not long in coming. In 1969, for example, in the north-east 
Bohemian district of  Semily alone the state police sent nineteen people to court 
for the production and dissemination of  printed matter, including leafl ets, and 
for writing anti-Soviet slogans.39 
The Local Press
Places where Soviet garrisons were based had to fi nd a way to deal with their 
presence and the associated pressures. The local press found itself  in a strange 
position. To a large extent, it continued to obey the premier’s instructions that 
it was “better not to write anything about them.” The offi cial district weekly, 
Jiskra Orlicka (The Orlice District Spark), mentioned only in passing that Soviet 
soldiers would be stationed in the Ústí nad Orlicí district.40 The Soviet soldiers 
were not mentioned again until November 5, 1968, about a month after they 
37 Návrh dopisu předsednictva ÚV KSČ krajským výborům strany o vzájemných stycích se sovětskými 
vojsky, ÚSD, sb. KV ČSFR, DII/121.
38  “Protest vládního zmocněnce SSSR pro záležitosti sovětských vojsk dočasně umístěných na území 
ČSSR,” ÚSD, sb. KV ČSFR, DII/122.
39  ÚSD, sb. KV ČSFR, OZ Semily.
40  “Události těchto dnů,” Jiskra Orlicka, September 24, 1968.
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had been stationed in the area. The fact that the weekly completely omitted the 
massive troop movements that accompanied the deployment41 is an indication 
of  how Soviet soldiers would be reported on in future. In an interview held 
on November 5, the chairman of  the District National Committee assured a 
reader that Soviet troops would not “make claims to fl ats” or other housing, 
that they would be provided only with surplus local foodstuffs, that the soldiers’ 
representatives would hold talks about complying with local rules and regulations, 
and that the movement of  common soldiers would be restricted to joint leave in 
closed units.42 By not discussing certain problems in the newspaper, the chairman 
of  the National Committee was endeavoring to forestall fear and panic caused 
by the unchecked movement and behavior of  Soviet troops in garrison towns. 
Not admitting a problem, or veiling it in impersonal administrative terms, was 
the general approach used in this weekly. From this local periodical we therefore 
learn little about the various aspects of  the coexistence of  Soviet garrisons and 
local populations. We do, however, learn how the offi cial image of  unproblematic 
and mutually benefi cial coexistence was gradually formed in part with the use of  
the local press. When, on rare occasions, local newspapers did report on confl icts 
or incidents between Soviet soldiers and Czech civilians, it was with the aim of  
“scolding” undesirable Czech excesses. In the garrison town of  Česká Třebová 
in eastern Bohemia, some panic was caused among Soviet soldiers when a young 
man, identifi ed only as Mr H., fi red a toy pistol near their patrol. The Jiskra Orlicka 
journalist commented: 
Most of  the people with whom I have discussed this case condemn 
the behavior of  Mr H., because it does not help to calm already 
stormy waters. [...] Similar acts, which lead to such conclusions, should 
disappear from daily life. They are no solution to the complicated 
problems of  contemporary life.43 
In a similar spirit, the weekly paper briefl y reported in May 1969 that ten 
young men in Vysoké Mýto had attacked a Soviet major and that “young men” 
had torn down a red fl ag from the secondary school. The mention of  these 
41  This included the withdrawal of  Polish troops who had been based in the district since August, the 
clearing out of  barracks and military areas by Czechoslovak garrisons, and the redeployment of  Soviet 
troops and all their military vehicles.
42  “S předsedou okresního národního výboru: O pobytu sovětských vojsk v okrese,” Jiskra Orlicka, 
November 5, 1968.
43  “Proč se střílelo?,” Ibid.
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cases in the crime and accident column ranks them with other small crimes, and 
in a similarly dry tone concludes, “All the culprits have been taken into police 
custody.”44 A June issue of  the weekly published an interview with the chairman 
of  the District National Committee about the “consolidation” of  the country 
and the “principles of  the consolidation of  public order.” The chairman said 
that it was unthinkable that “we would not intervene decisively against disorderly 
conduct [...], rowdyism, [...] and vandalism.”45 
The attacks against Soviet soldiers came under the category of  “rowdyism” 
(výtržnictví) and “vandalism” (vandalství). The local press thus communicated the 
idea that those who protest in any way against the basing of  the Soviet soldiers 
are a dangerous element that is disturbing the peace. The press was helping 
the Czechoslovak and Soviet representatives remove public references to the 
fact that many people perceived the Soviet military intervention as an act of  
political aggression. The delicate topic of  the coexistence of  Soviet garrisons 
and Czechoslovak civilians, with all the possible problems that it really entailed, 
was more or less avoided by the local press. Gradually, it was depicted mainly 
with confl ict-free images and reports about friendly, comradely relations and 
joint ceremonies. For example, the district press devoted much more space to 
the peace celebrations in the garrison town of  Česká Třebová to commemorate 
the 1944 Slovak National Uprising than it did to the fi rst anniversary of  the 
August intervention: 
A procession of  local citizens, members of  the Soviet Army, and units 
of  the People’s Militia, which had participated in operations against 
anti-Socialist elements in Prague, passed through the town. [...] To 
shouts of  approval and the thunderous applause of  the participants 
in the celebrations, the secretary of  the District Committee of  the 
Czechoslovak–Soviet Friendship Association thanked members of  
the People’s Militia, the police, and the Czechoslovak Army, who had 
come out decisively against the rowdies and anti-Socialist forces in 
Czechoslovakia.46
The rift between the offi cial Czechoslovak representatives and opponents 
to the military intervention probably came to a peak in August 1969. The 
44  “Černá kronika,” Jiskra Orlicka, May 13, 1969.
45  „Pro konsolidaci života země,” Jiskra Orlicka, June 3, 1969.
46  “Slavnost míru a přátelství,” Jiskra Orlicka, August 26, 1969.
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demonstrations during the fi rst anniversary of  the Warsaw Pact intervention47 
were suppressed by the Czechoslovak Army, the People’s Militia, and the 
police, without the Soviet Army having to move in.48 The offi cial press stood 
fully behind the crackdown, crudely denigrated the demonstrators, and offered 
readers a picture of  peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Army.49 
Boycott
Obviously, not everything was as the press presented it at the time. The Vysoké 
Mýto Chronicler was not afraid to take the position of  an ordinary citizen and 
to enumerate the diffi culties Soviet soldiers were causing in the town. Foremost 
among those diffi culties was the movement of  heavy military equipment, the 
buying-up of  goods, small incidents caused by drunken soldiers, occasional acts 
of  petty theft, the illegal requisitioning of  land by the Soviet Army, and the using 
up of  drinking water.50
After the resolution and offi cial proclamation of  the party and government 
representatives about the need to foster friendly relations with the Soviet Union 
and its army, it took some time before the idea was fully accepted among the 
locals with all of  its consequences. People did not easily abandon the idea that 
the Soviet soldiers who were settling in their towns were occupiers. The Vysoké 
Mýto chronicler also recorded local attempts to boycott this comradeship and to 
resist or protest the presence of  the Soviet Army. This protest was of  a highly 
diverse nature. No Soviet fi lms were shown in the local cinema; by contrast, 
admission to a newsreel about the August events in Prague was free of  charge. 
47  It was for a long time the last mass demonstration against the occupation and the regime that had 
approved the occupation.
48  The preparations for August, however, were carefully supervised by the Soviet side, as is attested to 
by the numerous visits by Soviet politicians and Soviet army offi cers at the state and the local level during 
the summer of  1969. Nothing was to be left to chance. At the local level, special teams were assembled 
consisting of  functionaries of  the national committees and commanding offi cers of  the security forces, 
who were responsible for maintaining order in their town. SOkA Trutnov, f. MěNV Trutnov, i.č. 20, kart. 3, 
Zápisy z plenárního zasedání, 20. dubna 1969 [Minutes from the Plenary Session, April 20, 1969].
49  In an article entitled “Reakční síly otevřeně proti republice” [Reactionary forces openly against the 
republic], the national daily newspaper Rudé právo described the Prague demonstrations as the “rioting of  
hooligans and déclassé elements.” This effort to discredit the participants in the demonstrations intensifi es 
later in the article: “Most of  the participants in the acts of  provocation were young people, the kind about 
whom one immediately sees that they are not fond of  work or soap, not to mention order.” Rudé právo, 
August 22, 1969.
50  Pamětní kniha Vysokého Mýta. 1961–1973.
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Even the town councilors were writing protests against the establishment of  
Soviet garrisons in Vysoké Mýto. A separate, especially creative part of  the story 
involves the leafl ets, pamphlets, slogans, and jokes made at the expense of  Soviet 
soldiers. Information about various social events, such as parties and balls, were 
not publicly advertised in the town; sometimes they were by invitation only, so 
that the Soviet garrison would not fi nd out about them and would not attend. 
Proposals for twinning were rejected by the institutions that were put forward 
for this. There were even occasional scuffl es between young civilians and Soviet 
soldiers, particularly in pubs, when Czechs, for example, took soldiers’ caps or 
cut off  their buttons or insignia,51 verbally attacked soldiers, and shouted out 
protest slogans in front of  the barracks.52
Similar behavior, however, led to condemnation not only in the local press 
but also, indeed mainly, from the local political representatives, who were 
held responsible for the implementation of  commitments stemming from the 
signing of  the Czechoslovak–Soviet agreements. They saw the public protests 
as disloyalty in a situation complicated by the presence of  Soviet soldiers and 
various, often contradictory pressures. As the chairman of  the Trutnov national 
committee said: 
Normalization in our town is being impaired by various incidents that 
are being provoked by irresponsible individuals from the ranks both 
of  adults and of  the youth. [...] The scenes they are making do not 
attest to the cultural quality of  our nation, and truly discredit us. […] 
Nor, however, can we passively look on forever at the gross disregard 
shown for commitments that our representatives accepted by signing 
the Moscow and Prague agreements.53
The local representatives considered any protest against the presence 
of  Soviet troops to be irresponsible because it harmed the interests of  the 
community as a whole, for instance the eventual return to normal life in the 
town and the resolution of  everyday problems; moreover, the protests were in 
opposition to views and decisions that were made at the highest levels of  the 
51  Ibid.
52  Státní okresní archiv [State District Archive] Trutnov, fond MěNV Trutnov [fond Trutnov National 
Committee], inventární číslo 57 [Inventory number], karton 18 [box 18], Zápisy ze schůzí rady, 10.12.1968 
[Minutes of  a council meeting], December 10, 1968.
53  SOkA Trutnov, f. MěNV Trutnov, k. 3, i.č. 19, Zápisy z plenárního zasedání, 3. prosince 1968 [Minutes 
of  the Plenary Session, December 3, 1968].
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state and party. As such, any protest had to be systematically made illegitimate 
and practically wiped out.
Infl uenced by these circumstances, open individualized protest against 
the presence of  Soviet troops became increasingly risky, and thus moved to 
the anonymous level. It mainly took the form of  anecdotes and jokes, which 
mocked the growing cooperation and comradely friendship with Soviet troops 
and reacted to developments in politics and society in general.54
Breaking the Ice
The mounting pressure was also linked to gradual personnel changes in senior 
positions. This fi rst took place at the state-wide level and eventually, from mid-
1969 onwards, also at the regional level. They included the usual exchanges of  
regional and district party secretaries, which led to a series of  other personnel 
changes in the leadership of  the national committees and important industrial and 
agricultural enterprises. An integral part of  these changes was the reassessment 
of  the recent past, including the recanting of  previous statements of  support 
for the Dubček leadership and of  disagreement with the occupation. In the 
“break” with the past before August 1968 and shortly afterwards, the Soviet 
Army played a key role. The declared attitude towards the Soviet Army became 
an index of  the more general attitude towards political developments. It was by 
means of  comradely friendship that the new and old established local notables 
demonstrated their political loyalty. For example, the new mayor of  Trutnov, 
in a speech about the activity of  the city council in February 1970, distanced 
himself  from the pre-August 1968 political developments by criticizing the 
previous leadership of  the district national committee for having been politically 
reckless (avanturismus), for having failed to respect the Moscow Protocol, and 
for having refused to “enter into relations” with Soviet Army representatives. 
He characterized the tearing down of  a Soviet tank from a pedestal in August 
1968 as an “anti-Soviet and counterrevolutionary act,” for which the erstwhile 
representatives of  the district national committee were also responsible.55
54  For example, the Vysoké Mýto chronicler recorded an anecdote in May 1969, which appeared after 
Gustáv Husák had taken Alexander Dubček’s place as First Secretary of  the CPCz Central Committee in 
April: “We built socialism with a human face; now we are building socialism with the hide of  a hippo [i.e. 
insensitivity].” Pamětní kniha Vysokého Mýta 1961–1973, entry from May 1969.
55  SOkA Trutnov, f. MěNV Trutnov, k. 3, i.č. 21, Zápisy z plenárního zasedání, 11.2.1970 [Minutes of  
the Plenary Session, February 11, 1970].
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With similar speeches, functionaries made it clear whose side they were on, 
and in general they distanced themselves from the displays that were perceived 
negatively and proscribed, now called, for example, anti-Socialist, anti-Soviet, 
and rightwing opportunist. They thereby accepted the interpretation of  the 
Prague Spring as an attempt at counterrevolution and the Soviet-led intervention 
as an operation to deliver the country from chaos.
The willingness to establish and develop comradely friendly relations, which 
had only recently met with resentment and thus been socially degraded, was 
gradually transformed at the offi cial level into a positive expression of  loyalty in 
unfavorable circumstances. This loyalty, however, now ceased to be pilloried as 
deviant conduct by obstinate oddballs, hardline dogmatists, and jilted individuals. 
Owing to gradually changing circumstances, it began to be increasingly 
rewarded. Together with this, the people who were previously punished for 
their “collaborationist attitude” were exonerated. That is also refl ected in the 
minutes of  the June 1969 plenum of  the Ústí nad Orlicí District Committee 
of  the CPCz. The minutes state that the District Committee of  the CPCz “has 
made amends for mistakes and errors; it has restored the honor of  people who 
were smeared and attacked for having defended international alliances.”56 The 
Soviet command, the exonerated conservatives and collaborators, including 
the leadership of  the new course, strengthened one another’s positions. Under 
these circumstances, the Soviet soldiers were increasingly admitted into Czech 
enterprises and schools and were invited to participate in the founding meetings 
of  branches of  the Czechoslovak–Soviet Friendship Association. 
Furthermore, the Czechoslovak–Soviet Friendship Association provides a 
convenient illustration of  changes in the perception of  the USSR and the Soviet 
Army in Czechoslovak society more broadly during the relatively short period 
since August 1968. At fi rst, it may have seemed that the August intervention 
would be fatal to an organization with a pre-war tradition and a mass grass-roots 
membership. A number of  local chapters did indeed close down, people en 
masse cancelled their memberships, which, anyway, they had been called upon 
to do by slogans chanted in the streets and on posters.57 The Association was 
56  ÚSD, sb. KV ČSFR, OZ Ústí nad Orlicí. The former managing director of  Dioptra, who was 
dismissed in 1968 because of  his “collaborationist” statements, was fully exonerated in the early 1970s. By 
contrast, those who had dismissed him were punished. ÚSD, sb. KV ČSFR, OZ Semily.
57  For example, “The Czechoslovak–Soviet Friendship Association asks its members to pay any 
outstanding membership dues, because this friendship is now ending.” Jindřich Pecka, Spontánní projevy 
Pražského jara 1968–1969 (Brno: Doplněk, 1993), 98.
Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia after August 1968
135
eventually discredited in the eyes of  the public by the contacts between several 
of  its members and the Soviet Army soon after the intervention. In the course 
of  1969, when popular protest against the occupation was petering out, new 
chapters of  the Czechoslovak–Soviet Friendship Association were founded, 
but considering the general atmosphere this was usually done privately, almost 
clandestinely. Nevertheless, the change in the offi cial course of  the uppermost 
level of  politics, which, in its attitude to the USSR and Soviet Army, was gradually 
projected into the mass media, as well as into local politics, also brought about 
a fundamental transformation in the perception of  the Czechoslovak–Soviet 
Friendship Association. The sudden growth in membership over the course of  
the 1970s58 demonstrates that the Association had freed itself  of  the reputation 
of  being a collaborationist organization for a handful of  conservative dregs. 
Although its proclaimed mission was the “buttressing” of  relations with the 
Soviet Union and also the establishment of  contacts with the Soviet Army,59 
it became for many people an acceptable variant of  the required public 
involvement and loyalty towards the political regime. One’s attitude to the Soviet 
Union became part of  the assessment of  anyone who aspired to hold a job other 
than manual laborer.
The fact that one registered at one’s workplace (instead of  one’s home) 
to join a branch of  the Czechoslovak–Soviet Friendship Association had a 
fundamental impact on the growth in membership, because it became part 
of  how one was assessed politically and occupationally by one’s employer. 
Comradely friendship was thus incorporated in the generally implemented cadre 
system, which included the regular political assessment of  employees.60 This was 
of  course most strikingly refl ected during the political vetting of  party and non-
58  In early 1972, the Czechoslovak–Soviet Friendship Association had, according to its own information, 
1,021,407 members in a total of  17,617 chapters. See VII. Sjezd Svazu Československo-sovětského přátelství: 
Dokumenty z jednání sjezdu Praha, 16.-17. června 1972 (Prague: Lidové nakladatelství, 1972). Although this 
source does not state the numbers of  members in 1968–69, it does mention the “intense pressure” to which 
the Association was subjected on all sides. The course it entered on to achieve the widest membership base 
turned out to be effective. At the next congress, in 1977, its central secretary stated that the Association had 
2,241,617 members in 28,574 chapters. 8. Sjezd Svazu Československo-sovětského přátelství: Dokumenty z jednání 
sjezdu Praha, 12.-13. Prosince 1977 (Prague: Lidové nakladatelství, 1978), 22. 
59  “It would certainly be useful if  the Soviet Army representatives gave speeches more often at our 
meetings, gatherings, and seminars. […] Such meetings will have to be attended by increasingly larger 
numbers of  members of  the Czechoslovak–Soviet Friendship Association and of  other citizens of  our 
towns and villages.” “Zpráva ústředního tajemníka SČSP,” in VII sjezd Svazu, 24.
60  Marie Černá, “Cadre Policy, Cadre Work and Screening in Communist Czechoslovakia: Simple Ideas, 
Complicated Practice,” Studia Territorialia 11 (2011): 9–28.
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party members in 1969–70. One’s attitude to the presence of  the Soviet Army 
in Czechoslovakia or to the Soviet Union in general became a key topic on the 
basis of  which the vetted employees and party members were assessed.61 This 
also contributed to the offi cial reassessment of  the basing of  Soviet troops in 
Czechoslovakia. 
Offi cial Images of  Friendship
Contacts between Soviet soldiers (mainly offi cers) and the local population 
occurred mostly at the workplace, schools, national committees and social 
organizations. A delegation of  soldiers, for example, was received by a factory 
organization of  the CPCz and a branch of  the Soviet–Czechoslovak Friendship 
Association; it was shown around these institutions, given refreshments, and 
then took part in a friendly discussion. Also publicized in the press were other, 
less formal meetings and contacts, including social gatherings of  women, visits 
by Soviet teachers to local schools, joint programs for Soviet and Czechoslovak 
children, visits by Pioneers (a Communist organization for children) to garrisons, 
sports matches, performances by the Soviet garrison band at various social and 
arts events, and New Year’s Eve celebrations together. Offi cial and unoffi cial 
events occasionally overlapped. Sometimes, certain natural, spontaneous 
tendencies and interests could be intentionally used for similar “twinning” 
or “comradely friendship” ends.62 And it was the “informal” component of  
meetings, such as concerts, dances,63 sports matches, and gatherings for children, 
which were meant to play an important role in the creation of  a positive image 
of  the Soviet Army as an ardent friend.
An important way of  initiating mutual contacts was to hold public political 
and ritualized events, which, since May 1945, had been a tradition for more than 
twenty years. And though the tradition was sometimes interrupted under the 
infl uence of  the Thaw in the 1960s, it offered something on which to build. One 
could cyclically return to the regular commemorations of  events such as the 
61  For the meaning of  the mass vettings in the so-called consolidation process, see Marie Černá, 
“Comprendre le processus de consolidation: Les campagnes de vérifi cation de 1970 en Tchécoslovaquie,” 
Cahiers du CEFRES 32 (2012): 199–233.
62  A graphic example is a sixteen-year-old girl from a secondary school in the town of  Česká Třebová, 
who appeared as a singer with a local Soviet army band. See “Děvče v uniformě,” Jiskra Orlicka, March 16, 
1971.
63  Music ensembles of  various styles, playing for the “listening and dancing pleasure” of  their audiences, 
were an important asset of  the Soviet Army, and often were part of  social events.
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birth of  Lenin, May Day (1 May), the Liberation (9 May), Soviet Armed Forces 
Day, and the October Revolution. (Indeed, since the date of  the Revolution by 
the New Style calendar was 7 November, rather than 25 October, the whole 
month of  November was devoted to Czechoslovak–Soviet friendship.) Many 
holidays and other important days were one way or another linked with the Soviet 
Union. The public events that accompanied them, which included parades, the 
laying of  wreaths, demonstrations, concerts, and exhibitions, became a natural 
platform for public appearances by Soviet soldiers as well. Such ceremonies also 
contributed to the rapid change in the offi cial image of  the Soviet Army. This 
was perhaps most strikingly manifested during the celebrations in May 1970 to 
mark the Red Army’s liberation of  Czechoslovakia 25 years earlier. The speeches, 
public appearances, and articles that appeared to mark the occasion refl ect the 
symbolic linking of  the Red Army liberators of  1945 and the Soviet soldiers of  
1968. The events of  August 1968 thus offi cially became another milestone in the 
history of  Czechoslovak–Soviet friendship. As the newspaper of  the Karosa bus 
manufacturer in Vysoké Mýto put it, 
the friendship between the common people of  Czechoslovakia and 
the Soviet Union is sprinkled with blood [...]. Do those 144,000 Soviet 
citizens who had to die in our country during the Second World War 
mean nothing? [...] In August [1968] they did not leave us in danger 
either; they came [...].64
Soviet ideologues also recommended linking the Red Army soldiers of  1945 
with the Soviet soldiers of  1968. With this copiously employed symbolic fusion 
there emerged an image of  the timeless Soviet soldier-liberator and benefactor, 
who could not be opposed, because that would mean trampling on the memory 
of  the anti-fascist fi ghters. The presence of  the Soviet Army also brought 
repeated exaltation of  the Soviet struggle against fascism.
The offi cial reception of  the Soviet Army as a savior was accompanied by 
a renewed wave of  idealization and the promotion of  the Soviet Union, Soviet 
culture, the land of  the Soviets, and the Soviet people. Rudé právo journalists 
reported on a two-week visit to the USSR in August 1969: “The striking production 
successes of  the Soviet workers and technicians were visible everywhere […] 
64  “Přátelství je věčné,” Karosář, May 8, 1970. 
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Many of  us did not hide our admiration for the all-round progress, especially 
technical progress, to which we were witnesses.”65
The rhetorical style of  this offi cial confi rmation of  the indestructible 
bond was openly inspired by the Communist culture of  the pre-war period 
and the Stalinist post-war period,66 which expressed love for and devotion to 
everything Soviet.67 At a somewhat less lyrical level, the reestablished friendship 
was expressed by an emphasis on the teaching of  Russian, the promotion of  
courses in Russian, the increased importation of  Soviet arts, including fi lm, 
the establishment of  comradely friendship and twinning at the district, town, 
enterprise, and school levels, organized excursions to the Soviet Union, and 
many competitions in poetry recitation and knowledge about the Soviet Union, 
just as Brezhnev and his ideologues had wanted.
Conclusion
Every political intervention carried out by military means also involves questions 
of  resistance, conformity, and collaboration. In this sense, the turnaround in 
the offi cial image of  the Soviet Army from occupier to savior is probably not 
exceptional in history. We might today be surprised by the speed with which it 
occurred. This is undoubtedly connected to certain characteristics of  the system 
that made such a quick change possible. It may seem that in the 1960s the 
authoritarian regime experienced a thaw. The events after August 1968, however, 
clearly show that the centralist principle of  government remained essentially 
unchanged: censorship was immediately re-imposed, a number of  civil rights 
and freedoms were revoked, personnel changes were quickly made according to 
the rules of  promoting nomenclature cadres and keeping an eye on them, and 
65  Rudé právo, August 12, 1969.
66  Again, for example, the 1948 words of  the fi rst Communist President of  Czechoslovakia, Klement 
Gottwald, were recalled about how Czechoslovak bonds with the Soviet Union were “inviolable” and 
how the state was “moving side by side with the Soviet Union in everything and will never do otherwise.” 
According to Gottwald, “the common Czechoslovak people will not put up with anti-Soviet witch-hunts 
and intrigues.” Zpráva ústředního tajemníka SČSP, VII sjezd Svazu, 13–14. With renewed force, therefore, 
terms such as “historical necessity,” “inseparability,” and “longevity” appeared in the political vocabulary in 
connection with the Soviet Union.
67  At the celebrations to mark the anniversary of  the liberation of  Czechoslovakia by the Red Army, 
which were held in the district capital, Ústí nad Orlicí, in the presence of  Soviet war veterans in May 1970, 
a poem by the Communist writer S. K. Neumann (1875–1947) was recited, which had fi rst been published 
in the collection Srdce a mračna in 1935. It included the line: “Vám poděkování a lásku vám” [To you, thanks, 
and love to you]. The same title is used for the article about the events, Jiskra Orlicka, May 12, 1970.
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mass vetting and purges were carried out. Open resistance to the intervention 
was quickly made illegal, and it was turned into a matter of  investigation and 
prosecution by a strong secret police force. As soon as the political leadership 
of  the country committed itself  to the terms of  the Moscow Protocol and 
the subsequent agreement on the temporary presence of  Soviet troops, it had 
at its disposal a number of  traditional instruments to pacify majority society 
and to foist responsibility on it for meeting its commitments. Since part of  
the agreements involved nurturing, fostering, or at least creating a semblance 
of  friendly Czechoslovak–Soviet relations, active and public maintenance of  
a negative image of  the Soviet Army as an occupying force was practically 
unsustainable in the long run.
The question of  resistance, conformity, and collaboration is doubtlessly 
always partly a matter of  personal choice. In this article, I explained mainly the 
wider structural or systemic aspects, which to a large extent created the framework 
for personal choices. In addition to informal, spontaneous, and private relations 
(which are more diffi cult to research), there were organized and offi cial contacts. 
Above all, comradely friendship with Soviet soldiers or, more generally, a positive 
attitude towards the Soviet Union as a political commitment was integrated 
into the existing political and cadre system. This enabled control of  the mass 
media, as well as supervision by the highest bodies of  the state and party over 
the activity of  subordinate bodies to ensure that they would not deviate from 
the centrally determined political line. Friendship became one of  the criteria of  
the political assessment of  individuals, groups, and institutions. One of  the most 
common ways to meet such a commitment was to become a member of  the 
Czechoslovak–Soviet Friendship Association. What membership actually entailed 
was determined by local conditions, as was the social inclusion of  an individual. 
Clearly, the most frequent direct contacts with the Soviet offi cers took place at 
the level of  the local and regional political élites and nomenclature cadres. An 
important aspect of  the change in the offi cial image of  the Soviet Army was the 
experience of  long-fostered friendship with the Soviet Union, both at the level of  
politics and politicians and of  various institutions, as well as specifi c individuals. 
This tradition could be renewed by the usual tried and tested political rituals 
and by incorporating a new circumstance—the 1968 intervention—into it. This 
tradition included the systematic promotion and idealization of  the Soviet Union 
and everything connected to it. The Soviet Army was then made an inconspicuous 
but important part of  the image of  the Soviet Union as benefactor, an image that 
had been created in a wide variety of  ways.
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The political consequences of  the 1968 military intervention were undoubtedly 
far-reaching. Nevertheless, at the offi cial level, one of  the consequences of  the 
subsequent political measures was the transformation of  the image of  the Soviet 
soldiers from the henchmen of  an occupying force to saviors who brought 
deliverance. In the eyes of  the public, their political importance was gradually 
but increasingly trivialized, and this shift was refl ected in everyday life. They 
were incorporated into public political rituals, celebrations, social gatherings, and 
cultural events, and they became part of  both the offi cial and also the unoffi cial 
economy. In the mass media, they were often depicted in contexts and roles that 
were apparently not connected to politics, such as musicians in concerts, sportsmen 
in matches, people attending friendly discussions, volunteer workers helping out 
in factories and on cooperative farms. Similarly, contacts between Czechoslovak 
organizations and citizens and Soviet garrisons gradually lost their negative political 
associations of  collaboration and betrayal. They became part of  ceremonial acts 
and expressions of  loyalty, which the citizens of  the communist state were regularly 
forced to perform. These acts were judged positively by the regime, but were 
often considered a formality, devoid of  meaning (including political meaning). 
The Soviet Army was thus gradually stripped of  the meaning of  occupier and 
important political actor, not only because of  the ways in which it was presented 
in offi cial propaganda, but also because of  people’s real-life experiences.
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Them and Us: Narratives of  Agents from the Kádár Era1
Today a good deal of  scholarly work has been published the authors of  which use, as 
their primary sources, the documents that were created by the state security services of  
the communist dictatorships of  East Central Europe. These documents reveal a great 
deal concerning the primary characteristics of  the mechanisms of  state security and, 
more specifi cally, the network of  agents. Most of  the inquiries that have been published 
so far have been of  a moralizing nature, in that they seem to have been motivated at 
least in part by the desire to pass judgment on those who cooperated in an organized 
way with the state security services of  the dictatorial states or, in some cases, to fi nd 
justifi cations for the conduct of  the people involved by offering explanations according 
to which they were compelled to collaborate. I have set a very different goal in this 
article. I examine how the people in the network interpreted their cooperation with the 
state. I draw on recollections that were written not after the fall of  the Kádár regime, 
but rather in its early stages. These texts offer different perspectives on the identity of  
the agent and shed some light on how the collaborator him or herself  understood his 
or her acts of  collaboration with the dictatorship. 
Keywords: collaboration, recollections, state security, agent network, Kádár era, 
communist regime, Hungary
A few years ago, in his refl ections on the moralizing narrative mode of  the assertions 
that have been made in Hungary regarding the network of  the state security 
services of  the fallen regime, Balázs Berkovits raised the essential question: “Can 
one speak of  agents in any other tone than that of  moral outrage, victimhood, and 
forgiveness? Can one escape the moral defi ning terms that infer one another, the 
vicious cycle of  sin—confession—forgiveness? How can we avoid the ethical and 
psychological/sociological conjectures and aims that already determine, before we 
have begun our examination, where we will end up?”2
The moralizing that seems to prevail in discussions of  the topic seems to 
be tied to the tendency in public opinion to identify the people who were in 
the network as “denouncers,” i.e. people whose endeavors are almost always 
deleterious, whatever the culture or society in question, and even more so in 
1  This article was written with the support of  program number K-104408 of  the Hungarian Scientifi c 
Research Fund (OTKA).
2  Balázs Berkovits, “Erkölcstelen besúgók, tehetséges áldozatok, áldozatos erkölcsbírók”, anBlokk 3. 
(2009): 13.
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the case of  a dictatorship. The foundation of  this discourse is the assumption 
according to which the simple citizen (as the agent seems to be) owes his loyalties 
fi rst and foremost to his own community, in other words to the society that has 
been subjugated by the dictatorial power.  Thus, if  someone cooperates with 
power, for instance by providing information concerning his fellow sufferers, 
he or she merits the label traitor.3 This “transgression” seems more damnable 
in retrospect than it did at the time because at the time of  the dictatorial regime 
it was “invisible,” as it was committed in secret and only came to light after the 
fall of  the regime. As Hungarian historian Gábor Gyáni has observed, however, 
with this disappearance of  the world of  the dictatorship, “denouncing lost any 
ethical justifi cation and its ‘usefulness’ also frayed.” Consequently, “this form of  
cooperation with the oppressive power of  yore is simply stamped as immorality 
or futility.”4
The moralizing approach is also dominant in the scholarly research on 
the network of  agents who worked together with the state security services. 
Practically, this means that the historian cannot completely avoid or ignore 
entirely the infl uence of  the interpretive models that prevail in public opinion 
and thus is inevitably compelled to orient him or herself  to this narrative mode. 
The practice of  historical scholarship involves a series of  ethical and moral 
choices, from the selection of  a subject of  focus to the manner in which fi ndings 
are put in writing, and even if  a historian is cautious to avoid making explicit 
judgments, his or her use of  language nevertheless bears certain (inherent) 
values.5 This problem lies more in the fact that (as the citation from Berkovits’ 
work suggests) the moralizing approach results in methodological and thematic 
narrowing in the research on the network of  agents used by the state security, 
essentially as if  the only genuine goal of  an inquiry into this history were to 
“name” the “guilty” with the intention, whether admitted or not, of  denouncing 
and pillorying them. 
The foundation of  moralizing in the case of  scholarly inquiries is the use 
of  the top-down model based on a sharp distinction between “power” and 
3  Cf. Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately, “Introduction to the Practices of  Denunciation in Modern 
European History,” The Journal of  Modern History, 68 (1996): 765–66.
4  Gábor Gyáni, “Kollaboráció és a hatalom titka,” in Az ügynök arcai. Mindennapi kollaboráció és ügynökkérdés, 
ed. Sándor Horváth (Budapest: Libri, 2014), 43–44.
5  Richard T. Vann, “Historians and Moral Evaluations,” History and Theory, Theme Issue 43 (2004): 3–30.
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“society.”6 Accordingly, historians tend (retrospectively) to present the period 
between 1945 and 1990 as a struggle between the “good” and the “bad,” the 
“oppressed” and the “oppressors.” The picture, however, is hardly this black-
and-white. For instance, even research on “informants” (both people who only 
occasionally provided reports and those who regularly worked as part of  the 
established system) shows that this distinction does not hold up under scrutiny. 
There were innumerable links and relationships between the system and 
Hungarian society. Indeed, this is logical. In order to ensure that their subjects 
remain submissive, disciplined, and “normal,” fi rst and foremost modern states 
must be able to keep the citizenry under observation and keep records of  its acts. 
In addition to the various techniques and institutions that are used to enforce 
discipline, power cannot do without the cooperation its citizens, whether we are 
speaking of  casual informers of  those who violate its rules, deviants or non-
conformists, or members of  the more or less structured informers’ network of  
the (political) police.7 It is quite clear that in authoritarian systems, which wish to 
exercise more than usual supervision over society, there is an even greater desire 
for this kind of  participation on the part of  the citizenry in the maintenance of  
power. This is true in part simply because, since any potentially critical organ of  
the press has essentially been silenced and the freedom of  speech denied, the 
people in power have more diffi culty obtaining reliable information about those 
“underneath” them.8 From the perspective of  the regime, this means that the 
much-feared Stasi, for instance, would not have been nearly as effective without 
the active participation of  tens of  thousands of  citizens.9 From the perspective 
of  society, this means essentially that people were coopted and made part of  the 
mechanisms of  their own surveillance.10 As Corey Ross noted with regards to 
the GDR, “the state did not so much rule over society as through it.”11
6  This is by no means true exclusively for conditions in Hungary. Jens Gieseke, „Staatssicherheit und 
Gesellschaft – Plädoyer für einen Brückenschlag,” in Staatssicherheit und Gesellschaft Studien zum Herrschaftsalltag 
in der DDR, ed. idem (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 7–22.
7  Fitzpatrick and Gellately, “Introduction”, 759–63.
8  Robert Gellately, “Denunciation in Twentieth-Century Germany: Aspects of  Self-Policing in the Third 
Reich and the German Democratic Republic,” The Journal of  Modern History, 68 (1996): 931–33, 966–67.
9  Paul Betts, Within Walls: Private Life in the German Democratic Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 23, 49.
10  Robert Gellately, “Denunciation as a Subject of  Historical Research,” Historical Social Research 26, no. 
2 (2001): 20.
11  Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of  the GDR 
(London: Arnold, 2012), 63.
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If  we wish to further a more nuanced understanding of  the phenomenon 
at hand (rather than pass judgment on the people involved), we would defi nitely 
do better to regard the network of  agents as a tool of  the everyday exercise 
of  power and a medium of  communication. There are innumerable ways of  
studying the acts of  agents, from examination of  contemporary documents 
produced about and by the agents to interviews with agents themselves. Naturally, 
active informants did not refl ect in their reports on their endeavors. In general, 
functionaries of  the state security offi ces assessed and interpreted the work of  
the people who were members of  the network. The interviews gave the former 
agents a chance to speak about how they remembered their activities, though 
of  course one must keep in mind that whatever statements they made were 
products of  memory acts, retrospective constructions that were to a large extent 
determined by the circumstances under which they were recollected, the attitude 
of  the person retelling his or her memories at the time, and so on. Furthermore, 
in this case the gap12 between the narrating subject and the narrated subject in 
the memoires or autobiographies is inevitably much more emphatic, since the 
former agent (who is, in other words, no longer an agent) is the person conjuring 
the fi gure of  the agent from the past. 
In this essay I examine recollections that active members of  the agent 
network wrote at the request or order of  the state security (auxiliary materials 
that the operational offi cers used in training). Among the documents of  the 
secret police of  the period of  state socialism in Hungary there are four such 
texts: two reports found in a dossier entitled “A network man’s recollections of  
his own secret work,” one dated May 27, 1958, the other dated May 28, 1958;13 
a text entitled “Dear Friend! The recollections of  an agent,” which bears the 
initials T. M. and was written sometime around 1960;14 and a recollection entitled 
“How I saw it. Anonymous notes from an abandoned apartment,” written in 
1969–70 by an agent who went by the code-name “Koroknai.”15
12  István Dobos, Autobiographical Reading. Spectrum Hungarologicum, vol. 3 (Jyväskylä–Pécs: University 
of  Jyväskylä, 2010), 9.
13  Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára (hereafter: ÁBTL) 4.1. A-3253.
14  ÁBTL 4.1. A-3783.
15  ÁBTL 4.1. A-2103.
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Us and Them
The texts in question here constitute only one possible world16 of  the network 
of  the state security, though this is perhaps their principal merit: they shed 
light on the functioning of  this world from a perspective that one does not 
fi nd in other documents. They contain the remarks of  agents who had been 
working in the service of  the state for a long time and who refl ect explicitly 
on their work as agents. Thus, the narrators provide narratives only they could 
provide, narratives that are, given the circumstances of  the narrators, genuine 
and are not found, or are found only in an implicit and highly embedded form, 
in the reports they and other agents submitted. These narratives can offer some 
understanding of  the stresses and demands involved in the execution by the 
agents of  the tasks they were assigned, tasks that were considered simple by 
the case offi cers (“tartótiszt”, the state security offi cers who were responsible for 
the reports of  an informant) who assigned them, whether we are speaking of  
obtaining a manuscript, coming to a meeting, or authoring a report. In addition 
to providing insights into the everyday workings of  the network and the ways 
in which agents themselves experienced life as part of  this network (i.e. the 
construction of  the aforementioned “possible world”), the recollections also 
help further our understanding of  collaboration with the secret police and in 
general the dictatorial system. In this article I examine the documents in question 
primarily from the latter perspective. 17
For T. M., the author of  “Dear Friend,” his recruitment must have been 
a decisive experience, since the description of  it comprises almost half  of  the 
text of  his recollections. This description sheds light on how the “candidate” 
experienced his apprehension by the authorities, the interrogation (which was 
like a prelude to his recruitment), and, fi nally, his recruitment. For some time, he 
did not actually know what was happening to him, and when he fi nally did begin 
to understand what they were asking of  him, he was not particularly opposed. 
Indeed, on the contrary he was eager to bring the whole process to an end. (The 
fact that he was in a hurry to meet with the ambulance in order to be able to take 
his sick children to the hospital played a role in this.) Later, however, he recounts 
the “troubled and unpleasant months” following his recruitment, when for a 
long time he felt like an “ethical corpse.”
16  Jerome Bruner, Actual minds, possible worlds (Cambridge–London: Harvard University Press, 1986).
17  I have analyzed these texts in greater detail elsewhere: Tibor Takács, Besúgók a besúgásról. Ügynök-
visszaemlékezések a Kádár-korszakból (Budapest: L’Harmattan, 2013).
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There are signs in the other recollections that initially having accepted the 
role of  denouncer left the agents with a feeling of  moral trepidation and they 
were troubled by doubts concerning the ethics of  their work as “snoops.” As 
one reads in the report of  May 28, 1958, “when a beginner starts to work, he 
is full of  inhibitions, fears, and ethical scruples. He thinks that what he is doing 
in his work is the most scandalous act one could commit. He does not trust his 
contact, and he ponders how to free himself  from the ‘burden’ that ‘weighs him 
down.’” The most effective means of  doing this was “de-conspiring,” i.e. the 
person who had been enlisted would inform the people around him that he had 
been enlisted. “There is a decisive moment at the beginning of  the position: the 
fi rst inner impulse of  someone who becomes a secret employee is the thought 
that he can only free himself  from ‘ethical slavery’ if  everyone discovers his 
secret—he drives away anyone who is burdened with sin in order to avoid causing 
him harm. This is a kind of  obsession with the protection of  one’s integrity, and 
it is coupled with a compulsion to speak, which the beginner hopes will liberate 
him from his inhibitions.” The case offi cer who maintained ties with the author 
of  the report, however, made him understand “that every word spoken, every bit 
of  chatter would destroy me ethically, for no matter where I went to complain, 
they would cast me out with the greatest disgust.”
As a means of  assuaging their ethical anxieties and mollifying their inner 
fears, the agents could create new identities for themselves, separate from their 
former selves, a kind of  informer “I,” who in their minds would not entirely 
displace their former, ethical selves. This was made a bit easier by the use of  
a code-name, which would allow an informer to perform his or her tasks as a 
member of  the network of  the security services almost as if  in secret from him 
or herself. From this perspective, the fact that, as of  the 1950s, agents were not 
designated with numbers or letters, but rather with actual code-names was of  
tremendous signifi cance. We cannot know whether this was one of  the purposes 
of  this change, but it unquestionably made it easier for the people involved to 
accept roles as informers and regard their informing selves as separate identities. 
We also cannot know whether it was thanks to this psychological strategy or 
not, but whatever the explanation, in time the agents managed to get over their 
initial concerns and at least by the time they were recording their recollections 
the confl ict between the person referred to by the code-name and the citizen 
designated by his or her actual name did not seem to cause any problem. The 
doubts and ethical concerns they initially had had were distant memories, which 
they could recall, but which, by the time they were writing them down, clearly 
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no longer bothered them too terribly. Instead, they felt that their “normal” lives 
came into confl ict with the roles they played when they went by their actual 
names, which they did in the interests of  being able to perform tasks as part of  
the state security services. In other words, the principal problem for the agents 
was not the activities in which they had engaged as denouncers, but rather the 
fact that—in order to perform these activities—they had had to appear to be 
enemies of  the system. 
The author of  the report dated May 28, 1958 complained that he had to 
show two faces to the world: “One was the face presented to the bosses at the 
offi ces, whose complete trust I had to have in order to be able to do my work 
properly. They regard me as an individual with a progressive spirit. But there is 
another layer at the establishment whose ‘favor’ I cannot lose, because they will 
spread the rumor that one must be suspicious of  me, because I am a communist 
who has gone wild. This fraternization, however, must be superfi cial. I must 
make them think that because of  my position I fear and avoid committing any 
and all unguarded statements or acts. Then I can count on their well-intentioned 
sympathies.” This duplicity caused problems in the informers’ private lives 
as well: “My wife was very perturbed when an enemy element came to the 
apartment and, right in front of  her, alas, what a fl avorful reactionary speech I 
held, how fi ery my ‘counter-revolutionary’ mood was! And then, again among 
colleagues, on another occasion I resembled a good, honest, conscientious 
worker.” T. M. complained at length to his “dear friend” of  how, because of  his 
work as an agent, he again had to become part of  a social life that had already 
dispersed: “I had to learn about the interests of  many people and understand the 
spirit of  their thoughts, which at times were obsessive, so that we would be able 
to converse coherently and in a manner that was interesting to me.” Similarly, 
“Koroknai” only met, whether regularly or sporadically, with former associates 
from the Independent Smallholders’ Party and people with whom they shared a 
similar mentality when it was in the interests of  the work he did in the defense 
of  the state. After 1956, the only change that took place was that he was able to 
represent the politics of  the Communist Party openly and was not compelled to 
dissemble (“I found myself  in a political stance in which there was no chance of  
misunderstanding between my offi cial work and my tasks in the defense of  the 
state,” as he wrote). 
Complaints about tedious socializing or having to play the part of  an enemy 
of  the system can be also understood as tools with which the people in question 
freed themselves of  moral reservations. The authors of  these narratives seem to 
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have striven to distance the target individuals from them: clearly it was much easier 
for them to perform their tasks if  they observed not normal, honest people (as 
they fancied themselves), but rather the enemy. This stance was necessary if  they 
were not going to regard the work they were performing for the state as snooping 
or denunciation, in short as betrayal. After all, one can only betray people with 
whom one shares an allegiance, people with whom one forms an “us,” but as far 
as the agents were concerned, the people they had observed or informed against 
were not part of  this “us,” but rather were members of  a “them.” This attitude 
was common among agents, as indeed the case of  László Borsányi also shows. 
One of  Borsányi’s principal tasks as an agent who later became a successful 
ethnographer and anthropologist was to keep the participants in the “Indian 
camps” under observation (it is ironic that later, as a scholar, Borsányi dealt with 
the culture of  North American Indians). Although he himself  was a regular 
participant in the camps, in his reports he does not refer to himself  as one 
of  the camp members, but rather recreates himself  as a university student of  
ethnography, thereby creating a kind of  textual world (at least) in which he was 
not betraying his “own.” In his case, the agent and the camp member should not 
be confl ated, while “the position of  the agent and the role of  the scholar can be 
reconciled—at least according to the logic of  power [at the time]—and indeed 
the role of  Indian, free of  contradictions, emerges as the only possible variation 
to the parallel life of  the scholar and the agent.”18 
One could reformulate this more explicitly by saying that the authors of  the 
recollections did not regard themselves as snoops or denouncers, but rather as 
spies. What is the difference? According to Karol Sauerland, the denouncer is 
someone who passes on information about someone to an institution of  power 
and in doing so may well bring grief  to the person on whom he or she informs. 
The denouncer may act out of  personal motives or in response to an assignment. 
Among the latter one fi nds those who worked as part of  the network employed 
by the state security (for whom a number of  colloquial terms were invented, 
such as snoop or brick). The reports they submitted, of  course, were only cases 
of  “denunciation” if  they caused injury or harm to others. In contrast, the 
spy arrives as an outsider among people who represent the enemy in order to 
gather information that is important to the people with whom he shares an 
allegiance. In order to infi ltrate this group, he must wear a fi gural mask. He must 
pretend to be one of  “them,” and this requires considerable preparation and 
18  Kata Horváth, “A Borsányi név. A politikai és a tudományos megfi gyelés határai,” anBlokk 3 (2009): 37.
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involves signifi cant risk. While the terms denouncer and snoop bear negative 
connotations, in general the spy is presented and regarded a fi gure worthy of  
admiration, even a genuine hero. According to Sauerland, the person who was 
member of  the network of  the state security can hardly be considered a spy, 
for even if  he did wear a guise, he did not arrive from the outside, but, on the 
contrary, moved from the inside towards the outside, and however much he may 
identify with those who give him his tasks, he will never become a stranger who 
was accepted from the outside.19 Of  course, from the perspective of  the agents 
who were looking back on their careers, this last contention is irrelevant, since 
the question of  how outsiders regarded the work of  the people who had been 
part of  the network was not the issue. The question, rather, was how the agents 
looked back on the work they had performed. It is not hard to understand that 
they preferred to regard themselves as spies who had been exposed to manifold 
dangers among the enemy instead of  snoops who had skulked around in the 
wake of  their friends and acquaintances in search of  secrets.
There are innumerable signs in the recollections indicating which “side” the 
narrators put themselves on and the perspective from which they interpreted 
their lives as informers. For instance, in the report of  May 27, 1958 one fi nds 
the following remark: “I regard the current tasks as good. Accomplishable, 
the details can also be thoroughly elucidated, because the active enemy stands 
opposite us.” The author of  the report dated May 28 made a list of  people who 
spoke in a striking manner of  “denouncers” and “snoops,” noting, “I found 
that in almost 100 percent of  the cases anyone who spoke like this was one of  
our agents!” T. M. wrote the following to the addressee of  his letter: “I trust you 
to decide how much you make use of  it, how much you use in the interests of  
attaining our common goals.” Elsewhere, he wrote, “I am not a genius, but perhaps 
I can determine whether someone whom I have known for more than ten years 
and an essay that I heard and read are useful to us or not.” While in the previous 
citations, the emphasis is mine, in this case the agent himself  felt that it was 
important to underline the word “nekünk” (to us), thereby drawing emphasis 
to his perception that he was one of  the people who worked in the defense of  
the state. “Koroknai” referred to the example set by two journalists in order 
to demonstrate that the motivations for the people who worked as part of  the 
network were at times very different. For one of  them, secret collaboration was 
19  Karol Sauerland, Harminc ezüst: Besúgások és árulások, trans. Péter Várnai (Budapest: Helikon, 2001), 
249–58.
Them and Us: Narratives of  Agents from the Kádár Era
153
just a tool, the price he had to pay, as it were, in order to be able to travel abroad 
and work as a reporter in the West. The other, in contrast, genuinely devoted 
himself  to the defense of  the state (and the system in general). The fi rst “works 
for us,” “Koroknai” wrote, while the second “is our man.”
Thus, the people who worked as part of  the network saw themselves 
as devoted followers of  the socialist system who had become close to the 
communist party independently of  their recruitment. This is perhaps the most 
striking in the case of  “Koroknai.” For him, recruitment was only a stage on 
his path to the Communist Party, a path he had set out on of  his own free will. 
Though he had been one of  the local leaders of  the Smallholders’ Party, he had 
approached the secretary of  the Hungarian Workers’ Party in Debrecen at his 
own initiative, informed him that he wanted to work together with the party, 
and sought his assistance. It was not important to him how or where he would 
serve. If, for instance, he were asked to work as an informer, in the service of  
the secret police, then so be it. He did not even go into detail concerning the 
process of  recruitment. His description suggests that it was little more than a 
simple conversation with the political police, who had asked him whether he 
wanted to work for them, and he had replied yes. Whether this description is 
accurate or not we cannot know. We can only be certain that after having worked 
as member of  the network for some ten or twenty years, “Koroknai” and his 
associates saw themselves, the work they had performed, and the people on 
whom they had informed according to the outlines sketched above. When we 
conjure our past, we do so in a manner that ensures that it will be consistent with 
our knowledge, sentiments, attitudes, etc. at the moment of  recollection, and 
this helps sooth and even extinguish the sense of  discomfort (what is referred 
to as cognitive dissonance) that we may feel because of  the confl ict or tension 
between thoughts or ideas we may once have had and thoughts or ideas we have 
now. In simple terms, we have a tendency, when looking back on the past, to 
think of  ourselves as having always had ideas and views similar to the ideas and 
views we have at the retrospective moment. This is not necessarily a deliberate 
form of  dishonesty so much as it is a mental effort that helps us interpret our 
lives as a coherent whole.20
In the texts under discussion, in any case, one fi nds many indications that 
existence as an informer helped the narrators deepen and strengthen their 
20  Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of  Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers (Boston–New York: 
Houghton Miffl in, 2002), 138–49.
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commitment to the system. The author of  the report dated May 27, 1958 writes 
expressly of  his development in the ten years that he spent working for the state 
security, in the course of  which, “coming from the borderlands of  a worldview 
with a different direction,” he came so close to “the socialist ideology” that he was 
willing to put the needs of  the party before the interests of  family. (In 1954, for 
instance, because of  his work as agent he left his family for three months. As he 
noted, he would not have been willing to do this in 1949.) One does not fi nd the 
same kind of  continuity in T. M.’s narrative, but according to the methodological 
introduction added as an afterthought, the narrative provided a good “mirror of  
the thoughts and feelings that arise in someone in the wake of  our work. It is also 
proof  of  how, in the maintenance of  the network, proper guidance can bring 
the agent—mistakes he has committed notwithstanding—closer politically, and 
in the end the agent becomes one of  the enduring supporters of  our people’s 
democratic system.” 
This comment calls our attention to an essential fact, namely that the 
network was not merely a tool with which information was gathered, it was also 
a tool with which people were indoctrinated, since the conversion, as it were, in 
the course of  his work as an informer (or even as a consequence of  this work) 
of  someone who was regarded as an enemy of  the system into someone who 
supported the system was a signifi cant achievement. According to the internal 
affairs commands regarding the network, the case offi cer was supposed to 
indoctrinate the agent.21 The offi cer was charged not simply with the tasks of  
training and guiding the agent, but also with his or her political indoctrination. 
According to one study written for state security offi cers in the case of  an agent 
who hailed from enemy circles and against whom compromising or incriminating 
evidence had been used in order to leave him or her little choice but to enlist, 
“the ultimate goal was to change their worldview and make them understand and 
accept Marxist-Leninist ideology.” This of  course was the most ambitious goal, 
but the offi cer at the very least had to manage to make the informer grasp that 
“the people’s democracy is the only system and the dictatorship of  the proletariat 
the only just form of  social life that ensures the welfare of  the majority. One 
21  ÁBTL 1.11.5. 2-3/6/1955. A belügyminiszter 6. sz. parancsa az államvédelmi szervek ügynöki 
munkájának alapelvei című instrukció kiadásáról, February 9, 1955; ÁBTL 1.5. 2-10/94/1956. A 
belügyminiszter 94. sz. parancsa az államvédelmi szervek ügynöki munkájának alapelvei című okmány 
kiadásáról, October 8, 1956; ÁBTL 4.2. 10-21/33/1958. A belügyminiszter 33. sz. parancsa az államvédelmi 
szervek ügynöki munkájának alapelvei című okmány kiadásáról, December 5, 1958; ÁBTL 4.2. 10-
21/5/1972. A belügyminiszter 005. sz. parancsa az állambiztonsági szervek hálózati munkájának alapelveit 
tartalmazó szabályzat kiadásáról, April 5, 1972.
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must nurture love of  the socialist homeland in him, which is the most elevated 
and most righteous form of  patriotism.”22
Me and Us
As is apparent, for the people who were recalling their lives as agents, the fact 
that they had had to inform on people was not a source of  displeasure. Rather, 
it was the fact that their bosses had not regarded them as people who were on 
their side and therefore had not trusted them. The author of  the report dated 
May 27, 1958 was very upset when at a meeting his case offi cer’s superior said 
the following about the information he had provided: “This is something. Get 
information like this, then we’ll be alright. But if  you don’t get information like 
this, then you can lie down at our feet and swear that you are our man, but we 
won’t believe you.” “Koroknai” also complained a great deal about how for a 
long time the case offi cers treated him as an enemy, “like someone who had 
been accused, though the accusation remained unspoken.” This explains in part 
why he was also displeased by the warning he was given by the member of  the 
secret police who recruited him: “do not let anyone learn of  your conspiring, for 
it would bring great shame on you if  people were to know of  our relationship.” 
The agent envisioned the development of  a “principled” relationship, since he 
regarded himself  as someone who stood on the side of  the defense of  the state, 
while the offi cer saw him as an enemy who had been compelled to serve as 
an informer. Yet, as he put it, “by the time the counter-revolution broke out I 
looked on the authorities like Endre Ady looked on God: my concern is your 
concern…”23 He regarded his private life and the work he did in the service of  
the state security as a unifi ed whole: “The nature of  my work so closely resembled 
the nature of  my secret tasks, they intersected at so many points that I was able 
to understand the whole thing as a single unifi ed progression. I likened myself  
to streams part of  which fl ows underground, as some subterranean streams do.”
The signs suggest that this was a general problem, and in time the internal 
affairs leadership noticed this too. According to a 1968 summary on the agent 
22  ÁBTL 4.1. A-3087. József  Muzslai and Ottó Szélpál, Az ügynökség vezetésének és nevelésének alapelvei és 
módszerei (Budapest: BM Tanulmányi és Módszertani Osztály, 1957), 37.
23  The citation is from the last stanza of  a poem by twentieth-century Hungarian poet Endre Ady 
entitled A kimérák Istenéhez, or “To the God of  Chimeras”: “My concern is your conern / For if  you do not 
keep your faithful / no one will believe in you in time: / God, Secret, draw your sword!” Ady Endre összes 
versei (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1967), 375.
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network of  the state security services, “in general it can be stated that we do 
not know well enough the people who are among the fi rst whom we expect 
to uncover and bring an end to enemy activities. In practice, this means, for 
instance, that often we entertain doubts in our assessments of  the reliability 
and trustworthiness of  the agents who maintain direct relationships with the 
enemy.”24 We do not know how much the situation changed after this.
The use of  terminology by the narrators also clearly indicates that they saw 
themselves as soldiers who served in defense of  the system, since they referred 
to themselves not as “members of  the network” or “agents,” but rather as secret 
(in some cases external) employee. As of  1972, the term “secret employee” („titkos 
munkatárs”) served as a designation for one of  the categories of  people who 
were active as part of  the network, though all of  the texts in question here were 
written well before this, thus clearly the authors were not using the term in this 
sense. Towards the end of  the 1960s, the suggestion was made to use the term 
secret colleague instead of  network member, since the relationship of  the agents 
to the state security services “was decisively founded on patriotic conviction.”25 
It is perhaps not coincidental that in 1968 (i.e. at roughly the same time) the state 
security of  the German Democratic Republic also changed the offi cial term 
that was used for informers from “Geheimer Informator” (secret informer) 
and “Geheimer Mitarbeiter” (secret colleague) to “Inoffi zieller Mitarbeiter,” or 
unoffi cial colleague. This change was motivated by the realization that people 
did not like to identify themselves as denouncers, but they were able to interpret 
cooperation in the defense of  the state and the social order as responsible and 
respectable work. Also, the term “colleague” implied that the offi cers and the 
informers worked together as (almost) equal partners.26 Clearly, the members of  
the state security services in Hungary also would have like to have thought this.
The narrators of  the retrospectives regularly referred to the state security 
employees designated in the offi cial phraseology as case offi cers as their (higher) 
associates, or contacts. Presumably, the operatives did not use the expression 
case offi cer in front of  the agents, since the term in Hungarian (“tartótiszt” ) 
would have been associated with keeping animals, and the agents would have 
24  ÁBTL 1.11.10. A Belügyminisztérium III. Főcsoportfőnöksége ügynöki hálózata, a hálózati munka 
fejlődése és feladatai, December 11, 1968 (II. sorozat, 60. doboz).
25  ÁBTL 1.11.10. Jelentés. A BM állambiztonsági szervek hálózata, a hálózati munka feladatai, July 12, 
1968 (II. sorozat, 60. doboz).
26  David Childs and Richard Popplewell, The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security Service, 
(Basingstoke–London: Macmillan, 1996), 83. Jens Gieseke, The History of  the Stasi: East Germany’s Secret 
Police, 1945–1990 (New York–Oxford: Berghahn, 2014), 79–80.
Them and Us: Narratives of  Agents from the Kádár Era
157
found this less than fl attering. (One can imagine how unfl attering they would 
have found it had they learned that the offi cers often used the term “gopher” to 
refer to them.)27
Essentially, the agents regarded the state security offi cers as colleagues (T. 
M. referred to them as colleagues many times in his letter). The only difference 
between them, according to the agents, was that the offi cers openly served the 
state, while the agents did so undercover. This, however, did not mean that the 
relationship between them was always harmonious. Almost all of  the agents 
complained that the case offi cers did not obey the basic rules of  conspiratorial 
work. Clearly the agents were more sensitive to this because they were the ones at 
risk. The principal source of  potential danger was the arrangement of  meetings, 
especially if  a meeting was held in a public place and not a private apartment. In 
the case of  the latter, if  the superior did not arrive in time this could be a source 
of  trouble. “Many times I waited for hours, and it was particularly diffi cult not 
to draw attention to myself  and watch and wait for the possible arrival of  my 
contact,” writes the author of  the report dated May 28, 1958. He added, “I 
had to take the stairs around our apartments many times before the contact 
arrived. In particular, before October 23, 1956 almost every apartment was on 
the fourth or fi fth fl oor.” Reading the agents’ dossiers, one realizes how little one 
appreciates the trials and tribulations endured by the informers…
In the case of  T. M., it is particularly clear that he regarded himself  as 
signifi cantly more important and more intelligent than the people who had 
engineered his recruitment and his later contacts. (Even the person to whom he 
addressed his letter was not an exception.) This occasionally gave rise to comic 
contradictions in his recollections. For instance, before 1953 he had still been 
angered by the fact that he had to deal with insignifi cant trivialities, but after 
1953 he was angry because the case offi cers had warned him not to insist on 
grappling with so many things at once. Before 1953, he was grieved by the fact 
that he had to write reports on the public mood, whereas in 1956 it bothered 
him that his superiors did not heed his reports on the general mood. But T. M. 
was not the only agent who from many perspectives was more Catholic than 
the pope (or more communist than Lenin, as it were). All of  the retrospective 
narratives contain episodes in which the agents allegedly knew better than their 
superiors what they should do and how they should do it. In the report dated 
27  ÁBTL 1.11.10. Jelentés. A BM állambiztonsági szervek hálózata, a hálózati munka feladatai, July 12, 
1968 (II. sorozat, 60. doboz).
158
Hungarian Historical Review 4,  no. 1  (2015): 144–170
May 28, 1958, for instance, one fi nds the following contention: “sometimes, in 
unusual cases I had to work according to a preplanned method. If  something 
didn’t go according to the plan, my contact was always angry at me. When I told 
him that if  he was going to get so angry when things didn’t go according to plan 
it would be more expedient to familiarize the enemy with the plan and hold a 
rehearsal, well, he delivered such a strident philippic that for some time I could 
hardly stand on my own two feet. And I lost my critical ‘bravery.’”
The agents drew a distinction between themselves and their contacts on the 
basis of  how they had held their ground during the 1956 Revolution, as well. As 
T. M. wrote when refl ecting on how he had seen the man who had recruited him 
on a bus during the tumultuous days of  the uprising, “outside all kinds of  kids 
armed with pistols were taking the law into their own hands, but I still had to be 
at my post, indeed then more so than ever, but there were no tanks protecting me, 
nor did I have the sense of  security created by knowing you have the possibility 
of  retreat.” In other words, he was superior to the members of  the secret police, 
who fl ed and left him on his own with no instructions or guidance. As he noted, 
“after 23 October no one with whom I could have spoken rationally or answered 
my telephone calls […] in 1952 it was easy to give orders, but in the fall of  1956 
at least they should have given some information regarding the circumstances. 
They didn’t.” The members of  the secret police took fl ight, while he had to stay, 
the diffi cult circumstances notwithstanding, to save what could be salvaged. It is 
quite clear who he was thinking of  when he asked the question, “and 1956. Who 
stood their ground better?”
“Koroknai’s” narrative also reveals that even in the most trying times he 
continued to submit reports, though for him this represented the community of  
fate and common stance he shared with the offi cers. According to his account, 
though he did not know exactly where they were, he maintained continuous 
contact with his connections, speaking with them three times a day on the 
phone. “I also knew that the leaders had fl ed. I knew that they too were afraid, 
though we never spoke of  this.” In other words, even surrounded by danger, 
the agents knew their duties and saw to their tasks, which made their leaders 
look even worse for having fl ed. The differences between the two narratives 
notwithstanding, “Koroknai” and T. M.’s accounts of  1956 were based on a 
similar model: in both narratives, “we” (in the case of  “Koroknai,” the secret 
agents and their contacts, in the case of  T. M., only the agents) referred to 
the people who had stood their ground, and the signifi cance of  this act was 
augmented by the fact that “they” (the leaders of  the state security services, or in 
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the case of  T. M.’s recollections the offi cers of  the secret police in general) had 
not braved the dangers, but rather had fl ed.
The authors of  the recollections preferred to perceive the relationship 
between agent and case offi cer as something more than a simple offi cial 
relationship.28 The author of  the May 27, 1958 report envisioned the ideal 
contact as someone who would be like a stern but understanding father, who 
would insist on the proper execution of  the tasks and methodically indoctrinate 
the agent, but who at the same time who takes an interest in the agent’s family 
life, for instance. (This father fi gure soon gave the agent—who was struggling 
with serious fi nancial problems—a signifi cant amount of  money, he was able to 
get a ticket to the Hungarian-English soccer match, or he took the agent to visit 
his mother in a car owned by the offi ce.) One fi nds traces of  this in the report 
of  May 28. The case offi cers were not always just or consistent (in comparison 
with one another), but they loved their “children,” i.e. the agents who could have 
learned from them: “One was never on time, the other always nervous, a third 
was angry because I had gone to the meeting in spite of  the fact that I was sick, 
while another did not accept my illness as an excuse. There was one who urged 
me to get the person under observation to drink so that I could learn more from 
him, and another who thought it was disrespectful of  me if  I was tipsy after 
having completed a task. I was also disparaged for going to the bathroom on the 
occasion of  a meeting. Nonetheless, I learned a great deal from each contact, and I 
sense that they were fond of  me. I also think back on all of  them with a warm heart ” 
(my emphasis).
“Koroknai” sensed the solicitude behind the scolding: “looking back on the 
criticisms [made by the contacts], I think that I badly needed them, especially 
because neither the people around me nor my superiors have regularly shown 
value for my work or my conduct.” In other words, it was important to him to 
have someone pay attention to what he was doing, and the assessments helped 
him become a better person. However, he preferred to see the case offi cer not 
as a father-fi gure, but as a friend. On one occasion he wrote the following: 
“a long time ago, sixteen years ago, a political offi cer came looking for me in 
my apartment. I was not at home. When I returned home, my wife used the 
following phrasing to ensure that our little boy would not understand: a friend 
of  yours was here. At the time, this was a code-word. Over the course of  the 
years it acquired meaning and no longer had to be used in quotations marks.”
28  This was true of  the informers for the Stasi as well: Betts, Within Walls, 46–47.
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On the basis of  his narrative, in order for this to happen it was necessary 
for the state security offi cers to become uncertain as a consequence of  1953, the 
dissolution of  the independent secret police, and the political changes that took 
place following Stalin’s death. The agent could only sense that the contacts were 
no longer working according to prefabricated schemes, but rather were brooding, 
which altered the nature of  the meetings as well. No longer did they resemble 
interrogations in which the agent had to provide an offi cial account, rather they 
were more as if  “two people were conversing in a room.” This changed the 
agent’s relationship to the case offi cer: “I felt as if  I were working not only in 
the service of  a political view, but was also personally helping the people who 
maintained a relationship with me in their work. And I used all my abilities to 
help them. I remember, once I had a contact who was old and too slow in the 
head to understand what was going on around us at the time. I have never been 
as attentive in preparing my reports as I was with him. I wanted him to be able to 
hold his ground as well as he possibly could in front of  his superiors. I think of  
him with respect and fondness to this day.” T. M. had similar sentiments. At the 
beginning of  his letter he makes the following impassioned complaint: “During 
those ten years—oh, how many times did I speak about this to deaf  ears—I 
missed friendship more than anything else. I worked together with antipathetic 
colleagues, indifferent colleagues, and congenial colleagues, but I was always 
missing a friend.” This is why he was so joyful and satisfi ed to be able to refer to 
his contact at the time, the addressee of  his letter, as his friend.
This all draws attention to one very important factor. It is quite clear that the 
authors of  the retrospective narratives did not regard themselves merely as parts 
of  a network, but rather considered themselves colleagues—external, working in 
secret—of  the state security services. However, apart from the declarations they 
made when they were recruited (the legal weight of  which was debatable), the only 
thing that tied them to the machinery of  the state security (which for them was 
obscure and vague in its outlines) was the case offi cer. The relationship between 
them and their case offi cers decisively shaped the attitude of  the informer towards 
his work and his commitment to the system. One notices a similar phenomenon 
in the case of  the unoffi cial collaborators with the Stasi. As far as they were 
concerned, the contact offi cer essentially embodied the institution, indeed to such 
a degree that they referred to their contact offi cers as “my Stasi.”29 This suggests 
29  Barbara Miller, Narratives of  Guilt and Compliance in Unifi ed Germany: Stasi Informers and their Impact on 
Society (London–New York: Routledge, 1999), 64.
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that collaboration should not be understood as some abstract relationship between 
an individual and “the” power. This relationship had a personal side as well: from 
the perspectives of  the collaborators, cooperating with the system or an institution 
of  the system meant working together with someone, i.e. with another person.
One of  the episodes recounted in “Koroknai’s” recollections shows that 
from the perspective of  collaboration with the Soviet occupation forces and 
the communists the importance of  personal relationships extended beyond 
the network of  agents. As the editor of  the journal Debreczen, a periodical of  
the Smallholders’ Party, he came into offi cial contact with an employee of  the 
Soviet embassy (which had its headquarters in Debrecen, which served as the 
temporary capital of  the country) who worked as a censor. (Presumably this 
was Bela Ianovich Grygoriev, i.e. Béla Geiger, who had moved to the Soviet 
Union with his parents as an emigrant. This seems likely given that, according 
to the description, the conversation between them was held in Hungarian, 
without an interpreter.) In time, their relationship became personal and even 
amicable. In the course of  their talks, “Koroknai” came to know a man who was 
cultured, wise, and always unperturbed, and he claimed that it was because of  
this acquaintance that as a politician and newspaper writer of  the Smallholders’ 
Party he never made an anti-Soviet speech and never wrote an anti-Soviet article. 
He portrays the Soviet censor as a man of  unimpeachable integrity, who he also 
later was able to regard as a stable point, drawing strength from his example, 
which strengthened his commitment to the system. 
Me and Them
The recollections of  the agents share many affi nities, perhaps the most 
signifi cant of  which are the authors’ perceptions of  their relationships to the 
state security and their attitudes towards the work they performed as agents. 
These similar perceptions stem fundamentally from the fact that the agents 
in question found themselves essentially in the same situation at the moment 
when they were writing their recollections. Each of  them had performed tasks 
as part of  a secret network for years, presumably to the satisfaction of  their 
superiors, as is indicated by the fact that they were asked to write about the 
experiences they had gained in the course of  their work. This similarity in the 
circumstances in which they found themselves when looking back on their 
careers led them to adopt similar perspectives in their recollections and offer 
similar portrayals of  the state security network. It is not clear, however, whether 
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or not the stances that emerge in these writings can be considered average, 
typical, or prevalent. Of  course, this can perhaps never be determined with 
any degree of  precision. In my view, however, the value of  these recollections 
lies not in their statistical relevance. They are interesting and valuable as texts, 
thus the “scope” of  the conclusions one can draw on the basis of  them could 
perhaps best be determined by comparing them with the recollections written 
at the same time (in the Kádár era) by agents who found themselves in different 
positions. No such “control group” exists, however, as it is diffi cult to imagine 
that the authorities would have had someone write down his experiences who 
only reluctantly had agreed to serve as an informer, had quickly shunned the 
work because of  moral scruples or for some other reason, or for whatever cause 
had proven useless as an agent. In the end, one cannot entirely exclude the 
possibility that the experiences of  a reluctant or ineffective agent would have 
been useful to the state security services, but it seems unlikely that someone who 
was not eager to cultivate the best relationship with the political police would 
have accepted this task. Whatever the case, however useful they would be as 
additional methodological sources, to my knowledge no other recollections of  
former agents similar to those discussed above survived. 
The situation, however, is not entirely hopeless. The narratives can be 
compared with a text that was written under the injunction of  the political police, 
if  perhaps under entirely different circumstances. The document in question is 
a confession written on March 22, 1957 by J. P., a man who was put on trial 
after 1956.30 Proceedings were brought against the man primarily because of  
acts he had committed in the course of  the events of  the uprising, but he was 
also accused of  having revealed his ties to the state security to others. The 
circumstances under which the document was written demonstrate that at the 
moment of  composition J. P. was in an entirely different relationship with the 
organs of  state security than the other four agents. He was not a respected agent 
who was considered useful, but rather a suspect accused of  treason. (Given 
the nature of  the text, it was not anonymous, but I will not include the name 
of  the author here, since it would not contribute in any meaningful way to its 
signifi cance in this context.)
The story begins with a description of  his recruitment. In this description, 
the soon-to-be agent plays no role whatsoever as initiator. On the basis of  the 
account, he agreed to cooperate only under pressure from the offi cers of  the 
30  ÁBTL 3.1.9. V-145842. 33–37. P. J. önvallomása, March 22, 1957. 
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secret police: “I was very afraid […] that my family ties could cause me grief. So 
in order to prove that I thought differently, I agreed to follow their instructions.” 
(The principal goal of  recruiting J. P. was to establish contact with his cousin, 
who had been sentenced to eight years in prison for having participated in 
underground organizational efforts in 1952, but who had escaped from a coal 
mine, where he had been serving time, in June 1955 and fl ed to the West. The 
agent was supposed to lure his cousin back to Hungary.)
In spite of  the fact that the documents were written under very different 
circumstances, the confession bears many similarities to the recollections of  the 
less reluctant agents. After having been recruited, J. P. was also troubled by moral 
misgivings for having accepted the role of  an denouncer. His contacts attempted 
to dispel these anxieties by insisting that he was not serving as an denouncer, 
but rather was only providing characterizations. It is not clear, on the basis of  
the text, whether this explanation provided him with any solace or not. It is 
revealing, however, that he almost compulsively emphasized that by submitting 
“characterizations,” he did not wish to malign anyone. He strove to say good 
things about the people he was asked to inform on. But he also emphasized 
that he did not intend to mislead the secret police either. His remarks suggest 
uncertainty, which stems from the fact that he sought to meet a variety of  
divergent expectations at once, but he did not know how to present himself  
in the best colors to the people to whom his confession was addressed. This 
tension is palpable in his relationship to the primary target, his cousin who had 
escaped to the West. On the one hand, he was not willing to attempt to persuade 
his cousin to return to Hungary and thereby betray him, while on the other he 
held his cousin responsible for the position in which he found himself. 
J. P. also emphasized that he established and maintained relationships with 
the people he kept under observation only because he had been ordered to 
do so by the secret police. He was noticeably pleased if  his superiors praised 
him or expressed satisfaction with his work, and he was also bothered when 
the case offi cers did not follow the most basic rules of  conspiratorial work. 
Clearly as an agent, he did not know specifi cally what these rules were, but a bit 
of  commonsense was enough for him to realize that if  he received telephone 
calls from the police station and the meetings were being held at his place of  
work, those around him might well realize that he was in the service of  the state 
security. As he said in connection with the letter that he was supposed to send 
to his cousin (which was dictated to him by one of  the offi cers), such steps were 
not productive, since the addressee would be suspicious. And indeed he was 
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probably correct, his cousin probably was suspicious, for he never replied to the 
letter and never wrote to J. P. again.
In J. P.’s account, 1956 understandably could not be portrayed as a period 
of  committed moral integrity in the face of  armed opposition (as it had been 
described by T. M.), if  for no other reason than simply because he had been 
arrested specifi cally for the acts he had committed during the revolution, but 
also because it was at this time that what the agent had feared the most had 
come to pass: more and more people had informed him that they knew about 
his ties to the state security. From a certain perspective, however, his situation 
nonetheless bore affi nities with the situation of  the other four agents. First, even 
after the revolution had broken out, he continued to “work,” though in his case 
this meant little more than routine execution of  his responsibilities for a time 
(on October 24 he discussed a letter that he was supposed to send with his case 
offi cer). Second, and this is considerably more signifi cant, he had a chance to 
experience abandonment: the county secret police fl ed the country and left him 
behind. Thus, he had to face the emerging threats and the possibility of  being 
exposed on his own. His solution to the situation was to expose himself  as 
someone who had worked for the secret police and try to win the goodwill of  
the revolutionaries.
J. P. did not use the expressions agent or case offi cer either, though he also 
did not refer to himself  as a colleague of  the offi cers, nor did he call the offi cers 
contacts. The position in which he found himself  at the time of  retrospection did 
not make it possible for him to regard the offi cers of  the state security services 
as colleagues. In my view, this was not because in the eyes of  his “colleagues” (or 
more precisely their colleagues) he was a man suspected of  having committed 
counter-revolutionary acts. According to all signs, he did not even see a link 
between the state security that had been dissolved in 1956 and the people who 
were interrogating him, for even after his arrest, he was convinced that he had 
been detained because he had worked for the discredited secret police. The 
explanation, in my view, lies rather in the fact that J. P. conjured his memories 
under circumstances and at a time that did not make it possible for him to make 
his agent self  an integral part of  his identity. He could not proudly admit to 
having worked in the service of  the state security, nor could he interpret the 
deeds he had committed as acts of  spying on the enemy. Unlike the other four 
agents, the circumstances did not enable him to regard himself  as anything other 
than a denouncer. While for the other four narrators the tension between their 
dual roles did not lead to a split in their psychological lives (at least not a lasting 
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split), for J. P., who found himself  in far less auspicious circumstances, his work 
as an agent clearly caused serious inner crisis and suffering.
Conclusions
The retrospective narratives under discussion here offer illuminating illustrations 
of  the fact that the state security network was the shared product of  “power” 
and “society”: in its organization, the secret police took the initiative, but in 
order for it to come into being they needed the cooperation of  members of  
the citizenry who had been selected as candidates for recruitment. Research 
on ideological dictatorships has shown that among the motivations of  these 
informers one fi nds notions of  patriotism or ideological commitment, but most 
of  the people involved were infl uenced by personal interest.31 The informers 
and their superiors thus used one another, and also depended on one another. 
From the perspective of  power, this meant that the informers contributed to 
the maintenance and functioning of  the system and also that the need for the 
information they provided made the system dependent to some extent on them. 
This realization may have played a role, for instance, in the fact that—unlike the 
Gestapo—the Stasi strove to rely on the organized network of  informers.32 The 
institutionalization of  informing, however, did not mean that personal, material 
or other considerations were not among the motivations of  the unoffi cial 
coworkers of  the East German secret police.33
The texts under discussion here paint a picture according to which 
the authors accepted the role of  informer out of  loyalty to the system and 
commitment to ideology. (Clearly, the authors did not consider it tactful to 
mention personal motives in narratives intended for their superiors.) This is the 
most apparent in “Koroknai’s” recollections. He had already offered his services 
to the Communist Party when he was recruited. However, this gesture could 
suggest another kind of  motive. Perhaps as he bore witness to the creation of  
the one-party system, the Smallholder politician realized that if  he wanted to 
remain politically active he would have to fi nd new opportunities and new spaces 
31  Fitzpatrick and Gellately, “Introduction”, 751; Gellately, “Denunciation as a Subject,” 23–24.
32  Idem, “Denunciation in Twentieth-Century Germany,” 956–59; Betts, Within Walls, 44–45.
33  Alon Confi no demonstrates this in an excellent case study: “The Travels of  Bettina Humpel: One 
Stasi File and Narratives of  State and Self  in East Germany,” in Socialist Modern: East German Everyday 
Culture and Politics, ed. Katherine Pence and Paul Betts (Ann Arbor: The University of  Michigan Press, 
2008), 133–54. Also see Betts, Within Walls, 46–47. 
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for action. The dictatorship offered him the role of  informer, and he accepted 
it. His case suggests that, for the people who were part of  it, the network of  
informers could serve as a tool for political participation in regimes in which 
there were few other such opportunities.34 (In the Soviet Union under Stalin, for 
instance, letters in which people were denounced served as a tool with which 
control was exercised, nominally at least by common members of  the citizenry, 
over people in power, a practice the roots of  which went back to the time of  
the czars.)35
In my view, we may be better able to break from the moralizing narrative 
mode if  we regard the acts of  agents or “denouncers” as “a kind of  citizen 
activity in their own right, one of  the few powerful forms of  agency available to 
them.”36 Thus the network used by the state security services can be regarded as 
one of  the tools of  dialogue between power and society, of  course a tool that 
power offered certain members of  society, who either rejected this “opportunity” 
or made use of  it, out of  fear, compulsion, possible advantages in the future, etc. 
Whatever the case, we can examine the work performed by the informers as a 
social practice, as one of  the forms of  collaboration with the dictatorship (using 
the term collaborator to refer not only to people who cooperated with the forces 
of  Soviet occupation, but more generally with the dictatorial system). Indeed, 
we can study it as an unusual form of  collaboration, in part because an agent 
could be regarded as a collaborator in a legal sense, since his or her recruitment 
was an act of  (admittedly precarious) legal weight, and in part because, given 
the essential nature of  this form of  collaboration, it had to remain a secret and 
thus obliged the agent to lead a double-life, at least for a time. Of  course, this 
approach does not entirely exclude the possibility of  passing ethical judgment, 
but it creates an appropriate foundation for a nuanced study of  the state security 
network of  the Bolshevik dictatorships.37
Nonetheless—and this is essential—the agents never referred to or thought 
of  themselves as collaborators. They did not contextualize the services they 
34  Fitzpatrick and Gellately, “Introduction”, 752; Gellately, “Denunciation as a Subject,” 25.
35  Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Signals from Below: Soviet Letters of  Denunciation of  the 1930s,” The Journal 
of  Modern History 68 (1996): 845–49; Vladimir A. Kozlov, “Denunciation and Its Functions in Soviet 
Governance: A Study of  Denunciations and Their Bureaucratic Handling from Soviet Police Archives, 
1944–1953,” The Journal of  Modern History 68 (1996): 867–98.
36  Betts, Within Walls, 49.
37  See Sándor Horváth, “»Apa nem volt komcsi« – a mindennapi kollaboráció és az ügynökkérdés 
határai”, in Az ügynök arcai. Mindennapi kollaboráció és ügynökkérdés, ed. Sándor Horváth (Budapest: Libri, 
2014), 7–37.
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had provided in the complex relationship between power and society. Indeed, 
they draw no such clear distinction between the two in their narratives. They 
characterize their work and in general the work of  the secret police as having 
been entirely in harmony with the society around them, or at least the society of  
honest workers, and something that was done in the interests of  this society. In 
addition, they regarded the circles of  the employees of  the state security, whether 
people who worked openly for the state (the offi cers) or people who worked in 
secret (the agents), and the work they performed as a unifi ed whole. One could 
say that they effaced entirely the border between “power” and “society,” and in 
doing so also effaced the border between offi cer and agent. 
With the exception of  the numerically small group of  people who actively 
opposed the regime, everyone was compelled to cooperate with the communist 
system to some extent or to fl ee the country. Everyday life was shaped by various 
ways of  relating to the regime. Perhaps, instead of  speaking of  collaboration, 
which implies a sharp dichotomy, it would be more productive to speak of  
various (and possibly diverging) degrees and forms of  cooperation with the 
system. 
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Caterina Preda
Forms of  Collaboration of  Visual Artists in Communist 
Romania of  the 1970s–1980s 
Little attention has been given in political science analyses of  communist-era Romania 
to the relationships between visual artists and the secret police. In this article, I attempt 
to address this lacuna in our understanding of  the interactions between the state and 
artists by presenting two forms of  collaboration of  visual artists during the last two 
decades of  Romanian communism: the artists’ involvement in the ideological project of  
the communist party and their “collaboration” with the secret police. In addition, I also 
examine the ways in which artists have contributed a posteriori to our understandings of  
the communist experience with their artworks. I offer detailed examinations of  the cases 
of  three visual artists. The approach I have adopted includes analyses of  interviews 
with two artists who represent two opposing cases and examinations of  the fi les that 
were kept on them by state surveillance organs, so as to provide a new, multifaceted 
perspective on the relationships between artists and the communist regime. I contend 
that the study of  artistic artifacts can supplement traditional sources for political science 
analyses of  the communist past and provide a more nuanced perspective on the period. 
The article shows that imposing artistic dogmas is not simply a top-down process, but 
one resulting from complex interactions between different institutional and individual 
actors. 
Keywords: visual artists, secret police (Securitate), Romania, communism, collaboration.
Introduction 
In this article, I introduce two understandings of  collaboration among artists 
with the communist regime in Romania: collaboration as part of  an artistic 
project of  the regime and the cooperation of  individual artists with the secret 
police. I also examine a posteriori contributions of  artists to our understandings 
of  the communist regime as another perspective on the ways in which life under 
the dictatorship is remembered. The collaboration of  artists with the communist 
regime is a topic that remains highly divisive in Romanian society given the 
political uses to which the archives of  the former regime, which were only 
recently made accessible to the public, have been put to.
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Before 1989, artists had to pursue their creative activity in conformity with 
the ideological principles of  the state. Thus, they were compelled to collaborate 
in the consolidation of  the myth of  communist society, or the “multi-laterally 
developed,” society as it came to be called towards the end of  the regime. At 
the same time, most artists developed “another art,” alongside their work in 
compliance with offi cial requests to depict the mandatory ideology. Some of  
these artistic productions can help us construct a history that differs from the 
offi cially sanctioned one and remains distinct from the narrative of  the so-
called “democratic opposition,” which emphasized victimhood and repression, 
which are not necessarily part of  a shared memory for all citizens. In this 
sense, artistic artifacts can supplement traditional sources for political science 
analyses of  the communist past. This different point of  view on this history 
is in accordance with Jacques Rancière’s concept of  dissensus. Both politics 
and art provoke a dissensus and impose operations of  reconfi guration of  the 
sensible; thus art can help us see what was unseen or see differently what was 
regarded from a unique perspective.1 The artist is also a collector of  signs. He 
or she is an archivist, and thus what artists register may convey meanings in 
everyday objects, such as a banal photograph or a mundane event, that at fi rst 
escape our glance.2
In this article, I discuss the experiences of  three Romanian visual artists, 
Sabin Bălaşa, Ion Grigorescu and Rudolf  Bone, and their interaction with 
the Securitate,3 as well as their perceptions of  these experiences. Although my 
discussion does not offer a comprehensive overview of  these interactions 
or the relationships on which they were based, the experiences of  these 
artists are evocative of  the control exerted by the secret police on the artistic 
world. I also attempted to learn more about the point of  view of  the former 
Securitate on this topic and requested any fi les archived by the Council for the 
Study of  the Securitate Archives (CNSAS). For Ion Grigorescu, I found no 
surveillance or collaboration fi les; the artist is briefl y mentioned in surveillance 
fi les that were kept on other artists. In the case of  Rudolf  Bone, there was a 
surveillance fi le that I use in order to compare the contents of  the fi le with 
the information given by the artist in the interview. There is a microfi lm fi le 
1  Jacques Rancière, Le spectateur emancipé (Paris: La Fabrique, 2008), 70, 72.
2  Jacques Rancière, The Future of  the Image (London–New York: Verso, 2006), 26.
3  “Securitate,” the name by which the secret police in communist Romania has come to be known, is 
in fact a kind of  shorthand. The actual name of  the institution was General Direction for State Security 
(D.G.S.P) in 1948. In 1968, it became the Council for State Security.
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on Bălaşa that documents his collaboration with the Securitate. The three artists 
represent distinct and opposing cases. While Bălaşa is considered to have been 
one of  the “painters of  Ceauşescu” (i.e. he painted several famous paintings 
of  the couple), Grigorescu was marginal during the communist era and Bone 
was a dissenter. Two other informal interviews with Romanian art critics (Pavel 
Şuşară and Aurelia Mocanu) accompany the secondary sources used for this 
investigation. The artistic examples include Ion Grigorescu’s depiction of  the 
“spontaneous organization” by the secret police of  a manifestation of  support 
for the communist leaders, Rudolf  Bone’s description of  his inability to act, and 
Ion Dumitriu’s documentation of  the lives of  the people who were and still are 
excluded from offi cial portrayals of  life under communism. 
This investigation covers the last two decades of  the communist regime 
in Romania, the 1970s and the 1980s, starting with the recalibration of  the 
Romanian cultural sphere after the so-called “1971 July theses” by Nicolae 
Ceauşescu, in which the dictator demanded that artists deal more often with 
socialist topics.4 The focus of  this research is on visual artists (or artists in the 
plastic arts, as they were called by the communist regime), including painting, 
sculpture, ceramics, etc.,5 as well as their forms of  representation, such as the 
Union of  Plastic Artists (UAP). 
Little attention has been given in political science analyses of  communist-
era Romania to the relationships between visual artists and the secret police. 
Some information is provided in studies that analyze the relationships between 
artists and the Securitate in the volumes of  collected documents edited by Dan 
Cătănuş, such as Intelectuali români în arhivele comunismului [Romanian Intellectuals 
in Communist Archives] (2006), which includes several references to artists 
who were arrested, etc. One could also mention the volumes edited by Silviu 
Moldovan, Arhivele Securităţii vols I & II (2006), which contain fi les from the 
Securitate archives that have references to artists. A further useful reference is 
the analyses of  the Romanian cultural sphere during communism. In addition 
to my doctoral dissertation, in which I compared the Romanian experience to 
4  As Verdery recalls, 1971 was also an important year because it bore witness to a change in the approach 
of  the Securitate. It was the year in which a “new Law on the Defense of  the State secret made the entire 
society responsible for protecting secrets.” Katherine Verdery, Secrets And Truths: Ethnography in the Archive 
of  Romania’s Secret Police (Budapest: CEU Press, 2014), 130.
5  The people involved in the cases in question are painters, but because they used other media (fi lm, 
photographs, body art) I use the term visual artists. My research here does not include fi lmmaking.
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the Chilean one,6 works by other authors have delved into this topic. In two 
volumes, Literatura şi artele în România comunistă 1948–1953 [Literature and the 
Arts in Communist Romania, 1948–1953] (2010) and Politicile culturale comuniste în 
timpul regimului Gheorghiu-Dej [The Communist Cultural Policies during the regime 
of  Gheorghiu-Dej] (2011), Cristian Vasile concentrates on a description of  the 
structures of  the communist regime and the decisions made by these institutions 
that affected artists and artworks. Additional information is provided by Magda 
Cârneci’s analysis of  the visual arts during the communist regime in Artele plastice 
în România 1945–1989 [Fine Arts in Romania 1945–1989] (2000), in which Magda 
Cârneci identifi es several periods within the long period of  communist rule and 
examines artistic trends and specifi c artists. Diaries kept by those involved in 
the artistic sphere, either as art critics or as employees of  a museum department 
(Petre Oprea) or a Union of  Plastic Arts’ department (Samuil Rosei), represent 
another important kind of  source that offers insights into the Romanian artistic 
world during the communist period. I use each of  these sources as complements 
to the interviews mentioned above.
My article deals with the collaboration of  Romanian visual artists with 
the Securitate, although there were other forms of  collaboration that could be 
investigated, such as the relationships they established within the UAP. I chose 
not to focus on this, however, as it has been already discussed in the studies of  
Alice Mocănescu, for example, much as the question of  collaboration between 
artists and organizations of  the PCR (Partidul Comunist Român [Romanian 
Communist Party]) has been touched on in the studies of  Cristian Vasile. A focus on 
their relationship with the Securitate offers another perspective from which to 
consider the complexity of  the links between artists and the communist regime, 
as well the different meanings of  adhering to the offi cial line or contradicting it 
and the types of  artistic freedoms artists had.
In what follows, after a presentation of  the Securitate and its relationships 
with the artists of  Romania, I offer an analysis of  the collaboration of  Romanian 
artists with the ideological project imposed by the communist regime (with a 
focus on the last two decades). I then discuss specifi c forms of  collaboration by 
visual artists and their relationships with the secret police in Romania. Finally, I 
present examples of  works of  art that contribute to our current understanding 
of  the communist past.
6  Caterina Preda, “Dictators and Dictatorships:Artistic Expressions of  the Political in Romania and Chile (1970s–
1989) No paso nada...? ” (PhD diss., University of  Bucharest, 2009).
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The Securitate Surveillance: Perception And Reality
The communist regime was based on ideological control and the establishment 
of  the illusion of  perfect surveillance. More often than not, people censored 
themselves on their own, without any outside stimuli (i.e. real secret police 
surveillance). This fear of  the other was gradually internalized by Romanian 
citizens during the communist regime and became the norm in the 1980s. For 
example, this awareness of  being followed was evoked by the art critic, Samuil 
Rosei who wrote the following in his diary in 1971: “I don’t know if  that day 
I observed I was followed. The ‘guys’ were on my trail for almost a year. I saw 
them in the morning in the window of  the attic across the street, happy that 
fi nally I was leaving home and giving them a chance to take a walk. I counted 
around 16 or 17 of  them, the people who chased me ‘from the shadow’.”7
The actual number of  secret police keeping members of  the population 
under observation was not as high as the people in question believed, but the 
extent of  the surveillance network remains impressive. The number of  informers 
at the outbreak of  the December 1989 Revolution was “450,000, of  whom some 
130,000 were active.”8 Other fi gures are more striking. According to Anisescu, 
“approximately 7,000,000 people, or one-third of  the adult population appeared 
in the registers of  the Securitate in 1965. Writers and artists were chosen generally 
as subjects for surveillance fi les.9 Along with the people who were collaborating 
with the secret police, we should also mention those who were working for the 
Securitate. The Securitate employed only 3,973 people in 1948, but by 1969 this 
7  Samuil Rosei worked for the exhibition department of  the Union of  Plastic Artists (UAP). See his two-
volume diary, which recounts his daily routines and the life of  artists at the time. The note quoted is from 
February 18, 1971, Samuil Rosei, Jurnal întârziat, 2 volumes (Bucharest: Ed. Anastasia, 2011), 75.
8  Denis Deletant, “Romania,” in A Handbook of  the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe 
1944–1989, ed. Krzysztof  Persak and Lukasz Kaminski (Warsaw: Institute of  Naftional Remembrance, 
2005), 314. Katherine Verdery gives a different number: “486,000 informers assisting 39,000 full-time 
employees,” the numbers being those given by the Romanian Service of  Information (SRI) after 1990. 
Katherine Verdery, Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of  Romania’s Secret Police (Budapest: CEU 
Press, 2014), 207.
9  Cristina Anisescu, “Evidenţele şi arhivele Securităţii,” in “Partiturile” Securităţii: Directive, ordine, instrucţiuni 
(1941–1981), ed. idem et al. (Bucharest: Nemira, 2007), 52 quoted by Cristina Vătulescu, Police Aesthetics 
Literature, Film & Secret Police in Soviet Times (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 6. 
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number had risen to 5,966, and10 by 1989 it had ballooned to more than 20,000 
(39,000 according to Verdery).11
Compliance was guaranteed through different techniques: blackmail, 
menace, surveillance or inducements, as well as surveillance that included “the 
use of  informers, visual surveillance, and wire-tapping.”12
There were several types of  collaboration with the Securitate, and several 
synonyms have been used in the literature on this topic. Thus, we could include 
here the terms collaborator, informer, popularly turnător (literally someone that 
spills it all), or source (offi cial name). According to Deletant, “the informer 
network was described as being composed of  informers, support personnel, 
residents and occupants of  safe houses,” and “the informer was defi ned as 
a person who had access to information and suffi cient personal attributes, 
someone who, under the constant guidance of  a Securitate offi cer, actively seeks 
and gathers information about the people and the deeds that form the object 
of  an investigation.”13 Moreover, an informer was a person who “provided 
information in an organized manner (preferably in writing), assumed a false name, 
and usually signed a “contract” called an Angajament [commitment].”14 There 
would be a further difference between “collaborator (unqualifi ed informer), and 
informer (qualifi ed, source—the name given by the Securitate),” but also with 
respect to the “‘informers with no traces,’ support persons in contact with an 
offi cer.”15
Specifi c techniques of  surveillance and repression were used by the communist 
regime for the artistic sphere. At the beginning of  the communist regime, “soft” 
repressive techniques were used, such as “interference in the creative process by 
the imposition of  themes, the censuring of  work, and obstacles to publication,” 
along with harsher approaches, such as “limiting access to education, exercising 
self-criticism in front of  the group, public exposure, exclusion from the party, 
10  Deletant, “Romania,” 302. 
11  According to Virgil Măgureanu, head of  the institution that inherited the organization after 1990, 
the Romanian Intelligence Service, quoted by Marius Oprea, “Securitatea şi moştenirea sa,” in Comunism şi 
represiune în România, ed. Ruxandra Cesereanu (Iaşi: Polirom, 2006), 25.
12  Deletant, “Romania,” 303.
13  Ibid., 315.
14  Germina Nagâţ, “Informatorul de lângă noi,” in Viaţa cotidiană în comunism, ed. Adrian Nedelcu (Iaşi: 
Polirom, 2004), 132. 
15  Germina Nagâţ, “Informatorul de lângă noi,” 132. Marius Oprea quotes an internal document 
of  1951 (The Directive for working with agents). Marius Oprea, “O privire în interiorul aparatului de 
Securitate,” in De ce trebuie condamnat Comunismul? Anuarul Institutului de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului în 
România, vol. I (Iaşi: Polirom, 2006), 103.
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being compelled to work at a low income job,” and even “being deprived of  
personal liberty by being sent to work colonies, assigned a fi xed residence, 
imprisoned, and, fi nally, recruited inside the prison to serve as an informer.”16 
According to Clara Mareş, the Securitate had several means of  exerting infl uence 
on artists and especially writers by using “neutralizing measures,” such as positive 
infl uence or alerting the party organization, and if  this did not work, the artists 
would be compromised, isolated or warned.17 Then, artists would be kept under 
surveillance, just like other citizens. Their mail was read, their houses and studios 
were searched, and the secret police installed listening devices. Even their friends 
and families were used to recruit informers.18 
Having examined the fi les on fi fteen artists and art critics held in the CNSAS, 
I have identifi ed details concerning the specifi c ways in which visual artists were 
kept under surveillance. First, there was an important difference between the 
motives for keeping an artist under observation in the 1950s and 1960s and 
the motives for keeping artists under surveillance in the last two decades of  
communist rule, i.e. the 1970s and 1980s. In the fi rst period of  the communist 
regime, the main motives concerned “hostile” declarations, i.e. anti-communist 
sentiments and pro-American statements, while later the reasons either involved 
artworks (works included in an exhibition that were regarded as going against the 
established canon) or were connected to the artists leaving the country, as well 
as to their contacts with foreigners inside the country. In the latter case, artists 
were coopted into collaboration and pressured to inform on the employees of  
consulates and embassies. Once abroad, they had to contact certain persons, 
discuss specifi c topics and inform the offi cer upon their return of  the details of  
their stay. I was not able to establish with certainty if  going abroad automatically 
meant being contacted by an offi cer so as to be coerced into collaboration, but 
whether this was the case or not, it was certainly the general perception of  those 
who recall the period.
Establishing contact with an artist in order to compel him or her to 
collaborate was part of  the preparatory work done by the Securitate. Prior 
to the initial contact by the offi cer, other informers (through “letters of  
16  Ana Maria Cătănuş, “Capitolul IV. Represiunea împotriva intelectualilor: forme şi manifestări,” in 
Intelectuali români în Arhivele Comunismului, ed. Dan Cătănuş (Bucharest: Nemira, 2006), 168.
17  Clara Mareş, “Represiunea Securităţii împotriva scriitorilor în anii 1986–1988,” in De ce trebuie condamnat 
Comunismul? Anuarul Institutului de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului în România, vol. I (Iaşi: Polirom, 2006), 
203–04.
18  Ana Maria Cătănuş, “Capitolul IV,” 170.
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recommendation”) and members of  the UAP (usually the chair) would have to 
characterize the person in question as a potential candidate for collaboration. 
A very detailed report was provided by the UAP, including information about 
the artist’s education, his or her character, and the quality of  her or his work as 
exemplifi ed in the number of  exhibitions in which he or she had participated. The 
fi le established by the offi cer in charge included information about the artist’s 
contacts with foreigners in Romania or Romanians who had emigrated (Bone). 
Before the offi cer arranged a meeting to determine whether or not an artist who 
had been identifi ed by the Securitate as a possible collaborator would agree to 
collaborate, the artist would be followed and thoroughly evaluated. Thus, most 
fi les include a “plan of  measures for surveillance,” such as the examination of  
his or her mail, eavesdropping on telephone conversations, and the installation 
of  different instruments used in surveillance inside his or her house or studio. 
Most of  the artists I investigated agreed to collaborate, and some, such 
as Bălaşa, were rewarded, while others were not. Some of  the artists who 
collaborated were able to travel with less diffi culty afterword, as is clear from their 
fi les; they received letters of  recommendation from the UAP and the militia in 
support of  their demands. Some of  the artists had several names as collaborators 
because they were surveyed in different periods and given a new name for each 
new surveillance or/and collaboration fi le. The fi les are very chaotic, since, as 
Verdery notes, they were organized on the basis of  the activities in question 
and not chronologically,19 but they sometimes provide information that goes 
well beyond the mere question of  whether or not the person collaborated with 
the Securitate. An important detail mentioned by Verdery is also noticeable in 
some of  the cases I investigated. As she notes, “fi les can make ‘informers’ out 
of  people who staunchly deny that they ever held this role.”20 Thus, the fi les 
archived by the CNSAS should be compared with other sources, as I try to do 
in this article by including the viewpoints and remarks of  the artists who create 
their own narratives through the answers they give to my questions or, in the 
case of  Bălaşa, to questions raised by others.
19  Katherine Verdery, Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of  Romania’s Secret Police (Budapest: CEU 
Press, 2014), 52.
20  Ibid., 66.
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Artistic Ideological Collaboration with Communist Myth Construction 
An important part of  the establishment and the consolidation of  the communist 
regime in Romania was the control exerted on the cultural sphere. Some artists 
and intellectuals were coerced into complying with the new offi cial dogma, 
others conformed voluntarily, and some opposed the regime and were punished 
accordingly. The punishments included imprisonment, execution, or the loss of  
the right to create as mandatory offi cial creative unions were established. Those 
who collaborated with the regime were offered important benefi ts if  they chose 
to participate in the ideological project and conform in their creative work to 
the new aesthetic. The regime rewarded those who agreed to collaborate by 
granting them prizes in the form of  monetary incentives, but also recognition, 
privileged access to creative institutions throughout the country, and domestic 
and international travel.21 
Rather quickly, at the end of  the 1940s, the Romanian government acquired 
a monopoly on art production and distribution through the nationalization 
of  cinematographs, printing facilities, museums, etc. and the centralization of  
educational institutions. Moreover, artists became ideological workers in the 
service of  the party. Their endeavors were organized by the state-structured 
artistic creative unions (which included writers, visual artists, architects, musicians, 
and, later, people involved in theater and cinema). For Magda Cârneci, the Union 
for Plastic Artists (UAP), the party (with its different structures), and the artists 
formed a kind of  totalitarian triangle. I would add to this triangle another type 
of  collaboration by artists with the regime, which involved the infl uence exerted 
by artists on their colleagues or acquaintances through their cooperation with 
the Securitate.
A unique style was imposed on creators: Socialist Realism imported from the 
Soviet Union, where it had become the norm in the mid-1930s. Relaxed after 1956 
in the Soviet Union and other East European countries, it remained the norm in 
Romania, and it even gathered strength in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1971, Nicolae 
Ceauşescu issued his infamous “July Theses,” which reinvigorated the socialist 
orientation of  artistic endeavors through a 17-point program to be followed by 
artists. Thus, “through different forms and varied styles of  expression, art must 
serve the people, the fatherland, the socialist society,” and art had to illustrate 
21  Alexandru Murad-Mironov, “Capitolul V. Benefi cii, privilegii şi recompense sau preţul intelectualităţii 
din RPR,” in Intelectuali români în Arhivele Comunismului, ed. Dan Cătănuş (Bucharest: Nemira, 2006), 457–73.
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socialist realities, understood as the life of  the working people.22 This translated 
into the promotion of  what Magda Cârneci has called “state kitsch,” which was 
centered fi rst and foremost on the image of  Ceauşescu himself, but also on his 
close family, his wife Elena and his sons and daughter. Then, having decided that 
in his view artists had not followed the offi cial guidelines, in 1983 Ceauşescu 
reiterated his call for artists to produce socialist inspired art through what is 
known as the “Mangalia Theses.”23 Art was considered merely an ideological 
tool that served political purposes and had no autonomy of  subject or method. 
This offi cial art was demanded from artists for regional, municipal, and local 
exhibitions, which were organized throughout the year, as well as for the rest 
of  the celebrations, which became ever more numerous in the last years of  the 
Ceauşescu regime.
At the same time, the communist panorama of  artistic creation is much 
more complicated and diversifi ed or stratifi ed. As Ion Grigorescu stated, “there 
were many ways to collaborate, in the sense of  working together.”24 The types 
of  collaboration with power included being a member of  the Communist Party, 
being a member of  the union (which was mandatory for any artist), working for 
the different intermediate or local party agencies that acted as patrons of  the arts 
in the free world and ordered artworks (for instance, the Union of  Communist 
Youth, UTC, etc.), having connections with the “Gospodăria de Partid” (a 
section of  the Central Committee of  the Romanian Communist Party in charge 
of  administrative internal affairs) or the BTT (Bureau of  Youth Travel), or, 
fi nally, working for the Ministry of  Internal Affairs (for these individuals artistic 
creation was a luxury).25 
For Ion Grigorescu, who in recent years has been characterized as one of  
the representatives of  the Romanian neo-vanguard for his artworks in which 
he mixes photography, video, performance art, etc., his choices were also more 
complex, as he recounts in the interview.26 His evolution as an artist was molded 
during the communist regime and his options were imprinted with the different 
realities that obliged artists to create:
22  Nicolae Ceauşescu, “Proposals of  measures for the improvement of  the political-ideological, 
Marxist–Leninist education of  Party members, of  all working people,” July 6, 1971.
23  Idem, ”Speech by Nicolae Ceauşescu at the Working Meeting on Organizational and Political-
Educational Activities of  Labor” (Mangalia, August 4, 1983).
24  Email interview with Ion Grigorescu, September 15, 2013. My translation from Romanian.
25  Ibid.
26  Ibid.
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I.G.: I began to exhibit visual art in 1969. I found the following 
[written] in my diary entry from March 11, 1976, “during the night, 
passing next to the steam from the cement-crushing mill (Balta Albă): 
if  these people are building socialism, so should I.” 
(…) My childhood coincided with the evolution of  the socialist society, 
I benefi ted from the permanent actualization of  the social and political 
problematic. I felt it was a new world that was being built on the basis of  
equality, of  the honor of  being a revolutionary fi ghter, of  the principle 
that life was an honor. These ideas shaped me in the sense of  the 
continuous fi ght for them, of  the personal example. As my family, my 
neighbors were having a diffi cult time in the fi rst years of  the 1950s, 
we all believed we were equally poor, in the work full of  perspectives. 
I was very fond of  the newspaper Scânteia [the offi cial newspaper], of  
its graphics and its information, and I had this representation of  an 
‘us,’ a block of  people of  the same social will, the bad coming always 
from outside. I found out in time that the social structure was much 
more complicated. I depart from the hardest work for which I have a 
deep love and respect. I like to listen to people of  all sectors of  life, 
the image of  their lives is formed out of  words; I’d like to try to follow 
a worker with my camera for twenty-four hours. Of  paintings, I don’t 
make ethical debates, I don’t want to give ratings, in fact I don’t have 
such a rigid position anymore, I suggest they be analyzed, I give way 
to discussions, to reactions in many mediums. I would like to make 
inquiries.27
I have painted several paintings, such as “The reconstitution of  the 
furnace in the studio,” “Uncamarades,” “Accomplishing the plan resides 
in the power of  the collective,” “Rapid Club.” I made the photographic 
collage of  the TVR broadcast entitled “The great manifestation of  
August 23, 1974” (with Scânteia texts) and two portraits of  president 
Ceauşescu. …I wasn’t a party member, and I preserved my position of  
presenting reality without commentary as long as I could.
On the basis of  my experiences, the [ideological] principles kept 
evolving, and sometimes they contradicted themselves and were even 
criticized in time, and artists followed them sometime without knowing 
what they really meant.28
The artist and art critic Magda Cârneci divides artists of  the 1970s and 1980s 
into three groups according to their relationship to power: “conformists, fake 
27  In the interview, the artist quotes a text he had published in the magazine Arta 6, no 12 (1973) about 
the “Realist artist.”
28  Email interview with Ion Grigorescu, September 15, 2013. All subsequent quotes are from the same 
source.
182
Hungarian Historical Review 4,  no. 1  (2015): 171–196
non-conformists (or fake conformists) and non-conformists,” a groups which, 
she says, would equal Sorin Alexandrescu’s classifi cation into “mercenaries, 
merchants and monks (…) or committed, neutral and opponents”.29 Conformists 
still created according to the offi cial aesthetic, while fake conformists/fake 
non-conformists or neutrals mediated between the two categories, “paying 
their tribute to power” by engaging in the creation of  the kinds of  artworks 
demanded by the regime and in parallel creating “an autonomous art”; fi nally, 
non-conformists detached themselves completely from the social advantages 
enjoyed by those in the previous category. For Cârneci, the difference between 
them was essentially an existential one.30 
According to art critic Pavel Şuşară, there were three categories of  artists 
who collaborated with the regime: those who were part of  the system and 
participated in the Cântarea României Festival; those who were neutral, neither 
good or bad, “they minded their own business”; and the vanguard artists, who 
were further subdivided into two types, those who used vanguard means and 
instruments (Andrei Cădere, Ion Grigorescu, etc.) and those who were subversive 
ideologically, in the spiritual, religious sense (for example the Prologue Group). 
For Şuşară, the latter had “liberty inside the birdcage.”31 Art critics were also 
collaborators, as the most rudimentary among them gave a “good to exhibit” 
kind of  stamp, which were subtle guarantees and had maximum credibility. 
Some artists collaborated voluntarily; some—victims themselves—made others 
victims, while others were forced into collaboration. Şuşară himself  was called 
upon at the Securitate after any artists’ meeting had taken place, and often 
because he was denounced for listening to Radio Free Europe. Along with this 
suspicion, those that had contacts with the secret police inside an artistic branch 
were well known by artists and art critics, but all accusation remains under the 
register of  rumors, suspicions, in the absence of  a documented proof  (for 
instance, the general public only has access to someone’s Securitate fi les if  the 
person in question was appointed to a public position32). If  some people were 
well-known for their roles, others were suspected of  serving as high-ranking, 
well-placed offi cers or more because of  their ability to travel and return without 
29  Magda Cârneci, Artele plastic în România 1945–1989 (Bucharest: Meridiane, 2001), 107–08.
30  Ibid., 108–09.
31  Informal interview with Pavel Şuşară, August 23, 2013. All the following quotes of  Şuşară have the 
same source.
32  See the website of  the CNSAS, accessed April 7, 2015, http://www.cnsas.ro/index.html.
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punishment (this was also possible for artists who had important family ties with 
party members or Securitate offi cials). 
Sabin Bălaşa is a very good example of  a fake conformist, a painter who paid 
tribute to power while continuing to create art that did not follow the offi cial 
aesthetic. Bălaşa even bragged that he was paid a large sum of  money for his 
paintings depicting the Ceauşescu couple, which he represented according to his 
own style, not in accordance with the offi cial aesthetic:
I don’t refuse an order. When I needed the money, and I did, because 
I have two children, and they came and ordered me to paint a work 
depicting Ceauşescu from me, I accepted gladly. But only with the 
condition that I do it my way! (…) I liked commissions that were made 
during the Ceauşescu regime. But I painted him as I wished (…) Since 
great artists always followed orders, only amateurs do what they like. 
(…) The orders did not come from the Ceauşescu family, I received 
them from completely different people. I know, I heard that they liked 
my painting, but this was not special, everyone likes my painting. I’ve 
only met them once, very late, in a strictly offi cial setting. The orders 
came from people who to this day are very rich, people whom I again 
thank for giving them to me. (...) I didn’t do politics and nobody told 
me what to do. Because I did not do politics and did not create any 
fuss, the Securitate did not treat me badly. Why complain? I stayed 
away from dissidence, from complaining, because dissidence is a sort 
of  complaining.33
Bălaşa characterizes himself, much as well as the critics of  the period did,34 
as an opportunist, an artist who did not care for ideological principles or art for 
that matter, but rather only for his own career. In fact, after 1990 the painter 
continued to create works of  art for the wealthy people of  the day and to 
construct his image as an artist of  genius, an opinion that was not shared by his 
33  Alice Năstase Buciuta, ”Sabin Bălaşa: am avut şi simţul creaţiei şi al procreaţiei,” Marea Dragoste/Tango, 
July 8, 2012. My translation from Romanian of  Bălaşa’s answers to an interview published in a women’s 
magazine. Because Bălaşa died in 2008, I could not use his answers to my questions.
34  See for example the television show “Mysteries and Conspiracies” by Florin Iaru on Romanian 
Television, TVR2 with three art critics, Tudor Octavian, Pavel Şuşară and Ruxandra Garofeanu “About 
Sabin Bălaşa.” Available at (accessed April 7, 2015) http://tvr2.tvr.ro/despre-sabin-balasa-sambata-la-
mistere-si-conspiratii_8675.html (November 8, 2014). In this show, the art critics estimate that Bălaşa 
received 200,000 lei for his paintings depicting Ceauşescu.
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colleagues. Bălaşa was, as we shall see in what follows, a collaborator with the 
Securitate who was paid for his services.35
The Relationship of  Romanian Artists to the Securitate: 
between Surveillance and Collaboration
In order to investigate how the relationship to the Securitate was established, 
I used three contrasting cases: those of  artists Sabin Bălaşa, Ion Grigorescu, 
and Rudolf  Bone. Grigorescu had no problems with the Securitate and even 
affi rms the contradictions that have arisen since the fall of  communism with 
regards to his work; although nowadays he is included in exhibitions that show 
his disrespectful artistic gestures toward the communist regime, he underlines 
how much more complex his artistic endeavors were, since he knew when to 
show respect for the offi cial canon and when simply to “keep quiet.” As he says, 
In two fi lms, I used the image of  the President (sic), if  I would have 
called many people to show [the fi lms] to them, they would have taken 
them from me as propaganda against the establishment and I would 
have been in a bad position. In my notebooks I had the texts of  the 
movies and other commentaries on the political education. They 
remained in the drawer. If  I would have willfully tried to exhibit abroad 
or to have contacts there, I would have probably been followed.36 
Bone, on the other hand, was openly against the communists and was 
followed by the Securitate as a consequence of  his artistic gestures. 
Why was an artist followed by the Securitate? Reasons having to do with 
style (for instance, shows of  disrespect for the offi cial norm) were signifi cant, 
and factors that made someone prone to blackmail were exploited, such as sexual 
orientation (homosexuality was forbidden and punished during communism).37 
Artists themselves viewed their relationships with the Securitate differently, as 
35  File of  the CNSAS: M.R. Buc. 142480/roll 1469.
36  Email interview with Ion Grigorescu, September 15, 2013.
37  See for example the study by Sînziana Cârstocea, “La Roumanie - du placard à la liberation. Eléments 
pour une histoire socio-politique des revendications homosexuelles dans une société postcommuniste” 
(PhD Diss., Faculté des sciences sociales, politiques et économiques Departement de Science politique, 
Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2010).
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can be seen from the answers they gave to my questions. As Ion Grigorescu 
recounts:
Preda: What was your relationship with the Securitate before 1989?
Grigorescu: I would say I had no relationship [with the Securitate]. In 
1977, after the earthquake, I was able to leave for Paris and Zurich, 
during the spring holiday, as I was a professor. (…)
C.P.: Do you have any information about a colleague or friend who 
was contacted by the Securitate? What was his relationship with them?
I.G.: No. In 1974, I met Paul Goma in the studio a colleague of  
mine with whom I exhibited that year, Ion Condiescu. I have no 
‘information,’ the world was full of  rumors and reticence. 
C.P.: What were artists reproached for by the Securitate? [and a 
broader question: What kind of  political control was exercised over an 
exhibition or a commission?]
I.G.: I don’t know what artists were reproached for by the Securitate. 
I assisted with a small number of  censorships of  exhibitions because 
usually the censor avoided the artist so as not to be obliged to give 
unpleasant explanations. In 1972, they removed a painting of  mine 
with a depiction of  a girl who had been hanged. In 1974, a painting 
by Matei Lăzărescu with a depiction of  a freezer including meat and 
money was removed. The censor asked, “what does it want to say? 
That it is expensive?” Around 1980, I was given a commission to paint 
a portrait of  president Ceauşescu (sic.). The head of  the service for 
exhibitions of  the UAP told me to erase two of  the three characters, 
which I did, then they told me it’s too realistic, that the character had a 
swollen, soft hand. The censor did not tell the truth when he rejected 
a work because he [the censor] was either afraid to say the truth, which 
would have meant to partake, or he didn’t want to become involved.38
Since the main preoccupation of  artists (and the majority of  Romanians) 
was how to escape, how to get away, how to leave the country, getting a passport 
was quite important. Thus, one of  the issues that concerned possible interaction 
between Romanian artists and the secret police was that of  obtaining the right 
to travel abroad. Romanians did not have passports; a Romanian citizen could 
only obtain a passport submitting an explicit request and providing adequate 
explanation. Deletant quotes an offi cial document of  the Securitate that made 
“the issue of  a passport conditional on collaboration with the organ of  state 
38  Email interview with Ion Grigorescu, September 15, 2013.
186
Hungarian Historical Review 4,  no. 1  (2015): 171–196
security,” and as he notes, “the award of  a passport to a Romanian citizen was 
a privilege not a right, and was in the case of  ‘service’ (i.e. issued for travel 
or offi cial business) opposed to ‘tourist’ passports often conditional upon the 
bearer fulfi lling an extra task for an organ of  the Securitate.”39 At the same time, 
Deletant recognizes that it was not possible that all the people who traveled 
abroad had actually collaborated with the Securitate: “all those who were granted 
passports were adjudged to have made concessions to the Securitate, either in 
the form of  accepting a misiune in the form of  reporting on the activities of  
Romanian relatives and friends abroad or of  informing on them at home, for 
which the favor of  a passport was the reward. This is certainly the case with many 
Romanians who were allowed to travel in the communist era but it is unlikely 
to be true of  all. The Securitate and the DIE were selective in their interest in 
Romanians wanting to travel abroad and it is doubtful whether they had the 
resources to charge every traveler with a mission.”40
Ion Grigorescu recounts the story of  his travels abroad during the 
communist era:
I.G.: How did I obtain my passport? The summer before [the spring 
of  1977 when he travelled to Paris and Zurich] I had asked for one on 
the basis of  an invitation to the international engraving exhibition. The 
exhibition passed with no reply. After almost a year, I found out that 
the man who issued passports, colonel Budecă, had left a telephone 
number at the UAP for artists who had contacts with foreigners. I 
called him, he replied that he did not deal with passports, but a week 
later I was contacted by post to pick up my passport. I left, I came 
back and fi lled the fi le with information regarding where I had been 
and the people with whom I had spoken, together with the chief  of  
personnel of  the UAP, the stoker Turlacu, the one who gave me and 
immediately took my passport. The same happened after I returned 
from Macedonia in 1979.41
If  for Ion Grigorescu there is no surveillance fi le in spite of  the fact that 
he traveled abroad on several occasions,42 for his brother, the painter Octav 
Grigorescu, there is a surveillance fi le that was kept following his trips to Italy and 
39  Denis Deletant, “Romania,” 285, 297.
40  Ibid., 313.
41  Email interview with Ion Grigorescu, September 15, 2013.
42  He traveled to Budapest, Zurich, Basel, Paris and Karlsruhe in 1977, to Macedonia in 1979 and to 
the USSR in 1981.
Forms of  Collaboration of  Visual Artists in Communist Romania of  the 1970s–1980s
187
his expression of  his desire to remain in Italy. Ion Grigorescu is not mentioned 
at all in any of  these fi les.43
For Rudolf  Bone, the experience he had with the Securitate was more direct, 
as he noted in the interview. He was under surveillance by the Securitate, and this 
directly affected him.
C. Preda: What was your relationship with the Securitate before 1989?
Rudolf  Bone: As far as what concerns me, my relationship with the 
Securitate was that of  someone being followed, intercepted [my phone 
was tapped], and listened to. I suspected this at the time, and it was 
later confi rmed [that] I had a fi le as someone who was being followed. 
It is not a big fi le, because I was followed only as of  1988. I think they 
followed me because, following the summoning of  all sculptors from 
Oradea to a meeting of  the county party cabinet, and although I was 
not a member of  p.c.r. (sic.) they were trying to convince us to accept 
to work on the building site of  the House of  the People, I was the 
only person who openly refused, and I immediately left the meeting 
room in spite of  the threats that were being made by the person who 
was leading the meeting. In consequence, I was discharged as a teacher 
at the primary school where I was teaching and was transferred to 
the Artisans’ cooperative, which was supposed to assign me to the 
building site of  the House of  the People, where I was supposed to 
carve decorative motifs into marble. And the worst thing was that I 
was the only sculptor from Oradea in this situation! I managed to avoid 
the trap with the help of  medical certifi cates provided by some doctor 
friends of  mine.
C.P.: Were you ever contacted by an agent?
R.B.: For the fi rst time around 1978–89, when a young lady visited 
me at the high school where I was teaching; I met her in the high 
school, and all I knew about her was that she had graduated from the 
Economics Institute of  Cluj. I didn’t know she was working for the 
Ministry of  Interior. I found out from her she was sub-lieutenant and 
that she was responsible for the artistic sphere, the art collections, the 
museum. Back then, all art collectors had something to do with the 
regime. My father had in his collection works of  local artists, but also 
some compositions from the Baia Mare School. You couldn’t sell or 
buy anything without THEM (sic!) knowing. My father sold without 
letting anybody know. The young lady tried a little blackmail, letting 
me know she knew something. I think they only suspected, otherwise 
they wouldn’t have been so discreet. She proposed that I collaborate 
43  Files of  Grigorescu Octav at the CNSAS: SIE 4045; I 454430/ 2 vols.
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with her for the expertise of  some paintings of  the Baia Mare School. I 
refused politely saying I was no painter and so I wasn’t qualifi ed to help 
her. She stopped looking for me, she even avoids me today. We don’t 
say hello. The second time was in September 1989, one day before 
I left for Bucharest for the exhibition I was about to do with [Dan] 
Perjovschi at the Orizont Gallery on Victoria Boulevard. Obviously 
they knew and thought I would soften. On the phone, a comrade 
major Marian or something like that tried to call me at the Securitate 
headquarters, which was close to my home. I told him rudely that I 
was not going anywhere because I had an exhibition in Bucharest and 
I had to pack my works. He replied that he knew about my business 
and that they were coming to my place. In seven minutes the lieutenant 
major arrived, fortunately alone. After some stupid questions, such as 
‘comrade Bone, why are you doing such pessimistic work?’ and after 
having let me know that they had a video of  my artistic actions in Sibiu 
in April 1989, when I had had some rather fi rm and nonconformist 
ideological attitudes, he asked me how I had ever come to exhibit a 
bronze sculpture in Ravenna in 1983. I replied that the answer was 
simple, I had sent it through the UAP, and a commissar of  the union 
had traveled with the works selected by the Ravenna jury on the basis 
of  some photos. Then he asked me the trick question, namely, would I 
want, from now on, to take my works abroad myself ? Me, who couldn’t 
even travel to the socialist neighbor and friendly country of  Hungary 
because they refused my passport demands! I replied that they should 
send sculptor K., who left any time he wanted to, traveling to Italy 
and anywhere in the West with no obstacles. As a close to our talk, he 
told me in a slightly threatening manner to be careful what I exhibit in 
Bucharest, and he put a white piece of  paper in front me on which I 
was to write that I wouldn’t tell anybody about our talk, and then I was 
supposed to sign it. I refused, saying that they found out everything 
anyway, so there would be no point in me signing. He insisted and I 
said clearly that I wouldn’t sign any paper. In my mind, I was thinking 
that I wouldn’t sign any agreement with Satan, no matter what they 
did to me! He left by saying, ‘we’ll meet again!’ We only met after the 
events of  1989, passing on the street, when I confronted him without 
telling him anything.44
At the CNSAS, I discovered that the Securitate followed Rudolf  Bone, 
assigning him the code name “Rudi” in a surveillance fi le (I 329979) in 1987–
1989. His fi le includes fi ve documents. The fi rst one is a “Note for tasks to 
44  Email interview with the artist Rudolf  Bone, August 28, 2013.
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be accomplished” concerning Bone, who was known for having contacts with 
foreign countries through the mail and who intended to participate in the VII 
Venice Biennial (1988). The offi cer asked for approval for surveillance “in 
order to prevent crimes from taking place” and so as to discover the artist’s 
connections with foreigners by studying his mail and eavesdropping on his 
telephone conversations. The second document is a report in which Bone is 
characterized as a serious person with no vices, and as someone who had many 
contacts in foreign countries. The third document is a report about Bone’s desire 
to participate with a work of  art in an exhibition organized in Italy. According 
to this report, the artist was to be contacted after he had asked for a passport in 
order to establish his position and his contacts. The fourth document is a report 
that suggests that Bone should be followed in order to be contacted and that 
he should be enlisted to collaborate, depending on his attitude. Finally, the last 
document in Bone’s fi le is a report regarding the contacts that were established 
with him by the secret agent in November 1989. According to the report, the 
artist discussed his participation in the exhibition in Sibiu, the possibility of  
sending artworks to foreign exhibitions without ever traveling abroad, and his 
former colleagues who had immigrated to West Germany; at the same time, the 
agent notes that Bone was instructed how to speak with foreigners and that he 
agreed to respect these norms.
The Sibiu event at which the Securitate was called on to interrupt an artistic 
action also included Bone, who presented his intervention, entitled Ritual (1989). 
It depicted the artist “sacrifi cing” a papier-mâché fi gure that he had made, and 
all this to a soundtrack of  “blah-blah” recorded by his fellow artists participating 
in the action.45 “‘The Ritual’ was consumed practically without an audience, 
although those looking gathered at the windows of  the gallery, recalling the 
atmosphere that dominated the year 1989 of  generalized fear of  the other 
(that the artist mocks), as well as eluding censorship that would have had to 
give its approval for such an action.”46 Chestnut self-portrait (1983), the work by 
Bone of  which I have included a digital reproduction below, is a depiction of  
his incapacity to speak freely at the time. The face and head of  the artist are 
perforated with small colored pieces of  wood, while the artist stares at us, as if  
wishing to communicate something important (Pintilie).
45  Ileana Pintilie, Acţionismul în România în timpul comunismului (Cluj: Idea, 2000), 68.
46  Ibid., 68–69.
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Rudolf  Bone, Chestnut Self-portrait, 1983, reproduced with the consent of  the artist.  
Being given permission to travel abroad was considered one of  the clearest 
indicators of  collaboration with the Securitate. The study of  the visual artists’ fi les 
shows that in many cases artists were followed when abroad by secret agents who 
had infi ltrated the exiled community, and some were invited to a “discussion” 
with an offi cer upon their return, in the course of  which they had to recount 
whom they had met, what they had discussed, whether or not they had been 
contacted by people active inside exile communities, who might have tried to 
convince them to stay abroad. 
Finally, the case of  Sabin Bălaşa (1931–2008) is interesting for the sake of  
contrast, because the painter had a collaboration fi le with the Securitate.47 He was 
also followed by the secret police, but as his fi le is missing most of  its pages, 
we do not have access to the documents. The fi le of  Bălaşa is only available on 
microfi lm and is incomplete. It includes a report for a proposal of  recruitment 
(1967), a report on how recruitment went, a signed “commitment” to collaborate 
(1971), a background report on his wife Alexandra from the UAP, a background 
report from the UAP from the head of  personnel and signed by the president Ion 
Pacea that confi rms that Bălaşa was not a member of  the Romanian Communist 
Party, two reports from two sources, and two receipts for money and a bottle of  
47  Bălaşa’s fi le at the CNSAS: M.R. Buc. 142480, roll 1469.
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whiskey (1986).48 Although Bălaşa’s signed agreement to collaborate dates from 
1971, his fi le states that he collaborated with the offi cers as of  1967.
Bălaşa’s signed commitment states: 
Conscious that defending the country, the security of  the state, 
constitutes a sacred debt of  any citizen of  this country, a patriotic 
obligation of  the whole people and also an important contribution 
I am called upon to make as a citizen of  RSR, I pledge to support 
secretively, actively and in an organized manner the organs of  security 
in the activity they accomplish to prevent, discover, and liquidate the 
crimes committed against the security of  the state. I commit to fi ght 
with consistency, to respect the law, to act with promptitude so as to 
prevent the imminent dangers to the security of  the state. To manifest 
vigilance toward the enemy of  the fatherland, to be honest with the 
security organs and not disclose to anyone my connection to them. I 
commit to respect this commitment, conscious that disrespecting it 
can bring damage to the security of  the state. September 9, 1971 (sic!).
In the plan to recruit Bălaşa, which dates back to 1967, the offi cer states that 
he had been contacted because of  his connections abroad, especially in Italy, 
and in order to provide information concerning Romanians who had emigrated, 
as well as Italians active in the emigration circles of  Romanians. In one of  his 
recommendations, he is shown appreciation because when he was sent abroad 
he did not stay in any of  the countries visited and thus showed his patriotism. 
His collaborator name was “Sorin Olteanu,” and the people who compiled his 
fi le appreciated his efforts, which helped solve several ”problems.”
Artistic Contributions to a New Understanding of  the Past: 
the Art of  Memorialization
I suggest adding to the perspectives on the communist past and its aftermath by 
including artistic points of  view in which symbolic languages are used or direct 
citations of  the period fi gure. Thus, I acknowledge the distinct perspective of  a 
privileged category of  citizens, visual artists.
48  The receipt for the bottle of  whiskey dates from 1986 and is for the collaborator BRUNO, although 
his collaborator name was different in 1967. I assume another fi le was opened at a later date and what was 
kept on microfi lm (selected information) was only preserved in order to prove, if  necessary, that he had 
indeed served as a collaborator. Bălaşa’s fi le at the CNSAS: M.R. Buc. 142480, roll 1469.
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Another perspective from which to consider the question of  the relationship 
between the artist and the regime involves depictions of  those who surveyed. 
The best example of  this is Ion Grigorescu’s image reproduced below. Part of  
his series of  photographs entitled Electoral meeting of  1975, this image presents a 
Securitate offi cer supervising the organization of  a “spontaneous” manifestation 
of  support for the offi cial leader, Nicolae Ceauşescu, and the Romanian 
Communist Party. The other 28 photographs show people being taken to the 
event, but the images also reveal the people’s boredom and disinterest. They 
are holding smiling portraits of  Ceauşescu and enthusiastic slogans, but they 
don’t seem at all animated. Offi cially, such events were not organized, but rather 
took place spontaneously, thus Grigorescu demystifi es the perspective of  the 
communist regime with material proof. The series of  photographs offers a 
point of  view that differs strikingly from the offi cial one. Moreover, Grigorescu 
manages to safeguard this telling image of  a secret police offi cer holding his 
walkie-talkie, preoccupied by the need to surveil the participants continuously. 
The person doing the surveilling was also being watched. This image contains 
nothing important. Nothing extraordinary is happening, but its mere trace is 
important today for our comprehension of  the ways in which the communist 
regime functioned.
Ion Grigorescu, Electoral meeting, 1975, reproduced with the consent of  the artist.
Moreover, Ion Grigorescu’s images of  the desolate communist daily 
landscape contradict the offi cial depictions of  an idealized reality as it was 
supposed to be presented by artists through the ideological lenses. For example, 
in his photographs Queue for meat (1975), Waiting for Propane tanks and Getting on 
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the bus from 1984, we see real everyday life under the Ceauşescu regime, time 
spent waiting to acquire products that were scarce, trying to fi nd one’s way to 
work by using the overcrowded public transportation system. Many other artists 
indulged in this chronicling of  the daily routines as a manifestation of  their 
ordeals, which were denied or at least hidden by the regime. These unimportant 
details of  everyday life can help us reconstruct today the reality of  communism 
in Romania as it was experienced by large parts of  society. In his videos entitled 
Beloved Bucharest (1977) and Balta Albă (1979), Grigorescu was also able to record 
the periphery of  the socialist urban dream life as testimony “to the failure 
of  socialism: the poverty, the dreary living conditions, the new construction 
projects, which gave rise to alienating and low-quality living environments.”49 
The artist reminds us that his fellow citizens shared his point of  view:
I think everybody was aware of  that [social reality]. Everybody knew 
that the propaganda was hiding a distinct and unpleasant reality in 
working conditions: people were working, but could take no pleasure 
in their work whatsoever. At least this is my conclusion. But when I 
exhibited such works, the only thing they could say was: ‘We won’t 
accept this, since it is ugly.’ They couldn’t just condemn the work 
directly, unless they were prepared to recognize the truth.”50
49  Magda Radu, Catalogue of  the exhibition Geta Brătescu şi Ion Grigorescu. Resources. Works from the collection 
of  MNAC Bucharest (Bucharest: MNAC, 2007), 17.
50  “Ion Grigorescu in discussion with Magda Radu,” in Romanian Cultural Resolution, ed. Alexandru 
Niculescu and Adrian Bojenoiu (Ostfi ldern: Hatje Cantz Verlag, 2011), 221.
Ion  Dumitriu, Groapa de Gunoi, Diapozitive, 1975–1978, reproduced with the consent of  the 
Foundation Ion Dumitriu.
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Equally interesting in this sense are Ion Dumitriu’s series of  slides, Groapa 
de gunoi [Landfi ll site] (1975), which document the activities of  people on the 
outskirts of  Bucharest, showing a side of  the communist reality that offi cially 
was not supposed to exist and much less be recorded or immortalized in art. 
The artist concentrates not on the successes of  the socialist program, but rather 
focuses on those that failed to “be integrated” and that lived their lives on the 
margins of  the offi cial narrative of  the glories of  socialism.
Conclusions
This concise investigation into the relationships between artists and the 
communist regime in Romania used three types of  possible interconnections 
between the two to discuss the complexities of  living under a dictatorial regime. 
Artists collaborated with the communist regime ideologically by creating art that 
conformed to the offi cial aesthetic. As Romanian art critics remind us, things 
were not so simple at the time, and thus many artists had a double art, one that 
fi t the public mandatory aesthetic and one that was true to their own aesthetic 
values. Finally, some opposed the regime completely and sometimes suffered 
the consequences, as in the case of  Bone. Interaction with the Securitate was 
motivated either by a desire to travel outside of  the country, which meant artists 
were contacted by representatives of  the secret police before and after their 
travels in order to receive a passport and to recount their journey and provide 
information regarding the people with whom they met, etc. Artists were also 
observed and contacted by the Securitate because, in the view of  the authorities, 
they had shown disrespect for socialist creative principles, as both Grigorescu 
(who says he did not go beyond the limits he knew) and Bone (contacted by an 
agent at the end of  the communist regime) acknowledge. 
Because of  the specifi c character of  the visual arts, which address a smaller 
public (when not using the propaganda of  Socialist Realism), the work of  visual 
artists, after self-censorship, was observed in order to ensure that it did not violate 
the limits by the UAP and the other departments of  party or state institutions 
before coming under the scrutiny of  the Securitate. The three cases discussed 
above allow us to conclude that, contrary to popular belief, traveling abroad 
did not automatically entail a proposal for collaboration, nor did it necessarily 
prompt the authorities (the Securitate) to open a surveillance fi le on the person 
in question. The study of  supplementary artists’ fi les shows, nonetheless, that 
this happened in other cases, and that the reasons varied across the decades of  
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Romanian communism: from the need to survey those in the exiled communities 
to the government’s desire to examine prior links with foreigners inside Romania.
In keeping with Rancière’s perspective on the artistic gesture that can 
provide a new understanding or a novel point of  view, the Romanian examples 
discussed above show how these artistic endeavors help bring forth a new 
perspective on life during communism, far from the offi cial line. We saw how 
the artistic gesture of  registering reality captures another side of  this reality that 
helps our a posteriori conceptualizations of  dictatorships with the addition of  a 
perspective that otherwise is not available. Artists register not only the secret 
police, as Grigorescu does in Romania, they also register details of  the daily 
misery that don’t exist in the offi cial propaganda and that today can balance this 
offi cial perspective on reality. Moreover, artists also capture feelings, and they 
symbolically give expression to the sentiments of  the majority of  Romanian 
citizens in the last years of  the Ceauşescu regime: trapped, incapable of  moving 
or talking, desperate.
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for the Study of  Securitate Archives] fi les:
 Bălaşa Sabin – M.R. Buc. 142480/roll. 1469.
 Bone Sigismund Rudolf  – I 329979.
 Grigorescu Octav – SIE 4045; I 454430/ 2 vols.
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Legacies of  Violence. Eastern Europe’s First World War. Edited by 
Jochen Böhler–Włodzimierz Borodziej–Joachim von Puttkamer. 
Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014. 334 pp.
This collection of  studies, which analyze the phenomenon of  violence as a 
consequence of  World War I from various perspectives, is a welcome addition 
to the current efforts to broaden geographically the scope of  the research on the 
fi rst global confl ict of  the twentieth century. Whereas in the past the fi eld has 
been dominated by studies focusing on Western Europe and the German empire, 
in recent years there has been a strong tendency to broaden the scholarship 
and include other geographical areas as well.1 Similarly, the study of  physical 
violence as one of  the determining phenomena of  twentieth-century history, 
which has its roots in the catastrophic experiences of  World War I, has drawn 
more attention in recent decades in connection with renewed interest in Central 
Europe and battlefi elds in eastern and southeastern Europe.2 
The editors of  the collection have divided the studies into four main groups 
that refl ect the main trends in the current research on the connection between 
World War I and physical violence. The fi rst group tackles the longer view on the 
war, focusing on trends and phenomena in the late nineteenth century that already 
foreshadowed the confl ict and also on some of  its lasting repercussions. Joachim 
von Puttkamer recapitulates the political and cultural development of  Eastern 
1  The literature on World War I is overwhelming. The most recent titles include: Jörn Leonhard, Die 
Büchse der Pandora. Geschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2014); Jay Winter, ed., The Cambridge 
History of  the First World War, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Herfried Münkler, 
Der Große Krieg. Die Welt 1914–1918 (Berlin: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2013); Alan Kramer, 
The Dynamics of  Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008).
2  On warfare and occupation on the Eastern front, see most recently: Bernhard Bachinger and Wolfram 
Dornik, ed., Jenseits des Schützengrabens. Der Erste Weltkrieg im Osten. Erfahrung – Wahrnehmung – Kontext 
(Innsbruck–Vienna–Bozen: Studien Verlag, 2013); Alfred Eisfeld and Dietmar Neutatz, eds., Besetzt, interniert, 
deportiert. Der Erste Weltkrieg und die deutsche, jüdische, polnische und ukrainische Zivilbevölkerung im östlichen Europa 
(Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2013); Stephen Velychenko, State Building in Revolutionary Ukraine. A Comparative 
Study of  Governments and Bureaucrats, 1917–1922 (Toronto: University of  Toronto Press, 2011); Michael 
Neiberg–David Jordan, The Eastern Front 1914–1920 (London: Amber Books, 2011); Alexander V. Prusin, 
Nationalizing a Borderland. War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914–1920 (Tuscaloosa: 
University of  Alabama Press, 2005); Vejas G. Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front. Culture, National 
Identity and German Occupation in World War I (Cambridge–New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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Europe just before World War I, which he defi nes as those parts of  Europe 
that were governed by the Habsburg, Hohenzollern and Romanov Empires. He 
concludes that the wartime confl ict in this part of  the world signaled the total 
erosion and collapse of  the prevailing order and the subsequent establishment 
of  a new order. Thus, according to him, the global confl ict was a clear break with 
the prewar era, and revolutionary Russia in his view should be understood as a 
case that calls for further comparisons, rather than as a unique event heralding 
the beginning of  a new era. 
Mark Biondich examines the problematic “shatter zones” of  the European 
continent, in other words the areas that were on the borders of  the old European 
empires. Drawing on the example of  the Balkan Wars of  1912 and 1913, he 
shows how these border zones became the fi rst experimental area on which 
some European powers tested new concepts of  ethnic cleansing, forced mass 
migration or, in some cases, even ethnic extermination. Biondich thus interprets 
the Balkan confl icts of  1912–13 as a prelude to the so-called Great War, a prelude 
which foreshadowed the radical transformation of  warfare in the twentieth 
century, targeting large ethnic or religious groups and often blurring the lines 
between combatants and non-combatants. 
 In the last contribution of  the fi rst group of  essays, Jochen Böhler 
summarizes the existing literature on wartime and immediate post-war 
military and paramilitary violence in Poland, Ukraine and revolutionary Russia. 
Essentially, he contends that already before the war the Russian empire added 
state administered collective violence against an entire ethnic group within its 
territory to the repertoire of  wartime practices, and World War I was thus only 
a continuation of  pre-war developments. This argument corresponds with the 
conclusion of  the previous study and prompts historians to consider the extent 
to which one should think of  World War I as a series of  confl icts that began in 
the Balkans in 1912 and ended around 1922 with the treaty of  Lausanne and the 
settling of  another confl icts all over Europe (Ireland, Silesia etc.).  
The second section is devoted to the politics of  long-term military 
occupation as a phenomenon during World War I that became part of  the 
standard set of  modern warfare practices. In his excellent study, Jonathan 
Gumz tracks the development of  international law and the proper defi nition of  
military occupation. Using this as his point of  departure, he examines Austria-
Hungary’s politics of  occupation in Serbia and Germany’s and Russia’s in Poland 
and the Ukraine. He concludes that during the war the occupation regimes of  
Germany and Russia violated international norms regarding occupation with 
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increasing frequency, indeed to such an extent that these norms eventually 
ceased to function as a reference for justifi cation of  the measures they adopted 
with regards to the occupied population. As an occupying power, the Habsburg 
Empire, on the other hand, attempted to adhere to valid international norms 
most of  the time. Stephan Lehnstaedt also arrives at the same conclusion in his 
analysis of  the economic policies of  occupation practiced by Austria–Hungary 
and Germany. While Germany, he argues, used the politics of  coercion and mass 
forced labor as a standard tool of  occupation, Austria–Hungary adhered to old-
fashioned market incentives, which indeed proved much more effective.  The 
section devoted to occupation is concluded by Robert L. Nelson’s study, which 
tackles the German plans to displace the populations in the eastern territories 
massively. Nelson reveals the extent to which these German fantasies were 
infl uenced by the American colonization of  the West and again indicates the 
contrast between German plans for occupation and the much more modest 
Austro-Hungarian plans, which were far more rooted in the old world of  the 
nineteenth century.   
The third part of  the collection covers the radicalization of  the warring 
societies not only on the fronts and in the occupied territories, but also in the 
hinterland. Maciej Górny vividly depicts how scientifi c anthropology aided 
the war effort of  states fi ghting on the eastern front. The Austro-Hungarian 
army’s anthropological fi ndings on the eve of  war served as the basis for 
interpretations that saw the war as a clash of  diametrically different European 
races. According to Górny, World War II thus was merely the culmination of  
the biopolitics that took root in Europe during World War I. Piotr M. Wróbel 
shares this argument in his analysis of  violence against Jews in Central and 
Eastern Europe perpetrated by state as well as non-state actors between 1914 
and 1921. He concludes that the radical increase in violence occurred during 
the immediate post-war era and was the fi rst symptom of  the mass hatred 
that led to massacres twenty years later. Wróbel in particular seems to dwell 
on earlier literature and the idea of  closed, homogenous ethno-religious 
groupings in East Central Europe. His focus on a mere enumeration of  cases 
of  anti-Semitic repressions and violence serves as an informed introduction 
to the literature on the topic. However, his approach makes it rather diffi cult 
to explain some trends that contradict the thesis of  a general anti-Semitic 
setback in the postwar years, such as the offi cial recognition of  Jewish 
nationality in Czechoslovakia or the Jewish emancipation in Romania, and 
also to understand anti-Semitic violence as a distinct form of  aggression, 
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with its own inner logic.3 Robert Gerwarth, in his contribution (which had 
already been published in another forum), also concentrates on the post-war 
years and the experience of  defeat, which greatly infl uenced the militarization 
of  the vanquished central European states, primarily Germany, Austria and 
Hungary.4 For Gerwarth, the specifi c paramilitary subculture of  these states 
was not the result of  general wartime brutalization, but rather a specifi c, 
regional reaction to imagined or real threats that arose at the end of  the 
war and materialized as anti-Bolshevic, anti-Slavic and anti-Semitic waves of  
paramilitary violence.  
The last group of  contributions deals with the marks that the wartime 
experience left in some of  the newly created Central and Eastern European 
states. Julia Eichenberg writes about the various successful or failed social and 
military demobilizations after 1918. In her assessment, the fl uid transition from 
classical war to civil war, which occurred in many parts of  Eastern and Central 
Europe, makes the year 1918 relevant as a turning point. Philipp Ther also argues 
for a new periodization. Using the example of  ethnic cleansing, he points out 
that this concept of  collective violence began to appear in Europe before 1914 
and persisted in many regions until the mid 1920s.5 From his perspective, the 
traditional periodization of  the war should be extended beyond the traditional 
years 1914–18. The section is concluded by Dietrich Beyrau’s study on violence 
in Soviet Russia. According to Beyrau, physical violence represented a permanent 
phenomenon which did not decline after World War I, but in fact became one 
of  the main tools in the maintenance of  the new order. Beyrau elaborates on 
the common historiographic perception that the revolutionary party’s rhetoric 
was couched in war terminology and the party elite often understood itself  as 
a prominent army unit on the frontline of  a worldwide revolution.6 The ever-
3  William Hagen, “The Moral Economy of  Popular Violence: The Pogrom in Lwów November 1918,” 
in Antisemitism and Its Opponents in Modern Poland, ed. Robert Blobaum (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2005), 124–47.
4  Robert Gerwarth, “Fighting the Reed Beast: Counter-Revolutionary Violence in the Defeated States of  
Central Europe,” in War in Peace. Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War, ed. Robert Gerwarth and 
John Horne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 52–71.  
5  See, for example: Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire. The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during 
World War I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Nick Baron–Peter Gatrell, eds., Homelands. 
War, Population and Statehood in Eastern Europe and Russia 1918–1924 (London: Anthem Press, 2004); Onur 
Yildrim, Diplomacy and Displacement. Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange of  Populations, 1922–1934 (New 
York: Routledge, 2006).
6  See, for example: Peter Holquist, “State Violence as Technique: The Logic of  Violence in Soviet 
Totalitarianism,” in Stalinism, ed. David L. Hoffmann (Malden–Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 129–56. 
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present symbolism of  war and violence then spread from party self-identifi cation 
to the whole society and infl uenced early twentieth-century Russian history. The 
book concludes with Jörn Leonhard’s short essay, which situates the topics in a 
wider comparative framework with the western part of  Europe. 
This collection of  essays is a welcome addition to the current debates about 
new ways of  conceptualizing World War I. Some of  the essays review existing 
secondary literature and will serve as an introduction to the vast panorama of  
East Central European history immediately after the war. Other texts are based 
on original research and will enrich our understanding of  state and non-state 
violent practices in the multiethnic, religiously diverse regions. The structure 
of  the book and the historiographical overviews that accompany many of  the 
chapters will make it useful not only for researchers, but also for university 
teachers. Many studies implicitly share the same arguments and persuasively 
show how the war in the East often meant something different than the war 
in the West. Individual arguments for a new periodization and the inclusion 
of  transnational spaces as a basic analytical framework are convincing and will 
certainly enrich the current scholarship on the course and consequences of  
World War I, beyond the traditional narratives about the West, which tend to 
stress a distinct beginning and end of  the war in 1914 and 1918 respectively, 
trench warfare, and allegedly more or less successful post-war reconstruction.
Rudolf  Kučera
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Nép, nemzet, zsidó [Folk, Nation, Jew]. By Gábor Gyáni. 
Pozsony: Kalligram, 2013. 280 pp.
In tandem with the changing thematic priorities of  international historiography, 
the interests of  Hungarian historian Gábor Gyáni have gradually shifted from 
social historical topics to explorations in cultural and intellectual history.1 In 
the 1980s and 1990s, Gyáni established his reputation with the publication of  
seminal social and urban historical monographs.2 He proved instrumental in 
making social history arguably the key fi eld of  innovative historical work in early 
post-communist Hungary,3 for instance as one of  the co-authors of  what is 
probably the most important overview of  the modern social history of  the 
country to have been published after 1989.4 
Since around the turn of  the millennium, however, Gyáni’s main scholarly 
preoccupations seem to have changed. As fi ve of  his collected volumes released 
over the course of  the past decade and a half  demonstrate,5 Gyáni has devoted 
sustained attention to the history of  historiography, questions of  history and 
memory, nationalism and the so-called “Jewish question,” as well as key issues 
in contemporary historical theory, above all, those related to the postmodernist 
challenge. His prolifi c output on these topics has established him as an important 
1  For more details on the unfolding of  this process in Hungary, see Ferenc Laczó and Máté Zombory, 
“Between Transnational Embeddedness and Relative Isolation. The Moderate Rise of  Memory Studies in 
Hungary,” in Acta Poloniae Historica, 106 (2012): 99–125.
2  Gábor Gyáni, Család, háztartás és a városi cselédség (Budapest: Magvető, 1983); Idem, Bérkaszárnya és 
nyomortelep. A budapesti munkáslakás múltja (Budapest: Magvető, 1992); Idem, Hétköznapi Budapest. Nagyvárosi 
élet a századfordulón (Budapest: Városháza, 1995); Idem, Az utca és a szalon. A társadalmi tér használata Budapesten 
1870–1940 (Budapest: Új Mandátum, 1998).
3  On this, see Balázs Trencsényi and Péter Apor, “Fine-tuning the Polyphonic Past: Hungarian Historical 
Writing in the 1990s,” in Narratives Unbound: Historical Studies in post-Communist Eastern Europe, ed. Sorin 
Antohi, Balázs Trencsényi, and Péter Apor (Budapest: CEU Press, 2007). It ought to be noted that 
társadalomtörténet (social history) has a peculiar and peculiarly inclusive meaning in Hungarian. Around 1989, 
many Hungarian social historians understood their scholarship as an alternative to political history writing 
in particular, and their scholarly practices were at times also linked to various forms of  social activism. 
4  Gábor Gyáni and György Kövér, Magyarország társadalomtörténete a reformkortól a második világháborúig 
(Budapest: Osiris, 1998); Gábor Gyáni, György Kövér, and Tibor Valuch, Social History of  Hungary from the 
Reform Era to the End of  the Twentieth Century (Boulder, Col.: Social Science Monographs, 2004).
5  Gábor Gyáni, Emlékezés, emlékezet és a történelem elbeszélése (Budapest: Napvilág, 2000); Idem, 
Történészdiskurzusok (Budapest: L’Harmattan, 2002); Idem, Posztmodern kánon (Budapest: Nemzeti 
Tankönyvkiadó, 2003); Idem, Relatív történelem (Budapest: Typotex, 2007); Idem, Az elveszíthető múlt. A 
tapasztalat mint emlékezet és történelem (Budapest: Nyitott Könyvműhely, 2010).
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mediator of  recent international scholarly trends to the scholarly community in 
Hungary and also as someone who has repeatedly articulated explicit criticisms 
of  professional shortcomings in his native land.6
The newest collection of  his writings, Nép, nemzet, zsidó (Folk, Nation, 
Jew), offers samples of  Gyáni’s recent publications. With a single exception, 
the twelve studies assembled here have already been published in Hungarian-
language journals or edited volumes, with two-thirds of  them originally released 
between 2010 and 2012.7 The introduction promises metahistorical explorations 
and, more concretely, conceptual and discursive analyses (p.9). One of  Gyáni’s 
declared aims, by focusing on the concepts in the volume’s title (which also 
serve as the main subjects of  the volume’s three sections), is to show how widely 
pluralistic and historically unstable the semantics of  key concepts can be. 
Nép, nemzet, zsidó begins with “A nép a maga valójában” [The Folk as It Truly 
Is], a critical examination of  a foundational concept in ethnography. Gyáni is 
interested here, above all, in how the concept of  nép (folk) has been used in the 
social historical parts of  a recent Hungarian-language ethnography handbook 
and, more generally, what the recurrent tendency to identify the nép with the 
peasantry has implied for the discipline.8 Beyond questioning some of  the social 
historical narratives offered by Hungarian ethnographers, the study articulates 
a critique of  the homogenous and essentialized image painted of  the peasantry 
as representative of  the folk in particular. Gyáni concludes that this manner of  
categorization may be crucial to the professional legitimation of  the discipline of  
ethnography, but it is in fact closely intertwined with the history of  nationalism 
and political myth-making (p.27).
In addition to offering such polemical interventions, Gyáni provides 
differentiated and balanced treatments of  various subjects. The nuanced approach 
characterizing much of  the volume is perhaps best illustrated by the studies on 
Ferenc Erdei and István Bibó. Whereas Gyáni, the social historian, has striven 
to falsify Erdei’s infl uential image—colloquially known as the theory of  the dual 
6  See, among others, Gábor Gyáni, “Helyünk a holokauszt történetírásában,” in Kommentár 3, no 3 
(2008): 13–23. See also Idem, “A hazai történetírás nemzetközi beágyazottsága. Egykor és most,” Aetas 25, 
no. 4 (2010): 15–27.
7  However, Gyáni occasionally provides explicit links between his studies here, treating them as 
interlinked chapters (see 27, 41).
8  Attila Paládi-Kovács, ed., Magyar néprajz VIII. Társadalom (Budapest: Akadémiai, 2000).
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structure—of  interwar Hungarian society,9 here he opposes attempts to discredit 
Erdei’s scholarly contributions by noting the—supposedly non-scholarly—
confessional tone of  his writings and their explicit political-ideological aims. In 
response to such critiques, Gyáni argues that Erdei approached and mediated his 
experiences as a Hungarian peasant by employing various viewpoints, including 
conceptual ones foreign to the peasantry, and asserts that the partly analytical, 
partly personal articulation of  his experiences may in fact be qualifi ed as the 
most intriguing and valuable elements of  Erdei’s writings on the peasantry 
(pp.56–57). Thus in the chapter entitled “A paraszti individualizáció Erdei Ferenc 
felfogásában” [Ferenc Erdei’s Conception of  Peasant Individualization], Gyáni 
ultimately maintains that, unlike many of  his népi (populist) contemporaries, Erdei 
largely succeeded at conveying his intimate knowledge of  peasant agency and its 
social contexts without painting an essentialized image of  peasants (pp.58–59).10 
If  the analysis of  Erdei offered a generous defense of  an author towards 
whose image of  society Gyáni is otherwise critically disposed, his essay on István 
Bibó’s refl ections on Jewish identities and assimilation in Hungary, entitled “Az 
asszimilációkritika Bibó István gondolkodásában” [The Critique of  Assimilation 
in the Thought of  István Bibó], does exactly the reverse. Here Gyáni explores 
the controversial aspects of  a contribution to Hungarian historiography that he 
explicitly recognizes as seminally, even uniquely important. More particularly, 
the article aims to show that the manner in which Bibó depicted Hungarian 
Jewry and the history of  assimilation in his 1948 essay “The Jewish Question 
in Hungary after 1944” in several respects reproduced his views from the late 
1930s, the years of  anti-Semitic legal discrimination, which Bibó, like Erdei, 
was unprepared to condemn. Examining Bibó’s personal and intellectual milieu 
in some detail, Gyáni asserts that his conception was markedly infl uenced by 
László Németh’s controversial views expressed in Kisebbségben (In the Minority) 
in particular (p.254).11 
Gyáni concludes that in the late 1940s Bibó still believed that Hungarians 
and Jews, two supposedly utterly separate “communities of  fate” (to attempt to 
9  On Erdei’s theory as interpreted by Gyáni in English, see Gábor Gyáni, “Image and Reality of  a 
Splitting Country: The Case of  Hungary,” in Mastery and Lost Illusions. Space and Time in the Modernization 
of  Eastern and Central Europe, ed. Włodzimierz Borodziej, Stanislav Holubec, and Joachim von Puttkamer 
(Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2014).
10  On a rather similar assessment of  Ferenc Erdei, see István Papp, A magyar népi mozgalom története, 
1920–1990 (Budapest: Jaffa, 2012).
11  For Gyáni’s elaborate argument to the same effect, see his “Bibó István kiegyezés-kritikája” [István 
Bibó’s Critique of  the Compromise] in the volume, esp. 126–30.
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render in English the term sorsközösség), displayed similarly strong opposition to 
their social integration, and this made Jewish assimilation in Hungary an entirely 
hopeless undertaking. Such an assessment indeed seems to resemble closely that 
of  László Németh, but—as Gyáni is quick to add—Bibó partly reinterpreted 
Németh in order to avoid putting the chief  part of  the blame on the Jews. Gyáni 
reasons that Bibó thereby articulated a narrative of  Hungarian social development 
that largely coincided with that of  Ferenc Erdei on the dual structure of  society. 
In Gyáni’s assessment, Bibó’s “The Jewish Question in Hungary after 1944” 
thus amounted to a rather curious amalgam that courageously explored the 
causes of  the moral bankruptcy of  non-Jewish Hungarian society, but which at 
the very same time aimed to discuss Jewish and non-Jewish shortcomings and 
failures in a symmetrical fashion, even after the annihilation of  the majority of  
Hungary’s Jews.
The chapter entitled “Identitás versus imázs: asszimiláció és diszkrimináció 
a magyar zsidóság életében” (“Identity versus Image: Assimilation and 
Discrimination in the Life of  Hungarian Jewry”) presents Gyáni’s broader 
and more theoretical refl ections on closely related questions. This important 
contribution argues that the two most powerful Hungarian discourses—the 
assimilationist one and the one focused on the history of  anti-Semitism—both 
fail to offer an adequate representation of  the actual historical experiences of  
assimilated Jews (pp.217–18). Gyáni maintains that both of  these discourses are 
based on an untenable premise according to which images create social realities, 
and they both fail to study the complex interaction between such dominant 
images and personal identities over time (p.219). Gyáni argues that processes 
of  social integration deepened over time and produced what he calls a “co-
constituted nation.” However, the gap between the image of  Hungarian Jews 
and their identity only widened (p.225). By pointing to such a dual process, the 
study offers an explanation of  how “the relative alterity” of  the Jews kept on 
being reproduced in modern Hungary, in spite of  the fact that—according to 
Gyáni—Jews no longer constituted a separate ethnic group. 
Similarly to these more theoretical refl ections, Gyáni’s review of  Katalin 
Fenyves’ recent monograph on generational patterns and inter-generational 
change of  intellectuals born Jewish in Hungary leads him to highlight the 
hybridization of  identity. 12 This elaborate review also provides him with an 
opportunity to critique a historiographical perspective, articulated notably by 
12  Katalin Fenyves, Képzelt asszimiláció? Négy zsidó értelmiségi nemzedék önképe (Budapest: Corvina, 2010).
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the late Péter Hanák, which affi rmed the success of  Jewish acculturation by 
presenting the major roles played by Jewish intellectuals in modern Hungary.
According to Gyáni’s assessment, the binary of  Hungarian versus Jewish proves 
inadequate when attempting to characterize intellectuals who were neither 
religiously Jewish nor Magyars in the way in which ethnic nationalists understood 
the notion (p.251).
The section on nation begins with a somewhat sketchy essay on 
“Nemzetelméletek és a történetírás” (Theories of  the Nation and History 
Writing). Reproduced from a volume originally published by the Hungarian 
National Gallery, the chapter contains Gyáni’s discussion of  classics of  
nationalism studies. It covers several key debates, such as the one on the modernity 
of  nations and the usefulness and limits of  distinguishing between political (or 
civic) and cultural (or ethnic) nationalisms. However, it adds little in the way 
of  original insights. Gyáni’s introduction to the fi eld of  nationalism studies 
nonetheless fi nishes on a rather polemical note with the author elaborating on 
what he sees as strong parallels between mythical and historical ways of  thinking. 
Pointing to what he perceives as the “fatal” connection between history writing 
and nationalism in particular, Gyáni ultimately suggests that more profound 
refl ections on collective memories combined with more thorough intertextual 
and interdisciplinary examinations may help us overcome the dangers of  
mythicization. 
The chapter entitled “A nacionalizmus és az Európa-kép változásai 
Magyarországon a 19–20. században” (Nationalism and the Changing Image 
of  Europe in Hungary of  the 19th and 20th Centuries), a key contribution on 
the theme of  the nation, draws an insightful sketch of  major developments in 
the relationship between the two subjects referenced in its title to show that the 
local contest over Europe tended to acquire considerable additional importance 
in moments of  crisis (p.131). Gyáni explains that in the Hungary of  the early 
decades of  nineteenth-century, Europe still served as a model to be emulated, 
whereas subsequently Europeanness was incorporated into the offi cial state 
ideology and was increasingly connected to exclusivist forms of  Hungarian 
nationalism. As Gyáni emphasizes, the strength of  anti-European ideas was 
greatly enhanced by the Trianon Peace Treaty and its local interpretations. 
He also discusses how leading communist-era historians maintained that the 
country diverged from Western European patterns in order to highlight what 
was supposedly a deep historical tradition of  Eastern Europeanness. As Gyáni 
notes, confederative and Pan-European proposals may have played a notable role 
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in public discussions and may even have provided certain groups of  intellectuals 
with a sense of  mission, but they remained rather marginal in the overall scheme 
of  things (p.145). 
The study on the changing image of  Europe in Hungary reveals with special 
force what I see as a shortcoming of  this otherwise excellent volume: the relative 
marginality of  the ambition to situate Hungary in its broader regional and 
continental contexts.13 The volume undoubtedly draws on a wide international 
variety of  methodological examples, and the debates on the peculiar features 
of  Hungarian modernization and the special social and cultural roles of  
Jewish Hungarians in it also have strong parallels in numerous other countries, 
including—probably most famously—Germany. However, the central ambition 
of  Gábor Gyáni seems to be to reshape local debates by bringing in new 
international perspectives: his agenda concerns the rethinking—and certainly not 
the “unthinking”—of  the national canon. The extent to which such attempts to 
convert local idioms of  research and debate into the language of  contemporary 
international academia can succeed remains to be seen, as does the extent to 
which their eminent national stakes will be recognized amidst the contemporary 
vogue for transnational and global history. 
In sum, Gábor Gyáni’s essays in Nép, nemzet, zsidó mediate a rich variety of  
scholarly literature and occasionally draw on in-depth philological investigations 
to discuss a host of  signifi cant themes in social and cultural history, particularly 
in the study of  the nation and nationalism and the related discourses concerning 
Jewish themes. Although Gyáni’s collection does not offer a systematic analysis 
of  the connection between the latter two subjects and refrains from theorizing 
the place and role of  “Jewish questions” in Hungarian discussions of  modern 
social development and cultural peculiarities, in addition to offering nuanced 
polemics with previous interpretations, the volume also makes numerous valuable 
suggestions as to how this immensely complicated and no less controversial 
subject could be approached in the future.
Ferenc Laczó
13  On the intellectual discourses of  Europe in a great number of  national contexts, though without 
the case of  Hungary, see Justine Lacroix and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, eds., European Stories. Intellectual Debates on 
Europe in National Contexts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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Propaganda State in Crisis: Soviet Ideology, Indoctrination, and Terror 
under Stalin, 1927–1941. By David Brandenberger. New Haven–
London: Yale University Press, 2011. 357 pp.
Paradoxically enough, the study of  Soviet propaganda almost fell victim to 
historiographical debates during the Cold War. This partly had to do with 
the importance the totalitarian paradigm ascribed to political indoctrination 
and mobilizational campaigns in the sustenance of  communist rule. Marxist 
ideology was considered the source of  terror, and the practice of  disseminating 
its tenets—i.e. propaganda—was generally interpreted as an attempt to cover up 
the “true” nature of  the Soviet regime and create a society of  subservient citizens 
and atomized individuals. The revisionist response to the claims of  scholars 
advocating the idea of  an all-powerful state left the essentialist image of  Soviet 
propaganda largely intact. The focus of  revisionist historians was on society and 
social responses to Stalinist policies, and not so much on the state’s techniques 
of  mass mobilization. In other words, the totalitarian emphasis on the role of  
propaganda in ensuring loyalty to the state triggered the marginalization of  the 
topic of  mass persuasion in revisionist historiography.
David Brandenberger’s book, Propaganda State in Crisis, is the fi rst attempt 
since the Cold War to bring the subject of  Stalinist propaganda back into 
the limelight. While aspects of  political indoctrination—political discourse, 
newspapers, visual propaganda, and so on—have been addressed by historians 
before, Brandenberger is the fi rst scholar to offer a comprehensive overview of  
mass persuasion in the Stalinist 1930s. To an extent, the book is a sequel to Peter 
Kenez’s classical analysis of  the emergence of  what the Hungarian–American 
historian famously called “the propaganda state” during the fi rst decade of  
Bolshevik rule in Soviet Russia.1 Although published in 1985, Kenez’s book is 
still remarkably accurate, and many of  its claims remain valid despite the fact 
that the author had no access to archival sources at the time. Brandenberger 
continues the story from where Kenez left off: Propaganda State in Crisis starts 
in the late 1920s and provides a vivid description of  Stalinist propaganda up 
until the outbreak of  World War II. Brandenberger’s narrative is supported by a 
1  Peter Kenez, The Birth of  the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of  Mass Mobilization, 1917–1929 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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plethora of  diverse primary material, ranging from archival sources to products 
of  Soviet mass culture. 
The originality of  the book, however, does not lie merely in the fact that 
it is based on new archival fi ndings. The volume, in general, offers a fresh 
perspective on the functioning and the effi cacy of  propaganda in totalitarian 
regimes. Brandenberger understands propaganda as a complex process, and he 
analyses political indoctrination at three different levels. First, he looks at how 
propaganda was constructed by the ideological establishment and who the key 
individuals were behind the formation of  strategies of  mass persuasion. Second, 
he analyses the process of  disseminating propaganda messages to the wider 
population by focusing on the activity of  the regime’s activists, mostly in the 
context of  party schools and study circles. Finally, he addresses the problem 
of  the popular reception of  the party’s indoctrination efforts and offers a 
discussion of  the overall impact of  Stalinist propaganda on Soviet society. It is 
this multifocal, yet fi nely balanced, analysis of  construction, dissemination and 
reception that makes the volume an original scholarly endeavor. 
The term ‘propaganda state’ evokes images of  an omnipotent polity—with 
a vast and smoothly run propaganda machine—the sole purpose of  which is to 
indoctrinate the population along ideological lines. The story Brandenberger tells 
us, however, is not the story of  strength and success, but one of  weakness and 
failure. The Stalinist Soviet Union, he argues, ultimately failed to construct and 
inculcate a conception of  identity that was coherent and distinctively “Soviet” at 
the same time. The book demonstrates that communist propaganda in the 1930s 
was far from being a carefully planned and effi ciently managed enterprise. It was, 
in fact, characterized by spontaneity, improvisation, and spectacular ineffi ciency. 
Brandenberger offers a fascinating account of  the trajectory of  a deepening 
crisis in the attempts of  the state to mobilize the masses in the name of  ideology 
and the often hasty and ad hoc responses that the party-state conjured up to 
overcome the problems it faced on the ideological front. The lack of  a centrally 
devised master plan and the scarcity of  competent cadres to implement the 
party’s improvised—and sometimes contradictory—policies exacerbated the 
crisis and paralyzed the regime’s propaganda machine by the end of  the decade. 
Therefore, if  viewed through the prism of  political indoctrination, the Soviet 
Union in the 1930s does not appear to have been all-powerful at all; rather it 
resembled a failing state. 
The author’s emphasis on system malfunction refl ects a recent trend in 
historical studies of  Soviet-type regimes. There is a growing interest in the 
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role of  agency in the functioning of  such states and the ways in which the 
representatives of  the system shaped the outcomes and popular reception of  
the party’s policies. Historians addressing this particular aspect of  Soviet rule 
focus not so much on how certain decisions are made, but on how they are 
implemented and how they are perceived by the population. The narratives that 
emerged as a result further erode the idea of  a monolithic state exercising total 
control over identity formation.2 Incompetence, it seems, was a systemic feature 
of  communism. It contributed to the overall failure of  the Bolsheviks to nurture 
enthusiasm for their utopian goals and aspirations, resulting in widespread 
popular indifference to the propaganda messages of  the party.3 For example, in 
his recent book on Stalinist Hungary György Gyarmati argues that the general 
incompetence of  the party’s cadres almost incapacitated the state in the early 
1950s.4 While Brandenberger’s argument also revolves around the theme of  a 
chaotically managed state on the verge of  paralysis, it offers one of  the most 
detailed analyses of  the topic so far.   
The book is not merely a story of  incompetence and failure, however. Some 
of  the chapters in the volume, in fact, present a case of  unexpected success: 
the emergence of  a populist version of  communist propaganda, dominated 
by the tropes of  heroism and patriotism. While this campaign seems to have 
struck a chord with society, it did not actually originate in the party headquarters. 
Although it enjoyed the support of  the leadership, the new line did not come 
from prominent party functionaries and ideologues; it came from the “sidelines,” 
and was most actively advocated and shaped by the intelligentsia, and key fi gures 
of  the Soviet cultural propaganda machine (Maksim Gorky, for example). 
2  While the revisionist school has criticized the notion of  the monolithic (totalitarian) state extensively, 
especially in works that revolve around the concept of  “resistance,” the effi ciency of  party propaganda has 
not been in the limelight of  historical research. “Classic” works on popular resistance include, for example, 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village After Collectivization (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), and Lynne Viola, Contending with Stalinism: Soviet Power and Popular Resistance in the 1930s (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2002). Historical discussions that address—among other things—the effi ciency 
of  party cadres in implementing the regime’s symbolic policies include Karen Petrone, Life Has Become 
More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of  Stalin (Bloomington–Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2000) and David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of  Modern Russian 
National Identity, 1931–1956 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
3  For an analysis of  the relationship between the incompetence of  party agitators and popular 
indifference see Balázs Apor, “‘Ignorance is bliss’: Cult-Reception and Popular Indifference in Communist 
Hungary (1947–1956),” in Der Führer im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Benno Ennker and Heidi Hein-
Kirchner (Marburg: Herder Institut, 2010), 90–107.
4  György Gyarmati, A Rákosi-korszak. Rendszerváltó fordulatok évtizede Magyarországon, 1945–1956 
(Budapest: ÁBTL–Rubicon, 2011), 215–19.
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Thus, somewhat unexpectedly, one the most successful projects of  Stalinist 
propaganda did not come from the party’s headquarters, but from the margins 
of  the institutional hierarchy. Brandenberger shows that the popularity of  the 
new line was more the unintended consequence of  a spontaneous and populist 
response to a mobilization crisis than it was the result of  the implementation 
of  a carefully crafted master plan. Despite this remarkable success, however, 
the Stalinist leadership decided to—quite literally—terminate the culture of  
heroes in the late 1930s. The Great Terror and the last few years of  the 1930s 
bore witness to the symbolic and the physical elimination of  “heroes” in Soviet 
political culture and the return in the propaganda of  the abstract and inaccessible 
concepts of  dialectical materialism. The book, thus, tells us a story of  sudden, 
unpredictable, and even contradictory zig-zags in the offi cial line, which were 
largely responsible for the failure of  the state to mobilize its citizens to labor for 
the realization of  a communist utopia in the mid to late 1930s. 
The book consists of  eleven chapters, but it could be divided chronologically, 
as well as thematically, into four parts. The fi rst three chapters discuss the 
mobilizational crisis that crippled the Soviet state in the late 1920s and early 
1930s and analyze some of  the strategies the Bolsheviks implemented to tackle 
the problems of  propaganda. Brandenberger shows how the failure of  the 
party to popularize the key concepts of  its ideology in the 1920s triggered the 
intensifi cation of  indoctrination efforts during the fi rst fi ve-year plan and how 
it contributed to the renewal of  attempts to create a credible historical narrative. 
Although the leadership was very much aware of  the crisis, the policies they 
implemented lacked coordination and were ad hoc in nature. Therefore, they 
generally remained unable to mobilize Soviet citizens for the cause. Historians 
had struggled to produce an accessible text on party history that could be used 
for propaganda purposes, and the quest for the offi cial biography of  Stalin was 
also aborted, after a sequence of  events that the author merely describes as “a 
comedy of  errors.”
Where party historians and leading ideologues failed, less infl uential members 
of  the creative intelligentsia (writers, journalists, fi lm directors, etc.) succeeded. 
In an attempt to offer a more accessible master narrative to Soviet citizens, 
newspapers and the Soviet cultural propaganda machine (literature, cinema, etc.) 
took the lead in promoting new themes—heroism and patriotism—that instantly 
gained popularity in Soviet society. In chapters 4, 5, and 6, Brandenberger offers 
a detailed discussion of  the emergence of  Soviet patriotism and the Stalinist 
culture of  heroes in the 1930s, highlighting the role of  key members of  the 
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intelligentsia (such as Gorky) in the process and paying equal attention to the 
construction of  both “real” (members of  the Cheliushkin expedition, military 
commanders, shock workers and Stakhanovites) and fi ctional (Chapaev or Pavel 
Korchagin) heroes. The author argues that the shift from the promotion of  
abstract ideological principles towards more concrete, and even populist, themes 
fell on fertile ground and was received positively by the population. Whereas the 
tenets of  dialectical materialism had failed to provoke enthusiastic responses in 
Soviet society before, the tropes of  patriotism and heroism were successful in 
advancing Soviet mass mobilization. These themes contributed to the formation 
of  an accessible historical narrative that was populated by lively heroic fi gures 
struggling for the construction of  a new world or fi ghting for the motherland.
While the early 1930s spawned a wide variety of  heroes, the end of  the 
decade witnessed their brutal decimation. The purging of  the party elite during 
the years of  the Great Terror, in general, had a dramatic effect on communist 
propaganda. Chapters 7, 8, and 9 analyze the damaging impact of  the violent 
events on indoctrination and mass mobilization. The fall of  prominent 
individuals, including party historians Vil’gel’m G. Knorin and Nikolay N. Popov, 
put an end to the proliferation of  heroes and triggered a drastic readjustment of  
propaganda material in the midst of  a chaotic and traumatic upheaval. Heroes 
were turned into criminals overnight, textbooks, novels and fi lm scripts were 
rewritten, and books were removed from shops and libraries as their authors 
disappeared in NKVD prisons or Gulag camps. While the impact of  the terror 
on Soviet society has been assessed and analyzed by numerous historians before, 
Brandenberger claims that the extent of  the purges in the ideological sphere 
was far greater than is normally acknowledged. The elimination of  the most 
successful component of  communist propaganda—or “the murder of  the 
usable past” to use the author’s phrase—brought communist mobilization to a 
standstill and provoked an atmosphere of  confusion, anxiety, and doubt.  
As the last chapters of  the book demonstrate, Soviet propaganda was 
unable to recover from the desolation caused by the terror before the onset of  
the war in 1941. The mobilization crisis continued despite the party’s efforts to 
reinvigorate the campaign for ideological indoctrination. Due to Stalin’s personal 
intervention, a new textbook on party history was published—the (in)famous 
Short Course—which enjoyed the support of  the leadership and quickly became the 
primary material used in party education. The crystallization of  a new historical 
narrative, after more than a decade of  failed attempts, was complemented by 
the publication of  an offi cial biography of  Stalin in 1939. Despite the successful 
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realization of  these long overdue projects, the new line generally failed to revive 
popular enthusiasm for the cause. As Brandenberger shows, the new Bolshevik 
master narrative remained excessively complex, inaccessible and impersonal. 
Apart from the theme of  patriotism, there was very little in the party propaganda 
that inspired Soviet citizens. The new heroes were stock fi gures that lacked 
any depth, and the Short Course, with its abstract, theoretical narrative, caused 
more frustration than intellectual excitement for the students (and teachers) 
in communist study circles. The elevation of  complex, depersonalized texts to 
the center of  propaganda, argues Brandenberger, led to the “ossifi cation” of  
the offi cial line “into a gray amalgam of  stultifying theory, cultish hagiography, 
and dogmatic catechism” (p.215). Whereas the fabrication of  the Soviet “usable 
past” had failed to produce the results expected by the regime, the war effort 
certainly provoked a remarkable degree of  enthusiasm for the state.5 However, 
it was the patriotic (“national Bolshevik”) aspects of  communist propaganda 
that struck a chord with the population, whereas the uniquely utopian claims of  
“Soviet” ideology were generally ignored. Although Bolshevik mass mobilization 
regained some of  its momentum after 1945 through the integration of  the Great 
Patriotic War into Stalinist mythology, abstract dogmatism—symbolized by the 
Short Course—continued to characterize Soviet propaganda until the collapse of  
the state in 1991.
Although the volume offers a detailed analysis of  the functioning of  the 
propaganda machine in the Stalinist Soviet Union, the heavy focus of  the 
narrative on individual historians and the production of  certain texts may seem 
somewhat daunting for the non-specialist. In a similar way, the lengthy descriptive 
paragraphs recounting the plots of  Soviet feature fi lms are somewhat excessive. 
The book would have benefi tted from an attempt to balance the dominance of  
textual and cinematic propaganda with refl ections on other visual means of  mass 
persuasion—posters, paintings, etc.—even if  there is already a substantial body of  
scholarly work on the visual aspects of  Soviet indoctrination campaigns. A more 
elaborate engagement with historiographical and theoretical debates on the key 
concepts discussed in the book (propaganda, agency, reception, state, etc.) would 
also have contributed to the emergence of  a more sophisticated narrative. While 
the author’s analysis of  the malfunctioning state is illuminating, the story needs 
5  The turn towards nationalist themes in Communist propaganda has been analysed by the same author 
in his previous monograph. See Brandenberger, National Bolshevism. See also Amir Weiner, Making Sense of  
the War: The Second World War and the Fate of  the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001).
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to be interpreted in the broader context of  (Russian) traditions of  dysfunctional 
state-building. Chaotically managed states can exist for long periods of  time and 
even demonstrate a certain degree of  stability, despite ineffi cient bureaucracies 
and failed propaganda campaigns. To what extent was the chaotic administration 
of  the Stalinist state unique in Russian history? Are there any historical parallels 
that would help us better understand the nature of  failing states? However, these 
objections and unanswered questions notwithstanding, David Brandenberger’s 
book, Propaganda State in Crisis will no doubt remain one of  the seminal volumes 
on Soviet propaganda in the years to come.
Balázs Apor
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A magyar népi mozgalom története: 1920–1990 
[History of  the Hungarian Populist Movement: 1920–1990]. 
By István Papp. Budapest: Jaffa, 2012. 282 pp.*
The so-called “populist movement” (“népi mozgalom”) was one of  the most 
distinctive and important political, social and cultural movements in Hungary 
in the twentieth century. While one might be hard pressed to fi nd something 
analogous in the other countries of  Europe at the time, several of  the strains 
of  the movement nonetheless invite comparisons with tendencies involving 
groups in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, and even the United States. The 
movement in Hungary, which was brought into being in the 1930s primarily 
by writers and people passionately interested in social issues, sought to bring 
an end to the economic and cultural stagnation of  village societies, as well as 
their political and social exclusion. The programs devised by the group were 
intended to help the peasantry (much of  which lived in the eastern part of  the 
country in poverty or even squalor) acquire land, secure a reliable livelihood, 
and have equal access to education and schooling. The leaders of  the movement 
also saw economic dependence—which was perpetuated primarily by owners 
of  large estates and large industrialists—as something that could be alleviated 
and indeed eliminated, and this in turn, it was hoped, would have helped further 
the assertion of  the rights of  the peasantry. The Hungarian populist movement, 
which was fundamentally cultural in its origins, in a wider sense strove to address 
the problems surrounding the modernization of  essentially agrarian societies on 
the periphery of  the capitalist global economy, societies that either had fallen 
behind in or never really undergone the process of  industrialization.
Although many writers who were part of  the populist movement worked 
together in various ways with the communist authorities, because of  their 
ambivalent attitudes towards the programs of  the communist government and 
communist politicians and also the roles they played in the 1956 Revolution, until 
the 1980s the ideas of  the movement were rarely part of  public discussion in 
Hungary. Even following the change of  regimes in 1989, the intellectual milieu 
that emerged did not really allow for a politically unbiased critical study of  the 
*   An earlier version of  this paper was published in Múltunk 58, no. 1 (2013): 283–90. This research was 
supported by the European Union and the State of  Hungary, co-fi nanced by the European Social Fund, 
within the framework of  TÁMOP-4.2.4.A/ 2-11/1-2012-0001 “National Excellence Program.”
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movement as part of  intellectual and cultural history. In recent years, however, 
the apparent lack of  interest in the populist movement—a lack of  interest which 
has been characteristic of  the community of  historians in Hungary since the 
publication of  the recently deceased Gyula Borbándi’s seminal work almost 
three decades ago—seems to be giving way. In 2012, two relevant volumes were 
published on the subject in Hungarian: a monograph by Bulcsu Bognár entitled 
A népies irányzat a két háború között [The Populist Tendency in the Interwar 
Period]1 and the book by István Papp on which I am writing here. As he himself  
notes, Papp is writing for the wider reading public, but he is also attempting to 
“rethink and reinterpret the history of  the populist movement for the discipline 
[of  history] as well” (p.11). Has he in fact achieved this goal?
The quite lovely pop-art cover of  the hardback book aptly symbolizes the 
variegated nature of  the populist movement. The book is divided into eight 
chapters on the writers of  the movement, beginning with the Treaty of  Trianon 
in 1920 and concluding with the fi rst free elections, which were held in 1990. 
Although the use of  1920 as a starting point instead of  1928 (the year which 
has come to be accepted as the starting point of  the movement in the secondary 
literature, in part because it bore witness to the publication of  two important 
essays by László Németh) is justifi ed more on political grounds than it is on any 
considerations concerning the movement itself, it nonetheless provides a good 
bookend, as it were, for the discussion. The title of  the fi rst chapter, however, “A 
magyar populisták” (“The Hungarian Populists”), is a bit harder to explain, since 
the chapter deals primarily with historical antecedents and similar trends and 
movements in the United States, Argentina, Finland, and Russia. More important 
than the title is the fact that in the pre-history of  the movement, the elements that 
were common in analogous trends across the globe were less emphatic, though 
clearly regulated markets or plans for the creation of  cooperatives were hardly 
Hungarian inventions. Indeed populisms abroad and the populist movement in 
Hungary shared numerous shortcomings. Yet however praiseworthy an attempt 
to situate the Hungarian phenomenon in an international context may be, 
grouping the movement among (agrarian) populisms (p.34) is debatable at best. 
The international secondary literature on populism, at least, does not deal with 
the Hungarian movement at all.2
1  Bognár Bulcsu, A népies irányzat a két háború között. Erdei Ferenc és a harmadik út képviselői [The Populist 
Tendency in the Interwar Period] (Budapest, Loisir, 2012).
2  See, for instance, Ionescu, Ghiţă, Gellner, and Ernest, eds.,  Populism. Its Meaning and National Characteristics 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969); Margaret Canovan,  Populism (London: n.p., 1981), Pierre-André 
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Papp often adopts a retrospective glance, and he is prudent to do so. I.E. the 
chronology of  the account is a bit loose, and this makes it more easily readable 
than it might otherwise have been, but this does not compromise the scholarly 
nature of  the account. The third chapter, “Az alvó népek zörgetése” [“The 
Rattling of  the Sleeping Peoples”], contains signifi cant (if  not always accurate) 
data. The following claim, for instance, is hardly persuasive, at least not in light 
of  recent research: “10 cadastral acres were by no means adequate to ensure a 
livelihood for a family with three children” (p.64).3 While Papp makes mention 
several times of  the fl awed value judgments of  the “older” secondary literature, 
he accepts without qualifi cation the generalization so often made before 1989, 
according to which, “the elite of  the Horthy era (…) showed little interest in 
the effi cient husbandry of  manorial estates either.”4 However, Papp makes 
persuasive use of  the terminology of  political science, clearly demonstrating the 
capacity of  the movement to establish broad coalitions, which also meant the 
desire and ability to create dialogue with the prevailing authorities. 
The fourth chapter, “Néma forradalmárok” [“Mute Revolutionaries”], in 
which Papp presents the sociographical wave of  the mid-1930s, sheds the biases 
and habits of  earlier accounts and offers a genuinely balanced examination of  the 
meeting points of  the institutions and fi gures of  power and the populist writers. 
Papp does not hide behind tired clichés. Rather he dares to utter his views on 
sensitive questions that for a long time have been glossed over, for instance the 
work of  writer József  Darvas (p.109), who joined the communists in the 1950s, 
or (later) the reputation of  László Németh (p.132), who has been accused of  
anti-Semitism. It is characteristic that while Papp considers Imre Kovács, who 
was forced to emigrate by the communists after the war, the prototype of  the 
Taguieff,  “Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem,” Telos 27, 
no. 2 (1995): 9–43; Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of  Democracy,” 
Political Studies 47 (1999): 2–16; Yves Meny and Yves Surel, eds., Democracies and Populist Challenge,  (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Francisco Panizza, Populism and the Mirror of  Democracy, (N.P.: Verso, 2005); 
Koen Ants and Stefan Rummens, “Populism versus Democracy,” Political Studies 55, no. 2 (2007): 405–24. 
Christa Deiwiks,  “Populism,” Living Reviews in Democracy 1, no. 1 (2009): 1–9. David Van Reybrouck, A 
populizmus védelmében [In Defense of  Populism] (Budapest: Gondolat, 2010); Ernesto Laclau, A populista ész 
[The Populist Mind] (Budapest: Noran Libro, 2011); Marco d’Eramo, “Populism and the New Oligarchy,” 
New Left Review 53, no. 4 (2013): 5–28. 
3  See Gábor Gyáni and György Kövér, Magyarország társadalomtörténete a reformkortól a második világháborúig 
[The Social History of  Hungary from the Reform Era to World War II] (Budapest: Osiris, 2006), 307.
4  See Levente Püski, Főúri identitás a két világháború közötti Magyarországon: Esterházy Pál herceg = Generációk 
a történelemben [Aristocratic Identity in the Interwar Period in Hungary: Prince Pál Esterházy = Generations 
in History], ed. Gábor Gyáni and Magdolna Láczay (Nyíregyháza: NYF GTTK–HIK TTE, 2008), 167–73.
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professional populist politician, he does not ignore the “nadir of  his career,” 
when Kovács campaigned aggressively and with vulgar language in support of  
the expulsion from Hungary of  the German-speaking members of  its citizenry 
(pp.195–96). He also makes the important observation that because of  the 
politicized vetting and the trials that were held by so-called people’s courts, 
“among the populists there was never any genuine confrontation with the events 
of  the war years or the Holocaust” (p.182).
In the chapter entitled Az útkeresés stációi (“The Stations of  the Search for a 
Path”), Papp offers a detailed discussion of  one of  this fundamental contentions, 
according to which, in contrast with the earlier concept of  decline, during World 
War II populism began to burgeon with a “vigorous” (p.126), “heretofore 
unseen” (p.211) fervor, which brought with it the creation of  institutions and 
periodicals, government measures, and polarization. Papp keeps his distance 
from the mythos of  the various ideological systems, but he nonetheless makes 
bold diagnoses, not trying to hide the political orientations of  the populists. 
The sixth chapter provides an exemplary examination of  the history of  
the populist movement after 1945, a history which is rife with contradictions. 
Papp examines the process whereby, with the turn towards a more “popular” 
form of  rule (i.e. the ascension to power of  a regime that at least in principle 
represented the people but which in fact was a precursor to the Stalinization 
of  the country), the term “nép” (“people” or “folk”) both was given a kind of  
absolute meaning and at the same time simply lost its value and connotations 
as it was appropriated by the new ruling ideology. This irreparably divided the 
“populist” camp. Although of  the prominent populists who were regarded as 
right-wing (József  Erdélyi, Géza Féja, János Kodolányi, István Sinka), only 
Erdélyi was brought before the aforementioned people’s courts, the communists 
forcefully marginalized the group, while at the same time they put populists who 
were willing to cooperate with them on a pedestal (Ferenc Erdei, Péter Veres, 
József  Darvas). The seventh chapter contains a detailed account of  the fate of  
the populists under the socialist regime, though according to Papp “we cannot 
really speak of  a movement” (p.212) under the dictatorship of  Mátyás Rákosi. 
One gets a sense from the book of  how a certain group mentality survived 
among the populists, even if, given the circumstances, life led them down very 
different paths. This mentality found manifestation in the help they provided for 
those who were labeled right-wing. At the end of  the chapter, Papp offers an 
interpretation of  1956 as a historical moment at which a third road would have 
been possible. He then examines the “insights” and “dealings” that followed 
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the suppression of  the uprising. Essentially, this brings his discussion of  the 
history of  the populist writers to a close. In his epilogue, Papp characterizes 
the populist-nationalist movement merely as the “bearer of  the populist 
tradition” (p.245). He faults the successors to the Kádár era fi rst and foremost 
for their lack of  “positive vision” (p.270), since the reformers who gathered 
around Imre Pozsgay and later won widespread support at Lakitelek (a village 
to the southeast of  Budapest, Lakitelek was the site of  several meetings of  the 
emerging opposition parties in the years leading up to the change of  regimes in 
Hungary) were hardly driven by the fervent opposition to the system that had 
been characteristic of  the 1930s. 
In the end, Papp essentially achieves the two goals he sets for himself  in his 
prologue. His book, which has been written in a refreshingly effortless style (the 
complexity of  the topic notwithstanding), bears ample testimony to the breadth 
of  his reading and research. He offers balanced assessments, and he does not 
allow his respect for the populists (which he admits from the outset) to lead him 
astray. However, since he also intended the book to serve as a contribution to 
the smaller community of  scholars, one cannot pass over without comment the 
frustratingly short and unstructured bibliography, not to mention the insuffi cient 
and sometimes haphazardly-looking footnotes, which are more striking than the 
occasional typos. It would have been worthwhile to have included an index of  
names similar to the one found in the work of  Borbándi. At the same time, 
it is worth emphasizing that Papp repeatedly uses the Historical Archives of  
the State Security Services. Thus the reports of  the organs of  state security 
provide a great deal of  interesting data on the relationship between the populists 
and the government after 1945. Furthermore, one cannot stress enough the 
relevance and importance of  Papp’s value judgements, which are both moderate 
and fi rm. Perhaps in the long-term, such assessments will further the widespread 
acceptance of  a healthier view of  the past less encumbered by bias. 
Ákos Bartha 
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Magyar idők a Felvidéken 1938–1945. Az első bécsi döntés és 
következményei [Hungarian Times in the Upper Lands, 1938–1945. 
The First Vienna Award and Its Consequences]. By Attila Simon. 
Budapest: Jaffa Kiadó, 2014. 247 pp.
On November 2, 1938, as a consequence of  German and Italian arbitration, a 
strip of  territory in what today is the southern part of  Slovakia was awarded to 
Hungary. The majority of  the population of  this territory was Hungarian by 
mother tongue at the time, and indeed many communities of  the region have 
signifi cant Hungarian communities to this day. For Slovak national consciousness, 
this decision represented a crime committed against the Slovak nation, which 
had fallen victim to a dictate enforced by foreign powers. According to public 
opinion in Hungary, in contrast, the decision represented a just revision of  one 
of  the provisions of  the Treaty of  Trianon, which had been concluded in the 
wake of  World War I. With his new monograph on the subject, Attila Simon 
attempts to add a third perspective to this discourse on the First Vienna Award. 
The book, Magyar idők a Felvidéken 1938–1945. Az első bécsi döntés és következményei 
[Hungarian Times in the Upper Lands, 1938–1945. The First Vienna Award 
and Its Consequences], examines the reintegration of  the region into Hungary 
from the perspective of  the Hungarian community of  the territory itself, which 
at the time of  the change of  rule had lived for some two decades as a linguistic 
minority within the Czechoslovak state. Simon’s book is the most recent work 
in the historiographical series edited by Balázs Ablonczy and published by Jaffa 
Publishing House. The series constitutes an attempt to present the history of  
Hungary and the Hungarian minority communities of  Central Europe in the 
twentieth century in a style that will appeal to a broad readership. It was launched 
a few years back with the publication of  two volumes by Ablonczy,1 and since 
then many works by well-established Hungarian historians have been published 
as part of  the series. Simon’s newest book should be understood as part of  this 
larger endeavor. Indeed, while working on the manuscript, he was inspired in 
part by a book by Ablonczy entitled A visszatért Erdély 1940–1944 [Transylvania 
Returned, 1940–1944].
1  Balázs Ablonczy, Trianon-legendák [Trianon Legends] (Budapest: Jaffa Kiadó, 2010); Idem, A visszatért 
Erdély 1940–1944 [Transylvania Returned, 1940–1944] (Budapest: Jaffa Kiadó, 2011).
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The choice of  titles (the reference to “Hungarian times”) indicates the 
focus of  the inquiry and should not be misunderstood as an expression of  any 
kind of  nostalgia for a time when what was (and sometimes still is) referred 
to in Hungarian as “Felvidék” (meaning northern lands and often translated 
into English as Upper Hungary) was part of  Hungary. The brief  year between 
the Vienna Award and the outbreak of  World War II and the years of  the war 
itself  (during which the territory in question remained part of  Hungary) are 
known in the historical memory of  the Hungarian community of  Slovakia as the 
“Hungarian times,” in contrast with the period between 1918 and 1938 or the 
period after 1945, which are remembered as the Czechoslovak eras. The author’s 
subjective stance with regard to the subject adds emphasis to this approach. 
Simon himself  is a member of  the Hungarian community of  Slovakia, and he 
serves as the director of  the Forum Minority Research Institute. This, in part, 
is why he has striven, as a member of  a minority community, to examine an 
important period in the history of  this community. 
However, the subjective nature of  his perspective in no way detracts from the 
credibility or seriousness of  his inquiry. His attempt to arrive at an understanding 
of  perspectives on the past is not tinged with personal sentiment, nor does it have 
any shades of  victimhood or nostalgia. On the contrary, he has set an important 
goal as a historian, which indeed he has reached: he draws attention to the failure 
among historians to devote signifi cant study to the subject and (in no small part 
a consequence of  this) the failure of  society to come to foster open discussion 
of  this period of  its history. The “Hungarian times” of  southern Slovakia have 
remained undiscussed. As Simon notes in the preface to the book, “even my 
parents never spoke of  it” (p.10). And indeed not only was it not made an openly 
discussed topic of  public memory, it has even been neglected by Slovak and 
Hungarian historians. Only a few studies have been published on the topic, and 
to this day no monograph or collection of  primary sources has been published 
dealing with the everyday lives of  the Hungarian community of  Czechoslovakia 
in the period following the First Vienna Award. Simon’s book is signifi cant for 
this reason alone, given that interest in the history of  Czechoslovakia in the 
international community of  scholars has tended to focus on the territory that is 
now the independent Czech Republic and, for instance, the centralist politics of  
Prague,2 the so-called German question in the case of  Czechoslovakia, or most 
2 Andrea Orzoff, The Battle for the Castle. The Myth of  Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914–1948 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009).
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recently the question of  the loyalties of  the Jewish communities of  Slovakia.3 
Essentially, Leslie M. Waters is the only international scholar to have addressed 
the issues pertaining to the Hungarian communities of  the region in the period 
under examination.4
With this book, Simon also makes an important contribution to general 
cultural history. This crucial moment in the history of  the Hungarian communities 
of  Slovakia, which now stretches back almost a century, are presented not only 
through discussions of  fi gures who will be familiar to the Hungarian readership, 
such as internationally celebrated author Sándor Márai, or the propaganda 
slogans about “Upper Hungary returned,” as for instance Gyula Popély does in 
his often cited work on the period.5 Some of  the chapters of  the book deal with 
fi gures of  the Czechoslovak milieu. Lajos Jócsik, for example, who had been a 
prominent member of  the Sickle Movement is one of  the important fi gures of  
reference, as are Pál Szvatkó, an important publicist of  the interwar period, László 
Mécs, a priest and poet, and Endre Kovács, who later became a literary historian. 
Similarly, the book also includes discussion of  Tamás Weis, a young Jewish boy 
of  Párkány (today Štúrovo in Slovakia), who was deported to Auschwitz in 1944 
and who, after his return from the concentration camp, changed his name to 
Tomáš Radil and, as a member of  the Czechoslovak Academy of  Science, wrote 
a Holocaust novel which has since been translated into Hungarian.6
Perhaps not surprisingly, the preface begins with a few remarks of  Sándor 
Márai, who has become an emblematic fi gure of  the city of  Košice, in which 
Márai gives voice to the joy he felt at the “return” of  the city to Hungary.7 
Simon is quick to note, however, that years after the Vienna Award Márai gave 
an assessment of  the meeting between the Hungarian community of  what had 
been the southern strip of  Czechoslovakia and the prevailing system in post-
3  Rebekah Klein-Pejšová, Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2015).
4  Leslie M. Waters, “Resurrecting the Nation. Felvidék and the Hungarian Territorial Revisionist Project, 
1938–1945,” (PhD diss., University of  California, 2012); Idem, “Learning and Unlearning Nationality: 
Hungarian National Education in Reannexed Felvidék, 1938–1944,” Hungarian Historical Review 3 (2013): 
538–65.
5  Gyula Popély, Hazatéréstől a hazavesztésig [From the Return to the Homeland to the Loss of  the 
Homeland] (Bratislava: Madách-Posonium, 2006).
6  Tomáš Radil, Az auschwitzi fi úk [Boys of  Auschwitz] (Budapest: Pesti Kalligram, 2014).
7  Sándor Márai, Ajándék a végzettől [Gift of  Fate] (Budapest: Helikon, 2004).
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Trianon Hungary that was far more critical than his response immediately after 
the change.8
The second part of  the book, which is entitled “Borderline Case,” offers 
a summary and assessment of  the events that led to the First Vienna Award 
and its later repeal. Simon strives to trace the threads of  the events, from the 
Peace Treaty of  Trianon and the domestic policies of  the fi rst Czechoslovak 
Republic to Germany’s foreign policy in the wake of  the Munich Agreement, the 
transformation of  the Slovak–Hungarian relationship, and fi nally the signing of  
the Paris Peace Treaty in 1947. This task is relatively simple, given that there is 
already a signifi cant body of  secondary literature on the diplomatic history and 
foreign policy implications of  the First Vienna Award.9
It is worth taking a moment to mention again the problem of  terminology 
that inevitably arises in discussions of  the fate of  the territory in question. 
Should one refer to it as “Felvidék” or “Upper Hungary,” as was done in the 
Hungarian propaganda at time and indeed is sometimes still done to this day? 
Or should one simply refer to it as Slovakia, its name today? Can these terms 
be used as synonyms? And is the phrase “southern Upper Hungary” useful, 
or “southern Slovakia”? This question is complicated by the fact that in the 
secondary literature in Slovak the phrase “territory ceded by the First Vienna 
Arbitration to Hungary” (in Slovak arbitrážne územie) is frequently used.
Simon tends to use the two terms interchangeably, as indeed he has done in 
earlier works.10 He refers most often, however, to “southern Slovakia,” as if  this 
were ever some kind of  independent, clearly demarcated region.11 In my view, 
this term may be a bit confusing to a reader less familiar with the topic, who is 
reading about a period in which the southern slice of  what today is Slovakia was 
indeed made part of  Hungary, but at the same time, the independent state of  
Slovakia (the territory of  which was essentially contiguous with the northern 
half  of  Slovakia today) was not created until March of  1939. Thus I fi nd the 
term “southern Slovakia” a bit anachronistic in this context. 
Simon offers not a synthesis of  the topic, but rather a kind of  catalogue 
of  issues. Thus in the ten chapters that follow the preface (in which Simon 
8  Sándor Márai, Hallgatni akartam [I Wished to Remain Silent] (Budapest: Helikon, 2013).
9  See for instance Gergely Sallai, Az első bécsi döntés [The First Vienna Award] (Budapest: Osiris, 2002).
10  For instance, Attila Simon, Egy rövid esztendő krónikája. A szlovákiai magyarok 1938-ban [The Chronicle 
of  a Short Year. The Hungarians of  Slovakia in 1938] (Šamorín: Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2010).
11  For more on the term Southern Slovakia, see Elena Mannová, “Southern Slovakia as an Imagined 
Territory,” in Frontiers, Religions and Identities in Europe, ed. Steven G. Ellis and Raingard Eβer with Jean-
François Berdah and Miloš Řezník (Pisa: Plus–Pisa University Press, 2009), 185–204.
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sketches the outlines of  his inquiry) and the second part of  the book (in which 
he summarizes the historical events), Simon addresses the most important issues 
pertaining to the reintegration of  the Hungarian community from the perspectives 
of  political, economic, social, cultural, mentality and even sports and educational 
history, though naturally not always in equal proportions. He very clearly devotes 
more attention to political and social history, and he often draws on much of  
his earlier scholarship. Thus the fourth chapter, which examines the diversity of  
the party politics of  the Hungarian minority communities before 1938 and the 
ways in which this diversity dwindled after 1938, and the seventh chapter, which 
deals with the Czech settlement policies in the interwar period, contain the most 
thorough analyses in the book. Simon gives scant emphasis, however, to the 
question of  economic factors, which are presented in a matter of  a few pages 
in the third chapter (pp.44–50), and the everyday lives of  the populations of  the 
region that changed hands. Furthermore, he devotes only a single chapter (the 
tenth) to the question of  sports in the region, which he discusses alongside the 
transformation of  educational and cultural life after 1938, either of  which would 
have merited a separate chapter in and of  themselves. 
Simon’s essay-like anecdotes more than compensate for these shortcomings, 
however. They make the book more enjoyable and the period under examination 
more vivid and personal. For instance, in the fi fth chapter, which deals with the 
mechanics of  the political screenings, Simon writes about the case of  János 
Kozma, a school principal who before 1838 was both a respected fi gure of  his 
community and also an active part of  local Hungarian cultural life. Nonetheless, 
following the First Vienna Award, because of  baseless accusations and a good 
bit of  human spitefulness, he did not make it past the screenings (pp.93–94). 
The book also acquaints the reader with the case of  Štefan Bolda, a Slovak 
employee of  the Hungarian state railway. He was allegedly more polite, when 
conducting his job, with Slovak train passengers, so he was reported and then 
moved from Košice to a place where he would have little chance of  coming 
across Slovaks (pp.140–41). These kinds of  anecdotes offer vivid illustrations of  
the ways in which the policies of  the Hungarian state following the First Vienna 
Award affected the everyday lives of  the people living in the territory that had 
been ceded to Hungary.
Simon identifi es the differing forms of  socialization in the Hungarian and 
Czechoslovak communities as the principle source of  the grievances of  the one-
time minority Hungarian community. In 1938, the Czechoslovak Hungarians 
went from living in a more democratic state that was more developed from 
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the perspective of  social welfare and more tolerant in its nationalities policy to 
the deeply hierarchical, autocratic Hungary under the rule of  Miklós Horthy, 
where they were often (mostly in government offi ces) derisively referred to as 
“Upper Hungary communists.” In the administrative and economic spheres, the 
Hungarian state demanded immediate transformation. The question of  loyalty 
to the nation, which in the nation-state mentality of  Central Europe meant 
loyalty to the state, was of  utmost importance. Even in the more democratic fi rst 
Czechoslovak Republic this loyalty had been a signifi cant issue. The Hungarian 
population of  the territory that had again come under Hungarian rule thus had 
to prove its “faithfulness to the nation,” or more precisely that during the twenty 
some years of  “Czechoslovak occupation” it had conducted itself  in a manner 
that was faithful to the traditions and culture of  the Hungarian nationality.
The manner in which the population of  the territory in question was 
expected to demonstrates its “fi delity” to the Hungarian nation fundamentally 
infl uenced the image of  Hungary among the elites of  the minority society 
following the First Vienna Award. In the fi fth chapter of  the book, Simon offers 
a vivid portrayal of  the frame of  mind that characterized the majority of  the 
“Upper Lands middle class” towards the end of  1938 and the beginning of  
1939. Members of  this community, who for twenty years had not been able, as 
citizens of  Czechoslovakia who belonged to a national minority, to count on 
positions in state administration, were confi dent that the change would open 
the gates to new opportunities for them and that they would receive some kind 
of  compensation from the Hungarian state as if  in exchange for the decades 
of  neglect they had suffered. Simon clearly regards the work of  the screening 
committees as having been a miscarriage of  justice, since they “put the entire 
offi cial staff  of  the region on the accused’s bench” (p.95) and did not provide 
them with employment after the First Vienna Award. He notes, however, that 
in the future historians should be cautious to modify the view according to 
which, instead of  members of  the Hungarian community from the region, only 
Hungarians arriving from with the borders of  post-Trianon Hungary (referred 
to in the parlance of  the time as “anyások,” i.e. Hungarians from the mother 
country, or as Paul Robert Magocsi writes, Hungarians who were “pampered and 
tied to the motherland’s apron strings”)12 were given positions in government 
administration in the re-annexed territory. 
12  Paul Robert Magocsi, “Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns. On the Seventieth Anniversary of  the 
Founding of  Czechoslovakia,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 14, no. 3/4 (1990): 427–60.  
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The foundations for this part are laid in large part by the sixth chapter, which 
deals with one of  the distinctive cultural-history aspects of  the integration of  the 
minority Hungarian community of  the region, a community that had undergone 
processes of  socialization different from those in Hungary, or what was referred 
to in the contemporary discourses as the so-called “spirit of  the Upper Lands.” 
Simon draws a contrast between the “neo-Baroque Hungary” of  Horthy and 
the “social idea of  the Upper Lands.” This mentality, however, was more an 
idealized self-image of  the Hungarians of  the region than it was a regional 
identity that might bear comparison with the regional identity of  Transylvania, 
for instance. While the Czechoslovak Hungarian communities never had any 
kind of  regional traditions or regional sense of  identity before 1918 (since the 
southern slice of  the state of  Czechoslovakia, stretching from Bratislava in the 
west to the sub-Carpathian region in the east, earlier had been an integral part of  
historical Hungary), Transylvania had been a distinctive and separate region not 
only from the perspective of  geography, but also from the perspective of  several 
centuries of  constitutional law. Thus it was hardly a coincidence that after 1938 
the notion of  a “spirit of  the Upper Lands” soon became a concept exploited by 
politicians, since politicians of  every leaning, from social democrats to members 
of  the Arrow Cross party, were able to mold the term as they sought fi t. Simon 
concludes that any such simplistic division of  the two societies rests on too 
many generalizations to remain plausible. The narrowing of  the history of  the 
“Hungarian times” to this problem is misleading, since it bears the personal and 
collective grievances of  the minority community. The elite of  the Hungarian 
communities of  the region rapidly integrated into the system of  the “mother 
country” after 1938.
This is all complemented by two indispensable chapters on the circumstances 
of  the Slovak and Jewish communities of  the territory ceded by the First Vienna 
Arbitration to Hungary. Slovaks regarded the Award as a kind of  national 
tragedy. Simon clearly dismisses the stereotypical image of  the “pious Slovak” 
and the notion, which to this day is widely accepted, according to which political 
activism and awareness was much lower among Slovaks at the time than it was 
among Hungarians. In 1938, a Slovak population that clearly had a strong sense 
of  self-awareness and had experienced democracy in the Czechoslovak republic 
of  the interwar period, enjoying all the advantages of  a developed social system 
(including general and secret suffrage), found itself  confronted with Hungary 
under Horthy. For the Hungarian government, the “Slovak question” was not 
regarded as an issue to be solved with forceful magyarization, but rather involved 
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nurturing loyalty among the Slovak communities to the Hungarian state, though 
it was not easy to persuade Hungarian public opinion of  this at the time. In 
the case of  the Jewry of  the region, Simon makes the important observation 
that it would be misleading to speak of  any kind of  distinctive “Upper Lands” 
Holocaust. The events of  the Holocaust in the territory, which resulted in the 
deportation of  some 30,000 Jews, took place essentially in the same manner 
as they did in other parts of  Hungary. The chapter entitled “Hungarian 
Followers of  Moses” provides a thorough presentation of  the processes of  the 
disenfranchisement and persecution of  the Jewry of  the region.
The chapter devoted to the city of  Košice addresses something of  a 
lacuna in the secondary literature, as neither the Hungarian nor the Slovak 
historiography has dealt with the history of  the city between 1938 and 1945.13 
From the Middle Ages to the latter half  of  the 1940s, Košice was a diverse mix 
of  ethnicities, languages, and religious denominations. And as Simon notes, the 
city became a kind of  symbol of  the struggle between Hungarians and Slovaks 
for control of  the territory. According to offi cial census statistics, during the 
time of  the fi rst Czechoslovak Republic the proportion of  Hungarians in the 
city fell below 20 percent, while after the First Vienna Award Košice seemed 
to change back, from one day to the next, to a city with a Hungarian majority. 
Simon is therefore cautious about relying on the statistics, as indeed other 
authors, such as Éva Kovács, have been.14 In her examination of  the national 
identity of  the Jewry of  Košice in the interwar period, Kovács persuasively 
demonstrates that on the basis of  the results of  the elections that were held in 
Czechoslovakia, one should be skeptical of  the Czechoslovak census results. 
Her research has shown, for instance, that a far higher proportion of  the people 
of  Košice voted for the Hungarian political parties than the proportion of  
residents of  the city who were, according to the census results, of  Hungarian 
nationality. Even into the fi rst decades of  the twentieth century, Košice and the 
other cities of  the region were inhabited by a citizenry that was multilingual and 
often changed its national identity, depending on the pressures of  the prevailing 
state powers. In the case of  the city of  Košice, it is quite clear that some people 
replied differently to questions regarding nationality depending on the census 
13  On the secondary literature on the topic see Timea Verešová, “Košice v období rokov 1938–1945 
– stav výskumu dejín mesta,” in Košice a dejiny – dejiny Košíc, ed. Štefan Šutaj (Košice: UPJŠ, 2011), 147–52. 
14  Éva Kovács, Felemás asszimiláció: a kassai zsidóság a két világháború között, 1918–1938 [Ambiguous 
Assimilation: The Jewry of  Košice in the Interwar Period, 1918–1938] (Šamorín–Dunajská Streda: Fórum 
Kisebbségkutató Intézet–Lilium Aurum Könyvkiadó, 2004).
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(i.e. the government in power). Simon shares Kovács’ conclusion, and he offers 
an illustration of  the phenomenon in the case of  Košice by examining data 
concerning the political attitudes and cultural consumption (for instance reading 
habits) of  the population. The chapter also contains a detailed presentation of  
the modernization of  Košice in the interwar period and the transformation of  
the city into an administrative center. 
After 1945, the “Hungarian times,” i.e. the re-annexation by Hungary 
of  territory in the southern part of  what today is Slovakia, was one of  the 
primary justifi cations for the notion of  the collective guilt of  the Hungarians 
of  the region, a notion that in turn was used to justify deportations, so-called 
“re-Slovakization,” and Slovak–Hungarian population exchanges. This remains 
one of  the traumatic elements of  the shared historical consciousness of  the 
Hungarian communities of  present-day Slovakia, and it continues to exert an 
indirect infl uence on relations between politics in Hungary and the Hungarian 
minority of  Slovakia. The period between 1938 and 1945 also bore witness to an 
array of  injuries and offences to the Slovaks of  the region, and thus the memory 
of  this period continues to encumber relations between Slovaks and Hungarians. 
 Simon had to fi nd balance in his assessment of  the internal and foreign 
affairs of  Hungary under the government of  Horthy and the functionality of  
the interwar Czechoslovak democracy and, within it, the social history of  the 
minorities of  Czechoslovakia, for the meanings of  the history of  the “Hungarian 
times” in Upper Hungary lie perhaps fi rst and foremost in the meeting—or 
collision—of  these two divergent worlds and the subsequent endeavors to 
put them on parallel courses towards common goals. With this book, he has 
made an inspiring contribution that addresses absences and shortcomings in the 
secondary literature while also providing a highly readable account that will be 
accessible to a broad readership with an interest in the history of  the region. 
Veronika Gayer
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Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold 
War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989. Edited by Mark Kramer and 
Vít Smetana. (The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series.) Lanham, 
Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014. xviii + 563 pp.
Recently, an ambitious work was published under the editorship of  Mark Kramer 
and Vít Smetana on the history of  East Central Europe in the period beginning 
with the end of  World War II and concluding with the fall of  communism in the 
Eastern Bloc in 1989. The volume, entitled Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open 
the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989, consists of  
twenty-four essays organized into four chapters. The essays in the fi rst chapter 
deal with the period of  the formation of  the Iron Curtain. The opening essay, 
which was written by Kramer, examines the goals of  Moscow’s politics and 
policies with regards to Eastern Europe between 1941 and 1948 and the role of  
the leading stratum of  the emerging communist camp. The chapter also contains 
an essay on the role of  the United States in Eastern Europe between 1943 and 
1948. We are then offered comprehensive pictures of  the various countries of  
the emerging “Soviet Bloc,” namely Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. 
The essays by Vít Smetana, László Borhi and Mark Kramer draw on a remarkably 
impressive array of  sources in their analyses of  the distinctive features of  the 
time. Kramer stands out even among this superb trio of  authors. He is thoroughly 
familiar with the primary and secondary literature that has been published in the 
West, but he also has a dazzling knowledge of  the Russian primary sources that 
have been published over the course of  the past two decades and the essays and 
monographs that deal with Soviet–Yugoslav relations. The last two essays in the 
fi rst chapter analyze the roles of  Austria and Germany following the war. 
The second chapter contains essays dealing with the “German question” 
and the politics of  the era within the Eastern Bloc following the death of  
Stalin. One essay examines how London perceived the evolution of  relations 
between Germany and Eastern Europe during the Cold War. Another offers a 
discussion of  the “German question” from the perspective of  France. The essay 
by Csaba Békés, which brings the chapter to a close, attempts to summarize the 
coordination of  the foreign policy conduct of  the countries of  the Eastern Bloc 
in the period beginning with the death of  Stalin and ending in 1975. 
The third chapter examines the roles that were played by Eastern Europe, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union in bringing the Cold War to an end. This is 
230
Hungarian Historical Review 4,  no. 1  (2015): 197–253
perhaps the most exciting part of  the book, perhaps simply because the history 
of  the “end game” still raises innumerable questions that will challenge historians. 
For instance, what role did the people who were affected by the process play 
in the collapse of  the Soviet societies? (This is a question that is the subject of  
debate in many circles.) In this process of  collapse or transformation, which was 
more signifi cant, the internal changes that took place within the Eastern Bloc, 
the infl uence of  U.S. foreign policy on the Soviet Union, or the inclination of  the 
Soviet leadership to “yield”? It is clearly not easy to give a simple answer to this 
question, in part simply because almost all of  the terms and concepts that are used 
to describe the process beg interpretation themselves. For instance, what does 
it mean to say that the leadership under Gorbachev proved “inclined to yield”? 
Does it mean that Moscow deliberately presented itself  as prepared to “let go of ” 
the countries of  the Soviet Bloc? Or does it mean that Russia could do little else, 
since after a point it would have had to have used violence in order to maintain 
control over the states of  Eastern Europe, and this would have undermined a 
politics based on attempts to reach a compromise with the West? Or does it mean 
simply that Gorbachev inaccurately assessed the popularity of  the system in the 
region and concluded that the countries of  Eastern Europe would remain within 
the Soviet Bloc and would preserve their Soviet systems of  governance, even if  
Moscow did not exert any pressure on them or threaten them with intervention? 
Given that Gorbachev and his immediate circle realized only very late—sometime 
around late 1988 and early 1989—that they might face problems when it came to 
the countries of  the Bloc, one could conclude that Moscow regarded it as self-
evident that these countries would remain committed to socialism. 
In his superb essay, Alex Pravda, another one of  the contributors to the 
volume, examines the background of  this enduring “optimism.” He discusses, 
for instance, the talk that took place in Budapest in November 1988 between 
Károly Grósz, the secretary general of  the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, 
and Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev, a member of  the political delegation of  the 
Central Committee of  the Soviet Communist Party. This meeting merits discussion 
in this context, for in all likelihood it was here that Yakovlev was fi rst confronted 
with the deep divisions within the Hungarian party leadership. Grósz spoke with 
remarkable openness in the course of  their private meeting on the situation in 
Hungary, which was increasingly dire, as well as on the tensions within the party 
and the mutual mistrustfulness. Clearly this experience played a role in Yakovlev’s 
decision, which was made soon after his meeting with Grósz, to ask four institutes 
in Moscow to prepare analyses of  the situations in the countries of  the Soviet Bloc. 
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By February 1989, the Bogomolov Institute, a research institute of  the Academy of  
Sciences of  the USSR which dealt with the socialist world order, the International 
Division of  the Central Committee of  the Soviet Communist Party, the Ministry 
of  Foreign Affairs, and the KGB submitted their reports. Of  these four reports, 
three were made public some time ago, thus we have a fairly clear idea of  what the 
Soviet leadership thought about Eastern Europe towards the late 1980s. Of  the 
four, the one submitted by the Institute of  the Academy was unquestionably the 
most interesting, and it was the most critical of  Soviet policies. At the beginning 
of  the analysis, it contained an emphatic ascertainment according to which “the 
attempt to build socialism that was done with Soviet participation and Stalinist and 
neo-Stalinist methods was a dead end.” These were harsh words, but they revealed 
a great deal about the political mood that had emerged in Moscow in the late 
1980s. Specifi cally, they reveal that by that time a great deal was permissible among 
the circles at the Academy that would have been unthinkable in earlier times. In 
consequence, the social sciences gradually ceased to serve the function they had 
earlier had of  legitimizing the regime. In the spirit of  this shift, the analysis left no 
doubt as to the fact that, in the European allies of  the Soviet Union, the position 
of  the communist parties, which earlier had maintained control over events, “had 
weakened signifi cantly.” Their social support was dwindling, and indeed “in some 
cases one can speak of  a complete lack of  trust.” The report divided the countries 
of  Eastern Europe into two groups on the basis of  the nature of  the crisis-
processes that were underway in them. In one of  these groups (Hungary, Poland, 
and Yugoslavia), “the crisis-processes have become open and intense,” while in 
the other (Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Bulgaria, and Romania), “for the moment 
the social and political confl icts are taking place in a concealed manner, but at the 
same time they are clearly discernible.” In spite of  the fact that the analysis that 
was submitted by the Bogomolov Institute dispelled all doubt regarding the crisis 
in the region, the Soviet leadership continued to conduct affairs as if  it were still 
in control of  the situation. The shorthand text of  the minutes of  the summit that 
took place in Malta in December 1989 between the American president and the 
secretary general of  the Soviet party demonstrates this (the text was made public 
a few years ago). The minutes make very clear that Gorbachev was still convinced 
that unless the United States and its allies forced “Western values” on the states 
of  Eastern Europe, these states would in all likelihood vote in favor of  a form of  
socialism that was simply more humane and more effective than the socialism to 
which they had become accustomed. According to the minutes of  the meeting, 
Gorbachev did not explicitly say this, but it was nonetheless implied, for instance 
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by the fact that both in the meetings in private and the plenary sittings the secretary 
general returned to this question. In the course of  the fi rst private meeting he 
made the following very clear: “I am under the impression that U.S. leaders are 
now quite actively advancing the idea of  conquering the division of  Europe on 
the basis of  ‘Western values.’ […] At one time in the West there was anxiety that 
the Soviet Union was planning to export revolution. But the aim of  exporting 
‘Western values’ sounds similar.” It is bit surprising that the essays in this chapter 
essentially do not deal with the meeting between George Bush and Gorbachev 
in Malta, in spite of  the fact that many people are fi rmly convinced that it was in 
the course of  this meeting, on December 2 and 3, 1989, that the Soviet secretary 
general and the American president reached an agreement on the re-division of  
Europe. Of  course, the hesitancy on their part to do this is understandable. The 
Malta Summit continues to be enshrouded in mystery and uncertainty. We do not 
even know how many times the two statesmen met in the course of  these two days 
or within what frameworks. It is quite certain, however, that they met at least twice 
in private and twice for the plenary sittings. 
This is all revealed in a collection of  documents in Russian that was published 
in 2010. Numbering roughly 1,000 pages, this collection (Отвечая на вызов 
времени. Внешняя политика перестройки: документальные свидетельства, 
Москва, 2010) is quite justifi ably considered the most important and the most 
comprehensive publication of  primary source material on the foreign policy of  the 
Gorbachev period. It contains the shorthand minutes of  all of  the four meetings 
(pp.234–49), though none of  the four is actually complete. Nonetheless, they are 
remarkably edifying. They are signifi cant in part because the meetings did not 
lead to the drafting of  any written agreement. This is one of  the reasons why so 
many hypotheses have been made concerning the Malta Summit. For instance, 
the notion that there was a top-secret fi fth meeting, in addition to the four 
meetings the minutes of  which were kept in writing, has proven quite enduring. 
During this fi fth meeting, Gorbachev allegedly accepted all the demands of  the 
Americans. In other words, he agreed to dissolve the Warsaw Pact, dismantle the 
socialist systems in the Soviet satellite countries, and allow for the reunifi cation 
of  Germany. There may or may not have been a fi fth meeting between the two 
heads of  state. If  there was, however, it is hardly likely that Gorbachev would 
have been prepared to make such concessions. If  we read the shorthand minutes 
of  the meetings held at the Malta Summit attentively, they suggest, rather, that 
Gorbachev simply misunderstood or misperceived the situation in late 1989. 
He seems to have failed to notice or appreciate the pace at which the events 
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had accelerated. What he said to Bush on the question of  German reunifi cation 
in the course of  their fi rst private meeting is revealing indeed. According to 
Gorbachev, it was impossible to foresee whether “a unifi ed Germany [would] be 
neutral, not a member of  any political-military alliances, or would it be a member 
of  NATO?” He then added that, in his view, “it is still too early to discuss either 
of  these options. Let the process take its course without artifi cial acceleration.” 
All this clearly indicates that Gorbachev continued to believe that European 
and global politics would be shaped by a kind of  compromise between Western 
and Soviet values. It does not seem to occur to him that perhaps the societies 
of  Eastern Europe would want nothing to do with “Soviet values” if  they had a 
chance to choose freely.
The minutes of  the Malta Summit, incomplete though they may be, are 
nonetheless immensely interesting in part because they clearly show the extent 
to which the Soviet leadership misunderstood the processes that were underway 
in Central Europe. And, because the Soviet leaders failed to understand these 
processes, they never realized that they would need to follow an alternative script. 
It is surprising that the extremely knowledgeable contributors to this collection 
of  essays do not seem to be familiar with the collection of  documents in Russian 
containing these minutes. They also do not seem to be familiar with the ambitious 
Russian undertaking that traces the political processes that were underway in the 
six countries of  Central and Southeastern Europe from the beginning of  the 
1970s up to the collapse of  the Soviet-type systems. This two volume, 1,600-
page collection of  documents (Анатомия конфликтов. Центральная и Юго-
Восточная Европа. Документы и материалы последней трети ХХ века. т. 
1-2. СПб. 2012–2013) is the only serious scholarly undertaking in Russia that 
could be compared to this collection of  essays. The Russian publication does 
not attempt to present the history of  the last two decades of  communist rule in 
the Soviet Union and Central Europe in essays, but rather seeks “only” to make 
primary sources available. It achieves this goal on an admirably ambitious scale. 
However, the failure on the part of  the contributors to the collection edited by 
Kramer and Smetana does not in any way detract from its importance or merits. 
The international group of  authors has enriched the secondary literature on 
the history of  the Cold War with an impressive collection of  essays that bears 
testimony to thorough research and impressive knowledge. 
Translated by Thomas Cooper
Zoltán Sz. Bíró
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Fabricating Authenticity in Soviet Hungary. The Afterlife of  the First 
Hungarian Soviet Republic in the Age of  State Socialism. By Péter Apor. 
London–New York: Anthem Press, 2014. 228 pp.
At the end of  1956, after the Hungarian revolt, János Kádár’s communist 
leadership had to answer some crucial questions. How could his despised, de 
facto illegitimate government obtain legitimacy and justify itself  in the eyes 
of  the population? How could the regime deprive the 1956 revolutionaries of  
their identity as freedom fi ghters and enforce a new negative image of  them 
as murderers, fascists and counterrevolutionaries? The answer lay partly in 
fabricating a new historical narrative based on the merciless struggle between 
progressive, revolutionary forces and forces of  counterrevolution in twentieth-
century Hungary. The source of  this battle was found in the obscure and 
controversial history of  the establishing and downfall of  the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic. As a result, “within the two and a half  years that passed between 
October 1956 and March 1959, from the Communist perspective the Soviet 
Republic was transformed from a relatively insignifi cant event in the party’s own 
history into the most important anniversary of  the nation” (p.155). 
Péter Apor’s book meticulously analyses this process of  revision, as well 
as the creation of  a new interpretation of  Hungarian history in the twentieth 
century. One of  the primary aims during the early years of  Kádár’s government 
was to create direct continuity between the actors of  1919 and 1956 and to 
construct a narrative of  October 1956 as an integral part of  the story based 
on the continuous revolution and counterrevolution, which started with the 
White Terror that followed the fall of  Soviet Republic (p.1). In this narrative, 
the heritage of  the anti-communist persecutions of  1919–1921 played a role as 
important as the “progressive tradition” of  Béla Kun’s Soviet Republic. It allowed 
for the creation of  the chronological sequence of  violent counterrevolutionary 
attempts, beginning with the White Terror, then the mass murders committed by 
Szálasi’s fascist Arrow Cross Party in 1944/45, and concluding (allegedly) with 
the atrocities of  the 1956 revolt. 
These events were presented as historical manifestations of  the rule of  
one essentially unchanging, continuous destructive force directed against all 
progressive, antifascist groups, particularly the communists. According to 
this narrative, it was precisely the communists, the most cruelly persecuted 
victims of  these tragic events in Hungarian history, who got the historical task 
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of  protecting Hungarians against the perils of  counterrevolution and, more 
importantly, against the return of  its perpetrators to power. 
However, as the title of  the book suggests, it does not deal only with the 
problem of  the instrumentalization of  the history and the creation of  the 
new post-Stalinist narrative. Apor is much more concerned with the following 
question: “What makes abstract historical interpretations authentic?” (p.1). He 
thus analyses the creation of  a new post-Stalinist metanarrative, “a body of  
discourse which presents a simplifi ed form of  the ideology and which is the 
vehicle of  communication between the regime and those who live under it,” by 
projecting “a conception of  society that explains both past current reality and 
future trajectory.” 1 In order to win society’s acceptance of  this metanarrative, 
party historians and ideologists had to offer a virtual reality comprised of  
myths and supported by carefully chosen symbols. The post-1956 communist 
regime had to introduce a meaningful symbolic politics expressed through an 
interconnected network of  interrelated objects, texts, persons and events in 
order to amalgamate the various representations of  the Soviet Republic into a 
system of  cross-references, interconnectedness and self-refl ection (p.23). Apor 
concentrates on the concept of  authenticity as an essential precondition of  the 
establishment of  the success of  the new memory constructions. According 
to Apor, historical representations have their histories, and his book “strives 
to describe the web that connects creative imagination and the objects of  
representation, as well as historical traditions mobilized by the modalities and 
means of  representation” (p.21).
The book is divided into the fi ve chapters (plus an introduction and epilogue), 
covering the changing interpretations of  the First Hungarian Soviet Republic 
between 1949 and 1959. However, at the same time, the chapters constitute case 
studies dealing with distinct symbols crucial for the legitimization of  the post-
1956 metanarrative. Each of  these fi ve parts offers a different perspective and 
analyses a special aspect of  the state symbolic politics. Apor’s interest includes 
language, visual media and orchestrated rituals, as well as judicial decisions, places 
of  memory and of  course offi cial historiography. The broad scope of  primary 
sources and methodological approaches utilized for their analysis constitutes the 
most signifi cant positive virtue of  the monograph.
The fi rst part, “Prefi guration,” analyses the historical interpretation of  the 
Soviet regime during the Rákosi dictatorship. It shows why the regime could 
1  Graeme Gill, Symbols and Legitimacy in Soviet Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3.
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not and did not want to appeal to the traditions of  the previous Soviet regime 
or see it as a direct predecessor of  postwar communist Hungary. Although 
the revolutionary year 1919 offi cially counted as one of  the progressive events 
of  the country’s history, it was at the same time a controversial topic for the 
Stalinist historiography of  the early 1950s, and the commemorations remained 
unpopular events for large segments of  Hungarian society. For the communist 
ideologists, it was therefore easier to present the Party as the heir of  the 1848/49 
revolution than as a descendant of  the short-lived experiment, the leaders of  
which perished during Stalin’s purges. 
The second chapter, “Resurrection,” deals with the creation of  the 
historical connection between the White Terror and 1956 revolt in order to 
legitimize the measures that were taken by Kádár’s government against the 
allegedly “counterrevolutionary” forces. In the narrative about the continuity 
of  the counterrevolution, the story of  the Hungarian Soviet Republic was 
nearly completely overshadowed by the focus on the White Terror. As Apor 
demonstrates by citing the example of  the so-called White Books about the 
atrocities of  1956, the abstract connection between 1919 and 1956 was 
authenticated by the similarity of  the two cases, especially by visualizing the use 
of  physical violence against the communists.
The following chapter, entitled “Lives,” is devoted to the trials of  war 
criminals. The life stories of  the perpetrators of  the White Terror were used 
to strengthen the thesis of  permanent counterrevolution in Hungary. In this 
case, the legal evidence should have authenticated the historical narrative and 
“populated” the existing abstract constructions. Apor states that, in the end, the 
Hungarian communists were unable to “demonstrate the direct tangible physical 
continuity between the actors of  1919 and 1956,” and they had to “rely on vague 
implications of  family relationships and blurred conceptions of  blood ties,” 
which made the whole narrative “unconvincingly abstract, ineffective and, in fact, 
ridiculous” (p.86). However, given the general communist obsession with “class 
origin” and the widespread belief  that the negative traits of  “bourgeois roots” 
are more or less hereditary (a notion the infl uence of  which can be observed 
already at the beginning of  the communist movement), “conceptions of  blood 
ties” were probably not so absurd and unbelievable as the author assumes, at 
least not to the people involved in the construction of  the metanarrative.2 
2  See the words of  the Chekist from 1921: “The fi rst question you must ask is: what class does [the 
accused] belong to, what education, upbringing, origin, or profession does he have? These questions must 
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The chapter “Funeral” is devoted to the planning, building and unveiling 
of  the very specifi c sepulcher, the Pantheon of  the Labor Movement. In this 
monument, the historical continuity of  revolutionaries “was crystallized around 
the bodies of  the dead” (p.22). In this case, Apor refers to the medieval notion 
of  the mystical body that played a crucial role in the self-construction of  the 
party. He uses the arguments of  E. H. Kantorowicz regarding the medieval royal 
tombs, and states that “the troubles with the search for communities in the late 
1950s […] resulted in similar ideas in diverse contexts: the idea that the mere 
gathering of  individuals in some mystical way shaped by the power of  religion, 
law or politics could be transformed into a thoroughly distinct quality, a genuine 
community” (p.137). However, one should also note dead kings and queens were 
buried in royal tombs in succession, regardless of  their deeds. This was a means 
of  reinforcing the legitimacy of  the dynasty, and not only the current ruler. 
The Pantheon of  the Labor Movement, which represented a formal celebration 
of  the communist movement in general, in fact gave legitimacy only to the 
Kádár’s party leadership. The dead who were buried there had to be selected and 
approved by the current ruler, while his predecessors were explicitly excluded 
from the list.3  
The fi fth chapter, “Narration,” is dedicated to the historical scholarship, 
fi ction and documentaries on paper, on fi lm or as exhibitions in museums based 
on the newly created narrative introduced as part of  the 40th anniversary of  the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic. In contrast with the interpretation presented in 1949, 
ten years later the Soviet Republic was characterized not by its alleged mistakes, 
but by its glorious achievements. What was even more important, it provided 
a perfect means of  clarifying “basic ideological-political issues related to the 
interpretation of  revolution and counterrevolution, Communist revisionism, 
nationalism and socialist patriotism without the need to openly address the 
revolt in 1956” (p.168). 
Apor’s work concludes that, in the end, the attempt to fabricate a new 
authenticity failed. The book offers enough evidence to prove this point. It was 
nearly impossible to link the abstract ideological statements to comprehensible 
determine the accused’s fate.” Quoted in: Edward Kanterian, “Communism: The Shadows Of  A Utopia,” 
Baltic Worlds 7, no. 4 (2014): 4–11, 8. See also: Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Ascribing Class: The Construction of  
Social Identity in Soviet Russia,” The Journal of  Modern History  65, no. 4 (1993): 745–70.
3  This was because the form of  succession in the Eastern European communist parties was much closer 
to the byzantine (or Russian czarist) tradition of  conquering the throne by defeating the predecessor than 
it was to the hereditary tradition of  the western kingdoms.
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accounts because the implied story was full of  blanks, contradictions and 
silences, while the First Hungarian Soviet Republic remained largely lacking 
in credibility and appeal. This failure then resulted in the mutually accepted 
politics of  “deliberate amnesia.” As a consequence of  an unspoken compromise 
between the communist leadership and Hungarian society, mention simply 
ceased to be made of  the 1956 revolt. The counterrevolutionary narrative was 
formally respected, but in reality lost its plausibility. But can be such a situation 
really defi ned as failure? In the light of  Havel’s “The Power of  the Powerless,” 
one may well ask, is it really necessary for people to believe as long as they act 
as if  they believe? Does it matter whether there was any genuine widespread 
conviction, or is it suffi cient for the rituals to be held and for the principles of  
the metanarrative to be observed?4 However, Apor makes no such inquires.
The book lacks comparative context, even if  the author briefl y refers to 
the situation in the other communist countries in the introduction. It is perhaps 
unfair to make this demand, since this book was not meant to be a comparative 
study. However, occasional reference to the international context would help the 
reader better understand which processes were specifi c to the Hungarian case 
and which were generic traits present elsewhere in the Eastern Bloc. The post-
1968 developments in Czechoslovakia in particular would have provided ideal 
material for occasional comparisons. 
The monograph mentions (albeit only as a side note) that the history of  
the First Soviet Republic had a clear nationalist undertone in the sense of  a 
patriotic war against newly established Hungarian neighbors (p.201). This is an 
interesting point which would have merited further refl ection and development. 
The communist regimes everywhere routinely relied on nationalist (patriotic) 
argumentation to make their narratives more acceptable.5 An analysis of  this 
approach in the case of  the First Hungarian Soviet Republic would bring one 
more interesting aspect to the problem of  creating the post-1956 metanarrative. 
I would venture one more minor critical remark concerning the frequent 
references to the early Christian and medieval politics of  symbols and rituals. 
4  Gill, Symbols, 273. See also: Michal Pullmann, “Konec experimentu.” Přestavba a pád kommunismu v 
Československu [End of  an Experiment. Rebuilding and Fall of  Communism in Czechoslovakia] (Prague: 
Scriptorium, 2011).
5  See: Frank Hadler, “Drachen und Drachentöter. Das Problem der nationalgeschichtlichen Fixierung 
in den Historiographien Ostmitteleuropas nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Die Nation schreiben. 
Geschichtswissenschaft im internationalen Vergleich, ed. Christoph Conrad and Sebastian Conrad (Göttingen: 
Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002), 137–64.
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Apor does not always adequately explain the relevance of  such comparisons 
with communist symbolic politics.
However, these few objections notwithstanding, Apor’s book offers a 
fascinating, sophisticated and multifaceted analysis of  the communist memory 
politics and politics of  history in a communist regime. The scope and number 
of  primary and secondary sources is truly admirable. It clearly demonstrates 
profound research and is ample testimony to the erudition of  the author. In this 
sense, Apor’s book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of  communist 
power from the perspective of  symbolic politics. It offers an admirable example 
of  how to deconstruct the processes of  fabricating history in the socialist 
dictatorships. As such, it is an important work on the history of  communist 
regimes in the Central and Eastern Europe.
Adam Hudek
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The Collectivization of  Agriculture in Communist Eastern Europe. 
Comparison and Entanglements. Edited by Constantin Iordachi and 
Arnd Bauerkämper. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014. 
557 pp.
This collection of  studies is the fi rst attempt to discuss collectivization in the 
former socialist countries of  Europe in a single publication. The time frame 
applied throughout the volume is not strict, but generally does not go beyond 
1965. The volume brings together some of  the most established specialists of  the 
Eastern Bloc who are also active in the international academia.1 According to the 
introduction, the book limits itself  to a discussion of  collectivization within the 
context of  Sovietization. It seeks to go beyond the conception of  Soviet power 
and state socialism as a one-way violent intrusion into normalcy. Moreover, one 
of  the editors objectives was to establish a timeline. The collection of  studies 
achieves this by adopting a methodology that addresses the criticism that has 
been raised regarding comparative methods by those that practice and theorize 
transnational history without, however, rejecting this criticism altogether.   
The book is divided into four main sections. When deciding on the way to 
arrange the fi fteen papers, the editors opted for a mix between geographical and 
methodological logic. The fi rst section deals with the Soviet Union, including 
republics that came under Soviet domination during World War II. The second 
section examines the countries that are regarded by the editors as part of  Central 
Europe. The logic of  this division is not self-evident. The case of  Hungary 
represents the complexity of  the choices that one has to make if  one seeks 
to group a country in one of  the areas under consideration in the book. Such 
decisions ultimately rest on a distinction between countries (and cultures) that 
allegedly do or do not have enough in common with a group of  other countries 
(and cultures) to be considered “in.” In other words, these decisions represent 
defi nitions of  the “other.” “German historical scholarship has no issue with 
the classifi cation of  Hungary as a country of  Southeastern Europe.2 Hungarian 
1  Namely, Lynne Viola, Nigel Swain, Melissa K. Bokovoy or Constantin Iordachi, professors working at 
the national level who have created schools, namely, Arnd Bauerkämper, Michail Gruev, József  Ö. Kovács, 
Darius Jarosz and Jan Rychlik, and a younger generation of  experts working in the region. In random order, 
they are Zsuzsanna Varga, David Feest, Dorin Dobrincu, and Jens Schöne. Örjan Sjöberg and Gregory 
Witkowski join this group as country specialists from Swedish and American academic circles respectively.
2  See e.g. Gerhard L. Weinberg, Hitler’s Foreign Policy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II (New York: 
Enigma, 2005).
Book Reviews
241
public opinion, in contrast, resents the idea of  being put together with countries 
of  the Balkans, such as Romania and Bulgaria. However, if  one studies the 
entangled history,3 the decision to group Romania and Hungary together may 
seem reasonable. To make things even more complicated, in the specifi c case of  
collectivization interaction between Bulgaria and Hungary is of  importance in 
terms of  policy design and outcome due to the expert group that was dispatched 
by the Hungarian leadership to Bulgaria with the explicit goal of  making 
recommendations based on experience in the fi eld. At any rate, Iordachi and 
Bauerkämper decided to group the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
under the heading “Central Europe” and Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Albania as “Southeastern Europe.” The fourth section of  the book includes two 
papers that provide novel interpretative frameworks for the study of  individual 
cases and two papers that were written with the goal of  juxtaposing individual 
cases. Since methodologically these papers are the more adventurous of  the 
fi fteen and in this respect have a great deal in common with the introduction, 
they might have served the volume better had they been the opening essays. 
The introduction, which is the joint effort of  Iordachi and Bauerkämper, 
argues that there is a way to develop a methodology that uses both comparative 
methods and the idea of  entanglement, and in fact the theme of  collectivization 
in the Soviet sphere requires this. Following up on this thesis, in his contribution 
Arnd Bauerkämper argues that the manner in which Soviet collectivization was 
experienced and the manner in which the Third Reich was remembered infl uenced 
attitudes towards collectivization in the GDR, so they had a bearing on modes 
and practices of  resistance against collectivization. In other words, the fi eld of  
memory studies is not only relevant to the interpretation of  collectivization 
because oral history interviews are important sources, but also because of  the 
ways in which popular historical knowledge was changing as a result of  interaction 
between personal memory, stories told by those who claimed to be witnesses, and 
propaganda. Zsuzsanna Varga also keeps the overall objective in mind when she 
applies a concept that political science has developed in recent decades: policy 
learning. She argues that collectivized agriculture became viable in Hungary 
because the government was capable of  learning from experiences outside of  
Hungary and from local opposition and claims. Gregory R. Witkowski makes 
an effort to emphasize the aspects of  collectivization that made its negotiated 
3  For the term “entangled history” see Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond 
Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of  Refl exivity,” History and Theory 45 (2006): 30–50.
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nature visible. He explicitly puts himself  among revisionist historians who do 
not accept totalitarianism as a valid interpretative framework and emphasize the 
possibility of  historical agency. It must be taken into account that with regards 
to Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, his archival material mostly comes from the 
US State Department, thus, events narrated were fi ltered through multiple lenses 
and translations. Moreover, authors of  the reports cited were in all likelihood 
delighted when they came across anything that could be understood as a sign 
of  popular resistance. In the closing essay of  section IV and of  the volume, 
Nigel Swain hits a refl ective tone. He is critical of  his own work published in 
the 1980s,4 in which he characterizes Hungary as a unique example within the 
Soviet zone in terms of  deviation from the ideal type. He emphasizes that the 
relationship between ideal type and practice was a complex one in each country, 
despite the textual form of  the ideal type, i.e. Stalin’s Model Charter. Relying on 
the wealth of  material and information with which contributors provided him, 
he points out six areas in which comparison and a study of  entanglements look 
feasible. These are: the policy context of  land reform; available resources; the 
concept and fi gure of  the kulak; campaigning techniques; and peasant responses. 
The studies that make up the volume are effi cient and effective in addressing 
each of  these, with the exception of  the failure to provide a clear picture of  the 
post-war policy context in terms of  the availability of  food and the sustainability 
of  pre-war structures.  
The Country level case studies that make up the fi rst three sections do not 
follow a uniform structure or methodology, but they are more than a series of  
disconnected essays with similar titles. On the one hand, each of  the papers 
demonstrates persuasively that measures and waves to collectivize derived from 
decisions taken or assumed to be taken in Moscow. Contributors were unable 
to track this process in the documents available to them, but the similarities 
of  the timelines serve as indirect evidence. On the other hand, the papers are 
written from a perspective from which the local context of  violence, coercion, 
and contest for victory, language and meaning is visible. They attempt to answer 
questions about the rhythm and internal logic of  collectivization, as well as the 
relationship between the dynamics of  internal party struggle and agricultural 
policy. They all emphasize that post-war rural societies faced a triple burden: 
famine following the war and the occupation, compulsory deliveries in order to 
4   Nigel Swain, Collective Farms which Work? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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avoid famine, and collectivization, which disrupted social and economic frames 
and was coupled with punitive measures. 
There are two cases in which collectivization did not become a major 
constituent of  state socialism. In the case of  Yugoslavia, Melissa Bokovoy does 
not explain away the reversal by dwelling on the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship. 
Instead, she writes of  widespread and violent resistance that bore the potential 
of  rekindling the culture of  violence that had emerged during World War II 
and reviving or reinvigorating ethnic divisions, thus threatening Tito’s plans 
for the regime. Turning to Bokovoy’s assumption about the weight that Soviet 
relations carried in policy outcomes, one may hypothesize that Soviet leadership 
appreciated both the strategic importance of  Poland and the extent to which 
the population internalized its hostility towards the Soviet Union and did not 
regard it as possible or prudent to indulge in any behavior that might provoke a 
wrathful response. In his paper, Dariusz Jarosz avoids giving a comprehensive 
argument about why Soviet leaders accepted that Poland defi nitively gave up 
on full scale collectivization. He emphasizes the importance and extent of  the 
territorial changes that reshaped Poland in 1945. He argues that the cleavage 
between hereditary farmers and newcomers (refugees) was the most important 
factor in explaining why the northwestern areas were the only ones in which 
collectivization took place on any signifi cant scale. However, one may argue 
that the so called Type 1b collective can hardly be regarded as a collective at all.5 
The narrative that Iordachi and Dobrincu establish for the case of  Romania 
shows that internal struggle among communist leaders, violence and violent 
resistance do not suffi ce to explain outcomes in the case of  collectivization. 
Romania experienced instances of  open, if  localized, revolt, as well as the 
longest-lasting collectivization efforts and cultural struggle concerning notions 
of  desirable social stratifi cation, yet the regime implemented collectivization and 
the transformation of  rural society, as a result which the Socialist Republic was 
indeed born. The transformation did not bring about improvement in material 
conditions. On the contrary, by the 1980s Romania was one of  the countries 
where food shortages were persistent, both in rural and urban areas. 
József  Ö. Kovács’s study stands out, as it outlines a broader social history 
of  the functioning of  the collectivized rural world. In addition to explaining 
5  Miklós Mitrovits, “A lengyel kollektivizálási kísérlet sikertelensége: okok és következmények” [Failure 
of  the Attempt to Collectivize in Poland], in Állami erőszak és kollektivizálás a kommunista diktatúrában [State 
Violence and Collectivization in the Communist Dictatorship], ed. Sándor Horváth and József  Ö. Kovács 
[(Budapest: MTA BTK TTI, 2015), 335–48, 337.
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different phases, stressing (like most of  the studies in the volume) that post-war 
land distribution measures were irrational in economic terms, and recounting how 
discriminative taxation, compulsory requisition and imprisonment were linked 
and served as tools with which to force people and families into cooperatives, 
he also includes age composition and various indices of  quality of  life to show 
the depth of  the changes that occurred as a consequence of  collectivization. He 
argues that as a result of  the changes arising from collectivization, rural society 
experienced structural exclusion in terms of  social and material capital. 
Taken together, these papers address questions pertaining to the location 
of  power and violence in a region that remained peripheral on a global scale in 
the time frame under consideration. If  ones goes beyond the notion that the 
communist regimes were the outcome of  the presence of  armies and illegal 
moves to take power, one starts to raise questions about what was particular and 
typical about the ways in which power was used and how it was related to various 
imageries of  modernity at various levels of  politics and local communities in the 
countries of  the former Eastern Bloc. Moreover, have specifi c entanglements 
produced a specifi c political anthropology or responses to the presence of  
power? The questions of  collectivization provide fertile ground for answers to 
such questions, since discussion of  the events has to involve a narrative about 
economic relations and reform initiatives before 1945, long-term changes, the 
social imaginary within and about peasant society, the role of  violence in post-
war conditions, and the changing scope of  state administration. 
Of  the authors, Lynne Viola is perhaps the most effective in explaining how 
collectivization was fundamental for state building in the Soviet Union. She goes 
so far as to state that this was indeed the meaning of  all of  the violence and 
change, and economic, political or class aspects were secondary. David Feest’s 
paper is particularly interesting from this perspective, since the focal points 
of  his inquiry, the Baltic countries, were at the frontier of  the Soviet Union 
during and immediately after World War II. It was a region in which, on the 
one hand, state building was a necessity from the regime’s point of  view, but 
it also fell in the zone where tactics of  a popular front government had been 
used in 1944–47. On the other hand, the frontier nature of  these areas meant 
that population movements carried information and knowledge across political 
borders. As in the case of  policy implementation and the politics of  history, here 
too entanglements turn direct and emerge as one of  the defi ning features of  the 
former Eastern Bloc. With regards to junctures of  modernity and discourse as 
a factor in modifying practices of  repression and social and political structures, 
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the case studies on Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria are particularly revealing. Both 
countries had some tradition of  collective farming and pre-war land reform. 
However, while Czechoslovakia was one of  the most agriculturally developed 
countries of  the region, Bulgarian farmers had extremely scanty resources. Gruev 
argues that collectivization in Bulgaria not only involved state violence in the 
form of  absurd and discriminatory taxation that made life impossible and mass 
imprisonment and execution following uprisings and open resistance, but also 
triggered an avalanche of  marginalization in localities that squeezed peasants to 
such an extent that rural culture and society disappeared within three decades. 
Jan Rychlík argues that due to the substantial differences that remained between 
Czechoslovak forms of  collective farms and Soviet kolkhozes, widespread 
resistance never reached the level of  uprising and indeed by the 1970s had won a 
large measure of  acceptance. He also stresses the importance of  the implications 
of  the changes in ownership patterns in areas where a signifi cant proportion of  
the population was German speaking. 
In summary, the collection of  studies fulfi lls the objectives stated in the 
introduction. They show how effi cient the comparative method and histoire croisée 
are in narrating collectivization as a major political venture and cause of  trauma 
in the former Soviet bloc. They also reach out to the local level. However, it is 
worth refl ecting on what other agendas are possible in the fi eld.
The papers in the volume do not address the gender dimension systematically. 
Such a move might have shown contours of  the region both vis-a-vis other 
peripheries (such as post-colonial areas and the so-called “West”). Viola has 
done extensive research on resistance among women, but her excellent essay in 
the volume does not keep gender at the center of  her argument. Throughout 
the studies, we fi nd cases in which women actively resist and cases in which 
an administration arrests women as a tactical move to weaken households in 
emotional and economic terms. We also see how male heads of  household 
would cite the stubbornness of  the women in their lives as an explanation 
for not joining the party. However, the inclusion of  standpoint theory as a 
methodological approach would have enabled a richer interpretation of  work, 
labor, food and welfare and would have shed some light on the relationships 
between these aspects and the location of  power during collectivization.6 József  
6   Martha Lampland emphasizes that the drive to bring women into wage labor was fundamental for the 
idea of  the socialist body politic and for socialist modernity, including in the rural zone. See “Unthinkable 
Subjects: Women and Labor in Socialist Hungary,” East European Quarterly 23, no. 4 (1990) and Martha 
Lampland, The Object of  Labor. Commodifi cation in Socialist Hungary (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995).
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Ö. Kovács’s broader social history, which considers gender as one of  the axes, 
points in this direction.
Considering that Constantin Iordachi has recently edited a volume concerned 
with the historical and human geography of  the Danube Delta, it is surprising 
that none of  the studies consider collectivization from an environmental history 
perspective.7 The ecological impact of  policies of  Sovietization and related 
changes of  the landscape are at least as under researched as collectivization. 
However, related monographs, such as the work of  Arvid Nelson and that of  
David Blackburn dealing with the GDR and Germany as a whole respectively 
indicate how questions of  ecological sustainability and practices of  power related 
to land can be discussed in a common framework.8   
The volume is Eurocentric to the extent that other areas of  the world are 
hardly mentioned. Arguably, it ends up downplaying the importance of  the Cold 
War. Varga mentions Chinese models and campaigns at the end of  1950s, but 
otherwise non-European experiences are confi ned to a few footnotes, in spite 
of  the fact that Soviet–Chinese rivalry was one of  the key aspects of  the era 
in the years when the last vehement rounds of  collectivization were launched 
in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the GDR. There is no 
reference to Cuba, North Korea or Southeast Asian communist regimes, nor 
is there any discussion of  how agriculture fi gured in Soviet Cold War strategies 
in North Africa and Western Asia. The question of  institutionalized expertise 
and scientifi c knowledge does not arise simply because of  the absence from the 
volume of  ecological and global concerns.  
The reader struggles to fi nd a comprehensive terminology of  collectivization 
and business/fi nancial practices of  collectivized farms. As the contributors to 
a collection of  studies designed to practice comparative methods and study 
entanglements, the editors and contributors had to face the task of  translating 
terminology. This question was especially salient in the case of  defi ning types 
of  collectives and tackling the contemporary discourse on “kulaks.” Regarding 
types, they opted to translate all terms into English, and this resulted in a mix 
of  terms that at times lacks clarity. This is particularly disturbing in the case of  
Poland, where we do not actually see what Type 1b meant in practice or how 
7  Constantin Iordachi and Kristof  Van Assche, eds., The Bio-politics of  the Danube Delta. Nature, History and 
Policies (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015).
8  Arvid Nelson, Cold War Ecology. Forests, Farms and People in the East German Landscape 1945–1989 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); David Blackburn, The Conquest of  Nature: Water and the Making of  
Modern German Landscape (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006). 
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distant it was from “real collectives” classed as Type 2 or Type 3. While making 
an effort to create a political history of  collectivization as a narrative in which 
peasant resistance plays a central part, the authors are insensitive to the small-
scale economic history of  the collective farms. 
Notwithstanding the number of  options left unaddressed, as the fi rst 
comprehensive volume adopting a regional perspective, the book achieves much. 
It provides comparable country-specifi c timelines and highlights key aspects of  
the political anthropology of  collectivization (such as resistance, responses to 
the notion of  the “kulak,” and differentiation between contexts of  central and 
local party administration). It brings together experts from various academic and 
geographic background and demonstrates clearly that collectivization is one of  
the most important fi elds in the study of  the regimes under Soviet domination.
Róbert Balogh
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Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of  Romania’s Secret 
Police. By Katherine Verdery. Budapest: CEU Press, 2014. 294 pp.
Katherine Verdery’s ethnographic study of  the fi le containing 2,780 pages kept by 
the Romanian Secret Police (the Securitate) on her activities in Romania between 
1973 and 1989 is a thought-provoking analysis of  this organization’s approach. 
The American author is Julien J. Studley Faculty Scholar and Distinguished 
Professor of  Anthropology at the Graduate Center of  the City University of  
New York. Verdery, who has a broad understanding and personal experience of  
Romanian society, has authored several important volumes. Her book entitled 
National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu’s Romania 
(1991) was a groundbreaking analysis of  the ways in which nationalism was 
used in the cultural sphere and of  the strategies adopted by artists who were 
competing for limited resources and thus willingly adapted to the trends that 
were imposed from above.
In her analysis of  her own fi les, Verdery makes a compelling argument 
that “the Communist Party tried to create a new kind of  family, a political one 
encompassing the whole society,” and “[t]he Securitate’s job was to implement 
this vision” (p.205). From the perspective of  the scholarship on the role of  
the Securitate, Verdery’s analysis is interesting because it affords us access to 
a specifi c case, that of  the author, which is also a scholar. Thus she treats her 
experience like a case study and applies a scientifi c approach to it, which is a 
rarity in the discussions of  these kinds of  fi les, discussions which are usually 
of  interest only to those directly involved. Verdery reminds us of  how “the 
Securitate’s fundamental working assumption was that people are not who they seem; 
its job […] was to fi nd out who people really were” (p.xiv). 
In Romania, gaining access to the fi les of  the former secret police, the 
Securitate, was not a simple task, and it only began to become easier after 
2005, when Traian Băsescu, who served as president for a decade (2004–14), 
allowed the National Council for the Study of  the Securitate Archives (CNSAS, 
established in 2000) to make more extensive use of  the resources of  the former 
surveillance institution. Katherine Verdery underlines the triple function given 
to archives of  the secret police after 1989: political, research and personal. She 
also examines how they “involved potential revisions of  history in the service 
of  a transformed present” (xi-xii), as well as the revision of  the truths they really 
encompass. In recent years, Romanian society and politics have been marked by 
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an instrumental use of  the archives of  the Securitate fi les, and the truth-value 
of  these fi les has only rarely been questioned. For example, the latest troubling 
discovery at the beginning of  2015 was that Dinu Zamfi rescu, honorary director 
of  the Institute for the Investigation of  Communist Crimes and the Memory 
of  the Romanian Exile (IICCMER) and a member of  the directive college of  
CNSAS, had himself  given information to the Securitate before leaving the 
country in the 1970s. He has been one of  the leaders of  the emigration, and he 
founded the Institute for the Memory of  the Romanian Exile, which merged 
with the Institute for the Investigation of  Communist Crimes (IICCR) to 
become the IICCMER. Zamfi rescu declared he feels no pressure to resign from 
the CNSAS or the IICCMER, as he was himself  questioned by the Securitate 
and did not inform, although documents indicate that this is not the case. The 
study that Verdery has done of  her own fi le advances some important issues and 
addresses signifi cant questions related to the meaning of  the work that was done 
by the Securitate.
The Introduction to the volume fi rst presents Verdery’s approach to the 
study of  the Securitate fi les. In the second part, the author asks as a subtitle “What 
Was the Securitate?” She offers a history of  the institution since 1948. Her goal 
is to study the fi les themselves and to see what they can tell us about the socialist 
system that we didn’t already know (p.4). By adopting an ethnographic approach, 
she intends to shed light on the way her methods and those of  the Securitate bear 
affi nities. In other words, she considers how both an ethnographer and a secret 
police examine “everyday behaviors and interpret what they found” (p.7). The 
historical approach of  the Securitate underlines the organization’s importance 
as one of  the largest intelligence services in the Eastern bloc in proportion to 
the population (p.9). The ascent of  Ceauşescu to power is also acknowledged, 
and Verdery emphasizes how the role of  the Securitate was transformed by this 
change, “from ‘destroying the class enemy’ to ‘preventing infractions against 
state security’ and ‘defending fundamental national values’” (p.16). Verdery 
makes the very important observation that, in the last period of  the socialist 
system, “the Securitate increasingly became a pedagogical or didactic rather than 
a punitive institution” (p.17). In fact, the Securitate sought to infl uence a large 
part of  the population through indirect means, using more refi ned types of  
surveillance, instead of  relying on the kinds of  direct repressive measures that 
had been in pervasive use before.
The fi rst chapter, “An archive and its fi ctions,” describes fi rst the resources the 
CNSAS has at its disposal, namely “as of  2013 (…) 1,800,000 paper fi les,” which 
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would stretch twenty-four kilometers (pp.32–33). Verdery stresses an important 
detail. Many of  the documents that were created or kept by the Securitate were 
destroyed, either accidentally or intentionally (p.33). The chapter contains a 
description of  the work that was performed by the agents in the construction 
of  a fi le. Verdery shares an impression I also had as a researcher at the CNSAS, 
namely the “extraordinary expenditure of  time, money, and effort” (p.41) put 
into the Securitate’s activities. Moreover, “the organization of  a surveillance 
fi le is not chronological but activity-based” (p.52). At the same time, Verdery’s 
approach is ethnographic and extends beyond the fi le itself. She quotes Cristina 
Vătulescu’s conclusion, according to which “[w]hile a personal fi le can mislead 
about the particulars of  a victim’s fate, its close reading can be abundantly 
revealing about what the secret police understood by evidence, record, writing, 
human nature, and criminality” (p.40). Verdery considers that “the truth-value 
of  what is in the fi le may not be the most interesting question we can entertain 
about it,” nor is the question of  “whether [the] fi les tell ‘what really happened’” 
the most signifi cant aspect. Rather, she is interested in “the agency of  the fi le: 
what social effects does it have? What […] does it fashion” (pp.62, 63). These 
questions are in the forefront of  the distinct approach Verdery proposes in her 
study of  the fi les, far more so than the one that dominates public discourse in 
Romania today, where “fi les can make ‘informers’ out of  people who staunchly 
deny that they ever held this role” (p.66). Indeed, in this public discourse the fi les 
have been transformed into sources for political or moral capital because “they 
are seen as repositories of  truth” (p.72). Verdery throws into question the truth-
value with which the fi les have been invested, both by considering the ways in 
which the fi les were constructed by the agents and addressing the motives of  the 
informers, “who reported under duress, out of  malice, or inaccurately,” and the 
case offi cers (the offi cers responsible for the informers]), who “made tendentious 
interpretations that suited their ends.” Equally important in this regard is the fact 
that the “destruction of  fi les left enormous lacunae in the corpus; agents opened 
fi les on people even when their ‘recruits’ refused to cooperate; the demands 
of  the planned economy set performance targets that compelled sloppy work; 
competition among offi cers and branches of  the secret service aggravated that 
tendency and so forth” (pp.72–73).
In the second chapter, “The Secrets of  the Secret Police,” Verdery embarks 
on a comparison of  the Securitate with secret societies of  New Guinea and 
Africa, taking some ideas from the anthropological literature on secrecy with 
the goal of  “disrupt[ing] our accustomed way of  thinking about it” (p.82). The 
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essential point, one worth repeating, is that “[f]rom the anthropology of  secrecy 
we learn that what counts is not the content of  a secret but the structure it is 
embedded in” (p.112). Verdery underlines the oppositions between the different 
institutions of  the communist regime, the party and the secret police and the 
distinct types of  secrets they handled. The author emphasizes the paradoxical 
condition of  the Securitate and asks, “[h]ow are we to put these two things 
together: the sometimes chaotic view from inside the organization and the 
fearful view from the populace,” two groups that were always separated by 
secrecy (p.80). The analysis continues with a detailed examination of  the content 
of  secrets that were kept by the Securitate and Verdery’s emphasis on the 
nature of  the organization as a “SECRET police” and not a “secret POLICE,” 
which was mainly preoccupied with the task of  unmasking secrets (p.85). The 
parallel with the secret societies in Africa and New Guinea is based on an “‘Ur-
secret’ representing what the community most fears” (p.88), which, in the case 
of  communist regimes, was the “enemy within” (p.89). Examining secrecy as 
a social-structural and cultural system, Verdery analyzes how this functioned 
inside the Securitate. The initiation practices for offi cers and informers had in 
common “the signature acts of  secret societies: a loyalty oath and one or more 
new names,” which were essential for “the fabrication of  an alternative reality” 
(p.99). 
Drawing on Gilbert Herdt’s “theory of  secrecy based on an analysis 
of  male secret societies” in the United States “as a response to major social 
transformations in gender and class relations” (p.107), Verdery discusses the 
Securitate as a secret society that had to compete with others at the time (p.110). 
Summarizing what the parallel with secret societies brought to the understanding 
of  the Securitate, Verdery recalls how she showed that “secrecy in the form 
of  conspirativity promoted inequality in the organization,” as well as how the 
ritual character of  recruitment helped create “an exciting parallel world” (p.115). 
Finally, she showed how the Securitate competed with other similar organizations 
in a context that was favorable to the fl ourishing of  such societies (p.115). In 
the subchapter of  chapter 2, “The lives of  agents,” Verdery sheds some light 
on the offi cers of  the Securitate. Interestingly, the Securitate had only limited 
resources compared to other similar organizations in Eastern Europe. While it 
numbered only 39,000 offi cers, compared to the 93,000 members of  the Stasi in 
the German Democratic Republic (p.129), the Securitate seemed omnipresent 
to the citizenry of  Romania. As Verdery writes, “[n]o one was certain who the 
offi cers were, who was informing, how much information was being obtained, 
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or how it would be used” (p.150). Verdery underlines at the same time how “the 
‘mask’ of  secrecy – its state effect” was able to conceal from most Romanians the 
fact that the Romanian Party-state “was not a coherent, unifi ed actor”, and “the 
fi eld of  power at the center was highly fragmented among disparate competing 
groups” (p.149).
The third chapter, “Knowledge Practices and the Social Relations of  
Surveillance,” addresses the situation of  the 486,000 informers who helped the 
39,000 offi cers of  the Securitate. Verdery discusses the “practices whereby the 
Securitate sought to create knowledge about reality, uncovering the secrets that 
might prove dangerous to the government” (p.158). She argues that “their most 
important methods for producing knowledge were at the same time socially 
transformative, aiming to produce a new social landscape, with implications for 
creating the ‘new socialist person’ and a new society” (p.159). Verdery notes 
that “many people (…) became informers because they were deeply embedded 
in social ties” (p.176). This is important because the strategy of  the Securitate 
developed into an approach that sought to infl uence larger social groups and 
thus targeted those who had strong social relations. At the same time, Verdery’s 
analysis provides important details on the different aspects of  collaboration and 
the refusal to collaborate, as well as the termination of  collaboration with the 
Securitate. “I have been showing that the regime was not simply disintegrating 
social relations but striving to reforge them, thereby altering the kinds of  human 
beings they enmeshed. Securişti intended to create new contacts for people 
while disrupting older ones: their aim was not just to obtain knowledge but 
to transform the conditions under which information would be produced (…) 
they sought to induce networks around their targets” (p.201). She argues that 
“personalistic ties were the currency of  social life in socialism” (p.188). Thus, “it 
was networks, not individuals, that the Securitate pursued” (p.189). Finally, the 
author acknowledges how her analysis aims to critique lustration in transitional 
justice, which, “targets not categories (p.all forms of  collaboration), but 
individual persons who collaborated” (p.210). As she observes, “if  collaboration 
was quintessentially a networked phenomenon, not an individual one […], such 
interventions appear misguided” (pp.210–11). Finally, the author insists on the 
problematic nature of  the use, in the service of  truth during democratization, of  
the fi les produced by the Securitate (p.211).
In her “Conclusions,” subtitled “The Radiant Future?”, Verdery discusses 
the relevance of  the surveillance conducted by the Securitate for today’s world, 
especially in the case of  the United States. She addresses the issue of  voluntary 
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online surveillance on social networks such as Facebook, but also the more 
problematic surveillance deployed by the United States in the aftermath of  
September 11 by the National Security Agency.
The volume authored by Katherine Verdery, Secrets and Truths, is a good 
overview of  the approaches used by the secret police in Romania in which the 
author uses her own fi les, but also information from other fi les either directly 
or in a published form, as well as recent scholarship on secret police forces 
in Eastern Europe. The book is well organized in three distinct chapters that 
consider the truths encompassed in the secret archives, the type of  work 
undertaken by the secret agents, and, fi nally, the ways in which informers were 
manipulated by the Securitate in the creation of  new ties within society. The 
volume provides detailed information on the Securitate and its activities that 
helps further a deconstruction of  many of  the myths on its approach.
The author compares her ethnographic method to that of  the Securitate 
operations, and at the same she time compares the Securitate to secret (male) 
societies. While the former is useful in her analysis of  the secret police in 
Romania because it shows the type of  knowledge and practices they used, the 
latter is less immediately pertinent, except perhaps to the anthropological study 
of  secrecy practices. 
Secrets and Truths provides an understanding of  the Securitate that does 
not take it as a provider of  truth, but rather shows the multiplicity of  aspects 
included in the practices of  this institution. Verdery’s ultimate purpose is to 
criticize the ways in which the archives have been used since the transition to 
democracy as s source of  truth in a manner that continues to follow the logic of  
the Securitate itself.
Caterina Preda 
254
Hungarian Historical Review 4,  no. 1  (2015): 254
Notes on Contributors
APOR, BALÁZS (Trinity College, Dublin), aporb@tcd.ie
BAKOVIĆ, NIKOLA (Regional Historical Archives of  Čačak, Serbia), 
laonik.bakovic@gmail.com
BALOGH, RÓBERT ((Institute of  History, Research Centre for the Humanities, 
Hungarian Academy of  Sciences), Balogh.Robert@btk.mta.hu
BARTHA, ÁKOS (University of  Debrecen), akosbartha@yahoo.com
ČERNÁ, MARIE (Institute of  Contemporary History, Czech Academy of  Sciences), 
cernamarie@gmail.com
GAYER, VERONIKA (Institute for Minority Studies, Centre for Social Sciences, 
Hungarian Academy of  Sciences), gayer.veronika@tk.mta.hu
HORVÁTH, SÁNDOR (Institute of  History, Research Centre for the Humanities, 
Hungarian Academy of  Sciences), horvath.sandor@btk.mta.hu
KUČERA, RUDOLF (Masaryk Institute and Archives of  the Czech Academy of  Sciences), 
r.kucera@email.cz
HUDEK, ADAM (Historical Institute, Slovak Academy of  Sciences. Currently a fellow at 
Imre Kertész Kolleg, Jena), adamhudek@gmail.com
LACZÓ, FERENC (Imre Kertész College, Friedrich Schiller University, Jena),  
ferenc.loerinc.laczo@uni-jena.de
MIRESCU, ALEXANDER (Saint Peter’s University, Department of  Political Science, Jersey 
City, US), amirescu@saintpeters.edu
PREDA, CATERINA (Department of  Political Sciences, University of  Bucharest), 
caterinapreda@gmail.com
SIRUTAVIČIUS, VLADAS (Lithuanian Institute of  History), sirutavicius@yahoo.com
SZ. BÍRÓ, ZOLTÁN (Institute of  History, Research Centre for the Humanities, 
Hungarian Academy of  Sciences), sz.biro.zoltan@btk.mta.hu
TAKÁCS, TIBOR (Historical Archives of  the Hungarian State Security), 
tibortakacs@t-online.hu
V.
N. 
S.
A.
M.
T.
C.
Sirutavicˇius
Bakovicˇ
Horváth
Mirescu
Cˇerná
Takács
Preda
4 /  1 | 2015 
T
he H
ungarian H
istorical R
eview
Contents
Features of Sovietization in Lithuania in the Summer of 1945........
Mobilization and Cooperation in Yugoslav Youth Brigades.............
Learning the Language of Collaboration after 1956 in Hungary......
Church–State Engagement in Yugoslavia and East Germany...........
Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia after August 1968.........................
Them and Us: Narratives of Agents from the Kádár Era..................
Forms of Collaboration of Visual Artists in Communist Romania......
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
HU ISSN 
2063-8647
New Series of Acta Historica
Academiæ Scientiarum Hungaricæ
4 1 
2015
vo
lu
m
e
n
um
be
r
Institute of History, Research Centre for the Humanities, 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Everyday C
ollaboration
Everyday Collaboration
Everyday Collaboration
